Universals: Have they always existed?

[Kenny]

So, if we had never existed, but assume the physical world did, roundness wouldn't be found anywhere?

Without intelligent life, shapes would still exist; there just would not be a name for them

Ken

I'd agree with your thought.

Given your obvious commitment to materialism,
does it similarly seem logical to you that the Sydney Opera House (or some other significant building structure) came into existence without any blueprints and mind to conceive them?

Of course not. I know what man made structures look like, and the Sydney Opera House (and all other significant building structures) looks like a man made structure.

We see the logical structure in the world as being once of mind -> form -> materialisation.
You will likely disagree, but so too I think this same pattern is evident in universals like triangularity -> pyramids.

I totally understand. We can agree to disagree on this one.

Ken

[Jac3510]

Kenny is just a nominalist, and nominalism deserves nothing but to be ignored.

My own view is that universals have not always been around, but to the OP, if we are not nominalists, then the dependence of universals on the mind constitutes a good argument for God's existence. As an aside, the belief that universals are eternal is fundamental to a philsophy called Platonism in its various forms. Moreland and Craig both adhere to this position (so see Moreland's Universals--good book). But here is an argument I wrote against the possibility of any kind of Platonism:

• Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower have put forward a very powerful argument against Platonism—specifically, against the view that "the truths expressed by predications such as 'Socrates is wise' are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.
  
  Their argument begins by recognizing the importance of the doctrine of aseity, which they define as, “(i) God does not depend on anything distinct from himself for his existing and (ii) everything distinct from God depends on God’s creative activity for its existing.” That this position is the traditional theistic claim needs no discussion . . . Bergmann and Brower contend, however, that any form of Platonism is necessarily at odds with aseity so defined, and as such, if any form of Platonism is true, then one must either cease to be a theist or, at least, become a non-traditional theist. They boil the essential idea of their argument down as follows:
  
  • If [Platonism] is true, then every property . . . will be a product of God’s creative activity. But this implies the general principle that, for any property F, God’s creating F is a prerequisite for, and hence logically prior to, F. Notice, however, that in order to create F, God must have the property of being able to create a property. . . . Evidently, therefore, in order for it to be true that God is the creator of all properties, there must be a property—namely, being able to create a property—that is both logically prior and logically posterior to God’s creating properties. . . . [T]his conclusion is obviously absurd.
  In other words, if God is to create any property (i.e., “being wise”), He must have the property of being able to create properties. But that is itself a property. Thus, either God created the property being able to create properties (which is circular and obviously absurd), or God is dependent at least on the property being able to create properties (which violates aseity and thus traditional theism). Thus, it seems that one cannot be a Platonist of any kind and maintain traditional theism, which includes the notion of aseity. And if aseity is biblically and philosophically warranted, which it seems to be, then it seems one cannot be a Platonist at all. (Note: This is not to say that one cannot be a theist of any kind and a Platonist. It is only to say that one cannot be a traditional theist, believing that God’s aseity is biblically and philosophically warranted, and a Platonist. Nicholas Wolterstorff, On Universals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) serves as one example of someone who has adopted a non-traditional solution. For those who are convinced that God exists a se, however, Bergmann and Brower’s argument is very powerful.)

Just some food for thought.

[Kurieuo]

@Jac, I expect their argument is unsound and trades on ambiguity with meaning of words.

If by calling universals "eternal" one is saying they aren't contingent, then that is being rejected.
In fact, I would argue the opposite.

The very fact that it is hard to comprehend universals not always existing, and their "conceptual" nature which begs for the existence of a mind, is indicating that aseity foundationally belongs to a highly intelligent and non-contingent being (i.e., God).

It is rather like how you use Aquinas to argue for the contingency of the universe regardless of whether it or some multiverse variation has always exists, right?
Similarly I can see universals are contingent upon a mind for their existence and as such God.

And so, in a manner of speaking, it can be argued that even something that has always existed is "created" by God due to its contingent nature.

[Kurieuo]

It is likely because one gets snagged on associating causality with time that confusion comes in. The immaterial is fundamentally different.
In a way, those in the argument you present are ascribing asiety in physical terms of "time" rather than immaterial terms of what is more foundational.

[Jac3510]

Completely agree, K. That's why I said I think it constitutes a good argument for God's existence. Really, the only way out of it is to embrace nominalism, which is such an amazingly stupid position it's one of the few things that still surprise me when (educated) people claim to hold it.

As to the argument I put forward about rejecting Platonism, there are, sadly, theists who have expressly argued that not only are universals not contingent, but that, in fact, God is contingent on them. Alvin Plantinga is the most important name that immediately springs to mind saying this. To quote him directly,

• If God were distinct from such properties as wisdom, goodness and power but nonetheless had these properties, then . . . he would be dependent on them in a dual way. First, if, as Aquinas thinks, these properties are essential to him, then it is not possible that he should have existed and they not be ‘in’ him. But if they had not existed, they could not have been in him. Therefore he would not have existed if they had not. . . . The point is that he would be dependent upon something else for his existence, and dependent in a way outside his control and beyond his power to alter; this runs counter to his aseity.
  Secondly, under the envisaged conditions God would be dependent upon these properties for his character. He is, for example, wise. But then if there had been no such thing as wisdom, he would not have been wise. He is thus dependent upon these properties for his being and the way he is . . . and there is nothing he can do to change or overcome it. . . . And this doesn’t fit with his existence a se. (Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 32-33)

And on the very next page, he says . . .

• Now I think the intuition—call it the sovereignty-aseity intuition—underlying the doctrine of divine simplicity must be taken with real seriousness. Suppose God has essentially the property of being omnipotent and suppose that property is an object distinct from him, is uncreated by him and exists necessarily. Then in some sense he does depend on that property. For in the first place he could not have existed if it had not; its existence is a necessary condition for his existence. And secondly he couldn’t have the character he does have, couldn’t be the way he is, if omnipotence didn’t exist or weren’t the way it is.

Anyway, that whole book is dedicated to the notion that we ought to reject this sovereignty-aseity intuition. God, for Plantinga, really is contingent on the universals in question. That is, he just regects God's aseity. I don't see how that works, as to your point, that means that the universals are not contingent on a mind, plus the additional argument I put forward. Augustine, though, for all his mistakes, at least saw this clearly, and made the "eternality" of the universals the very thoughts of God, which is obviously much closer to the truth.

In any case, your point, as far as I see it (?) is really beautiful and easily extended: if nominalism is true, knowledge is impossible; but knowledge is possible, so nominalism is false; so universals are real; but universals necessarily presuppose a mind; so a mind exists upon which universals are contingent; such a mind can only be described as God; therefore, God exists.

edit:

Moreland and Craig, by the way, were in agreement with Plantinga, at least at one point. These difficulties are openly admitted and no solution is offered in their Philosophical Foundations (504-507, according to my notes, but I don't have the text in front of me to confirm that).

[Kurieuo]

Well, this is the first time I've decided to dabble into the realm of universals.

I happened upon the argument previously stated by chance while talking about some other argument to my wife.
She readily grasped that math requires a mind and then I thought what a potent argument so tried to flesh it out here.

Plantinga looks to be trying to deal plainly with real issues back to God, and that's really what we all try to do since we don't start with God's position.
It is hard for me to try and critique. Looks like I have some reading cut out for me.
Thanks for the recommended books.

[Jac3510]

Well as usual you are immediately insightful, sir!

Thinking of book recommendations, I'd refer you to one right now that I'm sure I have before: Etiene Gilson's The Unity of Phiolosophical Experience. You can read the first fifty or so pages on Google for free here:

https://books.google.com/books?id=d2O1V ... &q&f=false

Conveniently, that's exactly the part where he discusses universals in some detail. I would be extremely interested in your thoughts on that section . . .

edit: Actually, not so conveniently, the preview ends right as Gilson is taking up Scotus' attempt to answer the question of universals, which, very relevant to your OP and especially your discussion with Kenny, lead directly to Ockham's own attempt and his embrace of nominalism. Still, the first fifty or so pages are a good read (I just reviewed them myself), and I hope they whet your appetite for the rest of chapter three, at least--maybe even enough to get the book!

[Storyteller]

K?

Allow me to stray slightly off topic? (I promise it`s only slightly)

IA while ago I read a book called Anna and Mister God. A true story of a six year old girl in the 1930`s whose heart was absolutely full of God. She was into maths, in a big way, and found what she called God numbers. I will have to look it up for you but I remember thinking at the time that somehow, how she explained these God numbers, proved God absolutely.


I am finding this thread absolutely fascinating, btw, hard to follow sometimes but absolutely agree with you. Just don`t ask me to explain it.

[Byblos]

Only God exists eternally. Ideas & things are the result of His creation.

FL

Is it possible for something to have always existed that was also created (dependant) upon God himself for their existence?
This is a main point that Jac and Byblos sometimes try and highlight when someone mentions the Kalam cosmological argument.
Something could exist forever (e.g., universe/multiverse), but still be ordered upon - contingent upon - the existence of something else (i.e., God).

That's an essential point to Christianity in general, particularly with respect to the trinity. The Son is eternally begotten from the Father, yet still uncreated. The Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, yet still uncreated. Why, then, could not an eternal universe follow the same principles?

[RickD]

Only God exists eternally. Ideas & things are the result of His creation.

FL

Is it possible for something to have always existed that was also created (dependant) upon God himself for their existence?
This is a main point that Jac and Byblos sometimes try and highlight when someone mentions the Kalam cosmological argument.
Something could exist forever (e.g., universe/multiverse), but still be ordered upon - contingent upon - the existence of something else (i.e., God).

That's an essential point to Christianity in general, particularly with respect to the trinity. The Son is eternally begotten from the Father, yet still uncreated. The Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, yet still uncreated. Why, then, could not an eternal universe follow the same principles?

Presently, I'm reading Jac's DS book, to try to understand that. And now you throw this out there?

Do you actually believe this to be the case, or are you just wondering if it may be possible?
I just would have some issues with an eternal universe. Maybe you could help. As the universe is understood, it is all space, matter, and time. Could you explain how time could be eternal?

[Byblos]

Only God exists eternally. Ideas & things are the result of His creation.

FL

Is it possible for something to have always existed that was also created (dependant) upon God himself for their existence?
This is a main point that Jac and Byblos sometimes try and highlight when someone mentions the Kalam cosmological argument.
Something could exist forever (e.g., universe/multiverse), but still be ordered upon - contingent upon - the existence of something else (i.e., God).

That's an essential point to Christianity in general, particularly with respect to the trinity. The Son is eternally begotten from the Father, yet still uncreated. The Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, yet still uncreated. Why, then, could not an eternal universe follow the same principles?

Presently, I'm reading Jac's DS book, to try to understand that. And now you throw this out there?

Do you actually believe this to be the case, or are you just wondering if it may be possible?

Personally I don't believe the universe (matter and energy) to be eternal. What I'm saying is exactly what Aquinas said vis-a-vis the universe. It cannot be demonstrated metaphysically that the universal is not eternal, therefore it must be accounted for as a possibility. This is why the KCA as presented by WLC and the like is ineffective, they rely on the universe actually coming into existence.

[RickD]

Only God exists eternally. Ideas & things are the result of His creation.

FL

Is it possible for something to have always existed that was also created (dependant) upon God himself for their existence?
This is a main point that Jac and Byblos sometimes try and highlight when someone mentions the Kalam cosmological argument.
Something could exist forever (e.g., universe/multiverse), but still be ordered upon - contingent upon - the existence of something else (i.e., God).

That's an essential point to Christianity in general, particularly with respect to the trinity. The Son is eternally begotten from the Father, yet still uncreated. The Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, yet still uncreated. Why, then, could not an eternal universe follow the same principles?

Presently, I'm reading Jac's DS book, to try to understand that. And now you throw this out there?

Do you actually believe this to be the case, or are you just wondering if it may be possible?

Personally I don't believe the universe (matter and energy) to be eternal. What I'm saying is exactly what Aquinas said vis-a-vis the universe. It cannot be demonstrated metaphysically that the universal is not eternal, therefore it must be accounted for as a possibility. This is why the KCA as presented by WLC and the like is ineffective, they rely on the universe actually coming into existence.

Ok, understood. Then in that case, the edited part of my post that you missed, is probably irrelevant to you, because you don't believe the universe is eternal.****edit**** Unless it can be demonstrated that time is part of the universe, and time cannot be eternal. In that case, haven't you demonstrated that the universe cannot be eternal?

I added:
I just would have some issues with an eternal universe. Maybe you could help. As the universe is understood, it is all space, matter, and time. Could you explain how time could be eternal?

[Jac3510]

In order to demonstrate the premise you would have to show that time can be construed as an essentially ordered causal chain. I've seen attempts at that but nothing that struck me as definitive.

Better to recast the kalam as a probabilistic argument rather than a demonstration proper.

[PaulSacramento]

We know that the universe is expanding, which means that if it did not have a beginning per say, the expansion had a beginning.
The universe AS WE KNOW IT, as it is RIGHT NOW, can not be viewed as eternal, though it can be argued that SOMETHING OF this universe MAY have always existed.
We don't know and it is far more plausible to think that it had a beginning, hence it's expansion.

[Jac3510]

The problem is the "as we know it" part. As Audie is fond of pointing out, science doesn't prove things to be true, not in the strict sense. We could make a discovery tomorrow to demonstrate that the universe really has always been around, or more specifically, to show that it is not true that the expansion had a beginning 13.9by ago. And that's the basic problem with the KCA as popularly presented. It presents the second premise as something we know to be true.

The problem is very easy to solve. All we have to do is restate the second premise, "All available evidence points to the universe as having come into existence," or more simply, "The universe probably came into existence." But people resist that and want to start arguing either that scientifically the universe HAD to have come into existence or that philosophically it could NOT be beginningless. But philosophical arguments need to be demonstrated from reason alone, and I don't see those arguments working; as such, I don't see the KCA as popularly stated as finally working.

As a thought experiment, ask yourself if God could have created a beginningless universe. It's a hard thought--it's counter-intuitive, I know, but don't confuse that with self-contradictory. God could not create a four sided triangle, but apparently He can create particles that can literally be in two places at the same time or that can spin 720 degrees before getting back to where they started. I think it's rather evident that God could have created a beginningless universe. It's simple to prove, to me, anyway. God created today. Fine. Was today the first day? No. Then there was a yesterday. Where did it come from? God created it. Was it the first day? No. Then there was a day before yesterday. Was it the first day? No. Then there was a day before the day before yesterday. What is the first day? No. And so on.

Now why can't you just do that forever? YOU couldn't because YOU are a finite being. But God is not. He's infinite, so I don't see why He couldn't do that infinitely. Sure, you wouldn't be able to start counting from the infinite past to get from the present (a common objection), but you aren't infinite. You could, though, start counting from ten days ago and point out that there was a moment from before that day. It's a category error of sorts to claim you have to be able to count from infinite, just like it's a category error to ask how much the color blue weighs. You may not be able to count from infinity, but that's because infinity, by nature, can't be counted! If it could, then it wouldn't be infinity. Duh.

So, again, I don't see what is logically self-contradictory about a beginningless universe. God could have made that. And to the OP, that implies that there could well be things that have always existed that were nonetheless created by God. Perhaps universals are just those sorts of things. The important thing isn't their temporal origin but their essential contingency. And that is what cannot be denied of the universe, which is why it needs a necessary cause (God), and that is why universals, even if they always existed, require a necessary cause as well (again, God). What we can't say (as theists like Plantinga do) is that universals are eternal and not contingent, but that God, in fact, is contingent on them. Now we are on very dangerous grounds (both philosophically and theologically).