Looks like you got through everything, K. I'll go ahead and respond. If I miss anything or you want to take up anything else we've not sufficiently treated from earlier, let me know:
K wrote:Ok, I can agree with that and a ball is comprised of atoms. However, Aristotle would not say a ball has a soul given it has no lifeforce. The first part of the ball is moved by something other, as we would be God, but it is still non-sentient possessing no will of its own.
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I agree, as would Craig, that souls and God a qualitatively different. Well at least I can verify God's substance for Craig. The material being made of parts and God not. I would throw in the soul as well. Clearly there is a difference between our fundamental essence and our bodies.
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Not quite, that is, re: where you say that I think I am identical with my soul. I do not believe it is as simple as that, and as I understand Moreland in his "Body and Soul" book, I don't think he believes its quites that simple either. But I will here speak for myself, as I am more certain of what I believe than Moreland.
For me, the soul is pure potentiality full of capacities that are not actualised. Thus, it requires a body, parts to feed into its capacties, in order to become whole. For me to be "me", and you to be "you", a body is needed through which we can be actualised in such a way that we can now function as persons. Otherwise we are not alive but is a form of stasis sustained in God. For me "form" is not eqivilant with "soul" but is found within the soul and made complete by our bodies. Thus, while we can be reduced to a foundational substance-essence (our "soul"), it isn't just as simple as that.
Thus, when I move my arm, foundationally it is me, my soul, who moved my arm. However, you are correct that my soul is moved itself. Indeed God moves us and I'd believe sustains our very being and essence. For me, it is God who holds us and everything together.
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I agree there is no change in God. I'm a little confused as to whether you believe I'd disagree with anything here?
So given this discussion, do you see why Thomas would say that a whole (including you), if it is moved, is always moved by virtue of its parts? In the case of non-sentient things such as rubber balls, that's not a problem, because the parts receive their movement from something external to themselves. The problem arises with sentient things, since they, having souls, are in some sense self-movers. The basic "part" that moves you is your soul; but here the argument just repeats itself. So the soul itself must be simple (not composed of parts). What, then, moves the soul? God. What moves God? Nothing. God is the
unmoved mover.
As to Moreland's view of the soul, I agree that's a side issue. I actually use that book in a course I teach on ethics. In fact, if you are ever really bored, you can listen to the
first six lectures of my ethics course and see if you think I've treated Moreland fairly. That said, as to your own view, I'm not sure what you mean by "pure potentiality." From Aquinas' perspective, pure potentially cannot really exist. That would be what is called "Prime Matter" and is only a conceptual reality. Granted, potentiality is real being, but it is potential being, not actual being. Actual being is primary--potential being draws its existence from the actual. So take the soul, which I agree with you has potentiality (note: so when I talk about the simplicity of the soul, I'm not saying it is simple in as radical a sense as God is simple). An unborn child has the potential to speak, and it will do so, all things being equal, as its lower order capacities are actualized. But something
actually exists that will
actualize those potencies. And that something is the soul itself. So the soul is not pure potentiality. It, like everything else, is an admixture of act and potency; it actually is this way and has the potency to be that way. So can you clarify your thinking here for me?
We'll talk more about changes in God below.
Kurieuo wrote:To be clear, I am not questioning whether Aquinas uses his arguments to argue for DS. However, when it comes to arguing for a necessary being, according to his reasoning provided where he explicitly uses terminology of "a being", his arguments do not preclude a being with an essence.
Specifically, Aquinas writes: "Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God." (underlining mine). Clearly, one's conception of God's nature, whatever it entails, does not matter to Aquinas here regarding God's being necessary.
Sure philosophically one can create additional arguments, for example those extra ones Aquinas makes that leads to DS. Then these can support and be read back in to rule out a God who has an essence as being the necessary being. However, bare minimum there in nothing unsound and illogical with the necessary being, being an actual being. Certainly it is not clear by any means. That requires extended reasoning and arguments.
That said, I'd encourage you to succinctly summarise your argument, if possible as a syllogism. That is, why my view of God (as you understand it) cannot be maintained as First Causer possessing the quality of aseity. That would provide an easy way for me to either clarify my position, or explain why I don't believe your argument is sound.
I agree here, but I think a lot of people have misunderstood Aquinas' methodology. His five ways each prove God exists--by "God" he really just means here a First Cause that is necessary and the proper end of all things. He then spends the next twenty five questions examining the nature of this First Cause called God. And the first thing he argues about it is that it is simple, and that, he says, flows
necessarily from his five ways. The reason is that the five ways, and the first, in particular, require us to think of the First Cause as Pure Act. For instance, he says in his first article on simplicity:
- the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. (ST Ia.3.1)
So the question arises - is God as pure act
necessarily entailed by God as First Cause. Aquinas says yes. And for Aquinas, God as pure act necessarily entails God as simple. Therefore, it is certainly fine to think of God as a necessary being, but it is incoherent (for Aquinas) to
not think of God as simple, given the nature of his five ways.
He could be wrong of course, but that's part of my beef with people who currently oppose DS. They seem to think that arguing against its internal coherency or even against its compatibility with Scripture is sufficient warrant for rejecting it. But it is not, for if you accept Thomas' five ways (and most theists do), and Thomas' five ways
entail simplicity, you are intellectually bound to accept simplicity. As such, it's not enough to prove that DS must be false. If you do so, you must then go on and either reject the five ways (via reductio) or you must show why Aquinas is wrong in his argument of entailment. Unfortunately, none that I've read have tried to do that at all.
As far as my argument against your view, everything in me is saying hold off, but I'll go ahead and offer two syllogisms (separate arguments) that I think are problematic for anyone who rejects DS:
- An Argument from Simplicity
1. God is not dependent on anything other than Himself, and everything outside of God is completely dependent on Him for its existence.
2. Any composite being is dependent on something other than itself for its existence.
3. Therefore, God is not a composite being.
An Argument from Pure Actuality
1. Change is defined as the reduction of potentiality to actuality
2. The First Cause (God) is pure act (that is, there is no potentiality in God)
3. Therefore, in God, there is no change (note: this would include temporal change)
4. Dependency in any way necessarily indicates potentiality
5. Therefore, God is dependent in no way on anything else (from 2 and 4); that is, he exists a se
6. To be in state x as a result of event e is for x to be dependent on e
7. Therefore, God can be affected by no event
8. But God is affected (e.g., he state was changed upon entering creation)
9. Therefore, God's state is dependent on some event(s)
10. Therefore, God does not exist a se
11. Therefore, there is potentiality in God
12. Therefore, God is not the First Cause
I'll leave these arguments without comment for the time being.
Kurieuo wrote:I intend to read it all. I should probably continue where I left off, as I'm sure it would help greatly in our discussion here and my understanding your words.
I'm sorry you have to put yourself through all that.
Assume that God focussed upon any one event in time (say Christ's incarnation), and then focuses upon a later event in time (Christ's crucifixion). In relation to God's knowledge, does this cause God's knowledge to change as to what is now in the past or future? I'd be surprised if you do. God's knowledge is the same, rather events themselves have unfolded (aka time) thus changing God's relationship or stance to them.
God does not change, rather the relationship does... and this is the crux of Craig's definitions. An intrinsic change requires more than a change in relationship to something other, it requires a change in one's self. In fact, Craig probably unknowingly contradicts himself. For in one breath he states that God's temporal knowledge is an intrinsic change, and then he concludes that God is immutable as far as His nature is concerned and rattles of omniscience as one such immutable characteristic.
In any case, Craig and I agree when it comes to specifically defining what can/cannot change with regards to God. Craig certainly needs to be more clear, perhaps this was a redaction on Moreland's part or vice-versa since the book is co-authored. Who knows except perhaps the authors and God.
You are right that God's knowledge is the same; but God's
state has changed. If God is now focusing on the incarnation but later will focus on the crucifixion, then strictly, we are saying that God actually exists in the state of thinking about the incarnation but has the potentiality of being in the state of thinking about the crucifixion. But there is no potentiality in God.
I would argue that discursive thought necessarily presupposes change in God, and that to me is really more fundamental than the real or logical relatedness of God to the world. Because even if I was okay with there being extrinsic changes to God (and I'm not, but for the sake of argument!), God's temporality (it seems to me) necessarily presupposes all kind of potentialities in God, which violates thinking of Him as the First Cause. And Craig does prove, I think, that if God is really related to the world then He is necessarily temporal, something you yourself seem to agree with when you note that God's very act of creation draws God into temporality.
"Onto-ethical version of divine immutability", I'm not really sure what that entails, but if that represents my words then ok. I do agree that my version of divine immutability is not strong enough, obviously because of who God is on DS. An external change for God may as well be an internal change since God changing "His state" (relationship to something) is on par with God changing "His act" -- which is what God is on DS. For example, as you yourself wrote: "If God is pure act, then there is no change (God is strongly immutable). So pure actuality necessarily entails not only divine simplicity, but strong immutability, impassibility, absolute sovereignty, aseity, timelessness, and a host of other doctrines."
Re: clarifying what I mean with God's relationship to us. If a static conception of time, or something akin to it, as DS must believe (?) is true, then God is not with us in time. God is with every person who has ever existed and every event in time all at once without becoming "impinged" if you will by creation. God is not really with me today, because God can't be in the present.
Furthermore, if A-Z is already there, and God's knows it all, then A-Z is already fated to happen. Kind of like the same movie being played over and over again. No matter how many times you play it, it will always have the same ending because the producer scripted it that way. In the case of creation the producer is God. There are many things that need explaining here, for those who accept a static conception of time... however, I apologise for mentioning all this. While related to DS, it is perhaps going to far abreast from DS itself.
I took the term "onto-ethical immutability" from Bruce Ware’s “An Evangelical Reformulation of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God,”
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 29, no. 4 (1986): 431-446. You'd probably enjoy it quite a bit. Here's a
link to the article if you want to read it and see if it accurately reflects your view. Consider it a test to see if I've accurately understood your view. I'll say that it entails that there are some senses in which God is immutable and some senses in which He is mutable (and that necessarily, since if we reject absolute immutability, then there must be, it seems, some sense in which God is not immutable; which is to say, there are some sense He is mutable).
As to your clarification, I don't see how God would not still be present. Remember how omnipresence is understood seeing God as pure act. God is giving you your very existence. That's not "something that He does" as if it is an act of God distinguishable from His being. God's sustaining you in this moment
is God. So in what sense is God not present to you? The fantastic thing is that He is completely present to you--that is, 100% of God is 100% present to each and every part of you in each and every moment of your existence. Your thoughts?
As to your second argument, I'd point out that only could apply to a B-Theorist, which while I used to be one, I'm not anymore. (See my comments on that a few posts back) Still, I think a B-Theorist would rightly reject that there's no more fatalism implied in a B-Theory than there is in an A-Theory in which God necessarily knows our future actions. Such a proponent could just argue that our actions are still [i[]our[/i] actions. That is, since I have free will,
I choose what I will do. It just so happens that my temporal mind is experiencing my choices in a temporal way.
To your first question, I find it a struggle to metaphysically comprehend it in an ontological and conceptual sense. But that to you is probably a strength since it makes God entirely something other. I can accept the notion of God as pure act, but personally cannot accept it, since it does not make sense to me. Maybe after I read your thesis I will be able to better and more readily conceptualise being as pure act?
Regarding your second question, ontologically I believe God has no potentiality. God cannot change who He is. On the other hand, I do believe God has the potential to perform actions that were not previously actualised (e.g., Creation). And in contrast to DS where such necessitates a change in God who is Pure Act, that this does not inherently change God's nature which I see as an essence.
I think this has clarified, if you will, the impasse we are here having regarding God's potentiality, immutability and the like. Regardless of who is right, it really does seem to come down to the clear difference we have regarding God's ontology.
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I think I'll need to re-revise our posts to get things back on track. I feel I have come to understand DS a lot more though, and why some hold to it, which is one of the reasons I started this thread (to better understand DS). Whether or not it is coherent, I cannot definitively say so I will need to leave that question aside. As you might be able to tell, such for me would require a re-examintion of many theological issues (e.g., God's relationship to time, creation, us, ontology, knowledge, predestination...). Many of these issues I have already developed opinions on, which I believe to be satisfactory and also counter a lot of criticisms levelled against God and Christianity.
Now it might be DS and all your theological beliefs are highly coherent. In which case, a Christian has two entire systems of thought that would answer criticisms levelled against Christianity in a logical and perhaps rationally sound manner. The responses might be different, but nonetheless each would be coherent and so possible. When it comes to what I believe, I am really big on coherentism. The more coherent a position across a great deal of issues, the more inclined I am to believe it to be true. It would be a massive task to compare DS to my own.
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I believe you have been clear. It helps to make DS more coherent, but like I mention previously, it does not necessarily mean I accept them. Any questions I have, I think I could logically think through how a DS advocate might respond. But I would always come to an impasse, that is, a blockage due to my current beliefs. So no response would be good enough unless I re-evaluate a whole range of my beliefs in light of DS theology. That said, I am prepared to give the benefit of doubt that DS is a coherent system of thought, especially since it has advocates from many great theological thinkers. That authority alone is not something to sneeze at.
I guess we have lots of directions our discussion could here go. I'd personally like to re-read over the thread, and your thesis. But that is really a one-sided affair. I've also raised previous issues which I'd be happy to receive responses to, or have further questions asked.
As for DS, I think you've been very clear as to what it entails and does not. To the point that I could defend it if I so desired.
That's fine. Then I would just emphasize my previous point. Aquinas makes a rather powerful argument (to me) that pure actuality is necessarily entailed by the Five Ways, and the First in particular. Perhaps he is wrong, but if he is, you need to demonstrate the fault in his reasoning, because if you accept the First Way, then Aquinas says you are intellectually obligated to accept God as pure act.
Beyond that, I think you are exactly correct. There are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about God here. There is classical theism and there is the modern analytical view (following Craig, Moreland, etc.). Personally, I don't just accept DS just because I find it coherent, but I find it warranted in view of certain basic assumptions I make about God: namely, that He is the First Cause and exists a se, two facts that I don't think the modern view can sufficiently account for. In fact, Plantinga has formally and explicitly rejected aseity as a doctrine we ought to attribute to God. Craig wants to hold it, but admits openly in
Philosophical Foundations that it poses serious problems for him. See pages 504-507 of that book.
More fundamentally, the issue at hand is whether or not we will adopt an Aristotelian or Platonic view of God; if the former, God is simple; if the latter, God is not, since each of God's attributes/properties really exist and are distinct from each other. And that's another reason I can't accept the modern view. Later on, I want to present Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Browers, "Theistic Argument against Platonism" which, if you want to get a preview of what I'd be saying, can be found in full
here.
So the problem, as I see it, is that while there are two views of God, they are incompatible with one another. I think both are coherent, but I think advocates of the modern view are still coming to terms with the implications of rejecting simplicity (e.g., rejecting aseity). Just my thoughts . . .
No need to apologise, was just responding. Any sharpness to my tone was unintended.
