God transcends time

[Byblos]

I want to add that the common assumption that people like Craig and K and lexy seem to be making with regard to creation is that in order for creation ex nihilo to be meaningful, there must have been a time--that is, a state of affairs--in which nothing really existed (apart from God). But I think that is unwarranted and frankly incoherent.

It is unwarranted because creation does not require nothingness "to exist" (whatever that would mean). It only requires that there be no material cause for the universe's existence. It certainly has an efficient and final cause, but so long as there is no material cause, then creation ex nihilo is satisfied.

It is incoherent because it makes no sense to speak of a time in which nothing existed, and that for a couple of reasons. First, if nothing existed, then there can be no state of affairs that we can call "nothingness." For a state of affairs is by definition something after all. True nothingness is actually non-being, and non-being is simply inconceivable. It is thus incoherent to say, "nothing existed." Possibly worse, it is incoherent so speak of there being a "time" in which nothing existed, because if there is nothing, then by definition there is no time.

Anyway, I just thought I would point that out. The assumption that there must have been a time or state of existence in which there was nothing is a false, self-contradictory assumption.

Jac on atheism the assumption that God (as an efficient and final cause) does not exist so they are left with 2 options:

1) An eternal material existence which is incoherent since anything material is contingent
2) An ex nihilo creation from nothing which is incoherent since it presumes creation without an efficient and final cause

Does that sum it up basically?

[Jac3510]

I want to add that the common assumption that people like Craig and K and lexy seem to be making with regard to creation is that in order for creation ex nihilo to be meaningful, there must have been a time--that is, a state of affairs--in which nothing really existed (apart from God). But I think that is unwarranted and frankly incoherent.

It is unwarranted because creation does not require nothingness "to exist" (whatever that would mean). It only requires that there be no material cause for the universe's existence. It certainly has an efficient and final cause, but so long as there is no material cause, then creation ex nihilo is satisfied.

Actually, there are varying degrees to "creation ex nihilo" that I see.

You have at least "God" and therefore creation is not really from nothing.

The question then is, what is creation "made from". Some pre-existing and separate substance that changes when it comes into contact with God (thus perhaps maintaining an strong immutability ), or something literally "breathed" into existence from the Divine?

I'm sure we're not in the same boat here. But I'd be interested in just a quick response from you to these questions for my own clarification. I'm fairly certain I'm also not in the same boat with Craig's view, which seems rather absurd to me. As absurd as Atheists believing the universe popped into existence from nothing, so too Craig believes due to God that the universe popped into existence from nothing. At least, this is based on an article I read from Craig somewhere online. Just because "God" or "God's Word" is added doesn't mean coming into existence from nothing (in the strictest sense of "nothingness") now makes sense.

I feel this might be straying from the topic at hand, but there is no real point lumping me in with Craig here, or presuming that there is some ulterior motive to my beliefs. My response takes seriously God's relationship with us throughout time, such that God is here with me in the present rather than being far removed so as to not taint some strange "immutability'" where a change in position somehow means a change in one's ontological nature. To use your potter's hands molding clay versus a motionless hand -- if God is not immutable in my view with God's relationship to time, then neither is the potter's hand "immutable" (i.e., changeless).

It is incoherent because it makes no sense to speak of a time in which nothing existed, and that for a couple of reasons. First, if nothing existed, then there can be no state of affairs that we can call "nothingness." For a state of affairs is by definition something after all. True nothingness is actually non-being, and non-being is simply inconceivable. It is thus incoherent to say, "nothing existed." Possibly worse, it is incoherent so speak of there being a "time" in which nothing existed, because if there is nothing, then by definition there is no time.

There is nothing I necessarily disagree with here given I believe it is illusory that the spawning of a temporal world can create time to exist before itself. This based on the impossibility of retro-causation (an effect causing itself to exist prior to its existence). Just because now time exists, we may in fact coherently speak of a time before time, it is not in actual reality true that time did exist prior to itself.

So in this manner, I agree with you that it is incoherent to speak of there being a time when nothing existed. Perhaps your further reasoning here is built upon your prior assumption of me having some ulterior motivation to make "creation ex nihilo" more meaningful. But really, I just don't see what I'm meant to be disagreeing with you on in this post of yours.

I'd like to ask you another question though. Is it not equally incoherent to speak of there being a state in which only God existed without creation? What is your take on this question? Also, just want to add that the way I've constructed the question has no bearing upon what I believe. Just interested in your thinking.

I do have to confess, K, that I probably associate your line of thought more closely with Craig's than I have a basis for. Some of my critiques, then, may be directed at him and not at you. My apologies for the degree I've done that.

To your point, I actually don't have the problem you do with Craig in terms of the univese coming into being from nothing at all, as you suspect. While I agree that not even God can do absurdities, I don't see anything absurd in the idea of something coming into existence absolutely. It is true, of course, that everything in this universe brings other things into being by means of changing preexisting matter. That is simply to say that nothing in creation as the power to create (that is, to bring into being) except in some analogical sense (i.e., I "created" this response). But this limitation doesn't apply to God, and not due to His omnipotence but rather due to His nature. God, on my view, is the very essence of existence. He is not a being. For if He were, then He would be dependent on the notion of being/existence as well, and it would follow that this limitation would apply to Him, too. I say this again for emphasis, because I do not think this point is sufficiently appreciated: God is not a being. He is, rather, Being. Now I regard it as a matter of demonstrated philosophical fact that all agents produce effects that are in some ways like themselves. So Aquinas says:

• Every agent produces something in some way like itself. But every agent acts according as it is in act. Therefore, to produce an effect by somehow causing a form to inhere in a matter will be the proper function of an agent actualized by a form inherent in it, and not by its whole substance. (SCG II.16.6)

So because I am embodied form, then I produce embodied forms. That is all I am capable of producing because of what I am. But since I can only prodce embodied forms, I must work with matter in order to produce anything. That is, I impose forms on preexisting matter to "create" something.

God, however, is not embodied form. He is pure form. Thus, He is able to produce pure forms. He, then, does not need matter in order to have "something" to work from. That is why He can produce angels. I would, in fact, suggest that on your view, you would be forced to adopt the idea that angels are also form/matter composites, for if angels are pure form, then they, by definition, can have no material cause. But if they can have no material cause, then there is no "stuff" out of which to make them! If your objection is that there must always be "stuff" out of which to make something (that "pre-existing and separate substance that changes when it comes into contact with God"), then angels, too, must be made out of "stuff," which is to say, they must be form/matter composites.

But we can go further with God, for not only is God pure form, but His form is identical with being. Let's compare to angels again. They are pure form, but existence must be added to their form so that they really do exist. So while angels are not form/matter composites, they are existence/form composites. God, however, is not so composited. His form is His existence. As such, He is capable of producing pure forms that do not have existence.

Again, that we cannot do so is not because there is any inherently self-contradictory notion in the idea of creation out of nothing. Rather, it is because we cannot do so because all agents (God included) produce after their own kind. We produce embodied forms, being embodied form. God, being unembodied, formal existence, can simply produce existence. That is, in fact, what He primarily produces!

So the TL;DR here is that I don't see creation ex nihilo as intrinsically self-contradictory even if taken in the strong sense. It depends entirely on the nature of the agent doing the creating. I will say, however, that I don't think that Craig is allowed to appeal to creation ex nihilo since he denies that God is existence itself. For him, God is a being, an existence/form composite. Since God is so composited, I don't see how He could produce anything without having preexisting forms to work with, and since preexisting forms necessitate the previos existence of something, I'm afraid Craig might be incoherent on this point after all.

I hope that helps answer your question? Your thoughts? I'm not asking you to agree that my position here is correct. I am curious if you see the internal consistency of the logic.

[Jac3510]

This is simply a laymen's perspective. The problem I see here, Lexy, is that this doesn't treat time as part of the universe. What I mean is that your position presumes that the timeline pre-exists and retreats right past 'in the beginning.' However, the beginning really is the beginning of space, time and matter. And I think Jac would agree that God is transcendent, timeless, and immaterial, and the creation is not. However, Lexy, you are presenting creation (as best as I can tell) as an act IN time. There was no creation, and then (at some point in time) God created. It is question begging. It presumes a timeline prior to the creation, and then the creation just fits on that timeline at some point. (For example: eternity<-------------bang/creation-------------->) I would argue, and I think Jac might agree, that to say "before" creation, is question begging and making an incorrect presumption. If the beginning (of time, space and matter) is truly the beginning, then there isn't a before in the sense that we are employing the word. Of course Jac may totally disagree and I may be completely off base.

I actually think that's an excellent way to put it. Oh to be able to put things so directly . . . I guess I just like the scenic route too much!

___________________

Jac on atheism the assumption that God (as an efficient and final cause) does not exist so they are left with 2 options:

1) An eternal material existence which is incoherent since anything material is contingent
2) An ex nihilo creation from nothing which is incoherent since it presumes creation without an efficient and final cause

Does that sum it up basically?

I thinkthat sums it up fairly well. You either have an entire contingent reality (even if it is infinite in expansion and thus infinite contingent) that is contingent, in the end, on nothing at all (which seems self-contradictory) or you have an uncaused effect, which is plainly stupid. I hate to be so blunt in that last part, but really . . . you may as well ask me to deny the law of non-contradiction. If atheism is built on a fundamental irrationality, then it doesn't deserve anything like a modicum of respect.

[Kurieuo]

Thanks Jac, I'll respond more thoroughly when I get time.

But, for now... just curious to ask...

If God is "Being", then is not everything that has "Being" part of God?

Not that everything IS God, but rather everything has its existence IN God.

Interested to know whether you embrace this or avoid it?

[Jac3510]

Very quickly, on my view, no, we are neither "in" God (strictly speaking) nor are we parts of God. If we were parts of God, then God would have parts, which He does not. He is complete, indivisible whole. Were we to partake directly in God's nature--if we were to "share" Being with Him, then He would absorb us into Him such that we would cease to be distinct selves, since, again, in God all division is obliterated in perfect unity.

We receive out being not as a part of our nature, but as that which actualizes our nature. We are form/matter/existence composites, but we cannot picture that as three "things" added together to make a single thing. It is not as if our nature is a really existent thing and that existence is a really existent thing and then when you add our nature and existence together you get us. Instead, our nature is such that it is capable of being, and it receives its being through efficient causality (that is, after all, what efficient causality means--it is the cause that actualizes something's potential for existence). God is, of course, the First Efficient Cause from whom we ultimately receive all being, but the difference should be clear. Whereas God has His being as a part of His nature, we do not. Our natures receive existence, which is to say, our natures' potential for existence is actualized by some other existing thing, a chain of causes that must ultimately terminate in a God whose nature is not waiting to be actualized but whose nature simply is actuality.

[Kurieuo]

I'm confused by the saying "God transcends time" . To me it seems time is change ( thoughts, actions , and any other form of change ) So transcending time doesn't make any sense as you would need to change in some way to create the universe ,because To be timeless ( due to transcending time not making sense )would mean to be forever timeless if there is no form of change to cause you to change yourself. With this in mind wouldn't god creating the universe mean god exists within time? This would restrict god with the question of "where did it come from" due to it also being a timed being with a required beginning to initiate change. So what i'm trying to ask is, am i missing something? is it just that i'm not taking something into account that lead me to deduce this as impossible? I always hear this from many adults who have faith in god and i just ponder in my head how they could think this to be true. I'm not stating no god exists, nor that one does, i simply think this idea of transcending time should be either explained in detail or not spoken of at all .

So K has given you the modern evangelical answer to your question. Allow me to present the other view.

First, while A and B Theories are both conceptions of time, they are not the only ones. The classical view is actually precisely what you have suggested, namely, that time is change. A-Theory (which K's answer necessarily presupposes) requires that we think of time as a real thing in and of itself. It is a Platonic conception that views time as a collection of "containers" of various lengths in which things happen. B-theory, on the other hand, just argues that there is really no such thing as time at all, that everything is static, and that all change is a matter of perception. I think both views are wrong. I agree with you that time is change and nothing else. Were there is no change there is no time.

Hi Jac, returning to this thread now I have some "time". And re-reading... I really want to clarify a great deal before dealing with your later posts. There have been perhaps by accident, some great misrepresentations of what I believe and perhaps even what A-Theory actually entails.

I certainly reject your identifying my position as believing time to be some Platonic "containers of various lengths". Perhaps you are thinking of Hugh Ross' conception of time? Both Craig and myself believe that time is change... in fact, Craig often makes this a crucial part of his argument in debates. That is, only an intelligent being such as God who has a will to change and power to bring about change, can be the "eternal" thing that has always existed. Since unintelligent matter (e.g., "ice") would forever exist in a changeless state as "ice" if that was the eternal thing that always existed. Thus, a being like God must be the eternal thing without beginning rather than unintelligent matter like our forever changing universe.

Changelessness = no time. God was in a changeless state and therefore timeless. Then some change happened, God willed Creation into existence (something He willed from eternity). This then created one state (God without creation), followed by a new state (God with creation). Much like you believe. Only I believe this means God is temporal, even if God's nature doesn't change whereas you believe God is still timeless.

Not sure whether than matters in the scheme of things, but to make a correction. Where there is change in states, there is a state than precedes the new state. That is, time. This is A-Theory conception of time. No third theory is required.

So the question is how a "timeless" being can do something "in time." Understanding "time" the way I've suggested, what we really mean is we need to know how a changeless being can produce a change in something else. First, let me just say that so stated, that isn't nearly as hard to imagine. Imagine a car accident in which a car smashes headlong into a brick wall (or if you prefer something less violent, a wave crashing into a cliff). The car/wave certainly changes a lot at impact, doesn't it? It changes in response to the brick wall/cliff. And yet the brick wall/cliff experience no change at all (let's let slide for the sake of an imperfect illustration underlying physics here. Again, this is only an illustration). So we can say that the wall/cliff produced a change in the car/wave without itself being changed. (FYI, the classical illustration is actually a potters hand molding clay; the hand doesn't move--it holds its shape. The clay changes in response to the unchanging hand.)

Interestingly, I agree -- as my previous posts ought to show. There are no issues between us here.

It is why I see that God can become "Temporal" without really changing in nature, and thus remain immutable.

You prefer to say this is God remaining "Timeless" (since God doesn't change), and I'd call such God's becoming "Temporal" since something did change (God w/o Creation then God w/ Creation). However, we still both believe that God's nature did not change, as per the "potter's hand molding clay" analogy.

It seems to me that perhaps fundamentally, we believe very much the same thing (as per usual), only somehow see it in different terms.

The contrast is perhaps that you focus much on God's immutability, while I focus on God's true and personal relationship with us. I'm not sure how my view of God's relationship to time changes God's nature, especially in light of your comments that seem to support God's nature would not be changed.

In your thread re: your paper, you distinguished "weak" and "strong" forms of immutability. Now I've thought on it, I just don't accept this and feel it's causing an issue where there is in fact none.

In a strictly logical sense, God's Nature still doesn't change due to His relationship to time and creation (as you perfectly illustrated with the potter's hand example). I don't care what traditional idea of "immutability" entails, and I reject that it is in fact a traditional view that God's external relationship can not change. Such strictness, means that Creation must have always existed because God is forever in relationship with His creation. This entails B-Theory, a tenseless static view of time, which you yourself declared was not the Classical view of time.

So something is wrong here:

1) Either the God's immutability only applies to God's nature, and the classical view of time representing change applies.
OR
2) The traditional view of God's immutability applies to both God's nature and external relations, and time is tenseless and static with everything eternally existing (B-Theory)
OR
3) The traditional view of God's immutability applies to both God's nature and external relations CONTRADICTS the classical view of time representing change.

Given (3), and my respect for Christian theologians of old, I believe that "traditional", "classical" or whatever you may call it... is being tossed around too freely.

By "tossed around too freely", I mean just like some YECs (forgive the example, but just trying to illustrate my point): "The Scriptural age of the Earth is 6000 years old"... such rhetoric of "Scriptural" adds weight to their claim as more orthodox and Christian, I feel that the terms "Traditional" and "Classical" are similarly being used as used as a rhetorical/persuasive vehicle.

Given there was much early debate over what we now consider foundational Christian beliefs like the Trinity, Christ's nature and the like... it seems to me that "Traditional" and "Classical" are quite meaningless. Yes, certain theologians believed certain things... and there could possibly be several "classical" or "traditional" views depending on which historical theologian one reads.

In any case, it still remains that (3) is incoherent. And it seems to me, based on your comments above, that you do prefer to side with me on A-Theory of time.

Only on a B-Theory of time, that is, a tenseless theory of time, can your "strong" immutability hold true -- that is, God being "immutable" to the extent that His nature and external relationships do not change. Thus, Creation has to have always existed, since there cannot be a state of God without Creation and then a state of God with Creation. And this is the static B-Theory of time.

I can understand Lexy's confusion over how God can will creation and still retain immutability with regards to His Nature and external relationship to a New Creation.

Now if that makes any sense, let me go just a bit further. Descartes realy screwed us up here, because he gave us Hume, and the whole modern idea of God's temporality is based on the Cartesian/Humean notion of causality. See, for Hume, change happens when e₁ brings about e₂. So in our example above, the first event is the impact (of the car/wave against the wall/cliff), and the second event is the crumpling of the car/dispersion of the wave. Now on this view, where is the causality?

I don't really follow your logic, but it sounds similar to Zeno's Dichotomy paradox where one can never reach a finish line, because a person must first get halfway to the finish, but before getting halfway they must first reach a quarter of the way, but before that 1/8th, and before that 1/16th and ultimately an infinite number of points much be navigated to reach the finish line. Or, put another way, a person must reach 50% of the distance, and another 50%, and then another 50% and so on and so forth... which means they'll never actually reach the end.

How can we disprove this? Well, we actually get up in real life and walk over a finish line. But it's much harder to logically consider and disprove what is going on with such absurd logic.

You asked "where is the causality?" Well isn't is obvious that the wave tossing the car against the wall would cause the car to crumple? In any case. Certainly, there is a state of the car uncrumpled (S1) and now a state of the car crumpled (S2). So evidently, some change in state has happened even if you find the causality perplexing. Thus, S1 -> S2 = change = time.

It turns out to be an unanswerable question, because there is nothing actually common between the events. What, after all, is between e₁ and e₂?

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your question. But isn't the "car" the common subject in the two events?

This is why Hume argued that all causality is merely psychological, and that if it really exists, we can't know it. It is also why Kant, following Hume, rejected all causal arguments for God's existence, since psychological reality cannot be applied to the external reality (the way Descartes got around that was by appealing to God's existence; but, of course, that makes arguments for His existence based on causality circular). The second problem is, when did the change happen? It turns out that we are forced on this view to assume either a Platonic view of time (as K does with his A-theory above) or else deny that time and change exist all the way around (which B-theory and Hume did).

Ahh... perhaps you were trying to describe and educate rather than actually believing there was no causality or change?

There seems to be some misunderstanding here.

Re: "A-theory", I reject the Platonic view of time that would say it passes independently of any change. Logically, in order for time to be measured, then I see that there needs to be some change. If the world stood still, and nothing anywhere changed, then no more time would pass.

I raise that because there are only two ways to conceive causality. The first is the way we just mentioned--the Cartesian/Humean notion in which events bring about other events within this Platonic container called "time"--or the classical position you implicitly assumed. The classical view is that things change, that things cause change (not events). On this view, change is not e₁->e₂, but rather S_a1->S_a2 (where S="substance," and a="accident"). That is, the car had the property being well shaped before the collision. Because of the car's interaction with the way the wall actually is, the car lost the property being well shaped (S_a1) and acquired the property being crumpled (S_a2).

I'm not sure where we disagree here.

Now, on this view, I ask the same questions. First, where is the causality? It is in the car/wave, not the wall. That is clear in that it is the car that changed, not the wall. So we see the classical axiom, "Change is always in the effect, never the cause." Second, when did this change occur? The answer is that the change precisely is the loss of one property and the gaining of the other. We do not need to presume a "container" called "time" in which the change happend. The change itself is what time is.

All we need to know for "tense" to exist, is that there was one state prior to another. Where this is seen, then the first state is now "past" = time. I don't think you disagree with this, right?

God is changeless (absolutely immutable). He simply is what He is. When He brought into existence the creation, there was no change in Him, because remember, change is always in the effect, not the cause. What changed? The creation. It "changed" insofar as it came into existence (I'm leaving aside here more technical discussions on the difference in generation vs. substantial change). God does not aquire a new property, having now created the universe.

And so after all, it turns out that you are supporting (1) above -- "Either the God's immutability only applies to God's nature, and the classical view of time representing change applies" -- just like I do!

And yet, I say since God's external relationship changed (from having no relationship to a Creation since it did not exist, to now having a relationship to Creation), that temporality now logically ensues God. Unlike you who believes God remains timeless.

However, like you, I believe God's nature remains unchanged, and everything else you just stated. And yet, there is a state of "God without the universe" and a state of "God with the universe". Even more tricky, there is a time on Earth without Christ, and a time where Christ was born and existed on Earth. Both are truly past events, or if you will, past states that no longer hold today.

The universe has the property, "having been created by God." You cannot say that the universe aquired some new property at creation (it exists where before it had the property it does not exist) because prior to creation there was no creation to have any properties at all. So we say that creation is "really related to God"--it has the relationship to Him that the effect (that which is changed) has to a cause (that which causes the change). We say further, however, that "God is not really related to the universe." Put differently, God's relation to the universe is not real but one of reason, which is a distinction well understood by philosophers. The "changes" in God as result of His relation of reason to creation are called by philosophers "cambridge changes" are are widely recognized, even by evangelicals who hold the views K espouses, as not really being changes at all. For instance, I suspect that prior to reading this, you did not know that Aquinas taught everything I am saying here. Having gained this knowledge, would you say that Aquinas changed? After all, he gained the property lexy is aware of my teaching, a property he did not have before! But it's obvious that Aquinas hasn't changed at all. On that level, your relation to him in one of reason, and the change is one of reason, not of reality. (As another aside, this is a good reason why we need to get away from the Platonic notion of "properties" all the way around and get back to proper language of accidents and substances).

Again, you've left me perplexed about where our disagreement is.

So bottom line:

In creation, it changed, not God. Since God did not change, He is not temporal. God transcends time.

I agree with much of what you say, but still don't see how this logically justifies God's timelessness.

You mention "cambridge changes" (thanks for introducing this term). I get that, which is why I believe God is still immutable even though God becomes temporal.

As I've been reasoning all along, in your thread re: your paper and this thread here... timelessness/temporality are not reflective of God's nature, but rather simply "cambridge changes". Despite me not specifically using that term, I'm not sure how you have missed that in all I've been saying.

However, it seems all the more obvious, as mentioned towards the beginning of my response in this post of mine:

• It seems to me that perhaps fundamentally, we believe very much the same thing (as per usual), only somehow see it in different terms.
  
  The contrast is perhaps that you focus much on God's immutability, while I focus on God's true and personal relationship with us.

You are seeing "timelessness" as part of God in some sense (some Divine Simplicity sense), and so saying God became temporal seems like a bigger change to you than the "cambridge change". However, I simply consider "timeless" and "temporality" as simply "cambridge changes" in virtue of God's true relationship with Creation and vice-versa, rather than "changes in God's nature".

Given this, I think the path of our discussion should be nutting out why you don't see "temporality" as a "cambridge change", but must make time to be something of God's nature.

Anyway, as a matter of honesty, given there are clearly big misunderstandings of what I believe... I'd appreciate if you stop associating my view with this or that.

I'm only familiar with some modern philosophical thinking, predominantly theologically flavoured, and my own free thinking. So in order to pick up on your misunderstandings about what I believe, I actually had to research what Plato believed and the like. It's kind of a blessing that I'm unacquainted with what was historically believed, since ancient philosophers discussed a whole lot of stuff that when I hear I simply roll my eyes. These even perhaps gives philosophers a bad name as just thinking about useless things like how many angels can dance on the tip of a needle. But, then it's also a curse in that I've come to conclusions without going through the same thought processes and earlier -> contemporary philosophers. So I may miss things. But then, that's also a blessing because my reasoning is to some degree unadulterated and very much my own free thinking -- and I am often surprised that I arrive at conclusions through my own thinking that others hold to without having been taught. It's one reason I love philosophy. Knowledge can be gained through thinking, not just reading.

In any case, let's just reason and discuss logic dropping who thought what or who I'm aligned with, who/what holds a traditional or classic position. Feel free to mention thinkers and what they believed, but please don't associate me with them. If you raise the thinking of someone, I'll happily acknowledge whether I agree or disagree with them.

Otherwise, I think the path should be why you do not see "God's temporality" as a "cambridge change". I have a feeling it might be something to do with Divine Simplicity since much difference between us seems to always boil down to this.

[Kurieuo]

As per my previous quote of Craig, a temporal God necessitates a change in His intrinsic nature. We aren't talking mere Cambridge changes here. These are real changes in God. Yet we simply cannot allow for intrinsic change in God.

I'll have to re-read Craig here, but I have a feeling such "intrinsic changes" would not be anymore more intrinsic than a potter's hand molding clay.

It's may be just how one chooses to define matters, but the details are the same. I'll soon see anyway. As I'll dig out Craig's book and in the next few days re-read over his thoughts here.

[Jac3510]

I'll provide a more substantive response later, K, but for now, let me make X quick points:

1. I've already said that I may have mistaken Craig's view for yours. With all due respect, I don't think you have understood Craig's view. I'll get his books out and provide a range of quotes later. For now, suffice it to say that he definitely and intentionally holds (following Plantinga) a Platonic conception of time. That is, in fact, the basis on which he makes his arguments concerning God's mutability and temporality. But I'll raise those points in detail only to help you get a firmer grasp on your own view. I don't think it does us any particular good beyond mere academic interests to discuss what Craig believes. Far more interesting is what you believe, and as I said before and will say it again, I apologize for conflating your beliefs. I will say, though, that while I disagree with Craig, at least I see him as coherent. I don't think you've appreciated some of the nuances of your insistance on both A-theory and the rejection of a Platonic view of time, since the former entails the latter--something Craig recognizes and thus accepts.

2. Concerning where we need to nut out our discussion--and you are right about the point of interest here--the problem is that cambridge changes are insufficient to ground temporality, because cambridge changes turn out not to be changes at all. Since time is change, then a cambridge changes do not entail time. Thus, if all changes in God are cambridge changes, then we have no warrant for claiming God's temporality.

3. We disagree that God was in a state of not having created and is now in a state of having created. This goes back to my point that God is not related to the world. Again, God did not acquire or lose any properties at creation, not even the property "having created the world." All such properties entail a real relation between God and the world, and that does not exist.

Again, I'll say more later, but I think that ought to clarify where our actual disagreements are, at least from my perspective.

[Kurieuo]

As per my previous quote of Craig, a temporal God necessitates a change in His intrinsic nature. We aren't talking mere Cambridge changes here. These are real changes in God. Yet we simply cannot allow for intrinsic change in God.

I'll have to re-read Craig here, but I have a feeling such "intrinsic changes" would not be anymore more intrinsic than a potter's hand molding clay.

It's may be just how one chooses to define matters, but the details are the same. I'll soon see anyway. As I'll dig out Craig's book and in the next few days re-read over his thoughts here.

You said you prefer to avoid Craig, but... this is something that I think needs to be dealt with. And I've just spend the last couple of hours researching as it was bugging me (thanks, only the best can do that!)

Understand that Craig's beliefs are very relevant to this discussion. I make no attempt to claim that I arrived at what I believe regarding God's relationship to time, except that Craig presented a position that made sense to me of God's creative act and avoiding an infinite regress, and so I adopted it thereafter. In fact, I purchased Craig's book in order to try and resolve this problem of infinite regress. So please understand, while you want to hear what I have to say, and I've presented much of my own and will still espouse my own beliefs... my position is in large part built upon Craig's.

Given this, I also believe I'm in a very good position to espouse what Craig in large part believes, and I do not believe what you have written is fully accurate -- which got me digging.

Firstly, in my previous post I explain that what changed from God's timelessness to temporality, was not an intrinsic change to God's nature but rather God's external relationship to creation (a "Cambridge change"). Thus, God's immutability is sustained with regards to God's nature. Now, Craig also happens to believe this as I thought he might. Consider Craig's following words:

The first argument is the argument based upon God's causal relationship to the world. In order to understand this, you need first to understand the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic change. Something changes intrinsically if one of its properties changes, which it has in isolation from its relationship to anything else. For example, a ripening apple turns from green to red; that's an intrinsic change in the apple. Something changes extrinsically if it changes in its relations to something else. For example, I was once taller than my son John, but I am now shorter than my son John, not because of any intrinsic change in me, but because of an intrinsic change in him. He has grown taller. I have become shorter than John by undergoing an extrinsic change. I have remained intrinsically changeless in terms of my height, but I have undergone extrinsic change in relation to John in that, because of his change in height, I am now in a new relation, namely smaller than, whereas before I stood in a different relation, taller than, to my son. So thus I have undergone a relational or extrinsic change.

Now in order for something to be temporal, it doesn't need to be intrinsically changing. All it needs to experience is extrinsic change in its relations. For example, imagine a rock existing in outer space, frozen at absolute zero. (Now I know that's physically impossible, but this is just a thought experiment.) Let's imagine this rock is frozen at absolute zero, so it is absolutely changeless intrinsically. Would that rock be timeless? Well, I think clearly not, because it could still change extrinsically in its relation to things around it. A meteor whizzes by—a little later, another meteor whizzes by—and a little later, another meteor whizzes by. Even though the rock is intrinsically changeless, it clearly stands in temporal relations with these successive events. And therefore merely extrinsic change is sufficient for a temporal existence.

This contradicts what you say that: "a temporal God necessitates a change in His intrinsic nature." Temporality does not necessarily imply an intrinsic change, but rather can be extrinsic as Craig here exemplifies. That is, we are indeed talking "Cambridge changes".

However, you are correct, that Craig sees some intrinsic change in God. But, God's nature still remains the same. This is what I believe as previously posted, and also what Craig believes. I think that you are simply wrong to believe that because an intrinsic change happens with God, that God's nature also changes. Also re-read your quotes of Craig. If I'm correct, at no point will Craig admit that "a temporal God necessitates a change in His intrinsic nature." Such is a misinterpretation of Craig.

In support of this, here is a question and answer I found:

Q. Thank you for your excellent talk! The concept of the immutability, the changelessness of God, is, I think, essential if we are to stay away from process theology or other areas where I think we could go wrong. If God is timeless before creation and temporal after creation, are you implying some change in His nature, His essence, or His character, or simply his relation to time?

A. Very good question! I am not in any way implying a change in God's nature. Remember, I spoke of His undergoing extrinsic change, change in relationships. This wouldn't be a change in His nature. I do think God also changes in intrinsic ways—for example, knowing what time it is. He knows it's now t1, now it's t2, now it's t3. But I think that these kinds of trivial changes are not at all threatening to an orthodox concept of God. What is crucial is that God not change in His attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, holiness, love, eternality, necessity, and all the rest. Those would all be preserved as essential attributes of God on this model.

Now to re-iterate something I said in my last post, it appears my feelings are correct that these "intrinsic" changes are no more significant than any in your "potter's hand molding clay" example. In order for the hand to mold the clay, it needs to intrinsically change in posture to effect the clay. However, the nature of the potter's hand remains the same. In a similar way, God's temporal knowledge could be likened the a change in posture, but the intrinsic nature of God remains the same.

While I respect that some has classified "immutability" in the strict sense that God could do absolutely nothing. As you quoted of Craig in that other thread:

the immutability affirmed by the medieval theologians is a radical concept: utter immobility. God cannot change in any respect. He never thinks successive thoughts, He never performs successive actions, He never undergoes even the most trivial alteration. God not only cannot undergo intrinsic change, He cannot even change extrinsically by being related to changing things.

Now whether this is "Classical" I suppose depends on how one defines classical. So I performed a quick search on what some believe God's Immutability entails. The Westminster Shorter Catechism says, "God is a spirit, whose being, wisdom power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth are infinite, eternal, and unchangeable." Louis Berkhof's systematic theology text defines God's immutability as "perfection of God by which He does not change in His being, perfections, purposes, or promises." And in Scripture (which is the most important to us) we have: Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Ps. 102:26; 2 Tim. 2:13; Heb. 6:17-18; James 1:17 -- neither of these definitions nor Scripture contradict Craig's or my own understanding of God's Immutability.

[Kurieuo]

I'll provide a more substantive response later, K, but for now, let me make X quick points:

1. I've already said that I may have mistaken Craig's view for yours. With all due respect, I don't think you have understood Craig's view. I'll get his books out and provide a range of quotes later. For now, suffice it to say that he definitely and intentionally holds (following Plantinga) a Platonic conception of time. That is, in fact, the basis on which he makes his arguments concerning God's mutability and temporality. But I'll raise those points in detail only to help you get a firmer grasp on your own view. I don't think it does us any particular good beyond mere academic interests to discuss what Craig believes. Far more interesting is what you believe, and as I said before and will say it again, I apologize for conflating your beliefs. I will say, though, that while I disagree with Craig, at least I see him as coherent. I don't think you've appreciated some of the nuances of your insistance on both A-theory and the rejection of a Platonic view of time, since the former entails the latter--something Craig recognizes and thus accepts.

Just quickly re: Platonic conception of time.

As mentioned previously, I simply do not know what Plato believed beyond what you've mentioned and a surface level scan.

There exists "containers of various lengths" whatever that means, but my understanding was that time is unaffected by "changlessness" and necessarily passes in and of itself. Whether or not I have correctly understood the Platonic conception of time, I do not believe this.

And yet, I do believe that there is some truth to it given the metric of time in our universe (i.e., seconds, minutes, hours, etc). God's timelessness is still dependent upon His changelessness, such that the moment He willed the universe into existence was the moment He entered into temporality. Perhaps time thereafter was measurable in and of itself, but say nothing changed, then there would be no way to determine whether a second passed, a minute or an hour.

Whatever the case, such "time" does not extend back to a before creation, since "time" presumably only came into existence with God's creative act.

Anyhow, until I have a proper understanding of the Platonic conception of time, what I say re: it should be taken with a grain of salt.

[Jac3510]

Re: Platonic time, this will get you off to a good start. It doesn't say everything that needs to be said, especially wrt Craig's views, but it lays some essentials all the same:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#RedPlaResTim

The whole article is important, but that section and the next (the topography of time) in particular are the important parts as far as our conversation goes.

[Kurieuo]

Re: Platonic time, this will get you off to a good start. It doesn't say everything that needs to be said, especially wrt Craig's views, but it lays some essentials all the same:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#RedPlaResTim

The whole article is important, but that section and the next (the topography of time) in particular are the important parts as far as our conversation goes.

Thanks Jac.