Jac3510 wrote:If this is true, and on a Thomistic metaphysic it appears to be, then the answer to how humans can make a choice dependent on God without that choice being absolutely necessarily determined by Him turns out to be the same as how God Himself can make a choice dependent on Himself without His own choice being absolutely necessary. Man, by virtue of being an intelligent creature, can will this rather than that. God, as the First Cause, actualizes it through the man and thus knows that contingency as a contingency as He would any other.
One may try to object by pointing out that this answer appears to make God respond to a person’s choice, thereby violating again God’s aseity. But this fails to recognize that it is the very nature of being to self-determine, whether in God or in man. As such, God, as the First Cause, is simply working out all effects in accordance with their formal nature, just as Thomas suggested.
I want to emphasize what I italicized just above. The distinction between necessity absolutely and by necessity is important. The former is determined. The latter is not. This distinction is why Molinism (in its classical sense) ultimately fails the free will test. Molina himself thought that the reason God knows the future is because He knows us so well that He knows what we will ALWAYS choose in any given circumstance. In other words, Molina understood that we will choose A or B necessarily because of our nature. The only reason we can't predict the future is not because our wills are indeterminate, but because we can't know all the variables at once. But God can, and so He can predict with mathematical certainty what we will always do. So on classical Molinism, the will is determined, and we do what we do absolutely necessarily, just as a triangle having three sides is absolutely necessary. Later Molinists realized the problem and corrected for it, making man's will really indeterminate. But then God cannot know our future based on a knowledge of our nature. Instead, He knows the future because He sees all our possible actions and then chooses to actualize this rather than that world. In other words, God sees in world A I am writing this post and in world B I am not writing this post. And God, apparently wanting me to write this post, actualizes world A. There are two serious problems with this view. [1] The first is that it denies God's aseity, because it makes man's decisions logically prior to God's, insofar as God "looks to see" what I will do and then actualizes a particular world in response to my choices. But that makes God contingent on me. [2] The second problem is that it denies God Himself freedom. And this is the REAL problem, for we see it denies God real sovereignty (and now we are getting back to my point). For here, God has some criteria by which He thinks that World A is "better" than World B. But this means that there is some criterion by which God judges what is "better" than something else. On this point, I think Frederick Copleston's remarks are helpful:
I'm sure you've read up on Molinism, probably more than I have.
However, we had a discussion long ago re: God's middle knowledge.
In that discussion
then, as you do here, you couldn't understand how God came by His knowledge on my view.
I feel the argument as you have presented here fails to consider other Molinist positions including mine as stated back then.
First re: [1].
I do not see how it denies God His
aseity if He "sees" what happens.
I think you'd have a hard time tightening any premises in an argument here through to such a conclusion.
However, what is a more solid argument is that God's knowledge in contingent upon humanity's choice and/or action.
If this is the case, then I see a solid argument could perhaps be formed for denying God's omniscience. (
see I'm fair when I see a good argument! )
Furthermore, if Divine Simplicity is correct, then making any attribute of God contingent upon humanity would make God partly contingent -- but since in DS there is no parts then God is perhaps fully contingent.
This absurdity means either DS is wrong, or the view that God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices are wrong.
Now, in the past as I do here, I simply say that "knowledge" is an attribute like "goodness" and "righteousness" which are rooted in God's nature.
It's not some "part" of God (in the DS sense) or something that is "contingently had". I'm sure you can see the parallel here to the Euthyphro dilemma.
In fact, I'm surprised given your DS stance that this isn't a position you allow Molinists to take.
Instead you make God's knowledge contingent upon His "seeing".
So to summarise my position here re: [1].
God's doesn't get His knowledge about our actions based upon looking at this "movie reel" and that "movie reel" of how things play out.
Rather, God in virtue of His omniscient nature are the movie reels ad infinitum.
That was my position 10 years ago (maybe 5 maybe I don't know when) when we touched upon this. That is my position now.
AND, if you can't logically comprehend that, well who can
really comprehend God's infiniteness?
As far as the infinite is concerned, we're all left scratching our heads as to how something has always existed -- but something must have necessarily so otherwise there would be nothing.
Now re: [2].
If my memory serves me correct, then it is true that Craig adopts some view wherein God elects people to be saved in one world over another.
And that the reason Craig posits why God chooses one world over the other is for the reason that you mention:
God has some criteria by which He thinks that World A is "better" than World B.
In fact, I think your use of Frederick actually distracts, or over-complicates this argument that God's selecting one world over another denies God's sovereignty.
To give you another argument, what I find personally disturbing, is it doesn't present a correct picture of God's nature. One of the Good Shepherd doing everything to gain one lost sheep.
A person in World A who might be saved in World B ought to be cheesed off with God that they were skipped. Abandoned.
I can't help but feel I'd be bitter if unsaved when I could have been. For I was looked over.
This creates within me some feelings of abandonment that I don't like feeling about God's good and loving nature.
It is little consolation to me thinking that God is helpless to change matters.
This doesn't make me as an unsaved person feel any better about such matters, but rather stirs up within me feelings that God isn't really a powerful God after all.
NO. I thought long and hard on this when I read over the Molinist position for the first time as presented by Craig.
Craig's position did not sit right with me. I couldn't not accept it. The pandering of God to us humans has to stop somewhere.
Focusing on this argument will make your argument more powerful against I'd dare say the majority of Molinists who likely accept such.
So what is the solution?
Well the issue as I see it (which you correctly identify) ultimately comes down to a denial of God's sovereignty.
We like to stress God's love and goodness above God's sovereignty, and yet ironically it is God acting out His sovereign rights that allow for love and goodness to flourish.
God could bring the "worst" possible world into existence, that is, where the least are saved. And still be good and loving.
God being God -- it is entirely His prerogative to do as He pleases in accordance with His nature.
This (God's sovereignty) is something lost on us today because we like everyone to be at the same level -- even perhaps God.
It is also an advantage I see in the Islamic conception of God where God wills what He wills.
The are many more Muslims with a very respectful sovereign view of God than there are Christians who are diluted in Westernised political correctness even of God.
Sovereignty would be better understood in times of monarchs, but it is a concept largely lost on us today.
Unlike kings who are equal as human, God is
rightfully sovereign by nature.
There is no being more powerful than God. No being who comes close to God.
BUT, what of those other worlds?
They're not real. The real one is the one God actualises.
Is someone guilty based upon what they would have done, or guilty based upon the act coming to pass?
We should not forget what is ACTUAL is REAL and anything else is not real.
So we can only be culpable for our free decisions in our real lives that we live in this world.
Therefore God is not culpable based upon what doesn't exist, but it is more rather that we are culpable based upon what does exist.
It is a lot for us to get our heads around, but at the end of the day it comes down to understanding God is Sovereign.
If you don't like that? You know what. Tough. Because God willed it and that's His prerogative in virtue of His Nature (
NOT based upon might be best for us).
And it is this Sovereignty that allows any goodness and love to flourish. So in order for God's nature to be culpable here one must argue that God's creative act diminishes such.
I'm not sure where that ultimately sits with you. You might be pleasantly surprised, although I know others might find such a hard line tough.
Really re: Molinism, I see that anyone who believes God is all-knowing has to necessarily be Molinist
to an extent.
That is, how can anyone deny God's "middle knowledge" if they believe God is all-knowing?
Whether such plays out to resolve a conflict between God's predestining while keeping intact our free choices is another question.
I believe it does,
but Molinists should take care not to deny God His sovereign role as God.