Leaps of Faith

[narnia4]

I thought this very recent blog post by Feser might have a lot of relation to what we were discussing here-

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05 ... e-and.html

I encourage everyone to read that, its simply an amazing post with a lot to chew on.

[domokunrox]

OK, Dom. If you insist . . . let's try it this way.

Sure, lets ride the gun again. Lets see how it goes back to the original disagreement.

1. RE: your ontological argument - You think you have proven that you are a mental substance. Fine. We agree on this proposition: "Thoughts exist." Now, take that premise, and prove to me that "I" am "thinking" those "thoughts." While you are at it, be sure not to use logic, since you say logic can't be proven yet.

No, we're not in agreement. I don't merely think that I have proven that I am a mental substance. I have proven that I MUST BE AT LEAST an imperfect mental substance. A thing that thinks, to put it simply. You disagree with me on linguistic based objections. However, any linguistic based objection against this is false on the basis that doubt presumes the truth of "I".

You've made an improper jump. Thinking is something else. You raise objections that are, again, false. It isn't that "thoughts exist". You're trying to smuggle in invalid foreign "ideas" that don't exist yet like "it", "there", "here", etc by saying "You need to proof I am thinking those thoughts". I don't need to do that.
With CERTAINTY, there is ONLY "I", SO FAR. You are not certain of any of foreign objects that can do the "thinking" for "you".
Also, Ideas are indubitable as ideas. I can doubt that I am experiencing a discussion at godandscience.org (the content), but I cannot doubt that I think I'm experiencing a discussion at godandscience.org (the idea)

There is NO LOGIC here used, so far.

At this point, I prove that God exists.

I do this on the basis that I have the idea of a mind with all possible perfections that is not my own, and that idea MUST BE WITH CERTAINTY innate in my mind when my mind was made by that mind with all possible perfections. I then augment this argument with my ontological argument.

2. RE: the KCA - riddle me this. Suppose scientists come with a testable theory showing that the universe can be beginningless. How does that affect the KCA?

Appeal to false consequences. While, it may be great to entertain a thought. Its unhelpful and useless here.

3. RE: Aristotelianism - you say we need to get away from it. Why?

It tries to be a jack of all trades for knowledge, but is master of none. Carries of variety of presuppositions that make it completely ineffective in rationally answering pragmatism, existentialism, and maybe a couple of different things more.
Its best that we let science examine with the understanding that it can only explain INSIDE nature, and use philosophy to answer some questions that science can and all other questions cannot answer OUTSIDE of nature.

4. RE: Numbers - you think zero is a number. Fine. So what is a number? I don't mean the symbol (e.g., "0"). That I assume you agree is just a conventional sign that points to something. What is the thing that the sign points to that we call numbers?

Numbers are abstract objects.

5. RE: The Prima Via - Since you say that you are not using the word motion (motus) differently from Aquinas, can you give me a definition of the word, because when you call it a force, you are fundamentally misunderstanding it. When you take that misunderstanding and tell me that I am misrepresenting metaphysics, you are making a serious charge. Defend it or retract it.

I will do no such thing. I said IF you are misrepresenting metaphysics, thats on you. Whats wrong with that statement?

I understand it as that motion is an undeniable. But what kind of matter of fact is it? The underlying cause for the motion (ANY AND ALL MOTION) is NOT AN EMPIRICALLY valid concept.
The idea of a "force" behind the motion is NOT perceptable. Empiricism is learning by experience the frequent conjunction of objects. There is NO NECESSARY CONNECTION.

This is why I've previously said as a response to Aquinas

In empiricism, if there is no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there.

Causality (motion) is relation of events INSIDE nature. Its perfectly acceptable to question the causality of events INSIDE nature, but its a invalid argument and illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism to say what the cause of ALL of nature would be.

Beyond that, if you think I've committed a naturalistic fallacy, demonstrate it rather than assert it.

We were discussing the KCA. You said this. Lets examine it closely

The only way to make the KCA a philosophical proof is to defend (2) on philosophical grounds alone (so, without appeal to science). Craig and others try to do it by insisting that since proper infinities are impossible, and a beginningless universe entails a proper infinity, then a beginningless universe is impossible. But the argument fails for multiple reasons. First, you have to demonstrate that proper infinities cannot exist in nature.

How do you miss such a obvious naturalist fallacy?

You proceed

Second, even if you can do that (and I'm not denying that you can), a beginningless universe does not entail an infinite universe, because at best, you can only demonstrate that a proper infinity cannot exist at one time. But a beginningless universe would not exist all at the same time (especially on A-Theory). In fact, the KCA would suggest an improper or potential infinity, which absolutely is possible and does exist in nature. So as a strictly philosophical proof, the KCA just fails

Twice!

I already explained to you. Actual infinites don't exist. Potential infinites are NOT REALLY INFINITE. They are ACTUALLY FINITE because they are bound by the number 0.

Stop imputing motives, as that's just a personal attack and goes directly against the board guidelines.

I find the content of your PM to me to be contrary to the above statement.




So, again. I believe the KCA is a good philosophical proof.

Often the ones who disagree with premise 2 are empiricists.

[Jac3510]

No, we're not in agreement. I don't merely think that I have proven that I am a mental substance. I have proven that I MUST BE AT LEAST an imperfect mental substance. A thing that thinks, to put it simply. You disagree with me on linguistic based objections. However, any linguistic based objection against this is false on the basis that doubt presumes the truth of "I".

What makes you think there is an "I" at all? You just assert you've proven it. Really, all you've done is asserted it. So, be consistent. If you are going to doubt everything, then doubt the "I," too. Prove to me that it exists.

Appeal to false consequences. While, it may be great to entertain a thought. Its unhelpful and useless here.

So if an ancient Greek said lightening proved Zeus existed, you would have said "appeal to false consequences"?

It tries to be a jack of all trades for knowledge, but is master of none. Carries of variety of presuppositions that make it completely ineffective in rationally answering pragmatism, existentialism, and maybe a couple of different things more.
Its best that we let science examine with the understanding that it can only explain INSIDE nature, and use philosophy to answer some questions that science can and all other questions cannot answer OUTSIDE of nature.

I see a lot of assertions. I don't see any arguments. Would you care to be specific?

Numbers are abstract objects.

On Platonism. Why should I presume that? Why should I assume that abstract objects exist at all?

I will do no such thing. I said IF you are misrepresenting metaphysics, thats on you. Whats wrong with that statement?

Because you are the one using motus differently than Aquinas. I pointed that out, to which you said you were not[/], and that if I was misrepresenting metaphysics, then that's my problem. The "if" here is directly tied to your claim that that you are using the word motus in the same sense Aquinas was and that I am mistaken. So, again, defend the statement or retract it.

I understand it as that motion is an undeniable. But what kind of matter of fact is it? The underlying cause for the motion (ANY AND ALL MOTION) is NOT AN EMPIRICALLY valid concept.
The idea of a "force" behind the motion is NOT perceptable. Empiricism is learning by experience the frequent conjunction of objects. There is NO NECESSARY CONNECTION.

No it isn't. Empiricism is the theory of knowledge that everything we know first came through the senses. Opposed to this is rationalism, the idea that at least some knowledge is innate. Whether or not there is a necessary connection between any concepts depends entirely on how those concepts are understood.

This is why I've previously said as a response to Aquinas

In empiricism, if there is no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there.

How are you using the word 'qualities'? God has no perceptible qualities. You aren't suggesting He isn't there. Ideas have no perceptible qualities. You aren't suggesting ideas don't exist. What perceptible qualities are there in the sentence, "If there are no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there"?

Causality (motion) is relation of events INSIDE nature. Its perfectly acceptable to question the causality of events INSIDE nature, but its a invalid argument and illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism to say what the cause of ALL of nature would be.

What are you talking about . . . "inside nature"?

I can't help but notice in all of this, I asked you for a definition of motus and you have not provided it. Please answer the question.

We were discussing the KCA. You said this. Lets examine it closely

The only way to make the KCA a philosophical proof is to defend (2) on philosophical grounds alone (so, without appeal to science). Craig and others try to do it by insisting that since proper infinities are impossible, and a beginningless universe entails a proper infinity, then a beginningless universe is impossible. But the argument fails for multiple reasons. First, you have to demonstrate that proper infinities cannot exist in nature.

How do you miss such a obvious naturalist fallacy?

You proceed

Second, even if you can do that (and I'm not denying that you can), a beginningless universe does not entail an infinite universe, because at best, you can only demonstrate that a proper infinity cannot exist at one time. But a beginningless universe would not exist all at the same time (especially on A-Theory). In fact, the KCA would suggest an improper or potential infinity, which absolutely is possible and does exist in nature. So as a strictly philosophical proof, the KCA just fails

Twice!

Quoting me isn't the same as a demonstration. Demonstrate how those arguments commit a naturalistic fallacy (and, if you would be so kind, please specify which kind you are talking about--I've usually seen that term used in ethical debates regarding inferences of what is good from what appears in nature; e.g., homosexuality appears in nature, so it must be good).

I already explained to you. Actual infinites don't exist. Potential infinites are NOT REALLY INFINITE. They are ACTUALLY FINITE because they are bound by the number 0.

Assuming Platonism. Why should I assume that? I've already given at least two extensive arguments as to why we ought to reject Platonism (which you conveniently never responded to).

[domokunrox]

Jac, this is getting really old. Once again, for the last time.

What makes you think there is an "I" at all? You just assert you've proven it. Really, all you've done is asserted it. So, be consistent. If you are going to doubt everything, then doubt the "I," too. Prove to me that it exists.

Doubt presumes "I". There is no inconsistency.

Get over it.

So if an ancient Greek said lightening proved Zeus existed, you would have said "appeal to false consequences"?

Your question doesn't make sense. How do you get from scientists coming up with a testable theory to lighting in ancient greece? Just drop it.

I see a lot of assertions. I don't see any arguments. Would you care to be specific?

You asked me a question. I answered.

On Platonism. Why should I presume that? Why should I assume that abstract objects exist at all?

Begging the question. If you have something to say on your philosophy about what Numbers are, you're free to do it. Otherwise, you bring absolutely nothing to this discussion. Its put up or shut up time.

Because you are the one using motus differently than Aquinas. I pointed that out, to which you said you were not[/], and that if I was misrepresenting metaphysics, then that's my problem. The "if" here is directly tied to your claim that that you are using the word motus in the same sense Aquinas was and that I am mistaken. So, again, defend the statement or retract it.

I'm not doing anything of the sort. Deal with it.

No it isn't. Empiricism is the theory of knowledge that everything we know first came through the senses. Opposed to this is rationalism, the idea that at least some knowledge is innate. Whether or not there is a necessary connection between any concepts depends entirely on how those concepts are understood.

Yes it is. It is a fundamental part of empiricism that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the nature. In short, sensory experience.

Again, in nature, there is only conjunction of objects. There is NO NECESSARY CONNECTION. There is absolutely NOTHING in your understanding of the concept of "force" behind "motion" that is empirical. I've already explained this.

How are you using the word 'qualities'? God has no perceptible qualities. You aren't suggesting He isn't there. Ideas have no perceptible qualities. You aren't suggesting ideas don't exist. What perceptible qualities are there in the sentence, "If there are no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there"?

In empiricism epistemology, yes. Causation has the problem of induction. This is why its invalid. You reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the idea of association that is the basis of our concept of causation.
But because you should be a realist, there is no necessary connections, only constant conjunctions.

Regarding ideas, you're not an idealist, are you? I thought you said you ruled that out.
Which is it, Jac? Are you going to point your finger up like Plato did? Or are you going to gesture your hand down like Aristotle?

What are you talking about . . . "inside nature"?

Whats confuses you?

I can't help but notice in all of this, I asked you for a definition of motus and you have not provided it. Please answer the question.

I have a even better question. How did you bring motus into this conversation? I didn't bring it in here.

Quoting me isn't the same as a demonstration. Demonstrate how those arguments commit a naturalistic fallacy (and, if you would be so kind, please specify which kind you are talking about--I've usually seen that term used in ethical debates regarding inferences of what is good from what appears in nature; e.g., homosexuality appears in nature, so it must be good).

1. You ask to defend the KCA, on philosophical grounds alone, then you say I need to demonstrate on the basis of nature. You've made the goal posts, then you moved them with a naturalist fallacy. Nature observations does not prove that something does not exist.

2. Something "potentially infinite" (fake infinity) exists in nature, therefore the KCA is a bad philosophical proof. Again, you've moved the goal posts on the basis that something exists in nature. You're trying to saying the philosophy is wrong, and you're just plain dishonest or wrong.

Assuming Platonism. Why should I assume that? I've already given at least two extensive arguments as to why we ought to reject Platonism (which you conveniently never responded to).

Again, its time to put up or shut up already. If you're going to say why 0 and 1 (like Aquinas did) are not numbers, go ahead. If not, then you're just noise that I am ready to ignore.

In regards to the thread you linked:
No, I responded.
See?

Jac, I look forward to you explaining what traditional theism presupposes and see if we can indeed determine that Platonism contrasts sharply.

Anyhow, I read you graduated in another thread. Congratulations on that.

[neo-x]

Doubt presumes "I". There is no inconsistency.

With CERTAINTY, there is ONLY "I", SO FAR. You are not certain of any of foreign objects that can do the "thinking" for "you".
Also, Ideas are indubitable as ideas. I can doubt that I am experiencing a discussion at godandscience.org (the content), but I cannot doubt that I think I'm experiencing a discussion at godandscience.org (the idea)

There is NO LOGIC here used, so far.

Well, to presume that "I" exist, you would have to smuggle logic in your argument which you deny doing but still do, since the only way to ascertain that you are thinking even if that thinking is your, doubting that it should be you who should be doubting and not some thoughts that are doubting and you are yourself nothing but a thought amongst many thoughts. You can cry out "foul" here but you would have to concede that without importing logic in the step before hand, your statement is open to be smashed, and which you also contradict by saying there is no logic involved, so far, yes there is. That is the only way you can presume the I, no other way you can do it.

I'll let Jac speak for himself but I think he was also pointing out something similar.

[Jac3510]

Jac, this is getting really old.

I agree. Hopefully you'll start answering my questions instead of just repeating bald assertions.

Doubt presumes "I".

Says who? Why does doubt presume "I". You're just asserting. Prove it.

Your question doesn't make sense. How do you get from scientists coming up with a testable theory to lighting in ancient greece?

They committed a God of the Gaps argument. Science later found out you don't need Zeus to explain lightening. The same could be true for the KCA. You say that since science can't explain the beginning of the universe, then God must have done it. Why is your argument any different from the Greeks'? I ask you that, and you say "appeal to false consequences." So now I am testing your intellectually honesty. If we can't ask what happens if science finds a way to posit an eternal universe on the grounds that doing so is an appeal to false consequences, then why can't a Greek theologian say it doesn't matter what science says about lightening on the same grounds?

You asked me a question. I answered.

I asked you why Aristotelianism needed to be thrown out. If I just wanted your opinion, I would have asked for that. If all you are going to give is an opinion, then "I just don't like it," suffices. If that's all you've got against the system, then I can see why you can't seem to answer any of my questions. You do realize that philosophy, like science, is not determined by your preferences. In other words, your opinions hold no weight. You need reasons. So, again, would you care to be specific in why you think Aristotelianism fails?

Begging the question. If you have something to say on your philosophy about what Numbers are, you're free to do it. Otherwise, you bring absolutely nothing to this discussion. Its put up or shut up time.

You're the one who said numbers are abstract objects. So you're the one begging the question, since you are presuming Platonism. I'm not asserting Aristotelianism in this thread. I'm asking why we have to assume Platonism. You're just asserting. Again. So I'm still waiting on an argument from you.

I'm not doing anything of the sort. Deal with it.

I provided quotes to you saying as much. If you aren't going to retract it, I'm going to ask a moderator to require one of you if you won't defend it.

Yes it is. It is a fundamental part of empiricism that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the nature. In short, sensory experience.

You are mistaken. Empiricism merely asserts that all knowledge begins in the senses. You are confusing empiricism with scientism.

Again, in nature, there is only conjunction of objects. There is NO NECESSARY CONNECTION. There is absolutely NOTHING in your understanding of the concept of "force" behind "motion" that is empirical. I've already explained this.

You've not taken the time to define 'motion' for me, or 'force', so I don't know if you know what you are talking about or not. I've repeatedly asked you for definitions which you aren't providing. Why is that?

In empiricism epistemology, yes. Causation has the problem of induction. This is why its invalid. You reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the idea of association that is the basis of our concept of causation.
But because you should be a realist, there is no necessary connections, only constant conjunctions.

Again, you are confusing scientism/materialism with empiricism. If you want to insist no the label 'empiricism,' then you are going to have to assert the very narrow band of Humean empiricism, which I obviously reject. Causality has no problem of induction (unless you accept Cartesian material passivism, which your philosophy would, in the end, require--I've already recommend Gilson's work on this).

Regarding ideas, you're not an idealist, are you? I thought you said you ruled that out.
Which is it, Jac? Are you going to point your finger up like Plato did? Or are you going to gesture your hand down like Aristotle?

No, I'm not an idealist. And questions like the last one show a profound misunderstanding of the Platonic/Aristotelian debate. So you mentioned that piece of art. So tell me, why was Aristotle pointing down and Plato up? What's the debate they are having?

Whats confuses you?

The words "inside nature." Again, can you explain why you mean by that? "Nature" has many meanings in philosophy. I can't know what is "inside" this "nature" until I know nature is for you.

I have a even better question. How did you bring motus into this conversation? I didn't bring it in here.

Wrong. You brought it up. Here's the quote:

• I don't like Aquinas' unmoved mover demonstration. Namely, there is no necessary connection to motion. An empiricist can see "motion" what they cannot see is the "has to".

Here, your critique of Aquinas' Prima Via is that, "there is no necessary connection to motion." The word Thomas uses for "motion" here is motus. So you did raise the issue. So I'm asking you AGAIN. Define the term. If you can't retract the statement. You can't go around making unsubstantiated claims.

1. You ask to defend the KCA, on philosophical grounds alone, then you say I need to demonstrate on the basis of nature. You've made the goal posts, then you moved them with a naturalist fallacy. Nature observations does not prove that something does not exist.

Wrong. I made two distinct points. I said that the only way for the KCA to be a philosophical proof is IF the second premise can be proven by reason alone (no science). I said that most people defend it on the basis of science because they either don't have the philosophical training necessary to defend it on philosophical grounds or they recognize that the philosophical arguments you are using are problematic.

2. Something "potentially infinite" (fake infinity) exists in nature, therefore the KCA is a bad philosophical proof. Again, you've moved the goal posts on the basis that something exists in nature. You're trying to saying the philosophy is wrong, and you're just plain dishonest or wrong.

I didn't say that potential infinities exist in nature and therefore the KCA is wrong. I said it can exist in nature.

In any case, you still haven't even defined what you mean by 'naturalistic fallacy.'

Again, its time to put up or shut up already. If you're going to say why 0 and 1 (like Aquinas did) are not numbers, go ahead. If not, then you're just noise that I am ready to ignore.

In regards to the thread you linked:
No, I responded.
See?

In other words, ignore arguments and just stick with your assertions. I've come to see that's something of a habit with you.

Again, with reference to your tone--drop it a notch. Statements like these demonstrate how weak your arguments really are:

• Just drop it.
  
  Its put up or shut up time.
  
  Deal with it.
  
  you're just noise

These don't contribute to the discussion. They obscure the issues and are little more than veiled personal attacks, which violate the board rules. Moreover, they bring the overall level of discourse of the board down, which is bad for everyone. Now, if you would, let's have a reasonable discussion about this, shall we? If you can't do better, I'm sure appropriate authorities will let you know.

[domokunrox]

Says who? Why does doubt presume "I". You're just asserting. Prove it.

Again, Jac. I'm telling you what I know, I'm not giving you an in-depth lecture the same as in the classroom.

You keep asking, says who? why? and prove it. There really is no nice way of putting it to you here. You're attempting to smuggle foreign objects in your line of questioning. Its not working, Jac. Ideas are indubitable as ideas. If you missed this, then you just straight forward have a misunderstanding about the philosophy.
You're going to need to just go, "I disagree" and walk away from it. I hope you consider Descartes later on with a much more honest inquiry.

They committed a God of the Gaps argument. Science later found out you don't need Zeus to explain lightening. The same could be true for the KCA. You say that since science can't explain the beginning of the universe, then God must have done it. Why is your argument any different from the Greeks'? I ask you that, and you say "appeal to false consequences." So now I am testing your intellectually honesty. If we can't ask what happens if science finds a way to posit an eternal universe on the grounds that doing so is an appeal to false consequences, then why can't a Greek theologian say it doesn't matter what science says about lightening on the same grounds?

I'm sorry, but this contrast of just absurd. The KCA isn't a God of the gaps argument if its based on philosophical grounds. Craig proceeds into deductive argument afterward. The KCA is a philosophical premise for God's existence, not a philosophical proof. Now, you may dislike the 2nd point in the KCA, or you may dislike that the argument implies A theory. You may dislike someone who takes a shortcut with the BVG theorem. Thats all fine and dandy, Jac. We got a solid argument to help us here, and I disagree with the bashing. This is bringing people into the light from the darkness.

So, again, saying "what if science can do x that disproves your conclusion?" is an appeal to false consequences.

I asked you why Aristotelianism needed to be thrown out. If I just wanted your opinion, I would have asked for that. If all you are going to give is an opinion, then "I just don't like it," suffices. If that's all you've got against the system, then I can see why you can't seem to answer any of my questions. You do realize that philosophy, like science, is not determined by your preferences. In other words, your opinions hold no weight. You need reasons. So, again, would you care to be specific in why you think Aristotelianism fails?

I'm not interested. Theres no need to be argumentative just to be argumentative. I gave you a brief, I apologize if you're not satisfied with it.

You're the one who said numbers are abstract objects. So you're the one begging the question, since you are presuming Platonism. I'm not asserting Aristotelianism in this thread. I'm asking why we have to assume Platonism. You're just asserting. Again. So I'm still waiting on an argument from you.

You asked me a question, I answered. I'm not begging the question. If the answer to your inquiry does not satisfy you, you're just doing what radical skeptics do. I'm not interested, Jac.
I already know how this discussion turns out. I've had it plenty of times before with other people.

I provided quotes to you saying as much. If you aren't going to retract it, I'm going to ask a moderator to require one of you if you won't defend it.

Jac, you do whatever you want to do. I'm not going to stop you.

You are mistaken. Empiricism merely asserts that all knowledge begins in the senses. You are confusing empiricism with scientism.

No, Jac. We're apples to apples here.You are a realist or a nominalist. If you're a realist, theres no reason whatsoever to not take it to its rational conclusion.

You've not taken the time to define 'motion' for me, or 'force', so I don't know if you know what you are talking about or not. I've repeatedly asked you for definitions which you aren't providing. Why is that?

If I'm talking about empiricism, we're talking about physics. Rational realism. Attempting to do metaphysics with empiricism is invalid. I've already made statements on this.

I'm not talking about metaphysics. To you, thats actuality-potentiality, correct?

Again, you are confusing scientism/materialism with empiricism. If you want to insist no the label 'empiricism,' then you are going to have to assert the very narrow band of Humean empiricism, which I obviously reject. Causality has no problem of induction (unless you accept Cartesian material passivism, which your philosophy would, in the end, require--I've already recommend Gilson's work on this).

No, no confusion. Hume empiricism is not an narrow band. Thats the default. I argue with modern day Hume's all the time.

No, I'm not an idealist. And questions like the last one show a profound misunderstanding of the Platonic/Aristotelian debate. So you mentioned that piece of art. So tell me, why was Aristotle pointing down and Plato up? What's the debate they are having?

Aristotle wasn't pointing down with his finger. He is palm spread gesturing toward everything else. I don't have a misunderstanding here. Its an interesting talk piece for sure, and people who see it have a variety of comments.
Plato points up, not because he believes the world is an illusion. Its made intelligible in reference to the ideal forms which lay behind it. Those are the true realities.
Aristotle instead with his palm spread says that these physical substances that we interact with are the true reality.

However, I want you and everyone to understand this if there is anything you should understand.

Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and everyone else were saying. The only way to understand these physical substances that we interact with is to turn away from your experience of them. Turn away from how they look day to day, and instead look for the ideal mathematical reconstruction of those objects.

In other words, if all triangular shaped objects seized to exist today, does that mean that the geometric entity triangle would seize to be?

Here is the thing, Aristotle and later on Aquinas didn't find mathematics to be of much use.

The words "inside nature." Again, can you explain why you mean by that? "Nature" has many meanings in philosophy. I can't know what is "inside" this "nature" until I know nature is for you.

No idea what you're confused about. Can you give a examples?

Wrong. You brought it up. Here's the quote:

• I don't like Aquinas' unmoved mover demonstration. Namely, there is no necessary connection to motion. An empiricist can see "motion" what they cannot see is the "has to".

Here, your critique of Aquinas' Prima Via is that, "there is no necessary connection to motion." The word Thomas uses for "motion" here is motus. So you did raise the issue. So I'm asking you AGAIN. Define the term. If you can't retract the statement. You can't go around making unsubstantiated claims.

Wrong again, I didn't mention Motus. Again, IF Aristotle misrepresents motion, I cannot help him.
I'm talking physics, not metaphysics.

Wrong. I made two distinct points. I said that the only way for the KCA to be a philosophical proof is IF the second premise can be proven by reason alone (no science). I said that most people defend it on the basis of science because they either don't have the philosophical training necessary to defend it on philosophical grounds or they recognize that the philosophical arguments you are using are problematic.

You made 2 points, they follow each other, and its your inquiry. So, are you now admitting to being dishonest?

I didn't say that potential infinities exist in nature and therefore the KCA is wrong. I said it can exist in nature.

In any case, you still haven't even defined what you mean by 'naturalistic fallacy.'

I already explained potential infinites. I already told you about the naturalist fallacy. If there is an "ic" at the end, its a mistake.

In other words, ignore arguments and just stick with your assertions. I've come to see that's something of a habit with you.

No, I'm just going to ignore your line of questioning. Its type of skepticism I hear everyday from people who aren't interested in learning something, but instead are doing so to just be difficult because it goes against your views and the presuppositions you hold.

These don't contribute to the discussion. They obscure the issues and are little more than veiled personal attacks, which violate the board rules. Moreover, they bring the overall level of discourse of the board down, which is bad for everyone. Now, if you would, let's have a reasonable discussion about this, shall we? If you can't do better, I'm sure appropriate authorities will let you know.

We can have a reasonable discussion, but thats not what you're doing.

[Jac3510]

Again, Jac. I'm telling you what I know, I'm not giving you an in-depth lecture the same as in the classroom.

You keep asking, says who? why? and prove it. There really is no nice way of putting it to you here. You're attempting to smuggle foreign objects in your line of questioning. Its not working, Jac. Ideas are indubitable as ideas. If you missed this, then you just straight forward have a misunderstanding about the philosophy.
You're going to need to just go, "I disagree" and walk away from it. I hope you consider Descartes later on with a much more honest inquiry.

In other words, you have no argument. Just your bald assertion based on the presumed philosophy. So circular reasoning. Got it.

I'm sorry, but this contrast of just absurd. The KCA isn't a God of the gaps argument if its based on philosophical grounds. Craig proceeds into deductive argument afterward. The KCA is a philosophical premise for God's existence, not a philosophical proof. Now, you may dislike the 2nd point in the KCA, or you may dislike that the argument implies A theory. You may dislike someone who takes a shortcut with the BVG theorem. Thats all fine and dandy, Jac. We got a solid argument to help us here, and I disagree with the bashing. This is bringing people into the light from the darkness.

So, again, saying "what if science can do x that disproves your conclusion?" is an appeal to false consequences.

The KCA isn't even a philosophical premise for a philosophical proof of God's existence, because the second premise is very weak as a necessary truth.

As far as the argument "bringing people into the light from darkness," I agree that people are coming to believe in God. Do you endorse, as a general principle, bringing people to light via deception? I could lie to someone with no training and say that scientists had done scientific experiments at the tomb of Jesus and found remnants of particles that are consistent with physical resurrections that had been observed in labrats and then provide links to a paper I faked in a famous journal to prove the point. If someone bought into that and was thereby convinced that Jesus was the Christ, would that be a reason to use the "argument"? I say no.

I would advise you to consider carefully God's words in Job 42:7.

I'm not interested. Theres no need to be argumentative just to be argumentative. I gave you a brief, I apologize if you're not satisfied with it.

So, again, we have no arguments from you. Just your personal opinions. I wish you just would have told me early in this discussion that you were going to be offering your opinion and refusing to offer reasons for it. Had you done that, I wouldn't have bothered following up with you at all.

You asked me a question, I answered. I'm not begging the question. If the answer to your inquiry does not satisfy you, you're just doing what radical skeptics do. I'm not interested, Jac.
I already know how this discussion turns out. I've had it plenty of times before with other people.

Of course you are. Your defense of the impossibility of infinites is based on a platonic view of numbers. I reject Platonism. So you prove Platonism by assuming Platonism. But, again, you've made it clear that you're just interested in giving your opinions and not arguments to support them. Why should I take you seriously?

Jac, you do whatever you want to do. I'm not going to stop you.

Then I'll also charge you with the sin of bearing false witness against your neighbor. You accused me of something for which you have absolutely no evidence. That's a sin.

No, Jac. We're apples to apples here.You are a realist or a nominalist. If you're a realist, theres no reason whatsoever to not take it to its rational conclusion.

I'm a moderate-realist.

In any case, my own view isn't in question here. YOU are the one arguing that we KNOW that infinities are impossible because abstract numbers exist, that we KNOW that there is an "I" due to the presence of thoughts, that Aquinas' arguments fail because he's misunderstood motion, etc. In other words you are making a lot of assertions for which I have repeatedly asked for arguments and evidence, and you have steadfastly refused to give any accounting for them whatsoever. What little you have tried to offer has been nothing more than a continued assertion of your own positions and other downright silly notions (like the idea that "I think, therefore I am" does not presume logic).

If I'm talking about empiricism, we're talking about physics. Rational realism. Attempting to do metaphysics with empiricism is invalid. I've already made statements on this.

I'm not talking about metaphysics. To you, thats actuality-potentiality, correct?

You certainly are. The moment you say that abstract objects exist, you are talking metaphysics. The moment you reject Aquinas' Prima Via, you are doing metaphysics. You sound like the atheist who says he isn't doing religion when he's just arguing the "science" for Darwinianism.

No, no confusion. Hume empiricism is not an narrow band. Thats the default. I argue with modern day Hume's all the time.

Again, you are wrong. I've already provided a link explaining this. That's the difference in me and you. I provide explanations and defenses for my positions. You just provide bald assertions, like you did right here. Humean empiricism the default? REALLY? Should I bother asking for evidence for that assertion?

Aristotle wasn't pointing down with his finger. He is palm spread gesturing toward everything else. I don't have a misunderstanding here. Its an interesting talk piece for sure, and people who see it have a variety of comments.
Plato points up, not because he believes the world is an illusion. Its made intelligible in reference to the ideal forms which lay behind it. Those are the true realities.
Aristotle instead with his palm spread says that these physical substances that we interact with are the true reality.

However, I want you and everyone to understand this if there is anything you should understand.

Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and everyone else were saying. The only way to understand these physical substances that we interact with is to turn away from your experience of them. Turn away from how they look day to day, and instead look for the ideal mathematical reconstruction of those objects.

In other words, if all triangular shaped objects seized to exist today, does that mean that the geometric entity triangle would seize to be?

Either your understanding of the debate the picture represents in flawed or your explanation of it is. The issue wasn't about what is "true reality," that is whether there were ideal forms beyond nature or whether nature itself is true reality. The question is where true forms exist. For Plato, true forms exist only in a Third Realm, whereas for Aristotle, all forms (thus, true forms) exist in the things they inform. Thus, Aristotle denied the reality of abstract objects, whereas Plato founded is philosophy on them. Thus, Aristotle was an empiricist (in the classical default, non-Humean sense), whereas Plato was a rationalist. Aristotle believed that all knowledge original came through the senses, whereas Plato believed that all knowledge was inherit in the person, and "learning" was really the process of "remembering" innate ideas. To go on to argue, then, that Aristotle thought that only things that could be compared against nature were real or that if there were no perceptible qualities in things then there was nothing there is just absurd and shows a gross misunderstanding of classical empircism. It's simply an anachronistic reading of Hume back into Aristotle and a confusion of scientism with Aristotelianism.

Here is the thing, Aristotle and later on Aquinas didn't find mathematics to be of much use.

WHAT? Again, you are simply factually wrong.

No idea what you're confused about. Can you give a examples?

"Nature" can refer to a thing's essence; it can refer to the way things are disposed to behave; it can refer to the non-civilized world (as in, I spent the weekend in nature, away from the city); it can refer to the non-spiritual, physical world, and many more. Here's an entire article on Wikipedia on the various uses of 'nature' in philosophy.

Wrong again, I didn't mention Motus. Again, IF Aristotle misrepresents motion, I cannot help him.
I'm talking physics, not metaphysics.

Wrong. You mentioned "motion" with reference to Aquinas' argument. Aquinas' word here is motus, so you did mention it. You saying you didn't bring it up would be like if we were having a theological debate about Paul's view of the sin nature, looking up the word "flesh" in Webster, and arguing from there. Suppose you replied that sarx does not mean what "flesh" does, that Paul uses the word in a specific sense. Then suppose I said, "I'm not arguing about the meaning of sarx. You brought it up. Not me. I'm interested in the meaning of "flesh!" That would be an absurd argument for obvious reasons. You are doing exactly the same thing here. Aquinas had a specific view of motion (motus) which you reject, but you reject it by understanding motion differently than Aquinas himself did. So you have, at best, a straw man of Aquinas' argument, insofar as you are critiquing it by using his own words differently than he is.

Now, AGAIN, can you tell me what Aquinas meant by motus or not, or do we have just another example of you asserting your opinion without offering any evidence in support of it (and, in fact, in the face of contrary evidence)?

You made 2 points, they follow each other, and its your inquiry. So, are you now admitting to being dishonest?

Dishonest? What are you talking about? You apparently misunderstood me from the outset. And now because you misunderstood me, I'm dishonest?

Again, I'm going to require to defend or retract your claim, as you are now questioning my character. I'm also now publically asking the moderators to monitor this discussion, as Dom has made my basic honesty a matter of debate.

I already explained potential infinites. I already told you about the naturalist fallacy. If there is an "ic" at the end, its a mistake.

No. You just pointed to your assumption of Platonism, which the KCA is based on anyway. And I've also pointed out that "the naturalistic fallacy" is a term usually reserved for debates in ethics. So I'm not even sure you know what the naturalistic fallacy is. I've asked you several times to explain it to me, as perhaps there is a non-ethical usage I am not familiar with. So, yet again, are you going to substantiate your claims, or are you going to leave us with your mere (ungrounded) opinion?

No, I'm just going to ignore your line of questioning. Its type of skepticism I hear everyday from people who aren't interested in learning something, but instead are doing so to just be difficult because it goes against your views and the presuppositions you hold.

We've not had a single discussion about what I believe. I'm asking you for evidence for what you believe. You don't get to say (to me or to an atheist) "I don't have to defend my beliefs just because what I believe is contrary to what you believe!" You asserted Platonism. I've asked for a defense. You've given none. You've asserted an incorrect understanding of motus without defense. You've asserted that thoughts necessarily entail the "I" without defense. You've asserted I've committed a "naturalistic fallacy" without defense or even explanation of what you mean. I could go on and on.

Now, you need to defend your claims, Dom. Just stating your opinion doesn't contribute to the discussion. None of us have any inherent authority. All of us have the burden of showing why our opinions are true. Just asserting that they are is a waste of time, and just asserting they are in the face of evidence against them is plainly irrational.

We can have a reasonable discussion, but thats not what you're doing.

Since when is asking you to defend your assertions not being reasonable? On the contrary, circular arguments and baseless opinions are much closer to being considered unreasonable.

[domokunrox]

In other words, you have no argument. Just your bald assertion based on the presumed philosophy. So circular reasoning. Got it.

No, I have an argument. I presented it, but it was unsatisfied by baseless skepticism you've brought into the discussion.

The KCA isn't even a philosophical premise for a philosophical proof of God's existence, because the second premise is very weak as a necessary truth.

Really? You think the premise is very weak because....what? To deny 1 truth is to affirm another truth, Jac.

Because actual infinities exist? Because numbers are not abstract objects? Because 0 and 1 are not real numbers?

Who's making the bald assertions now? You see, Jac, sitting back and playing the skeptic is all fine and dandy, but then when I tell you throw down you then suddenly lost your bravery?

As far as the argument "bringing people into the light from darkness," I agree that people are coming to believe in God. Do you endorse, as a general principle, bringing people to light via deception? I could lie to someone with no training and say that scientists had done scientific experiments at the tomb of Jesus and found remnants of particles that are consistent with physical resurrections that had been observed in labrats and then provide links to a paper I faked in a famous journal to prove the point. If someone bought into that and was thereby convinced that Jesus was the Christ, would that be a reason to use the "argument"? I say no.

Again, bringing people to light via deception is an oxymoron if I ever saw one. You know it, and I know it. Your contrived situation here doesn't fool me.

I would advise you to consider carefully God's words in Job 42:7.

Shame on you. I don't even know why I should continue.

So, again, we have no arguments from you. Just your personal opinions. I wish you just would have told me early in this discussion that you were going to be offering your opinion and refusing to offer reasons for it. Had you done that, I wouldn't have bothered following up with you at all.

I have no reason to believe your skepticism of my position on the matter will be received without more irrational skepticism.

Of course you are. Your defense of the impossibility of infinites is based on a platonic view of numbers. I reject Platonism. So you prove Platonism by assuming Platonism. But, again, you've made it clear that you're just interested in giving your opinions and not arguments to support them. Why should I take you seriously?

To reject 1 truth is to affirm another truth. You've made it clear that you're just interested in using your skepticism to bulldoze. I don't take you seriously at all.

Then I'll also charge you with the sin of bearing false witness against your neighbor. You accused me of something for which you have absolutely no evidence. That's a sin.

Now you're calling me a liar? Wonderful.

I'm a moderate-realist.

No, be specific. You're talking about Immanent realism, correct?

In any case, my own view isn't in question here. YOU are the one arguing that we KNOW that infinities are impossible because abstract numbers exist, that we KNOW that there is an "I" due to the presence of thoughts, that Aquinas' arguments fail because he's misunderstood motion, etc. In other words you are making a lot of assertions for which I have repeatedly asked for arguments and evidence, and you have steadfastly refused to give any accounting for them whatsoever. What little you have tried to offer has been nothing more than a continued assertion of your own positions and other downright silly notions (like the idea that "I think, therefore I am" does not presume logic).

No, your view is in question. If you're going to have this discussion, be prepared to put your view out there. To deny 1 truth is to affirm another truth. The fact that you're unwilling to even make a statement on what numbers are shows you're unwillingness to be academically honest. Instead, you think you're coming here and trying to bulldoze your way by uncontested. Thats not a proper discussion.

Now, you may not want to because the REAL consequences are your theology tradition is on the line on philosophical grounds. Lets not get it confused with my situation. I don't have a consequence. Everything we see here in the natural, physical world came from the mind of God, and I have no fear that something here doesn't make logical sense. It only doesn't make sense when WE MAKE AN ERROR. Its a proven concept that we have advanced our understanding and mathematically reconstructed objects in the natural world. We do it, and then we go "Thats how you did it, Lord. Thats amazing". All with the math and logic behind it.

Go ahead and keep doubting it, though.

You certainly are. The moment you say that abstract objects exist, you are talking metaphysics. The moment you reject Aquinas' Prima Via, you are doing metaphysics. You sound like the atheist who says he isn't doing religion when he's just arguing the "science" for Darwinianism.

In terms of motion? No, I'm not. If you're talking motion, thats physics. If I reject Aquinas, its because its not empirically valid. Again, i've explained this already.

You're misunderstood my method. I'm confident in epistemic dualism, as long as the scientists stay away from trying to do what philosophers are for. So long as they do that, we're good. We are certain to get some kooks like Richard Dawkins who think they can do philosophy. The best we can do is tell them why they're wrong and hope they come back around.

Aquinas is rejected for attempting to make statements on metaphysics. Any realist must reject it.

I'm not arguing science for darwinism. Thats absurd.

Again, you are wrong. I've already provided a link explaining this. That's the difference in me and you. I provide explanations and defenses for my positions. You just provide bald assertions, like you did right here. Humean empiricism the default? REALLY? Should I bother asking for evidence for that assertion?

If its not rational realism, its not good empiricism.

Either your understanding of the debate the picture represents in flawed or your explanation of it is. The issue wasn't about what is "true reality," that is whether there were ideal forms beyond nature or whether nature itself is true reality. The question is where true forms exist. For Plato, true forms exist only in a Third Realm, whereas for Aristotle, all forms (thus, true forms) exist in the things they inform. Thus, Aristotle denied the reality of abstract objects, whereas Plato founded is philosophy on them. Thus, Aristotle was an empiricist (in the classical default, non-Humean sense), whereas Plato was a rationalist. Aristotle believed that all knowledge original came through the senses, whereas Plato believed that all knowledge was inherit in the person, and "learning" was really the process of "remembering" innate ideas. To go on to argue, then, that Aristotle thought that only things that could be compared against nature were real or that if there were no perceptible qualities in things then there was nothing there is just absurd and shows a gross misunderstanding of classical empircism. It's simply an anachronistic reading of Hume back into Aristotle and a confusion of scientism with Aristotelianism.

There are many ways to look at the picture, but what I described is word for word the simpler account. Your view has all kinds of additional commentary with a clear set of presuppositions you hold.

Perhaps I should ask you to prove all those "bald assertions" and then continue to employ radical skepticism of it or ask for more prove of those proofs for "your position".

You can call it classical empiricism, but that doesn't help your position a single bit.

WHAT? Again, you are simply factually wrong.

Do you even bother to read what you link to?

Commentators on Aristotle from the 2nd century on tended to interpret Aristotle's mathematical objects as mental objects, which made Aristotle more compatible with neo-Platonism. Later the mechanistic movement in the late Renaissance treated Aristotle as divorcing mathematics from physical sciences in order to drive a deeper wedge between their views and his. Because of this, it has been very easy to discount Aristotle as subscribing to a version of psychologism in mathematics. These tendencies contribute to the common view that Aristotle's views mathematics are marginal to his thought. More recently, however, sympathetic readers have seen Aristotle as expressing a fictionalist version of physicalism, the view that the objects of mathematics are fictional entities grounded in physical objects. To the extent that this view is regarded as a plausible view about mathematics

Who's factually wrong?

Are you now going to tell me that your Immanent realism has now assimilated Fictionalism?

"Nature" can refer to a thing's essence; it can refer to the way things are disposed to behave; it can refer to the non-civilized world (as in, I spent the weekend in nature, away from the city); it can refer to the non-spiritual, physical world, and many more. Here's an entire article on Wikipedia on the various uses of 'nature' in philosophy.

I see what you're saying, but I don't see how you're confusing where there is constant conjunction. Let me put it this way, if you get metaphysics from what clearly is just physics, you're doing it wrong.

Wrong. You mentioned "motion" with reference to Aquinas' argument. Aquinas' word here is motus, so you did mention it. You saying you didn't bring it up would be like if we were having a theological debate about Paul's view of the sin nature, looking up the word "flesh" in Webster, and arguing from there. Suppose you replied that sarx does not mean what "flesh" does, that Paul uses the word in a specific sense. Then suppose I said, "I'm not arguing about the meaning of sarx. You brought it up. Not me. I'm interested in the meaning of "flesh!" That would be an absurd argument for obvious reasons. You are doing exactly the same thing here. Aquinas had a specific view of motion (motus) which you reject, but you reject it by understanding motion differently than Aquinas himself did. So you have, at best, a straw man of Aquinas' argument, insofar as you are critiquing it by using his own words differently than he is.

Again, Jac, you're wrong. I mentioned motion, and it doesn't matter what Aquinas calls it. Are we both talking about the same thing? Motion is a fact, but what kind of fact is it? Aquinas believes theres a metaphysical explanation behind the motion, and I firmly reject this. Its illegitimate empiricism. Motion is physics, and only physics. Constant conjunction. There is no necessary connection. Rational realism. This isn't a straw man argument. Move on.

Now, AGAIN, can you tell me what Aquinas meant by motus or not, or do we have just another example of you asserting your opinion without offering any evidence in support of it (and, in fact, in the face of contrary evidence)?

It doesn't matter what Aquinas meant. This argument is as stupid as arguing what someone meant when they say "I hope I get lucky tonight", and then argue about what he meant by "lucky".
To me, the rational realist will say, "Well, he just hopes he is lucky tonight"
To you, you'd be arguing, "Well, what he meant was. He hopes event "X" happens"

And again, this is invalid empiricism. I've explained it too many times already. Thats an illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism.

Dishonest? What are you talking about? You apparently misunderstood me from the outset. And now because you misunderstood me, I'm dishonest?

Again, I'm going to require to defend or retract your claim, as you are now questioning my character. I'm also now publically asking the moderators to monitor this discussion, as Dom has made my basic honesty a matter of debate.

I didn't misunderstand you. Did you ever think, maybe I misunderstood him before you went off on me about this whole argument?

The fact is, you came in with an argument against my position, but its clear you didn't care for any clarification I offered and practically demand that I understand your position of skepticism as factual. I've yet to hear why I or anyone else reading this discussion and argument should accept the presuppositions you've brought here. Your refusal to do so on the ground that you don't think its relevant or brought into this discussion is academically dishonest. End of story.

In contrast, I've been perfectly open to my statements clearly despite your baseless skepticism. I should have simply ignored them, as I usually do. But because we're believers in the same God, I was willing to see if your skepticism was valid.

No. You just pointed to your assumption of Platonism, which the KCA is based on anyway. And I've also pointed out that "the naturalistic fallacy" is a term usually reserved for debates in ethics. So I'm not even sure you know what the naturalistic fallacy is. I've asked you several times to explain it to me, as perhaps there is a non-ethical usage I am not familiar with. So, yet again, are you going to substantiate your claims, or are you going to leave us with your mere (ungrounded) opinion?

And you're brought your presuppositions into your argument against my position.

The naturalist fallacy is not a term reserved for debates on ethics. Ethics is just simply the most common way to object naturalist based arguments.
We recognize that nature has no connection to ethics, so what does it have a connection to? NOTHING! Thats why you can't connect it to any argument.

Nature is not going to tell you if something actually infinite exists outside nature, and on the flip side its not going to tell you it doesn't exist outside nature.

For example, does nature prove that numbers exist?

We've not had a single discussion about what I believe. I'm asking you for evidence for what you believe. You don't get to say (to me or to an atheist) "I don't have to defend my beliefs just because what I believe is contrary to what you believe!" You asserted Platonism. I've asked for a defense. You've given none. You've asserted an incorrect understanding of motus without defense. You've asserted that thoughts necessarily entail the "I" without defense. You've asserted I've committed a "naturalistic fallacy" without defense or even explanation of what you mean. I could go on and on.

Now, you need to defend your claims, Dom. Just stating your opinion doesn't contribute to the discussion. None of us have any inherent authority. All of us have the burden of showing why our opinions are true. Just asserting that they are is a waste of time, and just asserting they are in the face of evidence against them is plainly irrational.

Jac, you have presuppositions, and I'm not letting you off the hook for them. Look at the 2 sentences I underlined.

We haven't had any discussion about what you believe, yet my position is against the face of evidence and plainly irrational?

Nice try, Jac. You're a skeptic (and an irrational one at that), and you have "bald" presuppositions.

I'm holding you to every presupposition, Jac. If you refuse to play ball, you can't complain that I've taken my ball and went home.

Since when is asking you to defend your assertions not being reasonable? On the contrary, circular arguments and baseless opinions are much closer to being considered unreasonable.

I did defend my position. They don't satisfy your skepticism. Not my problem, Jac.

[Jac3510]

No, I have an argument. I presented it, but it was unsatisfied by baseless skepticism you've brought into the discussion.

You presented no argument, Dom. You can't just assert that you know something. That's not an argument. All you've shown for sure is that there are thoughts. You have shown no necessary connection between a thought and a thinker--much less have you proved that any such agent must necessarily be enduring from one moment to the next. If you take any time to read any pro-choice philosophic literature, one of the things you will find is that on a materialistic worldview, the notion of a "soul" is rejected. Personal identity is grounded in all kinds of things. One such example is the memory. The "I" is nothing more (on this view) than the collection of memories a particular body has.

Now, I reject that view, but I can't just say, "It's wrong because I know that I exist as an enduring agent." Moreover, since your entire proof for God rests on this bare assertion of your own continued existence, then your argument for God fails. In fact, in turns out to be circular, because (as Descartes teases out), enduring immaterial agents necessarily presuppose a supernatural existence beyond themselves. So when you just assume you are an enduring, immaterial agent you effectively are just assuming God exists. That's why your proof both for yourself and for God fails.

To reference Gilson again, and as I've said many times before:

• I wish I could make clear from the very beginning that in criticizing great men, as I shall do, I am very far from forgetting what made them truly great. No man can fall victim to his own genius unless he has genius; but those who have none are fully justified in refusing to be victimized by the genius of others. Not having made the mathematical discoveries of Descartes and Leibniz, we cannot be tempted to submit all questions to the rules of mathematics; but our very mediocrity should at least help us to avoid such a mistake. There is more than one excuse for being a Descartes, but there is no excuse whatsoever for being a Cartesian.

Emphasis added. You can read the quote there on page six, available on the preview I linked to.

Beyond that, I've never asked for a classroom lecture on anything. I've simply asked--repeatedly--for proof for your assertion that just because there are thoughts, therefore you exist. Claiming that ideas are indubitable is no proof. You're just assuming your Cartesianism.

[edit: if you want to know my own argument for the existence of the soul--as I reject Descartes'--click here for an audio file I created for my students. This comes from Joseph Owens An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Granted, this argument only shows that an immaterial substance exists that is drives our thoughts, free choices, etc., but that, I think, is rather significant in and of itself. If, though, you want a very robust argument that gives a full account of the soul, then see the first six lectures of my Issues in Ethics, available in full audio format here.]

Really? You think the premise is very weak because....what? To deny 1 truth is to affirm another truth, Jac.

Because there is no proof for it. When you say, "The universe began to exist," I say, "That may not be true. It may be true that the universe did not begin to exist." I'm not affirming that the universe did not come into existence. I am saying that you have not proven the second premise.

Now, you say, "I prove it by . . ." and then appeal to actual infinities not existing. I say, "How do you know that actual infinities do not exist" and then you appeal to Platonism. Now, I--as do a lot of people--reject Platonism. So that doesn't work. Here you have to be careful to avoid a circular argument. You can either try to prove Platonism separately from the KCA and then use it in support of the KCA, or you can find a different way to support the non-existence of infinities. What you can't do is use the universe's finite nature to prove the impossibility of infinities and thus support Platonism (in this case--if you can prove the universe is finite on non-Platonic grounds, then you can use that as support of your Platonism). That would be circular.

I gave you one such argument from Aquinas himself that I am sympathetic to. Unfortunately, it turns out to be rather weak and turns out to beg the question if we use it in support of the KCA. So I, personally, see no philosophical proof for the second premise. Go tell it to your Platonist friends, and they'll agree with you. Fine. But for those of us (the majority) who are not Platonists, then your proof is no proof. This is doubly true for those of us who have strong arguments against Platonism.

Again, bringing people to light via deception is an oxymoron if I ever saw one. You know it, and I know it. Your contrived situation here doesn't fool me.

People are convinced that thinks are true by bad arguments all the time. You know that.

Shame on you. I don't even know why I should continue.

I don't either. You won't answer questions and you just keep asserting your opinion without backing it up with any kind of evidence. Again, quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

I have no reason to believe your skepticism of my position on the matter will be received without more irrational skepticism.

It's not skepticism. It's accusing you of special pleading. You claim with Descartes that we ought to be skeptical of everything that cannot be absolutely (mathematically) certain. That's your mathematicism coming in. Yet your own arguments don't even meet your own standards, as I've repeatedly demonstrated.

Now you're calling me a liar? Wonderful.

No, I'm charging you with the sin of lying against me. If you have no defense for it, then I have no reason not to conclude that you've lied about me. If you have a defense, then let's hear it.

No, be specific. You're talking about Immanent realism, correct?

I was specific. Moderate-realism is another name for immanent realism. Telling me to "be specific" is like saying, "What, the evening star? Be specific--you mean Venus, correct?"

In terms of motion? No, I'm not. If you're talking motion, thats physics. If I reject Aquinas, its because its not empirically valid. Again, i've explained this already.

You're misunderstood my method. I'm confident in epistemic dualism, as long as the scientists stay away from trying to do what philosophers are for. So long as they do that, we're good. We are certain to get some kooks like Richard Dawkins who think they can do philosophy. The best we can do is tell them why they're wrong and hope they come back around.

Aquinas is rejected for attempting to make statements on metaphysics. Any realist must reject it.

I'm not arguing science for darwinism. Thats absurd.

All physics presupposes a metaphysics. If you don't know that, you should. If you do, then you know that asserting anything about motion, particularly with reference to Aquinas' argument, assumes a metaphysical understanding of motion. You rejected Aquinas' account. You are either obligated to show where he went wrong, or I am not obligated to take your rejection seriously.

In any case, as I've repeatedly said, I'm not a realist. I'm a moderate-realist.

If its not rational realism, its not good empiricism.

More assertions without argument.

There are many ways to look at the picture, but what I described is word for word the simpler account. Your view has all kinds of additional commentary with a clear set of presuppositions you hold.

Perhaps I should ask you to prove all those "bald assertions" and then continue to employ radical skepticism of it or ask for more prove of those proofs for "your position".

You can call it classical empiricism, but that doesn't help your position a single bit.

More assertions without argument . . .

Do you even bother to read what you link to?

Commentators on Aristotle from the 2nd century on tended to interpret Aristotle's mathematical objects as mental objects, which made Aristotle more compatible with neo-Platonism. Later the mechanistic movement in the late Renaissance treated Aristotle as divorcing mathematics from physical sciences in order to drive a deeper wedge between their views and his. Because of this, it has been very easy to discount Aristotle as subscribing to a version of psychologism in mathematics. These tendencies contribute to the common view that Aristotle's views mathematics are marginal to his thought. More recently, however, sympathetic readers have seen Aristotle as expressing a fictionalist version of physicalism, the view that the objects of mathematics are fictional entities grounded in physical objects. To the extent that this view is regarded as a plausible view about mathematics

Who's factually wrong?

You are. You said that they did not take math seriously, or, in your own words, that "Aristotle and later on Aquinas didn't find mathematics to be of much use." The section of the article you quoted doesn't prove you right. On the contrary, read what you actually quoted. Those who make your argument assume that Aristotle is a neo-Platonist. That misinterpreted contributed to the view that mathematics was marginal to his thought. The article is telling you that you are wrong.

But let's look back at the article again. Let's just start at the beginning:

• Aristotle uses mathematics and mathematical sciences in three important ways in his treatises.

Well, there you go. First sentence.

Are you now going to tell me that your Immanent realism has now assimilated Fictionalism?

Of course it is! That is a surprise to you? The alternative is Platonism. The basic assertion of moderate realism is that "The only basic realities . . . remain substances, however we are to conceive them." Mathematical objects like numbers are not substances, so they don't really exist. They are grounded in physical realities (substances). But they themselves are not substances.

Your incredulity on this point either shows a gross misunderstanding of moderate realism, and classical theism generally, or a serious pre-commitment to Platonism. Again, as I've argued at least two serious arguments against Platonism, I don't know why this surprises you in the least.

Now, here you are, wrong yet again, Dom. My advice to you is to stop assuming things and start asking questions.

I see what you're saying, but I don't see how you're confusing where there is constant conjunction. Let me put it this way, if you get metaphysics from what clearly is just physics, you're doing it wrong.

And as I noted before, all physics presumes a metaphysics. To claim you can do one without doing the other is naive and buys into the fallacy of scientism.

Again, Jac, you're wrong. I mentioned motion, and it doesn't matter what Aquinas calls it. Are we both talking about the same thing? Motion is a fact, but what kind of fact is it? Aquinas believes theres a metaphysical explanation behind the motion, and I firmly reject this. Its illegitimate empiricism. Motion is physics, and only physics. Constant conjunction. There is no necessary connection. Rational realism. This isn't a straw man argument. Move on.

Giving orders to 'move on' doesn't make for constructive discussion, Dom.

How can you say "Aquinas is wrong--he misunderstood motion" and then say it doesn't matter what Aquinas calls motion?!? The fact is, you said he was wrong in his view of motion. Now, I am AGAIN asking you to demonstrate your claim. Explain Aquinas' view of motion and point out where it fails. Frankly, I'm now wondering if you are stalling because you made another assertion here that you can't back up with evidence.

Thats an illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism.

Wrong AGAIN. It's the traditional understanding of the concept of empiricism.

• The dispute between rationalism and empiricism concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge. Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience. Empiricists claim that sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge.

For Aquinas, like all empiricists, all knowledge (even the knowledge of what motion is) begins in the senses. So when Aquinas says, "some things are in motion," he gets that from the senses. Then, he says, that "whatever is in motion is put in motion by another." How does he know that? That's the issue we are discussing. You are saying he is wrong because there is no necessary connection to motion. Aquinas says that is absurd, because as a traditional empiricist, all knowledge begins in the senses. He goes on to demonstrate how this is so: "for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality."

In other words, Aquinas is defining motion here. His whole argument rests on the definition of motion. So for you to say that it doesn't matter how he used the word is just absurd and grossly misrepresents Aquinas. Far from being an "illegitimate extension of . . . empiricism," this is good empiricist philosophy. Since YOU are the one rejecting it, YOU are the one obligated to show why he is mistaken. He has made and defended his assertions. You, now, have made an assertion (that he is incorrect in his use of 'motion'). Now, defend your claim, or I'll ignore it from here on out as just another of your unsubstantiated opinions.

I didn't misunderstand you. Did you ever think, maybe I misunderstood him before you went off on me about this whole argument?

The fact is, you came in with an argument against my position, but its clear you didn't care for any clarification I offered and practically demand that I understand your position of skepticism as factual. I've yet to hear why I or anyone else reading this discussion and argument should accept the presuppositions you've brought here. Your refusal to do so on the ground that you don't think its relevant or brought into this discussion is academically dishonest. End of story.

In contrast, I've been perfectly open to my statements clearly despite your baseless skepticism. I should have simply ignored them, as I usually do. But because we're believers in the same God, I was willing to see if your skepticism was valid.

I've not presumed skepticism. Your entire argument for the existence of the self and God are rooted in a position called methodological skepticism (the specific form being Cartesian Doubt). I'm asking you to be consistent with your own position.

Second, your argument for the soundness of the KCA's second premise is either predicated on the soundness of modern science--which makes it an inductive argument and therefore necessarily non-conclusive--or it is predicated on the philosophical arguments against the possibility of a beginningless universe. Those philosophical arguments, however, are flawed, as they all presume Platonism. It isn't skepticism to not be a Platonist, Dom.

And you're brought your presuppositions into your argument against my position.

The naturalist fallacy is not a term reserved for debates on ethics. Ethics is just simply the most common way to object naturalist based arguments.
We recognize that nature has no connection to ethics, so what does it have a connection to? NOTHING! Thats why you can't connect it to any argument.

Nature is not going to tell you if something actually infinite exists outside nature, and on the flip side its not going to tell you it doesn't exist outside nature.

For example, does nature prove that numbers exist?

Again, I'd have to ask you what you mean by nature, because I would STRONGLY disagree with the assertion that nature has nothing to do with ethics (since I am a natural law theorist in that regard). But, that sees 'nature' as referring to essence. Anyway, to say that 'nature' has no connection to ANYTHING is just really absurd in my rather humble opinion. Nature is connected to EVERYTHING. All knowledge begins in the senses, and what you sense is nature. So all knowledge starts in nature.

Regarding numbers, I don't think they exist at all, so how could nature prove that they exist? Beyond THAT, nature doesn't prove anything exists. The intellect does, based on what it learns from studying nature. Everything we know, we know from studying nature. So that's all the reason more that you still haven't shown how I've committed any 'naturalistic fallacy.' Make it clear for me. Define it first, and then put it in a syllogistic format. If I'm wrong, I'll accept correction. If not, I'll defend myself.

Jac, you have presuppositions, and I'm not letting you off the hook for them. Look at the 2 sentences I underlined.

We haven't had any discussion about what you believe, yet my position is against the face of evidence and plainly irrational?

Nice try, Jac. You're a skeptic (and an irrational one at that), and you have "bald" presuppositions.

I'm holding you to every presupposition, Jac. If you refuse to play ball, you can't complain that I've taken my ball and went home.

In the past two threads, I've pointed out that I'm a moderate realist (only to point out where you were wrong in asserting I had to be a realist or a nominalist). I've pointed out that I'm NOT a Platonist in response to your arguments assuming Platonism. I now point out that I'm not a skeptic. Rather, I'm a common sense empiricist in the mold of Aquinas and Aristotle.

You, however, have made a long series of claims, most of which you have provided no evidence for ("Thoughts exist, so I do to," "Numbers are real," etc.) or have been factually wrong about ("Aquinas didn't take math seriously," etc.). Against that, the evidence we have discussed in this very thread is against your position. Cartesian doubt says you doubt everything doubtable. I concede that you can't doubt that thoughts exist. I do not concede that you cannot doubt that you exist. To that, I refer you to the opening comments in this reply. To take another example, you've argue that the second premise of the KCA is not defended on the basis of science but rather on the basis of philosophy. ut the KCA is not based on philosophical grounds--at least not as popularly defended. I just watched a two hour debate between Ken Ham and Hugh Ross (and some others, but they aren't important) on TBN (not the Ankerburg debate). Ross consistently appealed to the Big Bang as requiring a Big Banger, which is essentially a popular form of the the KCA (and poorly stated, insofar as he left out the major premise--he just assumed that the universe, coming into existence as it did, required a cause; the first premise of the KCA does prove that, but Ross just assumes it). Guess how many times he appealed to the philosophy of infinities? Not once.

Now, perhaps you will argue that Ross isn't a good defender of the KCA. You seem to think that the KCA can rather be proven on strictly philosophical terms, and therefore science has nothing contribute to it. If so, I just point out that your argument for the KCA assumes an A-Theory of time (which is debatable) and Platonism generally (which is highly debatable). Classical theists, Aristotelian, and modern philosophers would all reject the second premise on strictly philosophical terms. The only people who would and do accept it on strictly philosophical terms are modern neo-platonic, analytical (usually Christian) philosophers.

Now, perhaps the modern neo-platonic, analytical philosophers are correct. But to just assume that is absurd. It shows a degree of arrogance on your part that doesn't take other views seriously, which in turn suggests an inherent weakness in your position. Still more, if you really want to present it as a philosophical argument, you need to stop appealing to the Big Bang as evidence for the second premise, because the moment you appeal to it, you are making--necessarily--an inductive appeal to its validity. But as I have been arguing the entire time: inductive proofs can never be certain. They are always, by nature, probabilistic.

So we come to the bottom line on the KCA: either it is necessarily true and can be deduced from pure reason (making it a philosophical deduction), or it is contingently true and proven inductively. If the former, science has no place in the argument (anymore than science has any place in defending the major premise); if the latter, then the second premise needs to be recast in inductive terms (i.e., 'the universe probably came into existence'), and to cast it certainly leaves you with a God of the Gaps argument. Moreover, casting an inductive argument in certain terms leaves you with a circular argument, because they only way to prove it is to ultimately make theistic assumptions. So choose which the KCA is (for you): a philosophical demonstration of the First Cause, in which case we have no place or need for scientific induction; or a scientific induction as to the probability of a First Cause, in which case it is not a philosophical proof.

These aren't my assumptions or assertions. These are the facts that your own position has to deal with. If you ever decide to reply to the arguments I've presented in favor of my own views, I'll defend them where necessary, just as you are required to do of yours here.

I did defend my position. They don't satisfy your skepticism. Not my problem, Jac.

And I point out that you've not defended your position. You've baldly asserted it. The most "defense" you've offered is incredulity that anyone would doubt your Platonism.

Now, you have a lot of work to do here. If you want to "line by line" this you can--but for your sake and others', here's the big ideas as I see them:

1. The defensibility of the KCA's second premise as a deductive or inductive argument
2. The defensibility of your claim that there are thoughts, and therefore you exist (as an enduring agent)
3. The defensibility of your claim that Aquinas did not understand motion properly
4. The defensibility of your claim that I've committed a naturalistic fallacy
5. The defensibility of your claim that numbers really exist (which is to say, a defense of Platonism generally)

There are other issues, I imagine. Perhaps I missed them, but those are the big ones that I see. As it stands, you've offered little to no defense of any of these. Asking you to defend your claims is not unreasonable. It is, however, unreasonable for you to just assert them without defense and claim that is enough.

[domokunrox]

You know what, Jac? I've thought about this recently, and I was dead set on just not replying. Your recent post doesn't deserve my effort or my time, but you know what? I did it anyway.

You presented no argument, Dom. You can't just assert that you know something. That's not an argument.

Define argument. I have a belief and provided the justification for it. Its hit you in the face several times. I'm not interested in giving you a greek style 1, 2, 3, 4, etc, therefore blah blah argument.

All you've shown for sure is that there are thoughts. You have shown no necessary connection between a thought and a thinker--much less have you proved that any such agent must necessarily be enduring from one moment to the next. If you take any time to read any pro-choice philosophic literature, one of the things you will find is that on a materialistic worldview, the notion of a "soul" is rejected. Personal identity is grounded in all kinds of things. One such example is the memory. The "I" is nothing more (on this view) than the collection of memories a particular body has.

No, heres where you're making obvious mistakes in understanding how to use an epistemological dualism philosophy like mine. Relations of ideas are NECESSARILY CONNECTED, and absolutely true. They CANNOT be false in the understanding of their representations.

Matters of fact (Res extensa) however is CONSTANT CONJUNCTION.

Recap
Relations of ideas is Necessary connection
Matters of fact is Constant conjunction

I must exist as an imperfect, mental substance. (A thing that thinks). I don't need to show you that there is a necessary connection between thoughts and the thinker because its not MATTER OF FACT (Epistemology). Its RELATIONS OF IDEAS (Epistemology), and the relations of ideas are ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN. You don't fundamentally understand this, then you just didn't read Descartes Meditations on first philosophy. I'm not going to copy/paste that whole chapter here for you.

Neither I, nor Descartes have made any mention that we are "enduring agents" (whatever that is) and any other foreign things you're thinking of and brought up. Stop putting words in my mouth or start using terminology I mention.

I doubt but I cannot doubt...
Cogito ergo sum
Res cogitans (an imperfect, mental substance)
Ideas are indubitable as ideas (Relations of ideas)
I have the idea of a mind other than my own with all possible perfections (Where did this idea come from?)
The idea of God MUST BE INNATE in my mind (an imperfect substance CANNOT come up with the idea of perfection)
The ontological argument
God is proven
NOW there is JUSTIFICATION for the existance of res extensa, logic, and so on.

Now, I reject that view, but I can't just say, "It's wrong because I know that I exist as an enduring agent." Moreover, since your entire proof for God rests on this bare assertion of your own continued existence, then your argument for God fails. In fact, in turns out to be circular, because (as Descartes teases out), enduring immaterial agents necessarily presuppose a supernatural existence beyond themselves. So when you just assume you are an enduring, immaterial agent you effectively are just assuming God exists. That's why your proof both for yourself and for God fails.

There is no assertion that I have my own continued existence, and neither does my view presuppose a supernatural existence beyond myself. Read Descartes Meditations on first philosophy. Until then, just forget about your objection.
I don't even agree with all other of Descartes ideas, btw. I discard several mathematical ideas he came up with. Namely, all that logical impossibilities stuff and his mind/body theory

Beyond that, I've never asked for a classroom lecture on anything. I've simply asked--repeatedly--for proof for your assertion that just because there are thoughts, therefore you exist. Claiming that ideas are indubitable is no proof. You're just assuming your Cartesianism.

Jac, its best that you read the book. If you fundamentally do not understand and object to this very first discovery Descartes makes, then you've simply just need to read the book to see why you're wrong. If you still disagree, then fine. No further discussion is needed on Descartes. Quoting someone else who thinks his genius defeats his own genius doesn't get you anywhere. I can see the headline now. Someone else thinks someone else is wrong. He was so smart, he outsmarted himself. More at 11.

Because there is no proof for it. When you say, "The universe began to exist," I say, "That may not be true. It may be true that the universe did not begin to exist." I'm not affirming that the universe did not come into existence. I am saying that you have not proven the second premise.

No, let me correct you. You're saying that you don't know anything, and because you say that you don't know if the universe began to exist. that "may not be true". You've made a claim here. You're admitting your own ignorance on the matter (in which case, why are you arguing that you know something?) or you're telling me that I'm wrong (in which case, you have burden of proof now). To deny truth is to affirm another truth, Jac. Get familiar with this phrase. I use it all the time, and it makes the skeptics honest or shows them for the cowards they are. Start making sense, Jac. Do NOT waste my time with post modern nonsense.

Now, you say, "I prove it by . . ." and then appeal to actual infinities not existing. I say, "How do you know that actual infinities do not exist" and then you appeal to Platonism. Now, I--as do a lot of people--reject Platonism. So that doesn't work. Here you have to be careful to avoid a circular argument. You can either try to prove Platonism separately from the KCA and then use it in support of the KCA, or you can find a different way to support the non-existence of infinities. What you can't do is use the universe's finite nature to prove the impossibility of infinities and thus support Platonism (in this case--if you can prove the universe is finite on non-Platonic grounds, then you can use that as support of your Platonism). That would be circular.

I don't really appeal to Platonism as you say that I do. Your version of fictionalism appears post modern. My justification on holding a platonic view on numbers is simple. The relations of ideas allow us to reconstruct those mathematical ideas WITHOUT the matter of facts. The spatial extension isn't an illusion, the idea BEHIND IT is the true reality (God). God is foundational to ALL knowledge. It baffles me that you're arguing this with me because my position has far more support from a biblical standpoint.

I gave you one such argument from Aquinas himself that I am sympathetic to. Unfortunately, it turns out to be rather weak and turns out to beg the question if we use it in support of the KCA. So I, personally, see no philosophical proof for the second premise. Go tell it to your Platonist friends, and they'll agree with you. Fine. But for those of us (the majority) who are not Platonists, then your proof is no proof. This is doubly true for those of us who have strong arguments against Platonism.

You, personally, see no philosophical proof, but you could be personally wrong. I expect better then post modern disagreements, Jac. Listen, we both agree theres a mind behind it. Yet, it baffles me that you're doing it backwards. You agree with the bible that there was a beginning and there was the word, yet you insist on trying to prove that the existence of spatial extension (without justification) is primary to your philosophy. That the undeniable fact of motion proves (or even comes close to suggesting) that in the beginning there was the word. Boggles my mind. Look, we certainly could respect each other's philosophies but your criticism of mine is wholly misguided and clear to me that you severely misunderstand it.

But for your benefit, I decided that I was going to get it 1 last shot to clear up your misunderstanding

People are convinced that thinks are true by bad arguments all the time. You know that.

So what? All you're telling me is that people have poor misunderstanding on philosophy and knowledge and it does not follow. This isn't groundbreaking information, but thanks for the reminder. Now, do you have a valid point to make here or not?

I don't either. You won't answer questions and you just keep asserting your opinion without backing it up with any kind of evidence. Again, quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.

I did anyway, Jac. To reject one truth is to affirm another truth. Justification has hit you in the face several times. If you refuse to consider it, and reject it then thats on you. Not me.

It's not skepticism. It's accusing you of special pleading. You claim with Descartes that we ought to be skeptical of everything that cannot be absolutely (mathematically) certain. That's your mathematicism coming in. Yet your own arguments don't even meet your own standards, as I've repeatedly demonstrated.

Theres no special pleading, Jac. We cannot be justified in the belief of res extensa as an axiom. We however can be justified in res cogitans and relations of ideas.

No, I'm charging you with the sin of lying against me. If you have no defense for it, then I have no reason not to conclude that you've lied about me. If you have a defense, then let's hear it.

All I was accusing you of was being academically dishonest. Maybe its not true at all. Its possible that you just don't know.
Thats all I'm going to give you, Jac. You're being dishonest or you don't know. I am not going to tell you you're right because you are not.
Calling me a liar and then citing the bible for it is just foul, and you should know better.

I was specific. Moderate-realism is another name for immanent realism. Telling me to "be specific" is like saying, "What, the evening star? Be specific--you mean Venus, correct?"

No, it isn't specific. Immanent realism has about 4 different flavors or so

All physics presupposes a metaphysics. If you don't know that, you should. If you do, then you know that asserting anything about motion, particularly with reference to Aquinas' argument, assumes a metaphysical understanding of motion. You rejected Aquinas' account. You are either obligated to show where he went wrong, or I am not obligated to take your rejection seriously.

In any case, as I've repeatedly said, I'm not a realist. I'm a moderate-realist.

Incorrect. There is no justification for res extensa as an axiom. It is possible that you are having a dream.
What kind of immanent realist are you?

More assertions without argument.

You don't have a rational basis for res extensa. Therefore, any argument you make regarding what reality is, is circular reasoning.

You are. You said that they did not take math seriously, or, in your own words, that "Aristotle and later on Aquinas didn't find mathematics to be of much use." The section of the article you quoted doesn't prove you right. On the contrary, read what you actually quoted. Those who make your argument assume that Aristotle is a neo-Platonist. That misinterpreted contributed to the view that mathematics was marginal to his thought. The article is telling you that you are wrong.

No, it enforces my position. Aristotle is first and foremost a natural scientist.

• Aristotle uses mathematics and mathematical sciences in three important ways in his treatises.

Well, there you go. First sentence.

Incorrect. Of course Aristotle presupposes math. He has to. Maybe you misunderstand what I was saying.

Aristotle did not think that math was of any use to understanding what the true reality is.

Of course it is! That is a surprise to you? The alternative is Platonism. The basic assertion of moderate realism is that "The only basic realities . . . remain substances, however we are to conceive them." Mathematical objects like numbers are not substances, so they don't really exist. They are grounded in physical realities (substances). But they themselves are not substances.

Fictionalism does not always include immanent realism.

"The only basic realities remain substances"
And what substances are those?
Res cogitans? Res extensa? Both? Where is the justification for those axioms?

"However we are to conceive them"
How do you conceive them? Are they conceived res cogitans? or res extensa?
Eyeballs, skin, noses, tongues, ears, and the physical brain are ALL objects of res extensa. Here is where the rubber meets the road, Jac. Lets see if your reasoning is circular or not.

Your incredulity on this point either shows a gross misunderstanding of moderate realism, and classical theism generally, or a serious pre-commitment to Platonism. Again, as I've argued at least two serious arguments against Platonism, I don't know why this surprises you in the least.

Again, I have no commitment to platonism. I don't consider myself a platonist.

My advice to you is to stop assuming things and start asking questions.

Same to you, buddy. However, you need to throw your view out there.

And as I noted before, all physics presumes a metaphysics. To claim you can do one without doing the other is naive and buys into the fallacy of scientism.

And as I already said, there is no rational justification for res extensa.

Giving orders to 'move on' doesn't make for constructive discussion, Dom.

How can you say "Aquinas is wrong--he misunderstood motion" and then say it doesn't matter what Aquinas calls motion?!? The fact is, you said he was wrong in his view of motion. Now, I am AGAIN asking you to demonstrate your claim. Explain Aquinas' view of motion and point out where it fails. Frankly, I'm now wondering if you are stalling because you made another assertion here that you can't back up with evidence.

Again, res extensa can only give us impressions, but it does not prove that is it THE reality. Dreams can give you impressions as well.
Physical motion ---> res extensa ----> matters of fact
Ideas ----> res cogitans -----> necessary connection

Wrong AGAIN. It's the traditional understanding of the concept of empiricism.

• The dispute between rationalism and empiricism concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge. Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience. Empiricists claim that sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge.

For Aquinas, like all empiricists, all knowledge (even the knowledge of what motion is) begins in the senses. So when Aquinas says, "some things are in motion," he gets that from the senses. Then, he says, that "whatever is in motion is put in motion by another." How does he know that? That's the issue we are discussing. You are saying he is wrong because there is no necessary connection to motion. Aquinas says that is absurd, because as a traditional empiricist, all knowledge begins in the senses. He goes on to demonstrate how this is so: "for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality."

In other words, Aquinas is defining motion here. His whole argument rests on the definition of motion. So for you to say that it doesn't matter how he used the word is just absurd and grossly misrepresents Aquinas. Far from being an "illegitimate extension of . . . empiricism," this is good empiricist philosophy. Since YOU are the one rejecting it, YOU are the one obligated to show why he is mistaken. He has made and defended his assertions. You, now, have made an assertion (that he is incorrect in his use of 'motion'). Now, defend your claim, or I'll ignore it from here on out as just another of your unsubstantiated opinions.

"Senses" are res extensa. Your reasoning is CIRCULAR.

What is the true reality, Jac?

Res extensa?

Or do you finally get why its ONLY rational because of the idea behind it is res cogitans? The IDEA behind it (God and his Perfection)

I've not presumed skepticism. Your entire argument for the existence of the self and God are rooted in a position called methodological skepticism (the specific form being Cartesian Doubt). I'm asking you to be consistent with your own position.

I am consistent. I am not going to recite from Descartes' book. I hate asking people to just read a book, but you need to. I dunno what it is with you.

Second, your argument for the soundness of the KCA's second premise is either predicated on the soundness of modern science--which makes it an inductive argument and therefore necessarily non-conclusive--or it is predicated on the philosophical arguments against the possibility of a beginningless universe. Those philosophical arguments, however, are flawed, as they all presume Platonism. It isn't skepticism to not be a Platonist, Dom.

Again, I don't consider myself a platonist.

Again, I'd have to ask you what you mean by nature, because I would STRONGLY disagree with the assertion that nature has nothing to do with ethics (since I am a natural law theorist in that regard). But, that sees 'nature' as referring to essence. Anyway, to say that 'nature' has no connection to ANYTHING is just really absurd in my rather humble opinion. Nature is connected to EVERYTHING. All knowledge begins in the senses, and what you sense is nature. So all knowledge starts in nature.

I fundamentally disagree with sentence I underlined, and I've repeated multiple times why. Senses are res extensa, therefore you are circular in your reasoning.

Regarding numbers, I don't think they exist at all, so how could nature prove that they exist? Beyond THAT, nature doesn't prove anything exists. The intellect does, based on what it learns from studying nature. Everything we know, we know from studying nature. So that's all the reason more that you still haven't shown how I've committed any 'naturalistic fallacy.' Make it clear for me. Define it first, and then put it in a syllogistic format. If I'm wrong, I'll accept correction. If not, I'll defend myself.

I want to point out what I underlined

Numbers: "I don't think they exist at all".
YET, you use them, do you not?

"Nature doesn't prove anything exists. The intellect does"
Whoa! Now we're onto something! What is the intellect, Jac?

"Everything we know, we know from studying nature"
*pounds head on desk*

"syllogistic format"
*pounds head on desk*
No thanks, Jac. I'll stick to the formal logic and way of thinking things out.

In the past two threads, I've pointed out that I'm a moderate realist (only to point out where you were wrong in asserting I had to be a realist or a nominalist). I've pointed out that I'm NOT a Platonist in response to your arguments assuming Platonism. I now point out that I'm not a skeptic. Rather, I'm a common sense empiricist in the mold of Aquinas and Aristotle.

Great, I still hold you to your presuppositions.

You, however, have made a long series of claims, most of which you have provided no evidence for ("Thoughts exist, so I do to," "Numbers are real," etc.) or have been factually wrong about ("Aquinas didn't take math seriously," etc.). Against that, the evidence we have discussed in this very thread is against your position. Cartesian doubt says you doubt everything doubtable. I concede that you can't doubt that thoughts exist. I do not concede that you cannot doubt that you exist. To that, I refer you to the opening comments in this reply. To take another example, you've argue that the second premise of the KCA is not defended on the basis of science but rather on the basis of philosophy. ut the KCA is not based on philosophical grounds--at least not as popularly defended. I just watched a two hour debate between Ken Ham and Hugh Ross (and some others, but they aren't important) on TBN (not the Ankerburg debate). Ross consistently appealed to the Big Bang as requiring a Big Banger, which is essentially a popular form of the the KCA (and poorly stated, insofar as he left out the major premise--he just assumed that the universe, coming into existence as it did, required a cause; the first premise of the KCA does prove that, but Ross just assumes it). Guess how many times he appealed to the philosophy of infinities? Not once.

Now, perhaps you will argue that Ross isn't a good defender of the KCA. You seem to think that the KCA can rather be proven on strictly philosophical terms, and therefore science has nothing contribute to it. If so, I just point out that your argument for the KCA assumes an A-Theory of time (which is debatable) and Platonism generally (which is highly debatable). Classical theists, Aristotelian, and modern philosophers would all reject the second premise on strictly philosophical terms. The only people who would and do accept it on strictly philosophical terms are modern neo-platonic, analytical (usually Christian) philosophers.

Now, perhaps the modern neo-platonic, analytical philosophers are correct. But to just assume that is absurd. It shows a degree of arrogance on your part that doesn't take other views seriously, which in turn suggests an inherent weakness in your position. Still more, if you really want to present it as a philosophical argument, you need to stop appealing to the Big Bang as evidence for the second premise, because the moment you appeal to it, you are making--necessarily--an inductive appeal to its validity. But as I have been arguing the entire time: inductive proofs can never be certain. They are always, by nature, probabilistic.

So we come to the bottom line on the KCA: either it is necessarily true and can be deduced from pure reason (making it a philosophical deduction), or it is contingently true and proven inductively. If the former, science has no place in the argument (anymore than science has any place in defending the major premise); if the latter, then the second premise needs to be recast in inductive terms (i.e., 'the universe probably came into existence'), and to cast it certainly leaves you with a God of the Gaps argument. Moreover, casting an inductive argument in certain terms leaves you with a circular argument, because they only way to prove it is to ultimately make theistic assumptions. So choose which the KCA is (for you): a philosophical demonstration of the First Cause, in which case we have no place or need for scientific induction; or a scientific induction as to the probability of a First Cause, in which case it is not a philosophical proof.

These aren't my assumptions or assertions. These are the facts that your own position has to deal with. If you ever decide to reply to the arguments I've presented in favor of my own views, I'll defend them where necessary, just as you are required to do of yours here.

My response, in short.

I've made my statement and provided my justification.

You do, however, beg the question in MANY of your skeptical questions because you assume that the conclusion is false.

To deny the truth is to affirm another truth, Jac. Again, get acquainted with this sentence.

1. The defensibility of the KCA's second premise as a deductive or inductive argument

The KCA is defended on grounds of philosophy. Some induction? Of course. Zero is a number. Therefore, there is no actual infinite absurdity.

2. The defensibility of your claim that there are thoughts, and therefore you exist (as an enduring agent)

Gross misunderstanding of Descartes. I've already addressed it.

3. The defensibility of your claim that Aquinas did not understand motion properly

He didn't. Its circular reasoning. I've already addressed it.

4. The defensibility of your claim that I've committed a naturalistic fallacy

There is no rational basis for res extensa. Circular reasoning. I've already addressed it.

5. The defensibility of your claim that numbers really exist (which is to say, a defense of Platonism generally)

Numbers are abstract objects. You don't need to be a platonist to conclude that. Thats a gross misunderstanding.

There are other issues, I imagine. Perhaps I missed them, but those are the big ones that I see. As it stands, you've offered little to no defense of any of these. Asking you to defend your claims is not unreasonable. It is, however, unreasonable for you to just assert them without defense and claim that is enough.

Thats it, Jac.

[Byblos]

Other than a reminder to all to keep your language civil ...

[Jac3510]

You know what, Jac? I've thought about this recently, and I was dead set on just not replying. Your recent post doesn't deserve my effort or my time, but you know what? I did it anyway.

Relax, I'll just do that favor for you.