jlay wrote:Spock:
I think it is safe to say that Craig would follow realism, that moral values exist independent of the human mind. That they are REAL values. The fact that Craig claims they are obvious doesn't discount this and force him into the weak objective definition of morality. And thus I think you've made errors rearding Craig's argument. I would also say it's false to say ontology presupposes epistomology, which was adressed regarding the post where I mentioned the ruler. Regarding the reductio, here would be the syllogism:
"a. Craig's argument proves God's existence by allowing the possibility of the existence of non-physical, mind-independent reality (i.e., objective moral values)
b. But non-physical, mind-independent reality (i.e., objective moral values) don't exist.
c. Therefore, Craig's argument is false, since it proposes the absurdity rejected in (b)."
Regarding (b), you would have to more than assert it. Athiest don't believe in the existence of objective moral values (in the strong sense). And yes (b) is the topic of much debate.
Quote from friend: "Regarding his (Spock's) nominalism, the problem here is that he's using words like "right" and "wrong" to refer to things that don't really exist apart from the mind. That is, those words have no corresponding reality in the extra-mental world. They're just concepts that refer to concepts, and those concepts have no root in reality. But Craig is a realist of sorts. He thinks that universals correspond to real existence in the objective world. So this all just goes back to the very, very, very old problem of realism vs. nominalism. Craig would just use a reductio against Spock's position, insofar as nominalism in general makes all knowledge of anything impossible, and moral nominalism in particular (what Spock holds at a minimum) makes all knowledge of moral issues impossible. We're just right back to his personal preference for the GR as his "objective" ruler over and against someone else's "might makes right" and someone else's divine command theory."
"The person who asserts might makes right or divine command is just mistaken. We may all have the right ruler and come to the right conclusion about whether any given act is right or wrong, but the underlying issue is not whether or not we can know if any given action is right or wrong, but rather, what the words "right" and "wrong" refer to. Do they refer to something that exists in reality itself, apart from the human mind, or do they just refer to a consistency with some personally accepted axiom (e.g., the GR, might makes right, lex talionis, etc.)? If Spock wants to say that divine command theory is MISTAKEN, then he is presuming REAL moral value, which is Craig's point."
Nothing is more obvious than the fact that Craig is assuming the philosophical position of moral realism. His argument reduces to this:
1) If God does not exist, then moral realism is false.
2) Moral realism is true.
3) Therefore God exists.
But he can't state it with this simple clarity because his ploy is to deceive his philosophically ignorant audience by assuming their common-sense realism as if it were the only possible philosophic view. WHAT A FREAKING JOKE! It looks like it is time for a brief review of a few of the elementary facts any REAL philosopher, unlike Craig, would know. His tactics are transparent to anyone with the most elementary knowledge of philosophy. Here are a few of the views that he conveniently leaves out of his argument so he can deceive people with his false dichotomy between Theism and Philosophical Realism. His argument would have no force to convince anyone if he stated his
naive realism in the context of all the other possible views:
REALISM: Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief that our reality, or some aspect of it, is ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc. Realism may be spoken of with respect to other minds, the past, the future, universals, mathematical entities (such as natural numbers), moral categories, the material world, and thought. Realism can also be promoted in an unqualified sense, in which case it asserts the mind-independent existence of a visible world, as opposed to idealism, skepticism, and solipsism. Philosophers who profess realism state that truth consists in the mind's correspondence to reality.
PLATONIC REALISM: Platonic realism is a philosophical term usually used to refer to the idea of realism regarding the existence of universals or abstract objects after the Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BC), a student of Socrates. As universals were considered by Plato to be ideal forms, this stance is confusingly also called Platonic idealism. This should not be confused with Idealism, as presented by philosophers such as George Berkeley: as Platonic abstractions are not spatial, temporal, or mental they are not compatible with the later Idealism's emphasis on mental existence. Plato's Forms include numbers and geometrical figures, making them a theory of mathematical realism; they also include the Form of the Good, making them in addition a theory of ethical realism
NAIVE REALISM: Naive realism, also known as direct realism is a philosophy of mind rooted in a common sense theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast, some forms of idealism assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms of skepticism say we cannot trust our senses. The realist view is that objects are composed of matter, occupy space and have properties, such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived correctly. We perceive them as they really are. Objects obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone to observe them.
MODERATE REALISM: Moderate realism is a position in the debate on the metaphysics of universals which holds that there is no realm in which universals exist (against platonism), nor do they really exist within the individuals as universals, but rather universals really exist within the particulars as individualised, and multiplied. This position is also called immanent realism.
IDEALISM: In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas — especially beliefs and values — shape society.[1] As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit.[2] Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind. An extreme version of this idealism can exist in the philosophical notion of solipsism.
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM: Subjective Idealism (immaterialism or phenomenalism) describes a relationship between experience and the world in which objects are no more than collections or "bundles" of sense data in the perceiver. Proponents include Berkeley,[26] Bishop of Cloyne, an Irish philosopher who advanced a theory he called immaterialism, later referred to as "subjective idealism", contending that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas also depend upon being perceived for their very existence - esse est percipi; "to be is to be perceived".
TRANSEDENTAL IDEALISM: Transcendental idealism, founded by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century, maintains that the mind shapes the world we perceive into the form of space-and-time.
NOMINALISM: Nominalism is a metaphysical view in philosophy according to which general or abstract terms and predicates exist, while universals or abstract objects, which are sometimes thought to correspond to these terms, do not exist. Thus, there are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals—things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g. strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects—objects that do not exist in space and time.
CONCEPTUALISM: Conceptualism is a philosophical theory that explains universality of particulars as conceptualized frameworks situated within the thinking mind.
Intermediate between Nominalism and Realism, the conceptualist view approaches the metaphysical concept of universals from a perspective that denies their presence in particulars outside of the mind's perception of them.
And I could go on of course. You would do well, jlay, to get your "philosophical" friend up to speed. I have explicitly said that I believe in objective morality. I have never written a word denying objective morality. I have never written a word that would indicate I am a nominalist. And can you guess why that might be? Here, let me help -
BECAUSE I AM NOT A NOMINALIST! Duh.
Craig designed his argument to take advantage of the philosophically ignorant. It has absolutely no philosophical merit whatsoever. Only the ignorant could be duped into promoting it. His argument is filled with gaping holes from beginning to end. He has been
totally debunked on the blog called Ethical Realism written by a man who believes in moral realism but rejects the idea that it must be grounded in God.
it's retarded. 
