Why Didn't God Just Not Create Us?

[domokunrox]

Jac,

I only mention that he MAY not be satisfied unless he understands how God relates to time. I've found that others find it much more satisfactory and in the end feel like they have a rational basis for their belief in how God relates to us in time.

Also, not that this is a discussion of time, but Aristotle says time is "arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron" which roughly translates to a number of change in respect of the before and after. This I cannot fathom anyone accepting that, as numbers are abstract objects and they don't stand in casual relation to anything. Understanding time is an immensely difficult subject and not easy to answer.

Shorthanded, when it comes right down to it, time either is an illusion (B-theory) or its not an illusion (A-theory). If you have a paper on a theory that you yourself have thought of or aristotle's that shows that it is neither A or B theory, I would be glad to read it. It would greatly interest me.

[Jac3510]

Suffice it to say, dom, that your understanding of Aristotle is severely lacking. He did not believe there were such things as abstract objects. You're just reading a bit of analytical platonism into Aristotle. As far as people not accepting it, I can point you to a wide range of modern philosophers who do, me included.

Frankly, again, I don't think that A or B theory of time are correct. The problem here, though (in my view), is similar to the Arminiam/Calvinism debate in that it is falsely presented as an either/or. Thus, to disprove one is to prove the other, and by extension, you can use the dichotomy as something of a sledge hammer against people's positions you don't like. "That's just Arminianism, and we all know that's wrong!" A and B theorists do it to each other all the time. Aristotelians, like myself, just stand on the sidelines, enjoy our popcorn, and get a kick out of people bludgeoning each other to death (as we yawn, since both theories tend to be inherently platonic).

edit:

Regarding your comments on numbers and time, I suspect you got your information from this Wordpress article. If so, I would have expected you to read the rest of the paragraph:

• It is important to note here that by defining time as a number of change, Aristotle does not mean that time is a number with which we count, time is not a number as such. Rather, time is a number of change, that by which we can quantitatively express the qualitative modification of something undergoing change. More succinctly, time is not a number, but of the number that is numbered.

The author then goes on to explain what Aristotle even means by change--the reduction of potentiality to actuality. It helps here to have a good understanding of Aristotle's terms energei, entelecheia, and dunamis, and particularly how these three terms relate to his notions of efficient and final causality. This is all a part of the Physics, so if you don't get this right, then the metaphysical questions surrounding God's relationship to time cannot be answered properly.

As to main point, though, I'm not opposed to the OP considering the A/B theory debate. As I said, it's another way to have the discussion. I would simply say, again, that it's unnecessary and I think wrongheaded just because neither theory is right in the first place. But, if he decides to adopt either theory and in adopting it, he can see the answer to his question, then fine. Whatever works . . . it just seems like a lot of unnecessary work to me! *shrug*

[Byblos]

So Jac, can you expand a bit more on exactly what the Aristotelian theory of time is and, more importantly, how it differs from A & B time theories? It would be great if you create a new thread properly titled for easy reference and search.

[Jac3510]

So Jac, can you expand a bit more on exactly what the Aristotelian theory of time is and, more importantly, how it differs from A & B time theories? It would be great if you create a new thread properly titled for easy reference and search.

Sure. Next week. That would be good, actually, to have on hand, since it comes up commonly enough.

[domokunrox]

Jac,

Aristotle didn't believe in abstract objects, but that doesn't mean what he believed to be real wasn't abstract objects. I can't help Aristotle make sense with his definitions, and that has no bearing at all that I look at it with analytic thought. To simply not do so is intellectually disengaged.

As far as comparing A/B theory to the Armenian/Calvinist debate. I don't think either can be directly compared. One argument is about theology misunderstood, the other is if something ACTUALLY exists, and what is it? Disproving 1 certainly does not prove the other, I agree. Time certainly is difficult to understand and may be as you say unnecessary,

Some things like understanding time could be too difficult to understand, but what we do understand shouldn't go AGAINST reason. Wouldn't you agree?

I would go as far as saying that the alleged so called things we know as "numbers" and the alleged rules of mathematics are completely arbitrary to say we have an understanding of them until we know with certainly God (the being with all possible perfections) exists.

Regarding the wordpress article you linked, I didn't get it from there. I found the quote and brief translation from a greek philosophy cliff notes I had around. But by the following paragraph you provided, I don't find particularly helpful. Time is expressed by numbers, but they are not the numbers themselves. No kidding. It sounded like he was trying to say more, but that's all I had to go by.

I await your expansion on the topic, however. I am very interested, and I appreciate your willingness to post it up in advance.

[Jac3510]

Dom,

As I said, I'll make a thread on the time issue next week. For now, I just want to comment specifically on this:

Aristotle didn't believe in abstract objects, but that doesn't mean what he believed to be real wasn't abstract objects. I can't help Aristotle make sense with his definitions, and that has no bearing at all that I look at it with analytic thought. To simply not do so is intellectually disengaged.

I don't think I understand what you are saying here. It sounds like you are saying that whatever Aristotle meant, the only way to make sense of his words is to understand things like numbers as abstract objects after all. But that can't be it, because don't you think it would be a bit presumptuous to argue that the only way Aristotle makes sense is to reject his philosophy and read him as if he were a Platonist? Don't you think it's more probable that Aristotle (and modern Aristotelians!) understood his definitions according to and within the stream of his own philosophical thought? In this case, that would be all the more true since Aristotle was responding specifically to Plato. Maybe it would help to understand Aristotle basic theory of numbers here? Again, they aren't abstract objects. For Aristotle (and I think he was right here), there are no such things as abstract objects.

And let me just add that this is actually of some theological importance. It seems impossible to reconcile the doctrines of aseity and sovereignty with their existence. Plantinga in his Does God Have a Nature? admits as much and when forced to choose between which to reject, he gets rid of "the sovereignty-aseity intuition." So he says:

• If God were distinct from such properties as wisdom, goodness and power but nonetheless had these properties, then he would be dependent on them. He would be dependent on them in a dual way. First, if, as Aquinas thinks, these properties are essential to him, then it is not possible that he should have existed and they not be ‘in’ him. Therefore he would not have existed if they had not. This connection between his existence and theirs, furthermore, is necessary; it is not due to his will and it is not within his power to abrogate it. That it holds is not up to him or within his control. He is obliged simply to put up with it. . . . [The] point is that he would be dependent upon something else for his existence, and dependent in a way outside of his control and beyond his power to alter; this runs counter to his aseity. (32, 33)

Finally, on page 61, he expressly rejects the notion that God exists a se or is sovereign over everything outside of himself, since he insists (correctly) that if "the Platonic menagerie" exists, then God would not be sovereign over, but in fact dependent upon, them.

Bergmann and Brower have proven the same thing conclusively, I think, and in fact have generalized it, showing that Platonism of any kind (that is, the belief in abstract objects) entails the necessary rejection of theism as it has been traditionally understood. The paper I'm referring to is available in preprint online, but I'll reconstruct the essential argument for you here:

• Definitions
  AD: (i) God does not depend on anything distinct from himself for his existing and (ii) everything distinct from God depends on God’s creative activity for its existing.
  T: Traditional theism (which includes AD) is true.
  P: All true predications, or at least all true predications of the form “a is F”, are to be explained in terms of a subject and an exemplifiable (however exemplifiables are themselves to be conceived).
  
  Assumptions
  A1. For any exemplifiable F, if F depends on God’s creative activity for its existing, then God’s creating an exemplifiable is logically prior to F.
  A2. For any x and any action A, x’s being able to do A is logically prior to x’s doing A.
  A3. For any x, any y, and any exemplifiable F, if x’s exemplifying F is logically prior to y, then F is logically prior to y.
  A4. x’s being able to create an F = x’s exemplifying being able to create an F.
  A5. For any x and any y, if x is logically prior to y, then y is not logically prior to x.
  
  Argument
  1. T&P [assume for reductio]
  2. All exemplifiables depend on God’s creative activity for their existing. [from T]
  3. For any exemplifiable F, God’s creating an exemplifiable is logically prior to F. [from 2 and A1]
  4. C1: God’s creating an exemplifiable is logically prior to the exemplifiable being able to create an exemplifiable.[from 3]
  5. God’s being able to create an exemplifiable is logically prior to God’s creating an exemplifiable. [from A2]
  6. God’s exemplifying being able to create an exemplifiable is logically prior to God’s creating an exemplifiable. [from 5 and A4]
  7. C2: The exemplifiable being able to createan exemplifiable is logically prior to God’s creating an exemplifiable. [from 6 and A3]
  8. ~(4&7). [from A5]
  9. ~(T&P) [from 1-8 by reductio]

They go on to point out that one can attempt to salvage some form of traditional theism by modifying the aseity-dependence doctrine as defined in AD as follows:

• AD*: (i) God does not depend on anything distinct from himself for his existing and (ii) everything distinct from God depends on God (though not, in every case, on God’s creative activity) for its existing.

This weaker version could allow one to argue that traditional theism can be understood as follows:

• T*: Traditional theism (which includes AD*) is true.

By this, one can ignore Bergmann's argument because while it shows that T and P are incompatible, it does not show that T* and P are incompatible. Yet they go on to show that even this conception fails as follows:

• Modified assumptions
  A1*. For any x, if x depends on God for its existing, then God’s being who he is is logically prior to x.
  A3*. For any x and any exemplifiable F, F is logically prior to x’s exemplifying F.
  A4*. God’s being who he is = God’s exemplifying his nature.
  
  Modified argument
  1. T*&P [assume for reductio]
  2. All exemplifiables depend on God for their existing. [from T*]
  3. For any exemplifiable F, God’s being who he is is logically prior to F. [from 2 and A1*]
  4. God’s being who he is is logically prior to the exemplifiable God’s nature. [from 3]
  5. C1*: God’s exemplifying his nature is logically prior to the exemplifiable God’s nature. [from 4 and A4*]
  6. C2*: The exemplifiable God’s nature is logically prior to God’s exemplifying his nature. [from A3*]
  7. ~(5&6). [from A5]
  8. ~(T*&P) [from 1-7 by reductio]

Again, I'd recommend reading the preprint, but it is evident to me that anyway you cut it, Platonism stands in direct contrast to traditional theism. You don't have to be a traditional theist, of course. Everyone from Anselm to Aquinas could have been wrong. But I suspect you don't want to go that far (though maybe you do). Yet I can attest--with extensive documentation to support my claim if necessary--that the acceptance of Platonism underlying modern analytic thought has led to a rejection of traditional theism, and with that, an introduction of a very wide range of problems we wouldn't have had otherwise (e.g., open theism, God's self-knowledge, the mind-body problem, etc.).

And on a final note, this is all something that Craig and Moreland themselves freely admit. If you have a copy of Philosophical Foundations sitting around, go read their comments on pages 504-507, after which it is concluded on page 515: "the doctrine of aseity confronts a serious challenge from Platonism, which holds that there exist separate realms of abstract objects. Platonism entails a metaphysical pluralism that is incompatible with the unique aseity of God."

But if unique aseity goes, then the question of logical necessity becomes questionable, and if the latter is affirmed necessarily but the former rejected, the the very question of the coherence of the doctrine of God comes into question.

So this is all rather serious, dom. Anyway, all of this is only distantly related to the time question and we can't deal with it there. I only point it out because your assumption of Platonism--indeed, your apparent insistence on reading Aristotle in light of Plato--has very serious ramifications elsewhere that I'm not sure you have thought through yet.

[jlay]

Dom,

Why would the rules (reason) for identifying a false dilema apply to one and be excluded from the other? Jac is saying there is a third option. You are saying or implying it is either A or B. If there is a 3rd option, as Jac implies, then it's a false dilemma just like saying one must be either Arminian or Calvinist.
Since both Jac and I both hold to a 3rd option, which is neither Arminian or Calvanists (unless you classify us as a zero point Calvinists), then his example only represents a false dilemma, not anything analagous beyond that.
When one says it must be A or B, and in fact there is a C to choose from, then you have a false dilemma. It doesn't matter if you are talking about theological positions or time theories.

After reading Feser's book on Aquinas, who was an Aristotilean, you see why so many modern philosophers get their positions wrong.

[domokunrox]

Jac, I look forward to you explaining what traditional theism presupposes and see if we can indeed determine that Platonism contrasts sharply. I don't consider myself a Platonist (I was going to express a joke, but I'll keep it to myself ).

To put it short, I look forward to the ontological discussion.


Jlay,

I see no connection with Jac identifying a false dilemma. I see his example as a category error. Arguing theology is not equal in any way to arguing the existence or non existence of something called "time" (Shorthanded). Unless you want to argue partial existence? or theory only? or some kind of oddity ontological existentialism?
Saying there is a 3rd option (Aristotelean) does not solve the view unless the view is an apathetic one that sits back with popcorn in hand (which he admits?).

Likewise, I see a false dilemma presented here on his behalf. That you need to hold a Aristotle or Plato view on properties, and if you hold a Platonism view well you can throw X, Y, Z, etc away. Isn't Nominalism an alternative for both of you (I'm not a Nominalist, either by the way)? The appeal to consequences being open theism, God's self knowledge, mind-body, etc. I see no necessary connection there.

But anyway, I look forward to the discussion ahead.

[Jac3510]

So Jac, can you expand a bit more on exactly what the Aristotelian theory of time is and, more importantly, how it differs from A & B time theories? It would be great if you create a new thread properly titled for easy reference and search.

Done