Morality Without God?

[PaulSacramento]

The murder issue is an interesting one.
Murder is, by definition, the unjustified or unwarranted or illegal taking of a life.
mur·der
   [mur-der] Show IPA
noun
1.
Law . the killing of another human being under conditions specifically covered in law. In the U.S., special statutory definitions include murder committed with malice aforethought, characterized by deliberation or premeditation or occurring during the commission of another serious crime, as robbery or arson (first-degree murder), and murder by intent but without deliberation or premeditation (second-degree murder).


1. manslaughter Compare homicide the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another

— vb
5. ( also intr ) to kill (someone) unlawfully with premeditation or during the commission of a crime
6. to kill brutally

Murder is, by definition, subjective.
It is subjective to the law, to what is viewed as unjustified or with malice ( but subjective terms).

Murder as an absolute wrong can only be defined as such because God says it is wrong.

[RickD]

Spock wrote:
In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values. This seems inconsistent with the argument put forth by the eminent Christian philosopher William Lane Craig who appeals merely to it being "obvious" and that "we all know it" as proof that objective moral values exist.

The way I see what Craig wrote is this: The Golden Rule can be proof that objective morals exist. But, the Golden Rule is not the basis for objective morality.

There also seems to be an inconsistency in his examples of things that are objectively immoral. Specifically, he says "Actions like rape, torture, child abuse, and brutality are not just socially unacceptable behavior--they are moral abominations." This seems inconsistent because we see genocide (the slaughter of every man, woman, and child) commanded by God in the Bible. This appears to be a direct contradiction. If anything is objectively immoral, we must agree that genocide is objectively immoral. If we reject this proposition, would not Dr. Craig's examples of "obvious" immorality fail?

Your point is that you say that God commanded people to kill other people, and that if murder is objectively wrong, then God is either inconsistent, or the God of the bible isn't really God, correct?

So, let's focus on murder for now. As PaulSacramento wrote,

Murder is, by definition, the unjustified or unwarranted or illegal taking of a life.

Do you have a problem with that definition of murder?

If we can agree on that definition, then you must be assuming that God was unjustified or unwarranted in commanding the killing of certain people. How can you know God's motives for wanting certain people dead? Of course we can guess, but we really can't know God's purposes.

[The Protector]

Greetings. May you all live and prosper.

In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values. This seems inconsistent with the argument put forth by the eminent Christian philosopher William Lane Craig who appeals merely to it being "obvious" and that "we all know it" as proof that objective moral values exist. Here is the relevant quote:

The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality
And could anything be more obvious than that objective moral values do exist? There is no more reason to deny the objective reality of moral values than the objective reality of the physical world. ... The fact is that we do apprehend objective values, and we all know it. Actions like rape, torture, child abuse, and brutality are not just socially unacceptable behavior--they are moral abominations. As Ruse himself states, "The man who says that it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says, 2+2=5." By the same token, love, generosity, equality, and self-sacrifice are really good. People who fail to see this are just morally handicapped, and there is no reason to allow their impaired vision to call into question what we see clearly.

I checked his other writings and could find no logical foundation for his assertion. He supports it merely by appealing to the subjective experience of humans. Such an appeal has been soundly rejected in this thread. Would not logical consistency demand a similar rejection of Dr. Craig's argument?

There also seems to be an inconsistency in his examples of things that are objectively immoral. Specifically, he says "Actions like rape, torture, child abuse, and brutality are not just socially unacceptable behavior--they are moral abominations." This seems inconsistent because we see genocide (the slaughter of every man, woman, and child) commanded by God in the Bible. This appears to be a direct contradiction. If anything is objectively immoral, we must agree that genocide is objectively immoral. If we reject this proposition, would not Dr. Craig's examples of "obvious" immorality fail?

It is my hope that our discussion will clarify and resolve these logical conundrums.

Again, may you all live long and prosper!

Hello Dr. Spock,

I actually agree with what Craig said, as I DO think that the existence of objective moral values is manifest. What Craig is saying here is that we all (or most of us) have a "moral sense;" even if we may differ in the specifics of what is morally right and wrong, we all have a sense of the existence of mind-independent (i.e. objective) morality. Craig (along with other philosophers) argues that we have no more reason to doubt this sense than we do our other senses; although our sense of sight may be flawed or incomplete, and although some people may have no sense of sight at all, few of us doubt that there is something to be seen. The point being made by the theists in this thread isn't that we cannot innately sense the existence of moral values, or even that we can't innately come close to knowing some of the specifics; the point is that, on an atheist worldview, there is no reason to call these sensations "moral," and certainly not objectively so. Indeed, I think it was Plantinga who noted that, given atheism, there is no reason to trust what ANY of our senses seem to tell us.

You see, the argument put forward by theists is not that we cannot sense the existence objective moral values. The argument is that calling them objective moral values is incompatible with naturalistic atheism. Indeed, the argument is that, given that we DO sense the existence of objective moral values, this points to the existence of God.

[PaulSacramento]

You see, the argument put forward by theists is not that we cannot sense the existence objective moral values. The argument is that calling them objective moral values is incompatible with naturalistic atheism. Indeed, the argument is that, given that we DO sense the existence of objective moral values, this points to the existence of God.

Pretty much it in a nutshell.

[Spock]

Spock wrote:
In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values. This seems inconsistent with the argument put forth by the eminent Christian philosopher William Lane Craig who appeals merely to it being "obvious" and that "we all know it" as proof that objective moral values exist.

The way I see what Craig wrote is this: The Golden Rule can be proof that objective morals exist. But, the Golden Rule is not the basis for objective morality.

I think Dr. Craig has made a false disjunction between moral ontology vs. moral epistemology. In his Objections to the Moral Argument he wrote:

I carefully distinguished between moral ontology (questions about the reality of moral values) and moral epistemology (questions about how we come to know moral values), and I said that my argument is solely about the objective reality of moral values, not how we come to know them. I’ll appeal to all the same mechanisms that you appeal to in order to explain how you know that is true. ... I don’t think that we need to appeal to God at all to know that objective moral values and duties exist.

He elaborates on this disjunction in his article Keeping Moral Epistemology and Moral Ontology Distinct:

I’m convinced that keeping the distinction between moral epistemology and moral ontology clear is the most important task in formulating and defending a moral argument for God’s existence of the type I defend. A proponent of that argument will agree quite readily (and even insist) that we do not need to know or even believe that God exists in order to discern objective moral values or to recognize our moral duties. Affirming the ontological foundations of objective moral values and duties in God similarly says nothing about how we come to know those values and duties. The theist can be genuinely open to whatever epistemological theories his secular counterpart proposes for how we come to know objective values and duties.

I think his disjunction is invalid because epistemology is fundamentally dependent upon ontology. Here is how Hugh G. Gauch, Jr. explains it in his book Scientific Method in Practice (quote available online):

In ordinary discourse, ontology, epistemology, and logic are reasonably distinct and recognizable topics within philosophy. But at the point where discourse begins, those topics fuse together. The reason is that epistemology presumes ontology, because what we know depends on what exists. But also ontology presumes epistemology, because what we can become aware of depends on our sensory and cognitive faculties. And logic is operating in any rational discourse.

It is impossible to understand the objective reality of morality (ontology) without understanding how we know something actually is moral or immoral (epistemology). And so the fundamental question is this: How do we know if something is moral? The answer, with which Dr. Craig seems to agree when he says he would "appeal to all the same mechanisms that you appeal to in order to explain how you know that is true," is the Golden Rule. That is how any sentient being determines if something is moral. We put ourselves in the place of the other and ask if we would want to be subject to our own actions.

A simple analogy - in physics we feel we understand how an atom works (epistemology) when we learn that it is made up protons, neutrons, and electrons (ontology) following the rules of Quantum Mechanics. The same goes for any study. A disjunction between ontology and epistemology destroys both because both are required before we can claim to have a real understanding.

There must be a unity and harmony between our ontological and epistemological understanding of morality. I think the Golden Rule provides the answer. It proves the existence of objective morality even as it explains why something is moral, and it gives a practical method for any sentient being to determine how to act. Thus it unifies moral ontology, moral epistemology, and moral practice. That's a very complete and coherent theory of morality that no other theory has been able to match in my estimation.

.

[PaulSacramento]

I think the Golden Rule provides the answer. It proves the existence of objective morality even as it explains why something is moral, and it gives a practical method for any sentient being to determine how to act. Thus it unifies moral ontology, moral epistemology, and moral practice. That's a very complete and coherent theory of morality that no other theory has been able to match in my estimation.

How can a subjective "rule" be objective ?
The golden rule is about treating others as you would want to be treated ( positive view) or Not doing anything to anyone you would not want done to you ( negative view).
BOTH cases are subjective to the individual and what they "want" or "don't want".
How is that objective morals when the morals are subjective to "want" ?

[PaulSacramento]

Many cultures that "advocated" the "golden rule' did so simply within their OWN society or group and outsiders were not included.
Vikings may have viewed the pillaging of their villages and raping of their women as wrong, but they certainly did it to others.
To base our morals STRICTLY on what makes us happy or what leads us to have a better relationship with each other is basing those morals on a subjective notion of what is best for us at any given time, hardly objective or absolute.
It may be in my best interest to be nice to you today because it is good for me.
Can't be more subjective than that.

[Spock]

Hello Dr. Spock,

I actually agree with what Craig said, as I DO think that the existence of objective moral values is manifest. What Craig is saying here is that we all (or most of us) have a "moral sense;" even if we may differ in the specifics of what is morally right and wrong, we all have a sense of the existence of mind-independent (i.e. objective) morality. Craig (along with other philosophers) argues that we have no more reason to doubt this sense than we do our other senses; although our sense of sight may be flawed or incomplete, and although some people may have no sense of sight at all, few of us doubt that there is something to be seen. The point being made by the theists in this thread isn't that we cannot innately sense the existence of moral values, or even that we can't innately come close to knowing some of the specifics; the point is that, on an atheist worldview, there is no reason to call these sensations "moral," and certainly not objectively so. Indeed, I think it was Plantinga who noted that, given atheism, there is no reason to trust what ANY of our senses seem to tell us.

You see, the argument put forward by theists is not that we cannot sense the existence objective moral values. The argument is that calling them objective moral values is incompatible with naturalistic atheism. Indeed, the argument is that, given that we DO sense the existence of objective moral values, this points to the existence of God.

Greetings Protector,

It is good that we agree on the existence of objective morality. But I think we need to clarify the concept of "objective." You say "we all have a sense of the existence of mind-independent (i.e. objective) morality." I cannot agree because I have no such sense. Indeed, that proposition doesn't even make sense to me because I cannot conceive of any concept being "independent of mind" since concepts exist in the mind. I define something as objectively true if its truth is independent of who makes the observation. This is what we normally mean by "objective." The truth of 1 + 2 = 3 is not dependent upon who does the calculation, unless, of course, the person can't add. But then we say he is objectively wrong and we can prove it with logic based on our ontological and epistemological understanding of arithmetic. In my previous post I explained the profound interdependence of ontology, epistemology, logic, and practice by quoting Hugh G. Gauch's book Scientific Method in Practice (quote available online):

In ordinary discourse, ontology, epistemology, and logic are reasonably distinct and recognizable topics within philosophy. But at the point where discourse begins, those topics fuse together. The reason is that epistemology presumes ontology, because what we know depends on what exists. But also ontology presumes epistemology, because what we can become aware of depends on our sensory and cognitive faculties. And logic is operating in any rational discourse.

A complete theory of morality is no different than a complete theory of arithmetic in the sense that any complete theory must fully unify ontology, epistemology, logic, and practice.

My conception of objective truth is analogous to inertial frames of reference in relativistic physics. Though observers in different frames will see things differently, there are objective rules to transform from one to the other so that the objective facts concerning events in space-time can be discerned by all observers. This is what makes the Golden Rule objective. It tells us to put ourselves in the place of the other. This is a moral symmetry - any moral statement involving persons A and B must be symmetric under an interchange between those two people. Simply stated, it would be logically inconsistent to apply one standard to person A and a different standard to person B, everything else being equal. The principle of moral symmetry is analogous to the symmetry principles used in physics to derive fundamental universal laws such as the conservation of angular momentum which is implied by the rotational symmetry of space by Noether's theorem. This reveals the profound depth, beauty, and completeness of this theory of objective morality. It is based on the same kind of objective principles we use to derive the laws of physics.

Now as for Plantiga's "Defeater of Naturalism" - I think his argument is fallacious. I would be happy to discuss it but we probably should start a new thread if you want to pursue that since it involves some pretty advanced philosophy that would distract us from the arguments put forth in this thread.

.

[Spock]

I think the Golden Rule provides the answer. It proves the existence of objective morality even as it explains why something is moral, and it gives a practical method for any sentient being to determine how to act. Thus it unifies moral ontology, moral epistemology, and moral practice. That's a very complete and coherent theory of morality that no other theory has been able to match in my estimation.

How can a subjective "rule" be objective ?
The golden rule is about treating others as you would want to be treated ( positive view) or Not doing anything to anyone you would not want done to you ( negative view).
BOTH cases are subjective to the individual and what they "want" or "don't want".
How is that objective morals when the morals are subjective to "want" ?

This returns us to my first post. Here is what I wrote:

In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values. This seems inconsistent with the argument put forth by the eminent Christian philosopher William Lane Craig who appeals merely to it being "obvious" and that "we all know it" as proof that objective moral values exist. I checked his other writings and could find no logical foundation for his assertion. He supports it merely by appealing to the subjective experience of humans. Such an appeal has been soundly rejected in this thread. Would not logical consistency demand a similar rejection of Dr. Craig's argument?

So are your rejecting Dr. William Lane Craig's formulation of the Moral Argument for God? If not, you need to show how it is not based on an appeal to the subjective opinions of humans.

.

[Spock]

Many cultures that "advocated" the "golden rule' did so simply within their OWN society or group and outsiders were not included.

That may be true. And if it is, then you and I would agree that those cultures were immoral because they violated the Golden Rule. This theory accounts for the ontology, epistemology, and practice of objective morality. We know why something is immoral, and can explain it with objectively valid logic.

Vikings may have viewed the pillaging of their villages and raping of their women as wrong, but they certainly did it to others.

Again, we understand that the Vikings were immoral because they violated the Golden Rule.

To base our morals STRICTLY on what makes us happy or what leads us to have a better relationship with each other is basing those morals on a subjective notion of what is best for us at any given time, hardly objective or absolute.
It may be in my best interest to be nice to you today because it is good for me.
Can't be more subjective than that.

Your comment is a caricature of the Golden Rule. A proper formulation clears up such confusions. The Golden Rule is objective because it is based on the objective principle of moral symmetry, not mere "happiness."

Given your criticism, I must ask again: Do you reject Dr. William Lane Craig's moral argument for God? It is based on the purely subjective opinions of humans that objective morals are "obvious" and that "we all know it." The Golden Rule explains why "we all know it." It is based on our most fundamental moral intuitions. We know that something is immoral if we interchange ourselves with others. This is the root of our moral intuitions. It is based on an objective symmetry constraint just like physics. I've never seen a theory of morality that could compare with its beauty, depth, and self-consistency.

.

[Butterfly]

Butterfly, I can't let you get off without answering my question. Let's see if you're really open as you say:

If you are sincere as you say, then answer my question: Who do you say Jesus Christ is?

Well?

Hi Rick,

I will answer this one question then I have to run, my womanly duties are calling...

Right now, from my non-Christian perspective, I say that Jesus was an historical figure who claimed to be the son of the Hebrew god, Yahweh...and god himself.

-

Thank you for attempting to answer my question. Going with what you say here, I can see that your interpretation of the bible shows you that Jesus did claim to be God. Do you say Jesus is God? Do you say Jesus is a historical figure who was merely human, and by claiming he was God, was a complete lunatic?

I didn't ask who you think Jesus claimed to be. I asked, "Who do you say Jesus Christ is?"

I'm back...

When I was a Christian I thought Jesus was the son of God, one with God, and the second person of the Trinity. The reason I no longer can believe that Jesus is God, or the son of God, is because of the Biblegod's immoral behavior. If the God of the Bible is not a true god then all of the claims of Jesus are false.
-

[jlay]

In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values.

Simply because of what you stated, which makes the GR a subjective preference. "I prefer to be treated....." Which means that it isn't objective, but subject to human preference. This kind of violates the very notion of what "objective" means. Why should we care?
Moral symmetry principle? Egads!!

Where's Jac when you need him?

[Spock]

In reviewing this thread, I have noticed an adamant rejection of the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values.

Simply because of what you stated, which makes the GR a subjective preference. "I prefer to be treated....." Which means that it isn't objective, but subject to human preference. This kind of violates the very notion of what "objective" means. Why should we care?
Moral symmetry principle? Egads!!

Where's Jac when you need him?

Greetings jlay,

May you live long and prosper.

I trust you will forgive me if I fail to see the logical cogency of your comment "Egads!!". We Vulcan's don't know how to interpret such emotional outbursts since they are not based on logic and facts. If you have a logical response to my first post, I would be delighted to discuss it with you.

Why did you quote words that I never wrote and which are not part of my argument? I never used the words "I prefer to be treated....." in any argument I have presented in this thread. It is impossible to have a rational discussion if you do not accurately quote me and worse, put false words in my mouth. The proper way to challenge my arguments is to quote the words that I wrote, just as I quoted the words of Dr. Craig and the words you wrote.

Did you read my first post? I get the impression you stopped at the comment you quoted. If you had read further you should have understood that there is a logical inconsistency between the acceptance of Dr. Craig's moral argument for God as objective and the rejection of the Golden Rule as subjective. Dr. Craig's argument is based on the subjective opinion that there are "objective moral facts." How then can you reject the idea that the near universal moral intuition of the Golden Rule could be used as the basis of objective moral values? If you don't understand why I see an inconsistency here, please review my first post and quote something I wrote that you would like to challenge.

For this conversation to progress, you need to tell me if you do or do not accept Dr. Craig's appeal to subjective opinions as the sole support of his assertion that objective moral facts exist. Specifically, the only support he gave for his assertion is that it is "obvious" and that "we all know it." See my first post for further details.

.

[jlay]

I am not a big Craig fan. I would lean more to the Thomist side of things.

[Spock]

I am not a big Craig fan. I would lean more to the Thomist side of things.

That's interesting, we might have some common ground here. I find the Divine Command theory which Craig asserts to be absurd. I think it directly contradicts morality because it breaks the connection between the intrinsic nature of an action and the reason why it is or is not moral.

As for Thomism - I presume you mean that you solve Euthyphro's dilemma by saying that God says that something is good because it is objectively good AND that its objective goodness is grounded in God's nature. Would that be correct? I think his solution is self-consistent, but that is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for it being true. And I don't think it can apply to the God of the Bible because I believe that Yahweh commanded things that are objectively immoral, such as genocide (which is something that Dr. Craig appears to say is objectively immoral though he elsewhere contradicts himself).

In any case, getting back to topic. Do you have any opinion on Craig's Moral Argument for God? Do you think his appeal to the subjective opinion that objective morals are "obvious" and that "we all know it" is a valid foundation for his argument?