Divine Simplicity - What is it and is it correct?

[Jac3510]

A fallacy of equivocation is where you use a term differently in the major and minor premise. For instance:

Selaphobics are afraid of the light
A feather is light
Therefore, selaphobics are afraid of feathers

Now, in our discussions, the words "God," "Omnipotence," and "omniscience" are being used the same in all premises. No fallacy of equivocation.

[domokunrox]

Jac, I admit I stretched it a bit, but not far off. It may not be fallacy of equivocation, but how the ideas relate are indeed very troublesome. I question very highly the method of epistemology.

[Jac3510]

It is very far off. You may not agree that omniscience and omnipotence are the same thing, but asserting they are is nowhere near a fallacy of equivocation. You are in the completely wrong ball park. Perhaps you agree with Craig that the fact that DS requires they be identical is simply a proof that DS is wrong. That's fair. But you need to state your objection fairly and not pretend there is a fallacy where there is none. It doesn't do your own credibility much good when you label something a given fallacy when it is objectively not so.

Further, would you like to clarify what you mean when you say you "question very highly the method of epistemology"? What method are we using you find so objectionable?

[domokunrox]

Illicit minor. Yeah, not equivation. Its close enough. Don't be too picky.

Yes, I agree with Craig.

As far as the epistemology goes. I don't question it here. I question how they KNOW it. The ideas just don't relate. At all. You have to admit at least that. Don't you at least agree there?

[Jac3510]

Illicit minor. Yeah, not equivation. Its close enough. Don't be too picky.

Yes, I agree with Craig.

It isn't an illicit minor, either. It is no illicit minor to say that if A is identical to B and B is identical to C then A is identical to C, which is the argument being used here. If omniscience is identical to God and God is identical to omnipotence then omniscience is identical to omnipotence. And I will be picky when someone is making incorrect claims about the nature of arguments.

As far as the epistemology goes. I don't question it here. I question how they KNOW it. The ideas just don't relate. At all. You have to admit at least that. Don't you at least agree there?

You said you "question very highly the method of epistemology." What is this method that you are questioning?

And what ideas don't relate? That omniscience is identical to omnipotence? If so, then no, I don't have to admit that and I do not admit that. If you take the time to read my response, you'll see how I demonstrate it to be the case.

Now, don't be silly. You aren't going to disprove divine simplicity by pointing out that there is something so basically wrong as committing a formal fallacy like an illicit minor or equivocation. It's been put through literally thousands of years of extremely rigorous philosophical reasoning. That doesn't mean, of course, that it is right. It does mean that the chances are pretty much non-existent that such a basic mistake would go unnoticed by the greatest philosophical minds in history (including Craig--he doesn't even make the arguments you are making here. His arguments against the position are much more subtle and much more difficult).

[domokunrox]

Jac,

I'll tell you what. We'll go ahead and entertain this further.

I'm under the impression you believe this Divine simplicity thing. Am I correct?
Lets keep it simple here. I am skeptical. A very honest one. I'm not going to move the goal posts or anything.

Since you affirm this idea. Do you hold the belief that it needs to only be possible or that its proven (either by logic or evidence)?
In either case, can you give me the simple rundown of the epistemology method(s) to conclude this?
Can you explain your cosmological argument to me? Define all terms. More specifically, I want the description of the attributes or whatever they are.
Can you explain your criteria for knowledge? What is truth?
When you have ideas, how do they relate? Are they just relational or are they factually binding once they are defined? Example: Where there is smoke, is there fire?

No rush at all, Jac.

[jlay]

Jac may refer you to the book I am reading, Aquinas a Beginners Guide, by Fesser. It covers the Thomist cosmological and teleological arguments. Aquinas' five ways are as follows. The first three are basically cosmological, the forth henological and the fifth teleological. Although Jac is welcome to summarize.

[Jac3510]

First, let me start by saying that if you want to discuss this, then you should be careful about the words you choose. All we have here is text on a page, not tone of voice, so phrases like "this Divine simplicity thing" can sound condescending if you aren't careful. Now, I'll assume you didn't mean it that way, but given the shallow, dismissive nature of your objections thus far, that's just a shear act of will on my part.

As to the substance of your post, you've asked a set of rather comprehensive set of questions, any one of which could receive a book-length treatment.I'll just give you a few bullet points to get started.

Since you affirm this idea. Do you hold the belief that it needs to only be possible or that its proven (either by logic or evidence)?

I'm not a fan of ontological arguments generally. Possibilities (usually -- sometimes, strong conceivability can make a persuasive case) do not suffice as proof.

In either case, can you give me the simple rundown of the epistemology method(s) to conclude this?

Aristotelian-Thomism: specifically, we start with metaphysics, and ontology in particular--the study of being qua being. Since everything that is or could be falls under the category of being, then studying being will give us a universal tool by which we can study everything.

Can you explain your cosmological argument to me? Define all terms. More specifically, I want the description of the attributes or whatever they are.

Which cosmological argument? In the thesis I wrote, I started with the first of the Five Ways. The Second is more popular. That's just Thomas' versions. There are many others (the Kalam, Leibniz', Scotus', etc.).

Here's one of the arguments I lay out in the thesis:

• 1. Some things in the world are in motion.
  2. Anything in motion is being put in motion by something else.
  3. But this something else, if it is in motion, is also being put in motion by something else, and so on.
  4. This series of things being put in motion by something else cannot be endless.
  5. Therefore, there must be a first cause of motion which is itself unmoved; this we understand to be God.

This follows, for the most part, Craig's rendition of the Prima Via. He and I are both persuaded that it is sound. The only terms that need defining are "motion" (= "changing") and "first cause" ("first" refers to logical, not temporal, priority) and "unmoved" (= "not changing or changeable")

For a full exegesis of this argument, where I differ with Craig, and how it concludes in DS (that, following Thomas), see my thesis (linked on the first page), pages 15-31

Can you explain your criteria for knowledge? What is truth?

Truth is that which corresponds to reality. As to knowledge, I follow a Thomistic model, in which knowledge is the union of a form with the soul.

When you have ideas, how do they relate? Are they just relational or are they factually binding once they are defined? Example: Where there is smoke, is there fire?

Smoke is a natural sign of fire. I'm not going to spend time laying out my theory of linguistics. Again, suffice it to say I follow a Thomistic model. If you want a good text on the subject, I would recommend Thomas Howe's Objectivity in Biblical Interpretation (available on Amazon.com).

Generally, all the questions you are asking are well answered by an an EXCELLENT little work titled Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide. It's also available at Amazon.com and, whether you agree or disagree with Feser (and Thomas) after completing it, I can promise you that your philosophical perspective will be deeply enriched by working your way through it.

In the meantime, if you want to have a discussion about DS, how about making sure you understand what it is first and providing very specific objections based on that understanding, as K did in the first post. Giving me a broad philosophy quiz doesn't advance the discussion. We can't possibly deal with every philosophical presupposition before addressing the arguments for and against DS. Rather, we should discuss them when they come up (for instance, as I did in raising the issue of a Platonic view of properties vs. a moderate-realist view).

edit: took the words out of my mouth, J.

[Byblos]

Rather, we should discuss them when they come up (for instance, as I did in raising the issue of a Platonic view of properties vs. a moderate-realist view).

Which was a nagging question of mine (Platonic view that is) but I didn't want to derail the thread so I figured I'd finish reading your thesis and lo and behold, the answer was right there.

[Kurieuo]

Jac, will respond to only a bit here as want to respond but short on time.

Jac, you know how I believe in panentheism? Well, I opened a thread which contains a brief rundown on how I came to believe in entitled Creation ex nihilo. In one of the final paragraphs I state:

Deeper yet, for those I have not lost and who can still grasp my thinking, panentheism begs for the existence of something like the Trinitarian concept of God we believe in. For in order for God to enter into relations with His created order, He must enter into His own be-all and end-all existence in order to relate. Thus, we have the persons of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit derived in an undifferentiated manner from God, who together completely and perfectly fulfill distinct roles and functions that allow God to relate to us within Himself.

I believe this could be written in your DS language... for example, where I state "His own be-all and end-all existence" this is perhaps akin to your "Pure Being". And via an "internal procession" and "willing" God is able to relate with Creation.

I will refrain from commenting on panentheism specifically. Contrary to some beliefs, it can be nuanced in various ways. Process theologians would claim in it contradictory aspects than a Palamite. If you want a Thomistic perspective on the senses in which God is in things, I would recommend ST Ia.8.

"Palamite" -- thanks for putting a word to it. I'll have to explore this more, but I definitely seem to always have more in common with Eastern Orthodox theology than the Western.

Beyond that, I would not say that God "enter into relations with His created order." A basic tenant underlying DS is that God is not really related to creation. The relation is logical only. Creatures, however, are really related to God.

Something I've been meaning to raise, relates the often accept premise "from nothing, nothing comes". If we are comprised of "being" and "act" than how can pure "act" bring about "being"? It might be said God being "pure act" just brought about "being", but there is still an issue. What is the substance of being that God thus created? Where did He get the "stuff" that underlies us? Speaking in terms of substance being an essence with properties (rather than collection of properties or Pure Being as in act) how did God "act" or what did God "act upon" to bring about the subtance of creation -- particularly when God lacks any such substance?

Futhermore, if God is not really related to creation, then how is it God could personally create us? You might say we came about by God's word (pure act?). Yet, God's word is still apart of God's nature. Thus, if God's word entered into relations with the created order in order to create (not to mention sustain and preserve), then this still requires a strong relational involvement. The question becomes, if God has no real substance, then what in God's nature was able to relate to the substance/s of creation?

Re: inward procession of the Trinity... do you believe God's acts are all inward? Is this why you say God cannot relate to creation, not simply because he is all act, but also because of His nature when it comes to procession?

I want to digest your additional words more fully, but have to go so will leave it here for now. Many questions or clarifications nonetheless which I'm sure if expanded upon will help me to more correctly understand.

Thanks.

[domokunrox]

First, let me start by saying that if you want to discuss this, then you should be careful about the words you choose. All we have here is text on a page, not tone of voice, so phrases like "this Divine simplicity thing" can sound condescending if you aren't careful. Now, I'll assume you didn't mean it that way, but given the shallow, dismissive nature of your objections thus far, that's just a shear act of will on my part.

As to the substance of your post, you've asked a set of rather comprehensive set of questions, any one of which could receive a book-length treatment.I'll just give you a few bullet points to get started.

Jac, words I choose are not random. Again, you're being fickle when you don't need to. Equivocation and Illicit minor are both category based. I'm not interested in arguing semantics. I admit, its not an equivocation fallacy. But an illicit minor is certainly POSSIBLE. Surely you can see this, right?

As for the condescending comment, just chill out. No need to get offended here.

Aristotelian-Thomism: specifically, we start with metaphysics, and ontology in particular--the study of being qua being. Since everything that is or could be falls under the category of being, then studying being will give us a universal tool by which we can study everything.

Yikes! Just Thomism? I do like the metaphysics defined, but I don't like the framework. Its too Scholastic. Send it to the moon.

Which cosmological argument? In the thesis I wrote, I started with the first of the Five Ways. The Second is more popular. That's just Thomas' versions. There are many others (the Kalam, Leibniz', Scotus', etc.).

Here's one of the arguments I lay out in the thesis:

• 1. Some things in the world are in motion.
  2. Anything in motion is being put in motion by something else.
  3. But this something else, if it is in motion, is also being put in motion by something else, and so on.
  4. This series of things being put in motion by something else cannot be endless.
  5. Therefore, there must be a first cause of motion which is itself unmoved; this we understand to be God.

This follows, for the most part, Craig's rendition of the Prima Via. He and I are both persuaded that it is sound. The only terms that need defining are "motion" (= "changing") and "first cause" ("first" refers to logical, not temporal, priority) and "unmoved" (= "not changing or changeable")

For a full exegesis of this argument, where I differ with Craig, and how it concludes in DS (that, following Thomas), see my thesis (linked on the first page), pages 15-31

Thomas' doesn't describe much. I ask for a cosmological argument because I like to see where you make your deductive reasoning. Not a whole lot of substance there. I'll read your 15 pages when I have time. At this point, I predict 15 pages of pulling rabbits out of the hat to support DS. No offense. I appreciate if you can tell me now if thats the case because I'd rather spend my time taking video of my infant.

Truth is that which corresponds to reality. As to knowledge, I follow a Thomistic model, in which knowledge is the union of a form with the soul.

I like your truth statement. Quick question, do you like Descartes' take on Thomism?

Smoke is a natural sign of fire. I'm not going to spend time laying out my theory of linguistics. Again, suffice it to say I follow a Thomistic model.

Its not a complicated question, friend. I need to see how you think ideas relate and its applications. Its an epistemology question. Not a theory of linguistics inquiry.

In the meantime, if you want to have a discussion about DS, how about making sure you understand what it is first and providing very specific objections based on that understanding, as K did in the first post. Giving me a broad philosophy quiz doesn't advance the discussion.

Its not a philosophy quiz.

We can't possibly deal with every philosophical presupposition before addressing the arguments for and against DS.

Yes, we could and we should. However, everything you told me about your mode of thought is vague and practically void of ideas that relate. If you can't even tell me how ideas relate to each other, how do you do the epistemology?
I'm not asking you to write me an essay.

Rather, we should discuss them when they come up (for instance, as I did in raising the issue of a Platonic view of properties vs. a moderate-realist view).

Well, they came up now. So, lets talk about it. I discard Plato's view of properties entirely. Send it to the moon.

Heres a direct quote from Craig on DS
"the classic doctrine of divine simplicity holds that God is an absolutely undifferentiated unity Who has no distinct attributes, stands in no real relations, Whose essence is not distinct from His existence, and Who just is the pure act of being subsisting. As such, the doctrine of divine simplicity is one that has no biblical support at all and, in my opinion, has no good philosophical arguments in its favor. Moreover, it faces very formidable objections."

Pretty strong statement there. He is no slouch.

So, Jac, my question now that given this model

God is Omniscient
God is Omnipotent

Is "is" the "is" of identity? or the "is" of predication?

[Byblos]

Seriously Dom? But I'll let Jac answer for himself.

A word of advise my friend, you would benefit a great deal from reading his thesis.

[domokunrox]

Seriously Dom? But I'll let Jac answer for himself.

A word of advise my friend, you would benefit a great deal from reading his thesis.

I don't have time. You know, I be all over that reading to be the benefactor of stuff.

I wonder why theres 15 pages though? I thought it was simple? Hence simplicity? Must be pretty complicated if its 15 pages long.

Less is more. Opps! Pun not intended.

[Byblos]

Seriously Dom? But I'll let Jac answer for himself.

A word of advise my friend, you would benefit a great deal from reading his thesis.

I don't have time. You know, I be all over that reading to be the benefactor of stuff.

I wonder why theres 15 pages though? I thought it was simple? Hence simplicity? Must be pretty complicated if its 15 pages long.

Less is more. Opps! Pun not intended.

You cannot be taken seriously with an attitude like that. We all are under time constraints Dom, you're not the only one. But we still find the time to make coherent arguments and pose coherent questions. In that case, I would appreciate it if you don't derail the thread with meaningless questions you can look up yourself, when your time permits, of course.

[Kurieuo]

I didn't address it in the thesis, but I will say this with regard to perichoresis. Both advocates of DS and its detractors would agree that we have intimate fellowship with God. The question is how that is possible. On that question, DS would offer a bit of a different answer it seems to me (not theologically different, but philosophically different). The biggest reason here is that, on DS, God is 1) impassible and 2) not really related to creatures. That would seem to "get in the way" of such intimacy, but on second thought, we discover it is not because we are really related to God and our experiences of God are certainly not impassible. Moreover, I think in the ends, DS helps us better understand perichoresis on a theological level, because it takes seriously Jesus' claim that He is in the Father and the Father in Him. This isn't just a unity of purpose but actually a unity of being, which is the deepest possible unity there is. I don't see how detractors of DS can say that as seriously as we can, for as they themselves demonstrate, they find distinctions in the persons deeper than DS proponents will allow. So we see, it seems to me, a closer unity than they do. Ultimately, I think that unity plays out in our own relationships with God (albeit in an analogical sense), which is one of the benefits of the doctrine as I understand it. (emphasis mine)

This is one reason for my wanting to understand your idea of substance. I'm not sure we fully connected with our two understandings of substance, nonetheless I believe I was able to interpret and understand your words including where you stand with Aquinas. That said, here I wish to deal with your words above.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe some equivocation might be happening here with two different understandings of "Being". To understand the two definitions better, let me first provide an example that I can make use of: A human soul might possess a lower capacity that affords us the potential to experience all that human experience can offer (physicality, emotional, touching, sight, hearing, intelligence, moral conscience, etc), however human experience does not become actual until we develop the higher capacity of a physical body with which we can finally experience such things.

Two definitions of "Being":-

1) DS definition of "Being": Actuality without potentiality. God in DS is simply "Being" in the sense of "being actuality". Having a substance, like a "soul" or "body" for you implies potentiality. Thus, in DS God cannot possess such things. Rather God is the actuality of His divine attributes. Such that God is not good in virtue of doing good, but rather God is good. God is not righteous in virtue of doing rightous acts, but rather God is righteousness.

You probably explain it better where you write:

Lastly, I want to note that when I say "pure being" I am talking of the notion of God as actus purus--strictly speaking, "pure act," where "act" here is opposed to "potency." Act is what something really is, where potency (as you well understand, I know) is how something really could be. Now, in God, there is no composition of act and potency. God is pure act, and He could thus be no other. In this sense, though, we cannot view God as a static being; rather, He is in act. So you have the Thomistic axiom, "God just is what He does." (underlining mine)

2) Second definition of "Being": The underlying essence or substance of a living being. Such that "human being" describes a living entity that is a creature of "human" type. A being that is a cat, describes an entity with the properties of a cat.

Now in the second definition of "Being" as I understood you and your quotes of Aquinas, DS has no claim to when it concerns God. For God is without being in this sense of the term being. Given this, I find it is odd that you so readily embrace perichoresis, that is, each person of Trinity indwelling and interpentrating each other, since a critic of DS might rightfully ask: "In what way does such an indwelling really happen if God's being is Pure Act?" Indwelling implies there is a being of the second definition.

It is hard to conceive of and understand how perichoresis is possible within the Trinity if God is simply what He does - Pure Act. A mutual sharing of "Pure Act" (or action), seems to me far removed from the unity expressed by a mutual indwelling. In "act" there is no indwelling one another, only a sharing of.

To put another way, a mutual indwelling implies a crossing over within one another. Such that, the Father abides in the Son and Holy Spirit and yet remains distinct, and vice-versa for the Son and Holy Spirit. Yet, what is it they each abide in? Pure Existience is also a foundational way to percieve God as I understand you on DS. Yet, we need to be careful not eqivicate on two meanings of "existence" here like with "being". For "Pure Existence" also does not entail God has a body or some substance that allow each person in the Trinity to mutually indwell other within (the suppositum). Indeed it is hard to understand what the suppositum consists of, except three persons who each share in Pure Act. Yet, persons cannot indwell each other in pure act. Such makes no real sense. Share perhaps, but not indwell.

Now I underlined a portion of your words on the Trinity, that is, "This isn't just a unity of purpose but actually a unity of being, which is the deepest possible unity there is." Now "unity of being" certainly when understood in the second definition I provide above may be seen as a deep unity. However, God is not "being" in this sense within DS. Rather, understanding "Being" as "Act", I do not even know what "unity in being" means. So for me, what might upon first glance seem like the deepest possible unity in DS with a "unity of being", actually seems a bit hollow when one grasps what DS means by "being".

It is far more enriching, I think, to embrace God having a divine essence. Not that such is accidental, for God's substance (or suppositum) being uncreated is qualitatively different from ours which is of a created genus - creature. Thus, while God is the actuality of many attributes (I'd agree with), God would also the actuality of being -- which I guess could be described as "to be". Yet, this for me implies an underlying essense wherein God's divine attributes have their existence.