Okay . . . so this post has been too long in the works! *cracks knuckles*
First, let me take you up on your offer about recommending you to some sources. John Feinberg has a book titled
No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God that has a good discussion on the matter. Chapter 4 discusses process theology in considerable detail, but he has a relevant quote much earlier in the book I think I want to quote in full, even if it is a bit lengthy:
- Another form of the view that God is both material and immaterial is known as panentheism (all in God). This view is especially associated with process theology as originally set forth by Alfred N. Whitehead and developed by disciples, including Charles Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, and David Griffin. . . . According to process theism, God is an actual entity. All actual entities are dipolar or bipolar, so God is as well. God has a primordial, eternal, potential pole and a temporal, consequent, actual pole. According to process thinking, there exist certain eternal objects which may ingress into our world to become actual entities. Such eternal objects are pure potentials, and pure potentials cannot order and relate themselves; that must be done by an actual entity. Hence, there is a need for some nontemporal actual entity, and this is God in his primordial nature. In his primordial nature, God is like a backstage director who lines up the forms, getting them ready to ingress onto the stage of the temporal world. However, God's primordial nature shouldn't be seen as distinct from the order of eternal objects, i.e., the order is his primordial nature. The primordial, conceptual pole of God is clearly immaterial. On the other hand, as all other actual entities, God has a physical, concrete pole to complete the "vision" of his potential pole. In God's case, the consequent pole is the universe. This doesn't mean that God's actual pole is merely identical to the universe about us. Rather, process theists like to say that God's being interpenetrates everything without being identical to it. Hence, they prefer to label their view "panentheism" rather than "pantheism," for everything exists in God without being identical to him. God and the world are mutually interdependent, and what happens to one affects the other. So, God is a finite being with both material (consequent nature) and immaterial (primordial pole) elements. (p. 52)
Now, I don't expect you to agree with process theists or argue that this represents your view. On the contrary, on quite a fwe points I am sure rather strongly disagree. All the same, this is important because it seems to me that panentheistism
entails all of this. If, then, this is wrong, then so too is panentheism. As a result, there is one of two arguments that is right:
- 1. Panentheism entails (or necessarily presumes) certain ideas that are expressed uniquely in and by process theism;
2. Process theism is wrong;
3. Therefore, panentheism is wrong.
This is my argument. My concern in our discussion is to demonstrate (1) as I take it that comments such as the above are sufficiently problematic to simply allow for (2) without detailed discussion. You, on the other hand, have suggested a different argument;
- i. Some process theists embrace panentheism;
ii. Process theism is wrong;
iii. Therefore, panentheism is wrong;
iv. But i-iii is a genetic fallacy (more technically, it denies the antecedent)
v. Therefore, it is not clear that process theism's error entails error in panentheism
In short, you recognize that I draw a connection between process theism and panentheism, and rejecting process theism I thereby reject panentheism. But you object to this argument as being fallacious on the grounds that such is a genetic fallacy (which I say you should modify to say that it is actually a fallacy of denying the antecedent). You would be right in your analysis except for the fact that I do not see a mere
correlation between process theism and panentheism. Rather, I see (as per (1) above) a
necessary entailment.
If, then, the mode of my argument is clear, I hope that we can put aside arguments about genetic fallacies, knee-jerk reactions, and whether or not you are a process theist or whether or not statements like the above quotation accurately reflect your views. All such matters are beside the point, for if I am right in the necessary entailment, then the matter is simply with your own internal consistency.
So how, then, do I prove (1)?
Actually, I don't think it is too difficult.
Any conception of panentheism conceives of God "entering into" creation, at least insofar as creation exists entirely within God. We could be idealists (as you argue Craig is) and deny any material nature in God or we could affirm the real material nature of the universe and thereby argue that "part" of God is material. But those are our only two choices, for if creation really is material, and if creation really is within God, then part of God--the part of Him that permeates creation at least, is material. Or if God is completely immaterial with no material part of any kind, then everything in God must also be immaterial, and if creation is within God, then it, too, must be immaterial.
I actually don't wish to argue whether either of these is correct (I think both are incorrect, which is another disprove of panentheism, but let that pass). The point I want to make is more fundamental. We know that creation changes. Unless we hold to a B-Theory of time, which you have emphatically denied, then change is a necessary part of creation. Therefore, at least the part of God that permeates creation is changing. By analogy, consider a lump of clay. I may shape it into a circle and then a square and then a triangle. I may change the circle, and then change the square, and then change the triangle. In all that, the clay is changing. Of course, the clay never ceases to be clay, but it is changing, nonetheless. Just so, since everything is in God and He permeates all that we are, then if we change, then He too must necessarily change. In so changing, He does not cease to be God, nor are we here affirming pantheism, since God and creation are not identical. But the fact remains that changes in creation necessitate changes in God.
I don't think that is too terribly problematic in and of itself, either--at least not for you. You have no problem, I believe, affirming that God is mutable to some degree, and this would go well with your idea that God is temporal (indeed, this would entail God's temporality). But it is here we see that we must accept the dipolar nature of God, which is the essence of process theism. For on this point, the part of God that is changing is not only temporal and mutable, but
necessarily so. It is necessarily so because the creation is necessarily temporal and mutable (if not in itself then at least in fact--again, we are firmly denying B-Theory here). Thus, part of God is necessarily temporal and mutable, if not in Himself then at least in fact. Whatever else we call it, this temporal, mutable part of God is precisely identical to what process theists call God's concrete, actual pole. You may differ in your terminology, but on this point, whatever word you use, you are expressing exactly the same idea.
So a part of God is inescapably changing. In process language, a part of God is "becoming" (as opposed to being). But the moment we say that, we see the necessity of another pole in God, another part of God that is necessary and immutable. We see this in three ways. First, change presupposes a thing to be changed. If part of God is changing, then God Himself is presupposed as the thing to be changed, and that necessarily so. Second, if something is becoming then it must be so that it may become. Thus, if part of God is becoming, then part of God must also literally be. Third, nothing that is in flux can be necessary, for by definition, it's previous state existed and its current state did not, being that it's previous state ceased to exist (and therefore it's previous state was not necessary) and it's current state at one point did not exist (and therefore it's current state is not necessary). Thus, anything in flux necessitates something else that is absolutely necessary. If God is changing, and if God is the necessary being, that means that a part of God is absolutely unchanging and exists necessarily. This, I think, is something you can readily accept as you have argued strongly before that while God may change in some respects, He really is immutable in others (i.e., His nature). Now, all of this means that while there is a mutable, temporal pole in God, there is also a necessary, immutable pole in God.
We should quickly add that in speaking of two parts of God we are not literally suggesting that God is a divided entity. We are simply saying that in one sense, God is absolutely necessary and immutable, and yet in another He is absolutely contingent and temporal, at least insofar as His relationship with creation is concerned. Thus, we have completely affirmed the dipolar nature of God. To emphasize:
a panentheistic conception of God necessitates that we affirm God's dipolar nature.
But if this is true, then we are forced to draw the conclusion that all process theologians must draw--there is no such thing as creation. The universe had no beginning but exists eternally with God. But this is in direct conflict with Scripture and is therefore to be rejected. To emphasize,
if panentheism is true, then because God is dipolar, then we must necessarily deny that creation had a beginning but must instead affirm that it is eternal with God.
I assume you agree that such a point is unacceptable, and so you would challenge the assertion. The reason it is true is rather simple: we cannot speak of God as dipolor now but monopolar
before creation (however we mean that). Thus, you cannot say that God is monopoloar
sans creation, but once He created the world, He
became dipolar. The reason should be self-evident. A monopolar God exemplifes the absolutely necessary, immutable existence. As such, there is no "part" of a monopolar God that can change. That is to say, a monopolar God cannot
become anything (refer to the conversation above about what "becoming" entails). Thus, a dipolar God must necessarily always be dipolar--indeed, that is part of His primordial pole (to be dipolar!). But if God is necessarily dipolar, and then the second pole--the actual, concrete pole that "contains" or permeates the material world--entails that a material creation exist. For the second pole of God is a contingent pole. It makes no sense to speak of the second pole
sans creation, for where there is no creation, there is no second pole. For this reason, we must affirm that a second pole of God necessitates a world.
Thus, on panentheism, God's primordial pole guarantees inescapably that a universe exist. It is self-contradictory to speak of creating one unless "creation" is reinterpreted to deny an actual creation and mean simply "dependence upon." But either view--the denial or reinterpretation of creation--denies the biblical account and so must be rejected.
Thus, I say what I have said all along. Panentheism, because of its necessary assumptions, is unbiblical. It cannot be sustained because it ultimately denies Scripture. It necessarily entails (or presumes) process theism, and that whether you know what process theism involves or not. Since process theism is wrong (as we have seen), then panentheism is also wrong.
Your thoughts?
edit:
I'll go back soon and answer line by line your post above, too. I don't want you to think I ignored it, and I'll say something about Ecclesiastes as well. For now, it's back to work!
