Proof that GOD Exists

[RickD]

Would the athiest say it is objectively true that morality is subjective to the culture they live in?

An atheist in Canada will have a far different view of the morality of infanticide or the worth of women, than an atheist in China.
Simply because to them, morals are subjective.
Of course the Atheist in Canada has no reason to believe that the atheist Chinese view on infanticide or girls is morally wrong.

Paul, are the statements you made here, objectively true?

[Dudeacus97]

Not to mention another flaw with subjective morality: the heroes and criminals.

If we hold subjective morality to be true, then history's worst criminals and villains would be people like Mother Teresa, William Wilberforce, Buddha, Martin Luther King Jr., Mohandas Ghandi and Jesus Christ. Why? Because they saw what they thought was wrong in the societies they lived in and seeked to change them.

Not to mention that under subjective morality (if that's even the word) the heroes of a society are the people who are champions of it's morality. I'm going to use good Ol' Godwin's law and bring up the Nazi party (it was inevitable). In Nazi Germany, it was considered immoral to be a Gypsy, Homosexual, Jew, mentally handicapped person, or Communist. (I don't care if I forgot any.) The Nazi soldiers were very zealous about their ideology, moreso than many of us here, so technically they would be better people under subjective morality. So, of course, if we believe in subjective morality, the holocaust was perfectly fine because it's the Nazi system of morality and you simply have a different one. Same can be said about slavery, the Khemr Rogue, Stalin's Purge, and any other democide in history. To object to any "evil" done by the rulers of a society would be objective.

[PaulSacramento]

Would the athiest say it is objectively true that morality is subjective to the culture they live in?

An atheist in Canada will have a far different view of the morality of infanticide or the worth of women, than an atheist in China.
Simply because to them, morals are subjective.
Of course the Atheist in Canada has no reason to believe that the atheist Chinese view on infanticide or girls is morally wrong.

Paul, are the statements you made here, objectively true?

You'd have to ask "them".
To me, either there is a moral absolute or there isn't and if there is, then morals must be objective and not subjective.
In short, either infanticide is wrong because it is wrong (objective) or it is wrong because we don't think it is right ( subjective) if it i subjective then, if we decide to think it is right then it is not immoral.

[Beanybag]

Not so, morality seems to be self-correcting. Notice that racism, sexism, and general isms tend to be on the fall in more developed countries? A society that defines morality as what is best for a society will eventually approach that morality through a form of selection very similar to natural selection. Better societies with morals that are better for society will do better (and thus propagate its morality more effectively) than morals that are not as well-suited. The people who might 'define' morality are not necessarily moral if their morals turn out to be unhealthy for the society. A society might have rulers, but the society itself simulates an organism with all of its constituents making up the 'cells' of that organism. The health of a society correlates with the morality of that society (among other things). If a ruler advocates for a morality that is unhealthy to a society, it will inevitably be selected against.

You'd have to ask "them".
To me, either there is a moral absolute or there isn't and if there is, then morals must be objective and not subjective.
In short, either infanticide is wrong because it is wrong (objective) or it is wrong because we don't think it is right ( subjective) if it i subjective then, if we decide to think it is right then it is not immoral.

I'd say you've created a false dichotomy, in part. I think subjectivity gets a worse rap than it deserves. Health of a person is somewhat subjective, but that doesn't mean there's not a more correct answer which can be objectively shown. The problem is in dealing with subjective beings a subjective element necessarily arises. But, surely you don't agree that objective facts cannot be made about subjective beings. Thus, even a subjective moral system will approach an objective moral zenith (or zeniths, depending). A lack of moral 'objectivity' (which, I think people overestimate the meaning of that) does not necessitate, then, moral relativism.

[Byblos]

Not so, morality seems to be self-correcting. Notice that racism, sexism, and general isms tend to be on the fall in more developed countries? A society that defines morality as what is best for a society will eventually approach that morality through a form of selection very similar to natural selection. Better societies with morals that are better for society will do better (and thus propagate its morality more effectively) than morals that are not as well-suited. The people who might 'define' morality are not necessarily moral if their morals turn out to be unhealthy for the society. A society might have rulers, but the society itself simulates an organism with all of its constituents making up the 'cells' of that organism. The health of a society correlates with the morality of that society (among other things). If a ruler advocates for a morality that is unhealthy to a society, it will inevitably be selected against.

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

[Beanybag]

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

Absolute whats? I generally agree with the idea of absolutes, but disagree with how much we can know.

[PaulSacramento]

Not so, morality seems to be self-correcting. Notice that racism, sexism, and general isms tend to be on the fall in more developed countries? A society that defines morality as what is best for a society will eventually approach that morality through a form of selection very similar to natural selection. Better societies with morals that are better for society will do better (and thus propagate its morality more effectively) than morals that are not as well-suited. The people who might 'define' morality are not necessarily moral if their morals turn out to be unhealthy for the society. A society might have rulers, but the society itself simulates an organism with all of its constituents making up the 'cells' of that organism. The health of a society correlates with the morality of that society (among other things). If a ruler advocates for a morality that is unhealthy to a society, it will inevitably be selected against.

Don't ever confuse appeareances with reality it may seem that way to you but not all would agree and many times one "isim" is replaced by another:
Racisim replaced by "worthissim" ( how much some is worth makes them more important/better as opposed to their skin colour or race)

I'd say you've created a false dichotomy, in part. I think subjectivity gets a worse rap than it deserves. Health of a person is somewhat subjective, but that doesn't mean there's not a more correct answer which can be objectively shown. The problem is in dealing with subjective beings a subjective element necessarily arises. But, surely you don't agree that objective facts cannot be made about subjective beings. Thus, even a subjective moral system will approach an objective moral zenith (or zeniths, depending). A lack of moral 'objectivity' (which, I think people overestimate the meaning of that) does not necessitate, then, moral relativism.

It MAY not necessitate relativisim, but it certaibly does seem to do just that.

[Byblos]

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

Absolute whats? I generally agree with the idea of absolutes, but disagree with how much we can know.

It doesn't really matter what the absolute is but as an example, you referred to subjective morality as evolving, 'improving' perhaps. Since it is improving then it must have undergone a change from a worse state to a better state, would you agree?

[jlay]

As my friends are showing, Beany's worldview is littered with problems.

Not to mention that it smuggles in objective morality. It presumes, without any attempt to account for it, that it is BETTER to not have racism, sexism, etc. of course for the betterment of society. But this presumes some inherent quality in human society?

[Beanybag]

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

Absolute whats? I generally agree with the idea of absolutes, but disagree with how much we can know.

It doesn't really matter what the absolute is but as an example, you referred to subjective morality as evolving, 'improving' perhaps. Since it is improving then it must have undergone a change from a worse state to a better state, would you agree?

Yes, I agree, which is why I don't describe it as wholly subjective. Health is a subjective value that we attempt to approach objectively. But, it also is a complex one; is health about longevity of life, quality of life, what do either of those things entail? Much the same, we try to discover what is healthy for a society through morality - this idea is not new. Learning exactly what healthy is is a human experience that will likely never finish. Is it reducing suffering, maximizing happiness and thriving, upholding freedom, some combination of all? It's not supposed to be an easy concept and disagreements are expected. That doesn't mean we can't all be approaching an objective zenith, as I said.

Do we want this society based on objective reasons? Kind of. It's human preference, and societal preference, but that doesn't mean it's arbitrary or just our opinion. We have good reasons to want this - healthy societies are successful, and through a form of selection, they'll propagate successfully. There might be problems along the way, but they're self-correcting.

Paul: We'll have to agree to disagree. History seems clear that the world has improved for the better through longer longevity of life, improved technology, lower amounts of violence, more human dignity, etc. Of course, work always has to be done and humans will still mess things up - but even you can agree with that.

I suppose we're all inevitably searching for the same thing, perhaps. We just have different ideas of how to get there.

As my friends are showing, Beany's worldview is littered with problems.

Not to mention that it smuggles in objective morality. It presumes, without any attempt to account for it, that it is BETTER to not have racism, sexism, etc. of course for the betterment of society. But this presumes some inherent quality in human society?

It does no such thing.

[Byblos]

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

Absolute whats? I generally agree with the idea of absolutes, but disagree with how much we can know.

It doesn't really matter what the absolute is but as an example, you referred to subjective morality as evolving, 'improving' perhaps. Since it is improving then it must have undergone a change from a worse state to a better state, would you agree?

Yes, I agree, which is why I don't describe it as wholly subjective. Health is a subjective value that we attempt to approach objectively. But, it also is a complex one; is health about longevity of life, quality of life, what do either of those things entail? Much the same, we try to discover what is healthy for a society through morality - this idea is not new. Learning exactly what healthy is is a human experience that will likely never finish. Is it reducing suffering, maximizing happiness and thriving, upholding freedom, some combination of all? It's not supposed to be an easy concept and disagreements are expected. That doesn't mean we can't all be approaching an objective zenith, as I said.

Well that's good, at least you're acknowledging the possibility of the existence of a zenith, which I'm sure you've surmised is where I was leading anyway. So if a scale exists where we have a zenith and anti-zenith on the extreme ends and somewhere in the middle a better and a worse, where would you say the source of this zenith is? It can't be from us, from this universe, as no matter how many degrees of perfections we attain, getting to the zenith is impossible.
So unless you deny absolutes, then you must acknowledge as well that the source of this zenith is not from within our world.

[Beanybag]

Beany, would you agree with me that there are such things as absolutes?

Absolute whats? I generally agree with the idea of absolutes, but disagree with how much we can know.

It doesn't really matter what the absolute is but as an example, you referred to subjective morality as evolving, 'improving' perhaps. Since it is improving then it must have undergone a change from a worse state to a better state, would you agree?

Yes, I agree, which is why I don't describe it as wholly subjective. Health is a subjective value that we attempt to approach objectively. But, it also is a complex one; is health about longevity of life, quality of life, what do either of those things entail? Much the same, we try to discover what is healthy for a society through morality - this idea is not new. Learning exactly what healthy is is a human experience that will likely never finish. Is it reducing suffering, maximizing happiness and thriving, upholding freedom, some combination of all? It's not supposed to be an easy concept and disagreements are expected. That doesn't mean we can't all be approaching an objective zenith, as I said.

Well that's good, at least you're acknowledging the possibility of the existence of a zenith, which I'm sure you've surmised is where I was leading anyway. So if a scale exists where we have a zenith and anti-zenith on the extreme ends and somewhere in the middle a better and a worse, where would you say the source of this zenith is? It can't be from us, from this universe, as no matter how many degrees of perfections we attain, getting to the zenith is impossible.
So unless you deny absolutes, then you must acknowledge as well that the source of this zenith is not from within our world.

The zenith doesn't have to be physically existent or even possible to be real. This is where we get into the problem of concepts. Is the idea of the maximal society an abstraction of empirical knowledge, a platonic concept that is real in the platonic heaven, a meaningless statement that is tautological at some level, etc. This seems necessarily related to the philosophy of math, which I don't feel is a settled nature - most mathematicians are actually Platoists, which is interesting - indeed, mathematical concepts have a sort of 'divine' nature to them that I myself cannot fully grasp. But I am content to let this question lie while assuming that these zeniths do in fact 'exist' conceptually. This is doable within a secular framework. You may argue that through an assumption I have smuggled in the concept, but I don't think it's necessarily your concept that has been smuggled (obviously). Your concept is obviously compatible with this, and once we have accepted this framework, that objection becomes true. I still find this debate to be unsettled, however, and many many very intelligent people disagree, so I'm willing to work with a 'smuggled' concept, even if I don't know where I've smuggled it from.

[jlay]

Beany, you keep using terms (better) that are indicitive of presuming objective morality and inherent value in human life. Saying, "It does no such thing," doesn't change it. The whole position presumes a standard that one is working towards.

Paul: We'll have to agree to disagree. History seems clear that the world has improved for the better through longer longevity of life, improved technology, lower amounts of violence, more human dignity, etc. Of course, work always has to be done and humans will still mess things up - but even you can agree with that.

All it shows is that there is a way we should live, and as resources provide, societies strive for such.

[Byblos]

The zenith doesn't have to be physically existent or even possible to be real. This is where we get into the problem of concepts. Is the idea of the maximal society an abstraction of empirical knowledge, a platonic concept that is real in the platonic heaven, a meaningless statement that is tautological at some level, etc. This seems necessarily related to the philosophy of math, which I don't feel is a settled nature - most mathematicians are actually Platoists, which is interesting - indeed, mathematical concepts have a sort of 'divine' nature to them that I myself cannot fully grasp. But I am content to let this question lie while assuming that these zeniths do in fact 'exist' conceptually. This is doable within a secular framework. You may argue that through an assumption I have smuggled in the concept, but I don't think it's necessarily your concept that has been smuggled (obviously). Your concept is obviously compatible with this, and once we have accepted this framework, that objection becomes true. I still find this debate to be unsettled, however, and many many very intelligent people disagree, so I'm willing to work with a 'smuggled' concept, even if I don't know where I've smuggled it from.

It's not a concept at all since the scale is real, zenith is the logical extension of that scale. You keep saying you're not a platonist but your words speak otherwise Beany. You know what though, I am also content with the fact that you acknowledge the smuggling part and have no issue with you not acknowledging its source. That is certainly your prerogative. Not very consistent, in my opinion but your prerogative nonetheless.

[Beanybag]

The zenith doesn't have to be physically existent or even possible to be real. This is where we get into the problem of concepts. Is the idea of the maximal society an abstraction of empirical knowledge, a platonic concept that is real in the platonic heaven, a meaningless statement that is tautological at some level, etc. This seems necessarily related to the philosophy of math, which I don't feel is a settled nature - most mathematicians are actually Platoists, which is interesting - indeed, mathematical concepts have a sort of 'divine' nature to them that I myself cannot fully grasp. But I am content to let this question lie while assuming that these zeniths do in fact 'exist' conceptually. This is doable within a secular framework. You may argue that through an assumption I have smuggled in the concept, but I don't think it's necessarily your concept that has been smuggled (obviously). Your concept is obviously compatible with this, and once we have accepted this framework, that objection becomes true. I still find this debate to be unsettled, however, and many many very intelligent people disagree, so I'm willing to work with a 'smuggled' concept, even if I don't know where I've smuggled it from.

It's not a concept at all since the scale is real, zenith is the logical extension of that scale. You keep saying you're not a platonist but your words speak otherwise Beany. You know what though, I am also content with the fact that you acknowledge the smuggling part and have no issue with you not acknowledging its source. That is certainly your prerogative. Not very consistent, in my opinion but your prerogative nonetheless.

Is the scale real, though? It would seem the scale only exists in our minds, to me. The 'realness' of our thoughts is a little strange without admitting the 'realness' of objects. I typically associate 'realness' to 'reality', which most often is at least in part physical. Now we have the issue of defining reality. Does reality include the concepts in our head that don't necessarily correspond to the physical universe?

And yes, that's my prerogative. I am simply not convinced that such an objective standard is only accountable through a deity. If such a time I feel convinced (obviously not empirically, since I think any proof of God based on empirical evidence fails) of God's existence, perhaps I will associate this objective morality to God, but perhaps I won't. If I get as far as deism, I still see no logical reason to assume God is perfectly moral. Thus, the fact that morals 'exist' doesn't lend itself to God being good, at least insofar as God is any other concept (such as evil) - in other words, even if God is (as much as the concept of divine simplicity confuses me) morality, existence, logic, etc. I don't see how this leads to God being good so much as God being the metric of good (which would seem to preclude God from being anything but the metric, neither good nor evil) nor would God be capable of action (thus, he couldn't 'do' good or evil since he would be 'incapable' of doing so, and vice versa, he couldn't perform an action since 'perfect' action doesn't seem physically realizable). An action seems to necessitate that God is bound by time, as well, which doesn't seem compatible if God is also time itself. Of course, I could simply be not understanding this correctly (which I suspect is the case) which is why I would prefer to say 'I don't know' with respect to these questions.

I'll create an analogy: Suppose you ask me 'Is the Reimann hypothesis true or false?' I say, I don't know. You say, 'Do you believe the Reimann hypothesis is true, then?" to which I say, no. I would be an a-Reimann-ist then. Now, logically, the Reimann hypothesis is either true or false and there is only one rational answer. The probability of this hypothesis is impossible to say, it has unknown probability. Nevermind that it has been proven true for the first 10^10,000,000,000 integers, or what have you. That lends no credence to the totality of the number line, as integers continue on forever and any finite number is equally and totally small in comparison to the infinite. However, it is wholly consistent with my rationality to go on with mathematics while not knowing the answer to this hypothesis. It would be irrational for me to claim it as true either way without a logical proof. And yet, you can work within a certain framework by assuming it is either true or false. In fact, one theorem was proven true by proving it true when the Reimann hypothesis was true, and then showing the theorem was true when the Reimann hypothesis was false!

In other words, I still feel I'm being rationally consistent.

Also, I very well might be a Platoist at some point, but at this point I have not wholly embraced the idea and am open to other ideas. My language may indicate Platoism at points, but I posit that's simply a failing of language that doesn't allow me to express my ideas as fully as I'd wish. If it is not the case, then I have accidentally smuggled in ontological Platonic ideas without meaning to into a discussion where no such assumption has been made. I don't feel that's the case though.