I was hoping to avoid this discussion until after I had read the book on this subject, but here I am. So pardon any ignorance on my part, I can't help myself.
Jac3510 wrote:As to how the argument is made, again, it's rather easy. The question is what we know. It's all boringly analytical. If I know X, then I know X and whatever is analytically implied by X. So if Y is analytically implied by X, then knowing X means I know (or can know, upon analysis) Y. But if Y is not so implied, then knowing X does not mean I know Y. In order to know Y, I would either need to know Y or some other Z that analytically implies Y.
So let's take the idea that all we really know are our ideas--our self-representations of the external world (whatever that is). X = ideas, and Y = the external reality to which X corresponds. We know X. Do we therefore know Y? No. Obviously not, since Y is not analytically implied by X. That's just definitional. There's no metaphysics or ontology that needs to be done here really. The statement, "X accurately represents Y" is a synthetic, not an analytical, statement.
Well, there's two objections I have here. One is that two different definitions of 'knowing' seem to be being used. When I
know an object, I clearly do not know everything about that object. Information theory would have strong objections there. Knowing an idea, also becomes a strange thing to say when I consider the second objection.. Two, our minds are at least partly physical. Knowledge/information is at least partly physical. Concepts, then, would be at least partly physical. When we think of a picture on a computer, we don't say that the picture on the computer is the object itself, we only say it's a representation. But, the picture is also still physical (somewhat) in the information that makes up this representation, because it is stored in a physical way on the computer. Now, intuitively, the picture is not the object, but it is at least somewhat accurately representing the object. Thus, while knowing Y might be impossible, we can at least know things ABOUT Y, and that is sufficient. We can also learn to approach Y through corroboration and deduction.
Now, this is where I get confused, so bear with me.
I suppose the question is, then, why does our idea X of object Y in any way accurately represent Y, and how can we even know? I have a few inclinations. One, I find it hard to know what an object is without knowing the fundamental pieces of an object. So, objects are made up of atoms and energy, and correspond to certain laws of nature. Atoms are made up of subatomic point-particles that exhibit a dual-nature. But, what are those objects made up of? Will this question continue on ad infinitum? I can't say I know the answer, and epistemic grounding seems difficult indeed. Munchhausen's trillemma seems difficult to answer, but I tend to agree with a more coherentist approach - we assume certain concepts and break them down into simpler common unknown denominators and work from there to explain things.
So, I suppose the problem I'm trying to represent is - what is a hylomorph? You're saying that every fork has a 'fork' essence? I think a fork is an emergent pattern that only has meaning to an intelligent being, and this concept is an abstraction invented by us - without a being to recognize such an object and classify the pattern, it remains a combination of simpler concepts. So, a fork is a complex shape made up of various different atoms and molecules - the essence behind the fork thus breaks down into the essences of these objects. So, each atom is made up of different sub atomic particles which have plank length, and perhaps it's these that have true essences since there can be nothing smaller can there? But then, what are these subatomic particles made up of if we have string theory? So, if these essences correspond to objects, it seems they must correspond to the most simple object to me, because I see nothing 'inherent' in a fork that gives it a fork like quality unless we define such a quality in our minds first. So, the object of a 'fork' is just a projection of an idea onto an object that isn't inherently thus, making the idea subjective. So, if an essence must correspond to the most fundamental particle, what is it about essences that we know and can we ever really know them since the question of composition seems to be of infinite regression?
Now, for this last paragraph, it's very possible I got the wrong idea here on essences. These are just my immediate inclinations whilst not having fully informed myself, so I apologize.
Now that's not a problem insofar as it goes. Perhaps I know X and I know Y. Then knowledge of the external world is possible. And better, we can compare X and Y and see whether or not they really correspond, thus confirming our knowledge. But if I can only know ideas, then I can never know Y. And if I can never know Y, then I can have no knowledge of the extra mental world, which is clearly absurd.
I think what bothers me is the dichotomy between X and Y and whether or not it's true. I know X is at least somewhat physical while Y seems entirely physical. There may be an essence Y that corresponds to the physical Y that wholly describes it, but is that really Y itself? I think back to Plato's allegory of the cave and the shadows being projected on the wall - clearly the shadows correspond to the real reality (the real reality being what creates the shadows) even if the shadows are not the things themselves. Thus, we can learn about the real reality even if our ideas don't seem to be the real reality itself.
Perhaps reality is similar to so: an object emits information about itself that is not wholly descriptive, but is partially descriptive. Each time an object emits information about itself, it also changes itself, thus, information about an object is always historical - but can still be used to make valid and accurate inferences. An object emits information along different channels of which our senses are able to pick up on some. While we may never fully understand an object (indeed, quantum mechanics leads us to believe that is impossible), we can at least approach accurate broader knowledge of an object that is emergent from higher order patterns. I think the dichotomy between mental and physical is possibly too stressed.
Why an object's information is nonrandom and in any way related to the object itself? Why does information about an object correspond accurately to these objects? Because the information itself is an object of sorts and has properties of sorts. Where do we get information about information? Well, it seems we necessary are able to get the information by having, in part, physical minds that can interpret and interact with it. Perhaps this makes certain aspects of knowledge impossible and makes material knowledge (through the senses) the only possible knowledge. That leaves an explanation for qualia and intent lacking, as they have no physical explanation, then (and the consciousness at some level). I don't have a good explanation for that, but I think this ontology handles part of the objections you raised quite soundly, but not completely.
These are only my immediate inclinations, however.
So, again, we either know things in themselves only, or we know both things in themselves and our internal representation of those things, or we know our internal representation of those things only. Thus, as soon as you say that all we know are internal representations, you admit the third option and therefore necessarily deny all knowledge of the extra-mental world.
So the only way to have knowledge of the extra mental world is to admit some possibility of things themselves apart from our internal representations of them. That means the thing itself must be in the mind and not merely a representation of that thing. But the moment you say that the thing itself is in your mind, you are necessarily admitting some form of hylomorphism.
Again, my inclination is that extra-mental and internal are difficult to define and the dichotomy seems to break down there. I accept the objection as being important and as one that must be addressed, I am just not sure it's necessarily true.
I think, my point is that: an accurate representation of an object is possible without the object being existent. We can have a picture of a horse on a computer but, upon searching the computer's memory, we will find no horse in the computer quite obviously. Even a nonphysical, immaterial essence of the horse doesn't seem necessary to construct the picture, an accurate picture, of a horse. Especially for human concepts like 'horses', 'forks, and other higher level emergent patterns that we classify as objects, I highly doubt those to have 'objective and true' essences. Rather, I think they are abstractions based on smaller ideas that break down into a most common denominator that might be objectively true. Even still, I can't be sure.
Perhaps it isn't a full blown Aristotelian hylomorphism you are admitting, but you are admitting to SOME kind, since material things cannot get inside a thought. Thoughts are immaterial, and therefore what they know is immaterial. Therefore if thought knows the thing itself, the thought knows the thing itself qua its immaterial self. Aristotle called that immaterial aspect of a thing its form. You can call it whatever you want. Admitting to its existence, you necessarily admit, again, to some form of hylomorphism.
Again, I'm not sure I admit to its existence because I would want a 'form' to correspond to the least common denominator of an object, and I'm not sure that LCD exists. It would seem to not be justifiable based on Munchhausen's trilemma, currently, and requires more knowledge for us to do so. Further, I think thoughts are, in part, physical.
So, I don't think 1) follows as concretely as you think. I'm still content to allow 2) be assumed true without justification until such time we can provide it. It might not be providable from our mind since our minds seem bound by some laws (including deterministic laws), and since our thoughts are somewhat physical and related to information theory, we are not capable of deciding an computationally undecidable problem (bringing my computer science degree into this, lol) since our thoughts and knowledge about the universe seem bound by physical, deterministic constraints and incapable of nondeterministic computing.
Again, apologies if my thoughts are somewhat ignorant, I still haven't had time to read your recommended book, but I promise it's on the to-do list.