In part I agree with you. Since linear ordering from a thomistic view could be past infinite, but under a thomistic view the way I understand it hiarhical ordering cannot. I didn't go into that because there is a bit of explaining to convey that.
That is correct.
To me personally I don't care if the universe is past eternal I am convinced of the unmoved mover in a hiarhical sense anyway. In that existence itself is grounded in God for example. The same example applies to hiarchical ordering with regard to the absurdity of actual infinites.
Again, correct. I happen to find arguments based on what you are calling a hierarchical ordering (the technical jargon being ordered
per se rather than
per accidens, or put differently, essentially ordered v. accidentally ordered causes) much more persuasive. A word on that below.
However we do have good grounds to also believe linear ordering cannot given the same example and also that the universe is not past eternal given the evidence we do have..I also disagree with your view that only a B theory of time applies, under an A theory of time it cannot be past infinite, this is well argued by WLC et al. In fact the way I understand it B theory of time for example is typically used as an objection against the WLC's kalam cosmological argument , since it challenges the "begins to exist" premise. WLC holds to an A theory of time, and I do as well for similar reasons, to me it seems quite evident that A theory is more true. Also prior to the beginning it is argued that there was no "time" as such.
I agree and disagree. Thomas himself doesn't say that the arguments against a linear infinity are faulty. He says that they are "not devoid of probability, [but] lack absolute and necessary conclusiveness." In other words, such arguments are not proper demonstrations. You can appeal to them from a probabilistic perspective, but you'll never have a formal
proof. That's not a bad thing. It just is what it is. Some things can only be accepted on the basis of a preponderance of evidence. Inductive reasoning only goes so far, but it's fair to say that it at least gives us
warrant in holding a particular position. Atheism doesn't even have that much going for it. But on the other hand, where demonstration is available, why settle for mere warrant? If God's existence can be known for absolute certainty, and if certain things about His nature can be so known, why leave people with the impression that we're just making the best inference? Again, sure, that's a victory in itself. But why not make the strongest case you can?
Beyond that, I don't think WLC is particularly persuasive on this point. He confuses counter-intuitive claims with self-contradictory ones. Hilbert's Hotel, strictly speaking, doesn't show an actual infinity cannot exist. It just shows an actual infinity leads us to ideas that we can't really get our minds around. But there's nothing strictly self-contradictory (meaning nothing that requires A = ~A) in the claim. To be clear, there are good arguments against actual infinities. You probably know some of them if you've been reading your scholastic metaphysics. It was so well understood even then that the phrase
infinitum actu non datur (an actual infinity is not found) was virtually axiomatic. WLC wants an infinite past to be impossible because it supports the Kalam. But he's just wrong on that point. Well intentioned, sure. But wrong, none the less.
As to the B/A Theory, I think you misunderstood me, or else I wasn't clear. I meant that on a B theory, it's feasible than an infinite past is impossible because then you truly do have an actual infinite insofar as everything exists at the same "time." But since A theory is a presentist view--the past and future don't really exist--then the argument against an infinite past doesn't work. Of course, if you assume a B theory, then the argument fails, as you note, given the "begins to exist" clause! In case you haven't figured it out, I'm not a fan of the kalam as Craig defends it. I think it needs to be recast as what it is--a probabilistic argument given warrant by modern science, not a philosophical demonstration. As such, the second premise should be restated, "The universe probably came into existence," where "probably" refers to the scientific evidence as we currently understand it (such that it is equivalent to statements like, "If I drop this apple, it will probably fall to the ground assuming there is nothing holding it up.")
Add in a good form of PSR with the argument from contingency we have solid grounds to plant our feet on. To me it's a strong cumulative case no matter how we look at it.
Again, agreed. When someone really understands the nature of the argument, they really do have to be an irrational hack to deny God's existence. I just think that it's our job to present that case in the strongest and most honest way possible.
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