Paging Mr. Morrison RE: Your Thesis P.139-147

[domokunrox]

So, I had a look at your thesis and I simply wanted to give you my comments strictly on the pages you asked me to look at.
Page 139

since, in the end, simplicity merely (strongly)
affirms that the Trine God is in fact one Being.

If, in the end, DS is merely (and strongly) affirm that God is in fact one being then there is simply no objection from me, Mr. Morrison. However, there is a saying "The devil is in the details". Does DS affirm other things that are absurd or otherwise contradict what I believe is rational and real? But again, if all that DS simply says is that, then there is no argument from me. In fact, I would be gladly in your camp defending this piece of philosophy.

Let me go ahead and tell you what I do endorse about God in addition to this. God is a perfect substance and that substance is not in any way analogous to anything else that exists. Now you may not like the term "substance" used in this manner, but thats what I believe is best to work with.

P 139-140

It can scarcely escape notice that much of the
preceding discussion assumes an Aristotelian-Thomistic
metaphysical framework. The Prima Via explicitly assumes
Aristotle’s account of change, and much of the argument
between Plantinga and Aquinas has been shown to actually
boil down to an argument about the nature of universals

that is, in what sense to properties exist? Yet in much
of modern philosophy, Aristotle has gone by the wayside,
having supposedly been debunked by modern science. If,
then, Aristotle’s basic accounts are faulty, then it seems
that everything said above is at best misguided.
This is, of course, not the place to engage in a full
discussion on which metaphysical picture is correct. Yet
given the centrality of this question, it is worth noting
the possibility that Aristotle may have been cast aside too
quickly. In support of this notion, three brief arguments
are worth considering.

What I like in particular here, Mr. Morrison is that you openly admit that the Aristotelean/Thomism metaphysical framework has to be axiomatic in order for your arguments to have any force. Fair enough. Realistically, this is one aspect that I believe we should have a clear head on. You can't really say that your arguments have much force behind them until anyone concedes the metaphysical framework you endorse. If one simply doesn't agree with it, we're free to ignore it and be on our merry way and affirm any piece of Christian theology that still does work under another metaphysical framework (especially if its a rational improvement upon Aristotelean/Thomism. Surely you can agree with that, right?). Sure, you can say "Well, then its not classical theism", and sure I guess so but that doesn't matter at all. I don't see how getting a seal of "classical theism" makes you more right and/rational, so lets not push that angle. I think thats attempting to pull the wool over people's eyes inadvertently.

So, next you got

General argument against Platonism

RE: Universals
and let me go ahead and say that I don't endorse Platonism. Also, let me go ahead and get the definition for everyone here, so they can follow along.

Platonism is the view that there exist abstract (that is, non-spatial, non-temporal) objects. Because abstract objects are wholly non-spatiotemporal, it follows that they are also entirely non-physical (they do not exist in the physical world and are not made of physical stuff) and non-mental (they are not minds or ideas in minds; the are not disembodied souls, or Gods, or anything else along these lines)

Lets stop right there and let me go ahead and explain why I don't endorse this view and why I don't believe anyone else should.
First of all, there is no adequate justification for asserting that universals are non-temporal. Second, charitably assuming that such universals are non-spatiotemporal. If that is the case, and in addition they are also non-mental. Then based on those 2 assertions, there is no way you can be informed of the existence of such things as universals. Hence, Platonism is rationally untenable. It matters not a single bit what Plato did in caves or any other experiments otherwise, these "universals" are undetectable to us and anything you would call a universal is simply hogwash (rationally speaking).

Now, I don't believe that Plantiga truly is fully committed to Platonism. I think he simply doesn't find Nominalism strong enough to hold his arguments up (probably). What it all mainly boils down to is the question of universals or abstract objects and its a complicated discussion so lets not get into it aside from me telling you that I am a rational realist (you should already know this)

You continue with this

General argument for realism of some sort
Since Descarte, philosophy has tended to take a
mechanistic view of the world—a view is fundamentally at
odds with the Aristotelian approach assumed throughout this
study. As such, many of the claims made in favor of
simplicity can easily be questioned or even dismissed given
modern metaphysical commitments. Brian Ellis calls this
system “passivism,”

I want to comment on the bolded to tell you that you are partially correct but gravely mistaken elsewhere. We're not at odds here. I don't think you have been given the proper lecture on rational realism and thus you haven't given it a fair shake. In fact, I agree with you on many things, Mr. Morrison. We believe in a lot of the same things, but that doesn't make it rational or right.

You mention that Bruan Ellis calls this Passivism, and I'm guessing its because they don't feel the position is forceful enough (probably like Plantiga). This is the wrong way to view the philosophy since I consider it a very forceful position since it forces everyone to concede certain things about reality (like how little we know about it). What I like about it is that it intellectually "neuters" your opposition and forcefully require anyone to admit that they need a foundational explanation for their axioms. Now you may say that you and everyone else are basing your theories on "properly basic beliefs" but thats not going to cut it.
You continue with how there is dissatisfaction with "mechanistic" view and there are new arguments for the "new essentialism"

In other words, things have
essences, and part of the essence of a thing includes its
natural potentialities (e.g., water has the potential to
exist as a liquid, solid, or gas)

Now, let me go ahead and correct this. Descartes has never said there is no essence. His system directly supports that notion. On one hand, we have spatial extension (A rock for example) the essence of which is to take up space.

So you go on to say

Essentialism seems to have a strong case on its side.........That is, modern science
seems very interested not merely in describing how things
have acted, but how they do act—that is, in uncovering and
describing their basic natures.

Now, modern science might be interested in how things do act, and uncovering and describing their basic natures. Sure, that is their interest, but that is no longer science. You would be absolutely correct in calling it modern science since such a system isn't based on rationality and consequently is intellectually bankrupt because of exactly that. The big difference between modern science and the scientific revolution is that the people who were doing the science method were also really well trained in philosophy (most of them were norminalists). Thats not the case these days and thats part of the reason why there is this abomination of verificationism/atheism today.

Rational realism and modern science are not birds of the same feather, clearly.

You go on to say

the passivist view
seems difficult to maintain in the face of modern science.....the causal powers of
certain things. The “forces of nature” in these models are
not broad, abstract frameworks, but rather descriptions of
the way really existing things really behave; that is, the
stuff of chemistry—atoms, molecules, electrons, and the
rest—are really thought to exist and really thought to have
the properties attributed to them. They are not passive
blobs of mass being pushed around by abstract forces.

Let me go ahead and tell you my view on forces. They aren't empirical. Sure, you can claim up and down that these "forces" do in fact exist because look at all the verified experiments, but thats phenomenalism. In the rational realist view, physics and math isn't science. Attempting to do such things without a proper understanding of what it is and why they exist is pretty much analogous to being a witch doctor.
Quite simply:
Constant conjunction? Absolutely.
Necessary connection? Absolutely not.

I like to quote Hume on this view

Can it be proven by the relation of ideas? No. Can it be proven by matter of fact? No. Then commit it to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion

So, Mr. Morrison, you may not like my approach on knowledge and God, but what I endorse is not at odds with you at all. When you say something proves or compelling evidence for the existence of God or the existence of forces. I believe you, but I believe you got it backwards (so, its actually wrong in that sense). We are the same thing, just a different tactic. I hope you get that at the very least. I tried to keep this brief to respect as much of your time as possible, so I apologize in advance if it doesn't satisfy your hunger like a snickers bar.

[Byblos]

I just have a couple of quick questions for you dom, if you don't mind.

God is a perfect substance and that substance is not in any way analogous to anything else that exists.

However unique God's substance is, it is still a substance independent of God, is it not? For if it is not distinguishable from God then it would necessarily be identical to Him. i.e. it would put us back in the DS camp.

If I grant then that God's substance is distinguishable from God, then

... I don't endorse Platonism ...
... Platonism is rationally untenable...
...these "universals" are undetectable...

First whether or not they are detectable I would think is utterly besides the point. More importantly though, if God's substance is indeed distinguishable from God then it is exactly the sort of "universal" Plato's brand of philosophy refers to. How can you then claim you're not a Platonist?

[Philip]

In articulating philosophical/theological positions/understandings about God, I think the following link to cautions offered by Norman Geisler (http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/ ... 9_JETS.pdf) - are very insightful. ESPECIALLY, the section on page 15 (numbered on the top right of the actual page / page 13 on the PDF). The section I'm referring to is titled: "II. HOW TO BEWARE OF PHILOSOPHY: INTELLECTUAL AND SPIRITUAL ADVICE."

[Jac3510]

If, in the end, DS is merely (and strongly) affirm that God is in fact one being then there is simply no objection from me, Mr. Morrison. However, there is a saying "The devil is in the details". Does DS affirm other things that are absurd or otherwise contradict what I believe is rational and real? But again, if all that DS simply says is that, then there is no argument from me. In fact, I would be gladly in your camp defending this piece of philosophy.

DS certainly affirms man things you appear to regard as "absurd and otherwise contradict what [you] believe is rational and real." My point in that section is, with respect to the Trinity, that the Trinity can serve as no defeater to DS. The moment you declare that the Father, Son, and Spirit are all consubstantial and coeternal, you've no Trinitarian basis on which to reject DS, because all DS is doing (here) is declaring that God is one Being rather than three. You believe God is one Being, so you have no debate from with DS from a Trinitarian perspective.

Let me go ahead and tell you what I do endorse about God in addition to this. God is a perfect substance and that substance is not in any way analogous to anything else that exists. Now you may not like the term "substance" used in this manner, but thats what I believe is best to work with.

I don't object to using the term "substance" to apply to God if we are using it very loosely, in the sense of "essence"--(I'm thinking here of Aristotle's secondary substance). But, again, it's important that we recognize that such language is really very loose, given the connection with these terms with genus. Strictly speaking, God, as pure being, transcends genus, and thus strictly is not a substance at all.

Byblos' question is worth answering, though. I would be interested in your response to it.

What I like in particular here, Mr. Morrison is that you openly admit that the Aristotelean/Thomism metaphysical framework has to be axiomatic in order for your arguments to have any force. Fair enough. Realistically, this is one aspect that I believe we should have a clear head on. You can't really say that your arguments have much force behind them until anyone concedes the metaphysical framework you endorse. If one simply doesn't agree with it, we're free to ignore it and be on our merry way and affirm any piece of Christian theology that still does work under another metaphysical framework (especially if its a rational improvement upon Aristotelean/Thomism. Surely you can agree with that, right?). Sure, you can say "Well, then its not classical theism", and sure I guess so but that doesn't matter at all. I don't see how getting a seal of "classical theism" makes you more right and/rational, so lets not push that angle. I think thats attempting to pull the wool over people's eyes inadvertently.

Naturally, which is why this section is in the paper. On the other hand, I put people who deny Aristotelianism in the same camp as I put people who deny the law of non-contradiction. They're just absurd and, in the end, really aren't to be taken all that seriously. As I argue over those few pages, you really can't get away from some type of Aristotelianism at all, so I'm not too terribly worried this a "weakness."

Still, I and every other Thomist openly admits--the metaphysics are, in many ways, Aristotelian. There's nothing shocking on that point.

Lets stop right there and let me go ahead and explain why I don't endorse this view and why I don't believe anyone else should.
First of all, there is no adequate justification for asserting that universals are non-temporal. Second, charitably assuming that such universals are non-spatiotemporal. If that is the case, and in addition they are also non-mental. Then based on those 2 assertions, there is no way you can be informed of the existence of such things as universals. Hence, Platonism is rationally untenable. It matters not a single bit what Plato did in caves or any other experiments otherwise, these "universals" are undetectable to us and anything you would call a universal is simply hogwash (rationally speaking).

Now, I don't believe that Plantiga truly is fully committed to Platonism. I think he simply doesn't find Nominalism strong enough to hold his arguments up (probably). What it all mainly boils down to is the question of universals or abstract objects and its a complicated discussion so lets not get into it aside from me telling you that I am a rational realist (you should already know this)

Actually, Plantinga is a committed Platonist (see Does God Have a Nature?, pp. 35-36), at least with respect to universals. So, by the way, is J. P. Moreland (see his Universals, an entire volume dedicated to the subject).

Anyway, I'm glad that you don't intentionally endorse Platonism. And I know that you hold "rational realism," but we've had that conversation before. I just don't think you understand the positions very well. With regard to universals, you are either some kind of realist or some kind of nominalist. If the former, you think universals refer to something real, to an actual extra-mental reality. And if that, then you think that those forms really exists in and of themselves (which is Platonic realism) or you deny that they exist in and of themselves and that they only exist in real things (which is moderate or, to use your preferred word immanent, realism). There are no other positions here. On the other hand, if you deny that universals refer to a real, extra-mental reality, then you, like those fools Descartes and Ockham, are a nominalist.

There are just no other positions to take here. We've exhausted all the logical possibilities. Universals are real (Realism) or not (Nominalism). If real, the reality they point to either subsist in themselves (Platonism) or in real things (Aristotelianism).

I want to comment on the bolded to tell you that you are partially correct but gravely mistaken elsewhere. We're not at odds here. I don't think you have been given the proper lecture on rational realism and thus you haven't given it a fair shake. In fact, I agree with you on many things, Mr. Morrison. We believe in a lot of the same things, but that doesn't make it rational or right.

You mention that Bruan Ellis calls this Passivism, and I'm guessing its because they don't feel the position is forceful enough (probably like Plantiga). This is the wrong way to view the philosophy since I consider it a very forceful position since it forces everyone to concede certain things about reality (like how little we know about it). What I like about it is that it intellectually "neuters" your opposition and forcefully require anyone to admit that they need a foundational explanation for their axioms. Now you may say that you and everyone else are basing your theories on "properly basic beliefs" but thats not going to cut it.

If you are trying to equate "rational realism" with "passivism" then you are very confused. If you aren't, then I don't understand what you mean when you say that Ellis calls "this" Passivism.

Anyway, passivism has nothing to do with the question of universals. Passivism has to do with whether or not things have natures that have the capacity for action. Passivism says they do not. Passivism says that all the stuff out there is being pushed around by these "forces" (whatever the heck those are). The alternative is not realism. It is called vitalism. I recommend you read J. P. Moreland's Body and Soul. He's more in line with your overall philosophy. I think you'll find him more palatable to your current worldview, and he addresses this question very clearly.

Now, let me go ahead and correct this. Descartes has never said there is no essence. His system directly supports that notion. On one hand, we have spatial extension (A rock for example) the essence of which is to take up space.

You're missing the point. Whether or not a thing takes up space has nothing to do with whether or not they are vital or passive. The new essentialism is asking whether or not passivism is true. It is asking whether or not things have real essences or natures that are capable of acting (which entails--not which is identical with--some sort of realism, either Platonic or moderate). The alternative is Cartesian passivism, in which things have no such natures (which entails--not which is identical with--nominalism).

Now, modern science might be interested in how things do act, and uncovering and describing their basic natures. Sure, that is their interest, but that is no longer science. You would be absolutely correct in calling it modern science since such a system isn't based on rationality and consequently is intellectually bankrupt because of exactly that. The big difference between modern science and the scientific revolution is that the people who were doing the science method were also really well trained in philosophy (most of them were norminalists). Thats not the case these days and thats part of the reason why there is this abomination of verificationism/atheism today.

Rational realism and modern science are not birds of the same feather, clearly.

I didn't equate modern science with realism. I said that modern science is working from realism as a theoretical basis whether it knows it or not. In other words, nominalism cannot support the modern scientific method. Only realism of some sort can. For more on this, I highly recommend you read Ed Feser's The Last Superstition.

Let me go ahead and tell you my view on forces. They aren't empirical. Sure, you can claim up and down that these "forces" do in fact exist because look at all the verified experiments, but thats phenomenalism. In the rational realist view, physics and math isn't science. Attempting to do such things without a proper understanding of what it is and why they exist is pretty much analogous to being a witch doctor.
Quite simply:
Constant conjunction? Absolutely.
Necessary connection? Absolutely not.

I like to quote Hume on this view

Can it be proven by the relation of ideas? No. Can it be proven by matter of fact? No. Then commit it to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion

Never quote Hume. He was a fool, and quoting him (affirmatively) makes you look like a fool, too.

Look, I get why you would appreciate Hume's argument. You like Descartes. But that's your fundamental problem. You don't appreciate the magnitude of the idiocy that is Cartesianism. And yes, I know that's not an argument. It's an ad hominem. If people want to believe that nonsense, it just shows that they are nonsensical. If the want to wade through an argument showing why it's nonsense, then they can read the pages of my thesis that you are reading. That along with The Last Superstition and Part II of Etienne Gilson's The Unity of Philosophical Experience more than cover all the necessary positions here, I think.

So, Mr. Morrison, you may not like my approach on knowledge and God, but what I endorse is not at odds with you at all. When you say something proves or compelling evidence for the existence of God or the existence of forces. I believe you, but I believe you got it backwards (so, its actually wrong in that sense). We are the same thing, just a different tactic. I hope you get that at the very least. I tried to keep this brief to respect as much of your time as possible, so I apologize in advance if it doesn't satisfy your hunger like a snickers bar.

If you think we're saying the same thing, then you didn't understand what you read.

But thanks for taking the time to look at some of what I did write, all the same.

[B. W.]

Let me add to the critique of the paper here with my simplistic uneducated uncouth barbarity with the English Language:

First off, what we are dealing with is the philosophic tradition of Thomas Aquinas known as Thomism. The Thomist style is pragmatic in its philosophic reasoning. This pragmatic form of reasoning is what eludes people and causes problems in understanding that should not come about in discussion on Thomist pragmatic principles.

How can one explain how Thomist thought operates?

Let me try using the old philosophic story that goes like this:

A Thomsist is usually staunch pragmatist, who looks at a chicken egg and says it is a chicken egg. No matter what, simply, a chicken egg is a chicken egg. Another group looks and sees the same chicken egg as a chicken. Another may deny there is even a chicken or egg at all and still other people will decry foul by saying what type of chicken egg is it – African or European?

Thomism is pragmatically designed to cut through the silliness of such arguments and pointing out that - a chicken egg is a chicken egg, period. Herein in lies the problem, Thomism, though good at sorting through the absurd and error, answers all inquiries as error due to being unpragmatic. It answers any inquiry as an objection, as the tradition espouses, and thus its main weakness is its pragmatism and the pragmatic nature of its staunches adherents.

For example, I have discovered the hard way that way too many neo-Thomist are pure pragmatic’s. They see the chicken egg as it is – a chicken egg. When it comes to God’s nature – God is simple being, period. With that, folks like Dom, Rick, and myself agree.

Where the trouble starts is when we see the versatility of the chicken egg. To the pragmatic Thomist – this is viewed as error, an objection to be bashed immediately and begins the brow beating anyone looking into the versatility of the chicken egg – after all a chicken egg is a chicken egg – simply being and will always be a chicken egg in any form! Ha! That sums up the pragmatic mind-set. While touting superior reason, it cannot fully reason, due to the short comings of pragmatist.

Dom, Rick, myself see the same chicken egg as a chicken egg and then un-pragmatically look into the versatility of the chicken egg. One can admire chicken eggs cooked over easy, or scrambled, or on a butter English muffin topped with bacon. Another looks at the chicken egg and sees how it can be used to coat bread to make French toast or used mixed with flour to make a cake. Still others see that they are allergic to chicken eggs and need to avoid them.

It does not matter to us because we still know - a chicken egg is a chicken egg and we also note and explore freely the versatile usages of the chicken egg at the same time. Even the shells are useful in garden for growing carrots. But to the Thomist, versatility is considered on the same level as blaspheme. Why, because, a chicken egg is still a chicken egg in any form despite its versatility.

Yes, we know that the chicken egg is still a chicken egg in any versatile form it is used in. With this, despite our agreement with them the Pragmatic Thomist looks at this with complete utter disdain compounded with the complete inability to understand why anyone would waste time exploring the versatile use of a chicken egg – after all, a chicken egg is a chicken egg – simple being – period – shut up – I win – good night! captures their abrasive style…

Well, that is the flaw I see, the failure of a pragmatist to articulate the versatility of God’s One Being and recognizing how others see God’s One Being with all versatility. They never get that we are not enemies, nor stupid because we are not fellow pragmatist. I wonder if the pragmatist even realize that God did not make all people – pragmatist? So they train themselves to incessantly argue and brow beat all non-pragmatist, never quite getting it, that God did not make all people pragmatist, like they. Too bad, so sad…

Christian People see, hmmm, let me put it this way that 'Being' is God’s perfectiones simpliciter simplices, intelligere actualissimum (the fullness of pure intellection or process of intellect), along with, or a debated, with perfection of aseitas (dependent existence).

We can que and spar over intelligere actualissimum, verses perfection of aseitas as that involves pragmatic intellection but God is still One Being…period!

But what does this pragmatic Thomism really matter – while my close friend is now undergoing aortic aneurism repair and his distraught wife concerns for her husband right now? What good are these debates to those going through hard times like that and worse?

Does perfectiones simpliciter simplices really matter when one is faced with discouragement, abandonment, rejection, betrayal – can Thomism soothe the hurting broken heart, healing it with the versatility of God’s Love in action?

Can it weep with those that weep or laugh with those who laugh – can it display the versatility of God displayed by us being his body on earth doing his will? So far, I have not seen it can. Instead it remains in the monastery on that high hill, above it all, looking down at all.

The versatility of the Godhead is ignored and anyone that dares look at God’s versatility in any other manner than pragmatic thought, well, is a heretic, stupid, or at least an intellectually inferior. In that, as I see it, is the greatest turn off to Thomism I know of: intellectual pragmatic snobbery - after all, a chicken egg is a chicken egg – simple being – period – shut up – I win – good night! reflects its attitude.

The lost who are headed to hell, well, are ignored. The Matthew 28’s Great Commission might be debated endlessly high on Mars Hill instead of presenting the gospel that heals the broken hearted, that sets those bound into liberty, grants joy to those burdened with sorrows so that they become the plantings (disciples) of the Lord to do his versatile will – well – just pragmatically is ignored.

Even though, fellow Christians agree on God’s Being – that Oneness – with the Thomis, but also see/exploring the versatility of God are treated as mere subhumans by the pragmatic Thomist. Why, because we dare look into the versatility of God’s oneness in a non-pragmatic way. That is the greatest weakness of Thomism which causes many to respond in a manner that violates scripture by creating strife between brothers and sisters in Christ. A Thomist may not like to hear it, but they are not the only believers in Christ that will be allowed in Heaven.

I see a chicken egg as a chicken egg but also note the versatility in the egg itself. So, as God is simple being - having intelligence – reason – wisdom – knowledge – understanding - power - so does each member of the Divine Trinity have the same. The versatility consists in this – two exercise the expressing of the one…

With that, have fun…

….and please note the critique is not about what you wrote, Jac, but more about your manners, pragmatism, how this pragmatism is conveyed to the reader in your articles and other writings written on this forum have been and can be perceived.

Thomistic thought brow beats, for no good reason, creating dissension, separation, and division between fellow Christians, not so much by what Thomas Aquinas wrote in Suma Theology, but rather by the pragmatist themselves. Fix that, listen (be slow to speak), and simply talk to people in a manner they understand and condemn them not for their seeing the versatility of the chicken egg, and your articles might make a difference.

Remember Proverbs 27:6
-
-
-

[RickD]

Jac,

Looking forward to "Divine Simplicity for Dummies" even more now.

[Furstentum Liechtenstein]

I like Jac just the way he is.

FL

[Jac3510]

Jac,

Looking forward to "Divine Simplicity for Dummies" even more now.

Haha, well it's coming along quite nicely, actually. The actual explanation of what DS is and why we ought to affirm it is done. Now I'm writing the part on some objections to consider (first general, then specifically Christian), and finally I have a chapter to rite on the benefits of DS and the kinds of problems it solves. I'm guessing this first draft should be done in the next two weeks--maybe sooner, if I get in a good writing groove.

[Philip]

BW echoes what I have previously posted - that God is a simple being, yet also unfathomably complex and unlimited (within His Holy Character), as His possibilities and ability are unlimited within His simpleness of Being. So God is both simple in that He simply IS, and that ALL that He IS, remains forever unchangeable. But that has nothing to say about there being any limitations within God (no righteous ones, anyway). So much about God can SEEM to be contradictory, but in fact is not!

[domokunrox]

Hey guys, its been a while since I've been here, but I wanted to dig this important dialog back up now I that actually have time to sit down and actually respond.

I just have a couple of quick questions for you dom, if you don't mind.

God is a perfect substance and that substance is not in any way analogous to anything else that exists.

However unique God's substance is, it is still a substance independent of God, is it not?

Short answer, No.

For if it is not distinguishable from God then it would necessarily be identical to Him. i.e. it would put us back in the DS camp.

Sorry, I don't think its puts us in the DS camp.

If I grant then that God's substance is distinguishable from God, then

... I don't endorse Platonism ...
... Platonism is rationally untenable...
...these "universals" are undetectable...

First whether or not they are detectable I would think is utterly besides the point. More importantly though, if God's substance is indeed distinguishable from God then it is exactly the sort of "universal" Plato's brand of philosophy refers to. How can you then claim you're not a Platonist?

Look, I don't know how to make this any more clear.

There are ONLY 3 categories of existence in ULTIMATE REALITY
Spatial extension (The essence of which is to take up space)
Imperfect mental substances (Individual "persons" and they do not take up space)
A single perfect substance (God)

Again, where exactly do I leave any room for the sort of "universal" Plato brand I have been accused of endorsing? I feel like we've been arguing semantics for years on this subject.

I don't object to using the term "substance" to apply to God if we are using it very loosely, in the sense of "essence"--(I'm thinking here of Aristotle's secondary substance). But, again, it's important that we recognize that such language is really very loose, given the connection with these terms with genus. Strictly speaking, God, as pure being, transcends genus, and thus strictly is not a substance at all.

Byblos' question is worth answering, though. I would be interested in your response to it.

Well, I did answer. Hopefully, its satisfactory. We should have a cage match or joust.