Faith and works

[Philip]

Does God change His mind based upon human actions? Not, ultimately. Because He comprehensively sees ALL actions, events, hearts, minds, motivations, across ALL time - seeing all actions and events simultaneously and BEFORE man ever existed. And, He has ALWAYS known ALL of His future actions and His "responses" because all PRECEDED man and thus simply ARE. However, He does respond to us in real time, which can SEEM to us like He changes His mind. God transcends ALL of the parameters that He both created and controls, as and when He so desires.



We have to be careful when considering God's actions and time. interesting question: God has always existed. ALL created things have a beginning and a definitive sequence. How could there ever have been a FIRST thing that God created? As, I would think, that as He by his nature is a creative being and thus never had a beginning to His being creative, how could there ever have been a FIRST created thing? As, logically all things have an origin and real-time existence. And, only God never had a beginning. And I'm not merely referencing physical things. But has God not always been creating, whatever the realm?

[Jac3510]

Obviously, God also chooses the consequences for unbelief. . . . And He saves those who desire and do indeed believe. . . . Either men reject God of their own will or God willed that they reject Him. And so, as we know that God cannot sin or cause it, then we know the cause of sinful actions is ALWAYS man. . . . As for hell, while the unrepentant do not want God, they also don't want hell - although they desire all that necessarily leads to it. They don't desire God, want whatever their hearts so desire, but they want both of these without having to incur the consequences set by the parameters of God's will, which is hell for all who reject him.

Clearly, God chooses the consequences of unbelief. This is the world God chose to create. But to add a nuance, I would not say that God condemns thsoe who reject Him, nor does He save those who want Him to. Rather, God chose to save those in Christ (what they think about it doesn't matter), and God chooses to condemn those no in Christ (what think about it doesn't matter). Obviously, I would strongly expect that most in Christ do want to be saved. But I've met plenty of people who don't want to be saved to know that the two groups are no identical. And, to go back to my diagram from earlier, Jesus does not say "whosoever believes AND wants to be saved . . ."

I would also just disagree that the condemned do not desire God. In this life, they do, but they do not know that is what they desire. When they see God face to face, they will know that is what they desire, and part of their eternal torment will be to see that and have it denied.

Everything else I agree with

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Here it is: Since Christ effectively died for the sins of the entire world, nobody goes to hell for their sins. They go to hell because they do not have eternal life.

Jac,

Could you expound on this? I think it's a very important part of the article.

I think that's the key to the whole article. I also think it is at the root of most, if not all, misunderstandings about salvation. Most people want the condition to go to heaven to have something to do with not sinning. So we promise to stop sinning (Lordship salvation), or we say that Jesus will make sure that we stop sinning (infused grace). We say that Jesus' death on the cross takes away the sin of the saved, which means that those who aren't under the Blood of Christ go to Hell for their sins. And, wouldn't you know it, that means that we get to point out finger at people who are still sinning and, for whatever our theological justification, we get to say they aren't saved because the Blood hasn't "really" been applied! And that's where people start adding conditions.

The bottom line is that all mistakes on salvation--from the Roman Catholic doctrine all the way to the hyper-Calvinist doctrine and everything in between--are rooted in not taking the Cross seriously, which means that salvation is accompished when we do something about sin in our life. But Hodges' point is that salvation has nothing to do with sin. Sin has already had its impact. It's done the damage. We're dead. The real problem isn't sin, but the lack of life. So how do we get THAT? By believing. By trusting. You get that through your head, and all the other systems of salvation look, frankly, pretty silly.

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Doesn't this mean everyone was born (created) saved?

Everyone was born innocent of sin and therefore alive. They were not born "saved."

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Will get to other posts later this evening!

[Philip]

Clearly, God chooses the consequences of unbelief. This is the world God chose to create. But to add a nuance, I would not say that God condemns thsoe who reject Him, nor does He save those who want Him to. Rather, God chose to save those in Christ (what they think about it doesn't matter), and God chooses to condemn those no in Christ (what think about it doesn't matter). Obviously, I would strongly expect that most in Christ do want to be saved. But I've met plenty of people who don't want to be saved to know that the two groups are no identical. And, to go back to my diagram from earlier, Jesus does not say "whosoever believes AND wants to be saved

A nuance, but an important one - which really is my point: That God's choices are in no way man dependent. But they are in line with His will and Holy, just, merciful and loving character. And He has told us what His will is (that ALL men come to faith and repentance). Yet, this truth doesn't seem to satisfy those believing God cannot BOTH remain sovereign AND allow man to either choose to embrace and accept Him or to permanently resist Him. But if He is truly sovereign, how could He not allow man anything He so desires to - really, that is a major mistake. This ability to choose to receive what only God can give, that cannot be earned or bought, of which God has decided every parameter and consequence - it's just difficult to see how that in any way takes away God's total sovereignty. As if that were the case, the very fact that we can go against God's will to sin, would also suggest God relinquishing His sovereignty - which is equally absurd.

[Jac3510]

I'm sure you've read up on Molinism, probably more than I have.
However, we had a discussion long ago re: God's middle knowledge.
In that discussion then, as you do here, you couldn't understand how God came by His knowledge on my view.
I feel the argument as you have presented here fails to consider other Molinist positions including mine as stated back then.

First re: [1].
I do not see how it denies God His aseity if He "sees" what happens.
I think you'd have a hard time tightening any premises in an argument here through to such a conclusion.

I didn't say it denies God's aseity to see. I said it denies His aseity to make seeing the mechanism by which He knows, which is how modern Molinism works. God looks at all possible worlds, picks the world that He wants to actualize, and then actualizes it. God knows all in virtue of looking at all possible worlds. But to know in virtue of looking is for knowledge to be contingent upon what is looked at, any anything that is contingent in any respect does not exist a se.

However, what is a more solid argument is that God's knowledge in contingent upon humanity's choice and/or action.
If this is the case, then I see a solid argument could perhaps be formed for denying God's omniscience. (see I'm fair when I see a good argument! )
Furthermore, if Divine Simplicity is correct, then making any attribute of God contingent upon humanity would make God partly contingent -- but since in DS there is no parts then God is perhaps fully contingent.
This absurdity means either DS is wrong, or the view that God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices are wrong.

Now, in the past as I do here, I simply say that "knowledge" is an attribute like "goodness" and "righteousness" which are rooted in God's nature.
It's not some "part" of God (in the DS sense) or something that is "contingently had". I'm sure you can see the parallel here to the Euthyphro dilemma.
In fact, I'm surprised given your DS stance that this isn't a position you allow Molinists to take.
Instead you make God's knowledge contingent upon His "seeing".

Your dichotomy is a good one. And, of course, I would just deny that God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices. There is a very real sense in which God's knowledge is the cause of our actions (again, the metaphysics underlying the language is important here--there is no divine determinism in that sentence). It's real enough that is Augustine says, "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." That this comes from Augustine may not be a comfort, since some accuse Augustine of divine determinism given his terribly wrong doctrine of double predestination. But Aquinas puts it more bluntly, saying, "The knowledge of God is the cause of things."

As to why I don't allow that to Molinists, it's just because that's not what Molinism teaches. Either God knows what we do by looking at what we do (including by looking at what we will do in all possible worlds), which is Molinism and denies God's aseity, or else God knows what we do by looking at Himself (which does not require looking at any possible worlds, although God knows all possible words in the same look at Himself), which is classical theism. The question here is the mechanism of God's omniscience. Molinists say God gets it from looking at the world. Classical theists say God gets it because He just is knowledge, and in knowing Himself, He necessarily knows all things, but real and possible. You are free to adopt the latter position. I hope you do, as it is my own. But in doing so, you make the argument for Molinism superfluous at best.

So to summarise my position here re: [1].
God's doesn't get His knowledge about our actions based upon looking at this "movie reel" and that "movie reel" of how things play out.
Rather, God in virtue of His omniscient nature are the movie reels ad infinitum.
That was my position 10 years ago (maybe 5 maybe I don't know when) when we touched upon this. That is my position now.

AND, if you can't logically comprehend that, well who can really comprehend God's infiniteness?
As far as the infinite is concerned, we're all left scratching our heads as to how something has always existed -- but something must have necessarily so otherwise there would be nothing.

I don't think I have a problem logically comprehending your position. I just don't accept it. God is not the movie reel, not this one or all of them. God is God and the movie reel is the movie reel.

Now re: [2].
If my memory serves me correct, then it is true that Craig adopts some view wherein God elects people to be saved in one world over another.
And that the reason Craig posits why God chooses one world over the other is for the reason that you mention: God has some criteria by which He thinks that World A is "better" than World B.

In fact, I think your use of Frederick actually distracts, or over-complicates this argument that God's selecting one world over another denies God's sovereignty.
To give you another argument, what I find personally disturbing, is it doesn't present a correct picture of God's nature. One of the Good Shepherd doing everything to gain one lost sheep.
A person in World A who might be saved in World B ought to be cheesed off with God that they were skipped. Abandoned.
I can't help but feel I'd be bitter if unsaved when I could have been. For I was looked over.
This creates within me some feelings of abandonment that I don't like feeling about God's good and loving nature.
It is little consolation to me thinking that God is helpless to change matters.
This doesn't make me as an unsaved person feel any better about such matters, but rather stirs up within me feelings that God isn't really a powerful God after all.

NO. I thought long and hard on this when I read over the Molinist position for the first time as presented by Craig.
Craig's position did not sit right with me. I couldn't not accept it. The pandering of God to us humans has to stop somewhere.
Focusing on this argument will make your argument more powerful against I'd dare say the majority of Molinists who likely accept such.
So what is the solution?

Well the issue as I see it (which you correctly identify) ultimately comes down to a denial of God's sovereignty.
We like to stress God's love and goodness above God's sovereignty, and yet ironically it is God acting out His sovereign rights that allow for love and goodness to flourish.

God could bring the "worst" possible world into existence, that is, where the least are saved. And still be good and loving.
God being God -- it is entirely His prerogative to do as He pleases in accordance with His nature.
This (God's sovereignty) is something lost on us today because we like everyone to be at the same level -- even perhaps God.
It is also an advantage I see in the Islamic conception of God where God wills what He wills.
The are many more Muslims with a very respectful sovereign view of God than there are Christians who are diluted in Westernised political correctness even of God.

Sovereignty would be better understood in times of monarchs, but it is a concept largely lost on us today.
Unlike kings who are equal as human, God is rightfully sovereign by nature.
There is no being more powerful than God. No being who comes close to God.

BUT, what of those other worlds?
They're not real. The real one is the one God actualises.
Is someone guilty based upon what they would have done, or guilty based upon the act coming to pass?
We should not forget what is ACTUAL is REAL and anything else is not real.
So we can only be culpable for our free decisions in our real lives that we live in this world.

Therefore God is not culpable based upon what doesn't exist, but it is more rather that we are culpable based upon what does exist.
It is a lot for us to get our heads around, but at the end of the day it comes down to understanding God is Sovereign.
If you don't like that? You know what. Tough. Because God willed it and that's His prerogative in virtue of His Nature (NOT based upon might be best for us).
And it is this Sovereignty that allows any goodness and love to flourish. So in order for God's nature to be culpable here one must argue that God's creative act diminishes such.

I'm not sure where that ultimately sits with you. You might be pleasantly surprised, although I know others might find such a hard line tough.

I don't think Copleston's position is a distraction.I still find it especially potent. But your argument works, too. I'm content acknowledging that we now have two distinct arguments against Craig's argument for God actualizing one possible world over another, and that as a means for explaining omniscience or in offering potential solutions to the problem of evil (which is his other major motivation).

The only problem that I have here (beyond the contingency/aseity problem I mentioned above) is that if you still have God choosing to actualize one world rather than another, you end up having God choosing this rather than that for completely arbitrary reasons. The problem I have here isn't with things lacking a reason per se; remember that I have absolutely no problem with indeterminacy. In fact, a major problem that I have with much modern philosophy and theology is that it works from a deterministic assumption--that is, that everything is determined by some sufficient reason. I reject that claim. But rejecting that, I insist we work out of a coherent indeterminism. My worry about the arbitrariness is rooted in the implicit assumption of Molinism that everything have a determined cause, even if it is just God's naked, arbitrary choice for this world over that one (naked, here, because you've stripped out, rightfully so, the external criterion for judging one as better than another--leave that criterion in and you have a truly deterministic world!). But then why should we just stop with God's naked choice? If EVERYTHING needs a reason, a determination, then why not His choice, too? But FOR ME, I deny the major premise. Everything does NOT need a determination. Indeterminacy is all around us in every aspect of our life. And so it is with human choices. And so it is with God's choices. I don't need God to actualize this rather than that world. I just have God moving my will to bring about its effects. In short, it seems to me that classical theism is consistent in its indeterminacy, but Molinism (or the more general view that God actualizes this rather than that world) is essentially deterministic except for when it comes to God. And THAT strikes me as a good an example of special pleading as any. It would be analogous to rendering the Kalam as

1. Everything that exists has a cause
2. The universe exists
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause

But then when someone looks at this argument and rightly asks, "Fine, then what causes God?" we object and say, "Well, everything but God has a cause!" So stated, it is special pleading. And that is why we phrase the major premise "everything that comes into existence has a cause."

But beyond all that, I agree that your argument against WLC's position on God saving some and the whole idea of this being the best possible world is a good one.

Really re: Molinism, I see that anyone who believes God is all-knowing has to necessarily be Molinist to an extent.
That is, how can anyone deny God's "middle knowledge" if they believe God is all-knowing?

I don't deny middle knowledge. Of course God has it. I deny that God's middle knowledge (as such) plays any role in the actualization of the world.

Whether such plays out to resolve a conflict between God's predestining while keeping intact our free choices is another question.
I believe it does, but Molinists should take care not to deny God His sovereign role as God.

Agreed.

[Philip]

We have to be careful when considering God's actions and time. interesting question: God has always existed. ALL created things have a beginning and a definitive sequence. How could there ever have been a FIRST thing that God created? As, I would think, that as He by his nature is a creative being and thus never had a beginning to His being creative, how could there ever have been a FIRST created thing? As, logically all things have an origin and real-time existence. And, only God never had a beginning. And I'm not merely referencing physical things. But has God not always been creating, whatever the realm?

I'd love some input on my above musing:As, logically, there HAD to be a FIRST thing God created, as NOTHING exists that He did not create. But being creative is one of His great attributes. And He does not change, so I would think this means He has forever been creating things. But God MUST have created some FIRST thing, even though He Himself never had a beginning and presumably has always been creating things - whether in the physical, spiritual or other dimensions.

Another thing I'd like comments on: I believe God is a simple being (in His unfathomable complexity and infinite potential), as He simply IS and thus doesn't change. I would think this means that He never has an original thought, as EVERYTHING God thinks about, He's always known. He cannot surprise Himself. He can never have a NEW idea. Any action He takes He's always known He would do so. What ye think about this? Of course, we think in time and sequence, but God...

[Jac3510]

I'n certainly not the expert in DS that Jac is, but I see some problems in your comments and how you are painting Jac's position.
I don't see what God's lack of parts has to do with the contingency argument, at least not in this case. We are talking about outcomes being actualized. For God to be contingent He would have to respond or formulate a response dependent on an outcome.
I've used the example of Nineveh.
Which of these statements is true?
-It was always God's will to destroy Nineveh.
-It was always God's will to spare Nineveh.

We know that God decreed the overthrow of Nineveh and we also know that God doesn't lie or change His mind. In other words, there was nothing that the Nineveh could do to create some emotional reaction in God that would then cause him to regret his decision. The problem is that we know God spared Nineveh, and we also know the reason they were spared was that they took heed to Jonah's warning. It was within the will of the King of Nineveh to actualize the outcome.
The fact is that both of these statements are true. It was always God's will to destroy Nineveh and always God's will to spare them. As it was also God's will to send a reluctant preacher to warn Nineveh and allow them the choice to ignore or respond. Both destruction and mercy were potential outcomes and both were completely within the will of God. God wasn't waiting on Nineveh, or even looking into the future, crossing His fingers and hoping He was right. He was working his sovereign will. Man's ability to actualize an outcome doesn't make God contingent.

Notice the underlined portion. That's an important point. If God is responding to us, then He is in some sense contingent on us. In the end, we must assert that God does not respond to us; we respond to God. Always.

I like your Nineveh example. Aquinas would add that God does not only decree what will happen (e.g, that Nineveh will be destroyed, or that Nineveh will be spared); He declares both what will happen as well as the means by which it will happen. We just see that decree play out in history. So part of God's decree with respect to Nineveh was that would not be destroyed and that their deliverance would come through their repentance, and that their repentance would come through the preaching of Jonah. That's why prayer works. God decrees that we are to have X, but in some cases He decrees that we are to have X contingent upon our praying for it, that is, that God declares that our prayers are the means by which we receive it. If, then, we do not receive it, it is because we do not ask for it, not because God chose not to give it (in such an example).

Anyway, to avoid the charge of divine determinism, we only must remember something like what I suggested above--God brings about any given thing in accordance with its own nature, so determined things determinately and indeterminate things indeterminately.

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We have to be careful when considering God's actions and time. interesting question: God has always existed. ALL created things have a beginning and a definitive sequence. How could there ever have been a FIRST thing that God created? As, I would think, that as He by his nature is a creative being and thus never had a beginning to His being creative, how could there ever have been a FIRST created thing? As, logically all things have an origin and real-time existence. And, only God never had a beginning. And I'm not merely referencing physical things. But has God not always been creating, whatever the realm?

I'd love some input on my above musing:As, logically, there HAD to be a FIRST thing God created, as NOTHING exists that He did not create. But being creative is one of His great attributes. And He does not change, so I would think this means He has forever been creating things. But God MUST have created some FIRST thing, even though He Himself never had a beginning and presumably has always been creating things - whether in the physical, spiritual or other dimensions.

Another thing I'd like comments on: I believe God is a simple being (in His unfathomable complexity and infinite potential), as He simply IS and thus doesn't change. I would think this means that He never has an original thought, as EVERYTHING God thinks about, He's always known. He cannot surprise Himself. He can never have a NEW idea. Any action He takes He's always known He would do so. What ye think about this? Of course, we think in time and sequence, but God...

RE a first creation, I am in the minority here, but I don't think there is anything preventing God from having created an infinite number of things in the past such that a first created thing is nonsense. That's one of the reasons I reject the second premise of the Kalam when defended on philosophical grounds, particularly in saying that an infinite regression of events is impossible. I think an infinite regression is possible, and so there's no reason that we must insist that God could not have done just that, meaning that a "first creating thing" could potentially be meaningless.

But I think that there was a first created thing. It's just something I take on faith. That is, it is something that I think cannot be demonstrated from reason alone. I believe there is a first thing because God says that there was. There was a "time" when there was nothing other than God, and then God created everything from nothing. So my basis for that affirmation is Scripture, not philosophy.

On the flip side, while we say that God is creative, that's something we can say because God has decided to be creative. Had He not decided to create, we wouldn't be here to claim otherwise. And that's fine, but what that means, at least, is that we cannot say that God MUST create, even by His nature. Such would be to deny God's freedom and in a twisted way make God contingent on us again. After all, if God MUST create, then His own existence is dependent on that which He creates, insofar as the act of creation perfects or fulfills that "must" in His nature. Take away creation, and if God MUST exist, then He is FORCED to create.

As an aside, this is also all a good argument for the Trinity or at least something like it. If God is love, and if love is by nature others oriented, then either God must have others other than Himself to love (meaning, if they don't exist, He must create) or else there must be a plurality of persons within Himself to love one another. And if God is absolutely independent and sovereign, then He cannot be dependent on the existence of others to love (nor can He be required to create), and therefore there must be a plurality of persons within God.

RE God's thinking: you are right. Discursive thought is not found in God. He doesn't think A and then B. Strictly, God only knows ONE thing: Himself. But in knowing Himself, God simultaneously knows all things. The reason is that all that exists does precisely because it shares in Existence, which God is. Everything that is, then, is being this way or being that way. So God, in knowing Himself, knows Being perfectly, and thereby immediately knows all ways in which being could be. He also knows every way in which being actually is. Therefore, in knowing Himself, God knows all that could be (middle knowledge) as well as all that is really the case. And that's easier to see in light of the fact that God's self-knowledge is identical with His very essence (knowledge isn't something He HAS as a part of Himself; rather, being a simple being, the very act of existence is in one way conceived of as knowing itself, since being tends toward itself), which is identical with His act. That is, God is what He does. So we can say with Thomas that God's knowing things is the cause of their existence and not vice-versa.

[Philip]

RE a first creation, I am in the minority here, but I don't think there is anything preventing God from having created an infinite number of things in the past such that a first created thing is nonsense. That's one of the reasons I reject the second premise of the Kalam when defended on philosophical grounds, particularly in saying that an infinite regression of events is impossible. I think an infinite regression is possible, and so there's no reason that we must insist that God could not have done just that, meaning that a "first creating thing" could potentially be meaningless.

But I think that there was a first created thing. It's just something I take on faith. That is, it is something that I think cannot be demonstrated from reason alone. I believe there is a first thing because God says that there was. There was a "time" when there was nothing other than God, and then God created everything from nothing. So my basis for that affirmation is Scripture, not philosophy.

On the flip side, while we say that God is creative, that's something we can say because God has decided to be creative. Had He not decided to create, we wouldn't be here to claim otherwise. And that's fine, but what that means, at least, is that we cannot say that God MUST create, even by His nature. Such would be to deny God's freedom and in a twisted way make God contingent on us again. After all, if God MUST create, then His own existence is dependent on that which He creates, insofar as the act of creation perfects or fulfills that "must" in His nature. Take away creation, and if God MUST exist, then He is FORCED to create.

As an aside, this is also all a good argument for the Trinity or at least something like it. If God is love, and if love is by nature others oriented, then either God must have others other than Himself to love (meaning, if they don't exist, He must create) or else there must be a plurality of persons within Himself to love one another. And if God is absolutely independent and sovereign, then He cannot be dependent on the existence of others to love (nor can He be required to create), and therefore there must be a plurality of persons within God.

RE God's thinking: you are right. Discursive thought is not found in God. He doesn't think A and then B. Strictly, God only knows ONE thing: Himself. But in knowing Himself, God simultaneously knows all things. The reason is that all that exists does precisely because it shares in Existence, which God is. Everything that is, then, is being this way or being that way. So God, in knowing Himself, knows Being perfectly, and thereby immediately knows all ways in which being could be. He also knows every way in which being actually is. Therefore, in knowing Himself, God knows all that could be (middle knowledge) as well as all that is really the case. And that's easier to see in light of the fact that God's self-knowledge is identical with His very essence (knowledge isn't something He HAS as a part of Himself; rather, being a simple being, the very act of existence is in one way conceived of as knowing itself, since being tends toward itself), which is identical with His act. That is, God is what He does. So we can say with Thomas that God's knowing things is the cause of their existence and not vice-versa.

OK, Jac, so far, so good, at least on the "easy" questions. Now for the FAR more difficult: What do you think I should get my wife for Christmas, as she seems to already have an infinite number of things! (but one more wouldn't hurt, eh? ) Bet you got your wife something like Grudem's Systematic Theology for a little light, bedside reading (and, just what she wanted!).

[Philip]

I am in the minority here, but I don't think there is anything preventing God from having created an infinite number of things in the past such that a first created thing is nonsense.

Except that one - unless you define "infinite" differently than most.

[Mallz]

Everyone was born innocent of sin and therefore alive. They were not born "saved.

Everything came together when you said this. For some reason I couldn't see it that way until you said it. Thanks jack!

[Kurieuo]

It would be analogous to rendering the Kalam as

1. Everything that exists has a cause
2. The universe exists
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause

But then when someone looks at this argument and rightly asks, "Fine, then what causes God?" we object and say, "Well, everything but God has a cause!" So stated, it is special pleading. And that is why we phrase the major premise "everything that comes into existence has a cause."

To pick the eyes out of your post as thoughts roll into my head.

That is not really why we phrase the major premise that way.
Rather, it is phrased that way because it's just common sense.

It is obvious that something has always existed.
Those who would say nothing existed which caused something are deluded by their philosophy and are easily ridiculed.
I dare say the majority of people readily see the simple argument: "If absolutely nothing existed, then there would be absolutely nothing now."
This argument gets us to quickly to: "Something now exists, therefore something has always existed."
It then readily follows that this "something that has always existed" is not caused.

So to make the argument sound and correct premise 1 must necessarily be: "Everything that comes into existence..."
No rigging. No special pleading.

The original premise 1 is just a strawman argument set up by those like Bertrand Russell and co.
One that allows them to easily knock down the cosmological argument (or so it seems to me).
An amateur starting from ground zero will readily see that something must have always existed, given something now exists.

The question then becomes: What is that something that has always existed?

[Kurieuo]

However, what is a more solid argument is that God's knowledge in contingent upon humanity's choice and/or action.
If this is the case, then I see a solid argument could perhaps be formed for denying God's omniscience. (see I'm fair when I see a good argument! )
Furthermore, if Divine Simplicity is correct, then making any attribute of God contingent upon humanity would make God partly contingent -- but since in DS there is no parts then God is perhaps fully contingent.
This absurdity means either DS is wrong, or the view that God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices are wrong.

Now, in the past as I do here, I simply say that "knowledge" is an attribute like "goodness" and "righteousness" which are rooted in God's nature.
It's not some "part" of God (in the DS sense) or something that is "contingently had". I'm sure you can see the parallel here to the Euthyphro dilemma.
In fact, I'm surprised given your DS stance that this isn't a position you allow Molinists to take.
Instead you make God's knowledge contingent upon His "seeing".

Your dichotomy is a good one. And, of course, I would just deny that God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices. There is a very real sense in which God's knowledge is the cause of our actions (again, the metaphysics underlying the language is important here--there is no divine determinism in that sentence).

I obviously also agree with you in denying that "God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices."

As for God's knowledge causing our actions that still needs some unpacking -- it is really hard for me to take "cause" in the plain sense that most would understand such. Are you able to give a brief response as to what you mean by "cause" and especially in relation to how you deny "divine determinism"?

I'll re-read what you previous wrote in a bit in case you did clarify, but for now...

It's real enough that is Augustine says, "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." That this comes from Augustine may not be a comfort, since some accuse Augustine of divine determinism given his terribly wrong doctrine of double predestination. But Aquinas puts it more bluntly, saying, "The knowledge of God is the cause of things."

Aquinas reasons that the knowledge of God is the first effective cause of all things.
This is quite different from saying that "God's knowledge causes our actions" per se.

I'm not sure if you are being intentional with your perhaps "stronger" wording here...
But, I feel it would be misleading (and confusing) to many reading to quote Aquinas in unqualified terms that "The knowledge of God is the cause of things."

When also pinned against Aquinas' other reflections (as B.W. earlier linked), where God's will (i.e., power) is compatible with our choice.
In fact, it is sometimes argued that "free choice" isn't a "thing" but an emptiness that God leaves unfilled for us to fill.
I'm not sure how that plays into things, but just letting my thoughts be side-tracked and flow.

You know, one can say God is the first effective cause of evil in the world. That is true. Because God created all things.
And yet, we do not believe that God is the cause evil per se, but rather free beings who turn against God are.

Indeed, I'd expect if someone said, "God is the cause of all evil" -- many Christians would be startled by this statement made in unqualified terms.
Likewise for me, you saying "God [God's knowledge] is the cause of our actions" leaves me wondering if you do actually intend something more, especially when put so bluntly.

As to why I don't allow that to Molinists, it's just because that's not what Molinism teaches.

I trust that you are correct and my memory of what Craig wrote here fails me.
Sometimes, I forget whether a position I held to was original to the person I read it through or an adaptation of theirs.
However, for me, God's knowledge is innate.

I'll have to re-read Craig, and then comment again if I remember to.
I thought this position of mine was like a neo-Molinism, that is newer form of Molinism.
Craig isn't after all a "traditional" Molinist as I understand him.

Rather, God in virtue of His omniscient nature are the movie reels ad infinitum.

I don't think I have a problem logically comprehending your position. I just don't accept it. God is not the movie reel, not this one or all of them. God is God and the movie reel is the movie reel.

By my words, all I intended was such to be analogous to God's knowledge which would be comprised of such "middle knowledge.
Really, the number of combinations to worlds a limitless. Only infinite knowledge could know an number of worlds.
Strange, considering infinite is just a concept. But, as much worlds as could be thought up, God would know in His infinite wisdom.
That is all I meant. I get that you don't believe God actualised our world based upon such knowledge.

[B. W.]

Great posts!

As for Craig, he is not a traditional Molinist but mentions there is need to rethink Middle Knowledge in a more rational form.

I wrote a long post somewhere on this on the forum that goes into this with many quotes and links...

Older Monlinist Thread

Anyways, very good and enlightening thread!
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[Jac3510]

I obviously also agree with you in denying that "God's knowledge is contingent upon humanity's choices."

As for God's knowledge causing our actions that still needs some unpacking -- it is really hard for me to take "cause" in the plain sense that most would understand such. Are you able to give a brief response as to what you mean by "cause" and especially in relation to how you deny "divine determinism"?

I'll re-read what you previous wrote in a bit in case you did clarify, but for now...

I don't really think I'm using the word "cause" in a special sense. At least, not any more special than anything we say about God. Granted, I hold rather strongly to the view that all our language about God is analogical . . .

But in attempt to answer your question: to "cause" something is to bring about an effect. God brings about all the effects of this world by knowing all the effects in this world. He does not know them because they have been brought into existence. God's knowledge is the literal cause of their existence. That does not entail determinism for the reasons I already said above. God brings about (causes) every effect in accordance with its nature. Indeterminate effects are brought about in an indeterminate fashion. Determinate effects in a determinate fashion. Volitional effects in a volitional fashion. And so on. I think I've unpacked those ideas above.

Aquinas reasons that the knowledge of God is the first effective cause of all things.
This is quite different from saying that "God's knowledge causes our actions" per se.

Do you mean efficient cause? God is also the formal cause and the final cause of all things. Of the tradional four, the only one God is not, I believe, is the material cause.

Anyway, even if we limit our l anguage to God being an efficient cause, it is still true that God's knowledge is the effecient cause, insofar as God's knowledge is His essence. We distinguish in our mind and in our language between God's knowledge, essence, and acts, but in and of themselves, "they" are all exactly the same thing, perfectly numerically identical.

I'm not sure if you are being intentional with your perhaps "stronger" wording here...
But, I feel it would be misleading (and confusing) to many reading to quote Aquinas in unqualified terms that "The knowledge of God is the cause of things."

I hope you can see that I'm not trying to be misleading in the stronger language. I'm being as clear and straightforward as I can. Things are because God knows them. God's knowledge of things causes them to be. Of course, part of what God knows is a thing's nature, and if the nature of a thing is that it is indeterminate, then God's knowledge that a thing is indeterminate is what makes it indeterminate. Here we might look at the distinction in abolute necessity and necessity by supposition. In the former, something is necessary because it must be by nature (it is absolutely necessary that all triangles have three sides); in the latter, something is necessary insofar as it actually is (if I am sitting, it is necessary that I am actually sitting). So God's knowledge of indeterminate things means that those things are necessarily indeterminate, but that necessity is by supposition and not absolute; divine determinism would only follow if you showed that God's knowledge of a thing's nature made that thing's nature what it was absolutely necessarily.

When also pinned against Aquinas' other reflections (as B.W. earlier linked), where God's will (i.e., power) is compatible with our choice.
In fact, it is sometimes argued that "free choice" isn't a "thing" but an emptiness that God leaves unfilled for us to fill.
I'm not sure how that plays into things, but just letting my thoughts be side-tracked and flow.

You know, one can say God is the first effective cause of evil in the world. That is true. Because God created all things.
And yet, we do not believe that God is the cause evil per se, but rather free beings who turn against God are.

Indeed, I'd expect if someone said, "God is the cause of all evil" -- many Christians would be startled by this statement made in unqualified terms.
Likewise for me, you saying "God [God's knowledge] is the cause of our actions" leaves me wondering if you do actually intend something more, especially when put so bluntly.

Yes, God is the casue of evil, insofar as God is the cause of everything. But evil is not a thing, for reasons you have already pointed out, so saying God "causes" it is more metaphorical than saying God is the cause of your existence. Free will, however, is not a privation as evil is. The "emptiness" you speak of is an emptiness of determination, not an emptiness of essence.

I trust that you are correct and my memory of what Craig wrote here fails me.
Sometimes, I forget whether a position I held to was original to the person I read it through or an adaptation of theirs.
However, for me, God's knowledge is innate.

I'll have to re-read Craig, and then comment again if I remember to.
I thought this position of mine was like a neo-Molinism, that is newer form of Molinism.
Craig isn't after all a "traditional" Molinist as I understand him.

I believe my memory of Craig is correct. But this is one place where I get frustrated with "Molinism" in general. There are as many kinds of Molinisms are there are Molinists. But in general, there are two ideas: the Molinism of Molina, which was condemned by the Catholic Church as a heresy clearly denies free will, and the more general and more modern approach to Molinism that, at base, makes God's knowledge of actual really logically posterior to His middle knowledge, and further, that God's elective and creative act (choosing to create "this" world) is logically posterior to His middle knowledge as well. But that, as I charge, is to make God contingent and for that reason alone ought to be rejected.

In any case, at this level, the debate is similar to the lapsarian debate that Calvinists like to make. So take that for whatever it is worth.

By my words, all I intended was such to be analogous to God's knowledge which would be comprised of such "middle knowledge.
Really, the number of combinations to worlds a limitless. Only infinite knowledge could know an number of worlds.
Strange, considering infinite is just a concept. But, as much worlds as could be thought up, God would know in His infinite wisdom.
That is all I meant. I get that you don't believe God actualised our world based upon such knowledge.

Fair enough!