Total Depravity

[Byblos]

Ok, Byblos. I believe, as I've said before, that God gives man free-will, in the sense that He gives man the ability to choose to have faith in Christ, or choose to deny Christ. I believe that God wants us to choose to love Him. If the only way we are able to choose to love Him, is that some choose not to love Him, then that's the way it is. Love is not love, if it is forced. Double predestination, IMO, is forced love.

I know the argument Rick, I believe it myself, but it doesn't take away from the fact that it's at least semi-paleagian. It is a fact that without this cooperation one is not saved so either this cooperation is totally inherent within the person (semi-paleagianism) or it is coming from God (TD). There really is no escaping that.

there are only 2 positions, TD on one side and semi-paleagianism on the other, there is no in between. If you're not with one you're with the other.

So, you believe that the Catholic and Arminian views are semi-Pelagian?

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

[PaulSacramento]

Ok, Byblos. I believe, as I've said before, that God gives man free-will, in the sense that He gives man the ability to choose to have faith in Christ, or choose to deny Christ. I believe that God wants us to choose to love Him. If the only way we are able to choose to love Him, is that some choose not to love Him, then that's the way it is. Love is not love, if it is forced. Double predestination, IMO, is forced love.

I know the argument Rick, I believe it myself, but it doesn't take away from the fact that it's at least semi-paleagian. It is a fact that without this cooperation one is not saved so either this cooperation is totally inherent within the person (semi-paleagianism) or it is coming from God (TD). There really is no escaping that.

there are only 2 positions, TD on one side and semi-paleagianism on the other, there is no in between. If you're not with one you're with the other.

So, you believe that the Catholic and Arminian views are semi-Pelagian?

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

Do you believe that Grace is a Gift from God or something to be earned?

[RickD]

Ok, Byblos. I believe, as I've said before, that God gives man free-will, in the sense that He gives man the ability to choose to have faith in Christ, or choose to deny Christ. I believe that God wants us to choose to love Him. If the only way we are able to choose to love Him, is that some choose not to love Him, then that's the way it is. Love is not love, if it is forced. Double predestination, IMO, is forced love.

I know the argument Rick, I believe it myself, but it doesn't take away from the fact that it's at least semi-paleagian. It is a fact that without this cooperation one is not saved so either this cooperation is totally inherent within the person (semi-paleagianism) or it is coming from God (TD). There really is no escaping that.

there are only 2 positions, TD on one side and semi-paleagianism on the other, there is no in between. If you're not with one you're with the other.

So, you believe that the Catholic and Arminian views are semi-Pelagian?

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

I believe it is from God, but not as totally depraved, as T in tulip suggests.

[Jac3510]

Before we go on and accuse, disparage, or criticize Calvinism in any way (not accusing anyone in particular myself, I just know where these discussions often lead), here's a question I have yet to have a satisfactory answer for: If TD is wrong, could someone please offer an alternative that does NOT result in a paleagian or at a minimum a semi-paleagian position? Thank you very much.

As it happens, I made a post on this on another board I frequent.

I said there:

Still, a very basic sketch would simply start with the denial that man cannot place his faith in Christ apart from a special work of grace. I do think that faith is an basic function of a free will, and that a man may place his faith in anything he likes, including the work of God. The only special grace here is that the work must be revealed to him, which is done through the preaching of the Gospel (in whatever sense--I would include in that the reading of Scripture, etc.). It's hardly a mystical act. Anyway, that theological position aside, I see the issue of election in precisely the same way I see every other act of the free will. Since God can actualize my freely willed acts according to their free nature (e.g., riding a bike rather than walking to work), He can actualize my choice to place my faith in Christ without determining my choice. But that is not election. I don't think that God elects people to be in Christ. Rather, God elects those who are in Christ. We are found in Christ by being born again; we are born again when we place our faith in Him. Thus, God's election is not arbitrary. It is based on a real thing: my status as being in Christ rather than being in Adam. Simply, then, God elects all of those who are in Christ for salvation (which naturally entails my view of OSAS, with which you are completely familiar). God then predestines all of those whom He has elected (indeed, those whom He foreknew in the relational sense of the word) unto adoption, redemption, and glorification. In my view, predestination and election are not the same thing as they are for the Calvinist.

The bottom line, for me, is that if God can be the primary cause of any trivial choice without determining that choice (and I think He can), then God can be the primary cause of my faith, so long as faith springs from free will. Augustinians, of course, strongly reject that possibility. But since I am not Augustinian . . . I don't

There was a priest there who said he thought it was semi-pelagian on account that it left potentiality in God, but ultimately conceded that the difference was on the definition of 'freedom,' and moreover, that strictly speaking, what I was saying could potentially be permissible (so far as I understood him) insofar as it did not violate anything the Catholic Church has decreed de fide. In fact, if Molinism can avoid the semi-pelagian charge (and it must, since it has been heavily debated before several Popes and has been explicitly NOT condemned), then a fortiori I would think my own view does as well.

The problem you'll have with my view is not that it's semi-pelagian, but that it is anti-augustinian. But you asked for a non-pelagian alternative, not a non-augustinian alternative . . .

[PaulSacramento]

I think that it is a jump to go from original sin to total depravity.
Not a big jump mind you, but a jump nevertheless.
I often wonder if Augustine would have been "OK" with the notion of Total Depravity.

[PaulSacramento]

If God's grace is given freely by God them as anything GIVEN, it must be received ,yes?
And if it is received then one must choose to recieve it, yes?
The doctrine of "irresistible grace" says that, to those that grace is given, they can't resist it.
But unless one is forced to accept something, then is received, no?

[Byblos]

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

Do you believe that Grace is a Gift from God or something to be earned?

I'm not sure where this came from Paul since I'm arguing FOR TD (sort of) but to answer your question initial grace by which a person is justified is a free gift.

[Byblos]

Before we go on and accuse, disparage, or criticize Calvinism in any way (not accusing anyone in particular myself, I just know where these discussions often lead), here's a question I have yet to have a satisfactory answer for: If TD is wrong, could someone please offer an alternative that does NOT result in a paleagian or at a minimum a semi-paleagian position? Thank you very much.

As it happens, I made a post on this on another board I frequent.

I said there:

Still, a very basic sketch would simply start with the denial that man cannot place his faith in Christ apart from a special work of grace. I do think that faith is an basic function of a free will, and that a man may place his faith in anything he likes, including the work of God. The only special grace here is that the work must be revealed to him, which is done through the preaching of the Gospel (in whatever sense--I would include in that the reading of Scripture, etc.). It's hardly a mystical act. Anyway, that theological position aside, I see the issue of election in precisely the same way I see every other act of the free will. Since God can actualize my freely willed acts according to their free nature (e.g., riding a bike rather than walking to work), He can actualize my choice to place my faith in Christ without determining my choice. But that is not election. I don't think that God elects people to be in Christ. Rather, God elects those who are in Christ. We are found in Christ by being born again; we are born again when we place our faith in Him. Thus, God's election is not arbitrary. It is based on a real thing: my status as being in Christ rather than being in Adam. Simply, then, God elects all of those who are in Christ for salvation (which naturally entails my view of OSAS, with which you are completely familiar). God then predestines all of those whom He has elected (indeed, those whom He foreknew in the relational sense of the word) unto adoption, redemption, and glorification. In my view, predestination and election are not the same thing as they are for the Calvinist.

The bottom line, for me, is that if God can be the primary cause of any trivial choice without determining that choice (and I think He can), then God can be the primary cause of my faith, so long as faith springs from free will. Augustinians, of course, strongly reject that possibility. But since I am not Augustinian . . . I don't

There was a priest there who said he thought it was semi-pelagian on account that it left potentiality in God, but ultimately conceded that the difference was on the definition of 'freedom,' and moreover, that strictly speaking, what I was saying could potentially be permissible (so far as I understood him) insofar as it did not violate anything the Catholic Church has decreed de fide. In fact, if Molinism can avoid the semi-pelagian charge (and it must, since it has been heavily debated before several Popes and has been explicitly NOT condemned), then a fortiori I would think my own view does as well.

The problem you'll have with my view is not that it's semi-pelagian, but that it is anti-augustinian. But you asked for a non-pelagian alternative, not a non-augustinian alternative . . .

I know Jac, I remember the thread and as I recall at some point you had conceded that your position may be seen as semi-paleagian and that you were fine with that. Have I misunderstood or missed some important posts?

[PaulSacramento]

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

Do you believe that Grace is a Gift from God or something to be earned?

I'm not sure where this came from Paul since I'm arguing FOR TD (sort of) but to answer your question initial grace by which a person is justified is a free gift.

I thought so, but like I mentioned above, one must receive the "free gift" for it to be a gift.
How does one reconcile free will with TD ?

[Byblos]

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

Do you believe that Grace is a Gift from God or something to be earned?

I'm not sure where this came from Paul since I'm arguing FOR TD (sort of) but to answer your question initial grace by which a person is justified is a free gift.

I thought so, but like I mentioned above, one must receive the "free gift" for it to be a gift.
How does one reconcile free will with TD ?

I honestly don't know how they can be reconciled. But like I said, any system that relies on free will to cooperate with God's free gift, even if that cooperation is passive, is dancing around the semi-pelagian line.

[Jac3510]

I know Jac, I remember the thread and as I recall at some point you had conceded that your position may be seen as semi-paleagian and that you were fine with that. Have I misunderstood or missed some important posts?

I initially conceded that it could be semi-pelagian (could be being the key term). As the conversation progressed, it became clearer that the problem was with the rejection of Augustianism than it being explicitly semi-pelagian. That is, debate was over what it means for an act to be free, since I agree that all of our acts are primarily moved by God (including our free acts). So I would reject the (semi) Pelagian claim that we do anything in and of ourselves. The alternative my position offers differs from the Calvinist/Arminian/Catholic views in that it offers a different view on the natures of grace and faith.

[PaulSacramento]

Let me put this way, I haven't see an argument against TD that convinced me beyond any doubt.

Do you believe that Grace is a Gift from God or something to be earned?

I'm not sure where this came from Paul since I'm arguing FOR TD (sort of) but to answer your question initial grace by which a person is justified is a free gift.

I thought so, but like I mentioned above, one must receive the "free gift" for it to be a gift.
How does one reconcile free will with TD ?

I honestly don't know how they can be reconciled. But like I said, any system that relies on free will to cooperate with God's free gift, even if that cooperation is passive, is dancing around the semi-pelagian line.

Well, that tended to be the view before Augustine's theory on Original Sin, so perhaps it should be more rightly called something else.
If man is not free to accept grace, then it is not a gift and if it is not a gift, can it be called grace?
If God has preordanined who is to receive grace and they have no choice in the matter, then it is NOT a free gift or a gift of any kind.
While we all sin and are all born with the innate desire to sin, that has to do with the intent behind our actions.
I am not sure if we can have ill-intent in faith, can we?
If we do, then it isn't faith is it?

[Jac3510]

I honestly don't know how they can be reconciled. But like I said, any system that relies on free will to cooperate with God's free gift, even if that cooperation is passive, is dancing around the semi-pelagian line.

What do you think about the argument I made earlier in this thread, Byblos?

I think this gets at an even deeper issue of what it means to be human. Whether intentional or not, I think the T in the TULIP actually denies mankind their humanity. The moment you say, "the human nature is necessarily sinful (in the Calvinistic sense)," what you are saying is that sin is an essential property of the human nature. There's no way around that. That's what necessary means in this context--that thanks to the fall, human nature is such that it is now essentially sinful. But that means that anyone who can choose not to sin has a different sort of nature (namely, one to which sinfulness is accidental rather than essential). But in that case, both people cannot be said to be human! For if you change something's essential properties, you change what it is. Now, we know that Christ never sinned, so that means that either Christ is truly human and that we are not truly human (since Christ's nature is not essentially sinful whereas ours is), or it means that we are truly human but that Christ is not truly human. Both consequences seem, to me, absolutely absurd, for in either case, Christ is not as we are and therefore cannot be our mediator.

I realize I'm doing something here different than you intended--I'm providing an argument against TD. But I can't help it. When talking about this issue, I think we need to be consistent. If we are going to hold to the premise that TD is true and that TD entails that a person cannot choose not to sin, then we must explain why that is true: namely, because man is essentially sinful; which means that humanity is essentially sinful, and therefore a) anything non-sinful we do, we do because God overrides our humanity, and b) either we are not humans or Christ is not human (or, that Christ Himself was essentially sinful, contra Scripture).

How is it semi-pelagian to assert that human nature is such that it has a will, and that will can choose something if it perceives good in it? Obviously, nothing. That's the Catholic position on the will. So then why is it semi-pelagian to suggest that the intellect (which directs the will) can perceive goodness in Christ? I know that Augustinians just assert that it cannot be so, but why? What makes it semi-pelagianism deny Augustine here? The only way I can make heads or tales of it is to assert that the will cannot do anything good (thus the bondage of the will), but the only way to do THAT is say make the human nature essentially sinful. But if that, then since Christ was not essentially sinful, either we or Christ were not human.

Your thoughts?

[narnia4]

Byblos, I know you don't believe in the TULIP view of depravity. So, how do you answer your own question?

so now tell me, why is it that some cooperate with God's free gift and are saved, and yet others do not cooperate with God's free gift and remain reprobate? What is this secret power inherent in the ones that do believe that somehow is lacking in the ones that don't?

This is one of those conundrums I have for which I have no answer Rick. I don't believe in TD simply because I defer to the wisdom of my Church on the matter, it is as simple as that. But if you ask me if I find merit in it, the answer is a resounding YES. The way I see it there are only 2 positions, TD on one side and semi-paleagianism on the other, there is no in between. If you're not with one you're with the other.

To be honest this is sort of the direction my argument is meant to head toward. Maybe not strictly speaking, but it seems to me as if you can roughly divide things into two general camps. How exactly you should label them I don't know for sure, but that's the general direction I was heading for. I'm sure that the vast majority of Calvinists (who are usually a good deal more aggressive than I am) wouldn't give two hoots about what distinctions you could make.

Now we're getting somewhere. I think this is close to the nature of total depravity. But the scenario you set up is off. The reprobate does things that, were he saved, might be considered good, but are in fact tainted by sin. An unsaved person may not murder his boss, but that may only be because he doesn't want to get caught, or simply because he was raised that way. It might be "good" in one sense, but in a more serious sense everything he does is tainted by sin. And I alluded to this when I wrote about the nature of sin and how that seems to be close to the heart of the disagreement.

I just don't see how this helps the Calvinist, though.

I hope I don't miss something by cutting down points but I want to limit down the length of my reply somehow. To use the example I quoted earlier, a glass with a couple drops of poison mixed in. The whole glass (with whatever liquid it is, wine/water doesn't matter) isn't poison, but the entire glass it tainted.

But you brought up a point that makes it more clear, namely that rejecting Jesus is a sin. Man in his sinful state rejects God, he wants nothing to do with him. Because our actions are not of God, that taints every action. Now on a superficial level that seems to go against my argument, but I don't think it does. Regardless I think we may be able to mostly come to an agreement on what the important difference here actually is so the question becomes academic.

Moreover, I think this gets at an even deeper issue of what it means to be human. Whether intentional or not, I think the T in the TULIP actually denies mankind their humanity. The moment you say, "the human nature is necessarily sinful (in the Calvinistic sense)," what you are saying is that sin is an essential property of the human nature. There's no way around that. That's what necessary means in this context--that thanks to the fall, human nature is such that it is now essentially sinful. But that means that anyone who can choose not to sin has a different sort of nature (namely, one to which sinfulness is accidental rather than essential). But in that case, both people cannot be said to be human! For if you change something's essential properties, you change what it is. Now, we know that Christ never sinned, so that means that either Christ is truly human and that we are not truly human (since Christ's nature is not essentially sinful whereas ours is), or it means that we are truly human but that Christ is not truly human. Both consequences seem, to me, absolutely absurd, for in either case, Christ is not as we are and therefore cannot be our mediator.

I don't mind arguments against TD being presented for two reasons. First I allowed for it in my opening post. Second, I would much rather that someone actually present an argument rather than question beg and say that TD is false because its false and position x is true, and just leave it at that. That's happened before in discussions that I've had.

But I'm not going to commit myself to the scenario you presented, I feel as if there may be important distinctions (at least semantically) that some Calvinists would make. Unfortunately I can't put my finger right on it off the top of my head, but I guess that's what I get for being an amateur at present.

Actually, I will for a moment assume that your scenario is exactly correct. If what you present here is actually a problem, then I don't know see how it isn't a problem for every other position. The minute that you say that man has a sinful nature and that sin is a practical reality, the way I see it you're confronted with the exact same issue. Of course there is the obvious difference as well, that Christ was fully God.

[Jac3510]

Narnia, let me just quickly comment on this:

Actually, I will for a moment assume that your scenario is exactly correct. If what you present here is actually a problem, then I don't know see how it isn't a problem for every other position. The minute that you say that man has a sinful nature and that sin is a practical reality, the way I see it you're confronted with the exact same issue. Of course there is the obvious difference as well, that Christ was fully God.

Yes, Christ was fully God, but He was also fully man, and anything that makes Him less than man or that makes His human nature different from man's nature is going to be seriously problematic.

As far as how to answer your question, anyone who makes the sickness of sin accidental to the human nature will not have this problem. The problem is that TD advocates make the sickness of sin essential to the human nature insofar as we necessarily sin. I have no problem, again, with saying that we all sin as a practical matter. I have a problem with saying that we are not capable of not sinning by nature.

The moment you say that sin is a sickness that is accidental to the nature, you are no longer promoting TD as Calvinists say it, because it is no longer absolutely necessary for you to act according to your sin. Highly likely? Sure. But necessary? No. Not at all. I have no problem saying that we are all sick. I have a serious problem saying that the sickness of sin has become an essential part of our nature.