How God can create through evolution:

[hughfarey]

I don't think consciousness is a 'thing' that humans have and other animals don't. It appears in various levels throughout the animal kingdom (at least), and it is difficult to define precisely which aspects of it are peculiarly human. It seems to be derived from neurological complexity, as an 'emergent property'. If we are to reconcile the religious cut-off line that humans have souls and animals don't, it would be better to see it in terms of achieving a particular threshold than as something wholly separate.

[Kurieuo]

I don't think consciousness is a 'thing' that humans have and other animals don't. It appears in various levels throughout the animal kingdom (at least), and it is difficult to define precisely which aspects of it are peculiarly human. It seems to be derived from neurological complexity, as an 'emergent property'.

That doesn't really explain anything Hugh. Emergent property from what exactly?

Consider Nagel's following words:

The bare assertion of such a connection [between consciousness and physical processes] is not an acceptable stopping point. It is not an explanation to say just that the physical process of evolution has resulted in creatures with eyes, ears, central nervous systems, and so forth, and that it is simply a brute fact of nature that such creatures are conscious in the familiar ways. Merely to identify a cause is not to provide a significant explanation, without some understanding of why the cause produces the effect. The claim I want to defend is that, since the conscious character of these organisms is one of their most important features, the explanation of the coming into existence of such creatures must include an explanation of the appearance of consciousness. That cannot be a separate question. An account of their biological evolution must explain the appearance of conscious organisms as such.

Nagel, Thomas (2012-08-29). Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (p. 45). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

[hughfarey]

Sorry, Kurieuo, but that was probably the best I could do! The first bit might be OK - "Emergent property from what exactly?" From the number of neurons and the number of interconnections they make in a brain. That's my guess. The rest is difficult, although it may be that the current experiments in Artificial Intelligence will lead us further. The trouble with emergent properties is that you can't easily study them until they've emerged, and then it may be too difficult to deconstruct them to find out exactly what caused them to emerge. However, Nagel's point: "Merely to identify a cause is not to provide a significant explanation, without some understanding of why the cause produces the effect," is very true.

Still, the 'how' may, in the end, be a simple (!) engineering question. The 'why' would depend on the particular evolutionary pressures on early hominids. Some biologists suggest that as hands and arms lost their locomotive function, the possibilities for what they could be used for instead became so vast that a complex brain evolved to think up ways of using them!

[Kurieuo]

Hugh, have you looked into the mind-body problem before? Mental properties are quite radically different from anything physical... like our intentions. What would they look like, in our brains? In what state would they exist? What does a belief look like? What is there size? location? colour? etc.

These are just some of the things associated with conscious beings, none of which are really explainable in evolutionary terms, except is often very ambiguous ways. For example, we've all heard about "brain sizes" which is far from true, that the bigger the brain, the more intelligent.

This isn't an attack on evolution per se, but rather more a limitation of evolution's scope and ability to explain things. Perhaps it is nice as a physical theory of origins, but the thing is, mental properties aren't qualitatively physical.

[hughfarey]

Hugh, have you looked into the mind-body problem before?

Yes, indeed. That's how I know how imperfect our understanding of it is!

Mental properties are quite radically different from anything physical... like our intentions. What would they look like, in our brains? In what state would they exist? What does a belief look like? What is there size? location? colour? etc.

True, but 'mental properties' of one kind or another crop up in animals. Sensory input such as vision or hearing, memory, pair-bonding, care of the young, intention, even, apparently, respect for the dead, all these are mental properties common to other animals as well as humans. The exact mental difference between us and, say, bonobos is difficult to pinpoint. Language seems to have a lot to do with it.

For example, we've all heard about "brain sizes" which is far from true, that the bigger the brain, the more intelligent.

I doubt if you've heard any such thing from a biologist! The factors seem to be number of neurons, and more importantly, number and nature of interconnections. From species to species, relative brain size (compared to body mass, for example) may also be significant.

This isn't an attack on evolution per se, but rather more a limitation of evolution's scope and ability to explain things. Perhaps it is nice as a physical theory of origins, but the thing is, mental properties aren't qualitatively physical.

Abstract mental qualities can certainly and definably arise from the physical, as we are continually discovering. Hunger, for example, or fear, can be induced into creatures that are well-fed or brave by simple physical/chemical means. Anti-depressant and hallucinatory drugs are simple chemicals that affect neurons, purely material interventions but having profound mental effects. Whether all metal processes can be, or will be, explained in purely physical terms or not is not something we know at present, but that certainly cannot be arbitrarily ruled out.

[hughfarey]

ps. I'm not sure I picked up the distinction between explaining mental processes in evolutionary terms, as opposed to material terms. Intelligence for an animal with minimal physical faculties would be such a distinct reproductive advantage, that I would expect it to develop quite fast once it emerged. Evolutionarily speaking, neither consciousness nor introspection are at all difficult to explain - although some scientists think it may have developed too far, to the point where it has actually become a disadvantage to the species rather than an advantage.

[Kurieuo]

Hugh, have you looked into the mind-body problem before?

Yes, indeed. That's how I know how imperfect our understanding of it is!

Mental properties are quite radically different from anything physical... like our intentions. What would they look like, in our brains? In what state would they exist? What does a belief look like? What is there size? location? colour? etc.

True, but 'mental properties' of one kind or another crop up in animals. Sensory input such as vision or hearing, memory, pair-bonding, care of the young, intention, even, apparently, respect for the dead, all these are mental properties common to other animals as well as humans. The exact mental difference between us and, say, bonobos is difficult to pinpoint. Language seems to have a lot to do with it.

Of course they do, animals are conscious beings too! Notice the one things I haven't done here is enter into "soul talk" -- it's not required, nonetheless I think it obvious if you stick them with a pin and they'll experience the feltness of what is it like (phenomenal qualia) to be stuck with a pin. This I see is a soulish quality.

For example, we've all heard about "brain sizes" which is far from true, that the bigger the brain, the more intelligent.

I doubt if you've heard any such thing from a biologist! The factors seem to be number of neurons, and more importantly, number and nature of interconnections. From species to species, relative brain size (compared to body mass, for example) may also be significant.

Brain sizes did appear in biology textbooks. In fact, I believe not too long ago Audie made a reference to such re: Neaderthals, though it was an ambiguous reference. Regardless, we agree it's a misnomer, which makes matters even more unclear with regards to our "sapience".

This isn't an attack on evolution per se, but rather more a limitation of evolution's scope and ability to explain things. Perhaps it is nice as a physical theory of origins, but the thing is, mental properties aren't qualitatively physical.

Abstract mental qualities can certainly and definably arise from the physical, as we are continually discovering. Hunger, for example, or fear, can be induced into creatures that are well-fed or brave by simple physical/chemical means. Anti-depressant and hallucinatory drugs are simple chemicals that affect neurons, purely material interventions but having profound mental effects. Whether all metal processes can be, or will be, explained in purely physical terms or not is not something we know at present, but that certainly cannot be arbitrarily ruled out.

Some might classify this as evidence that mental states are reducible to physical states, yet this only demonstrates that the mind is causally connected to the brain and not that they are identical.

[hughfarey]

In absolute terms, I believe Neanderthal brains were on average slightly bigger than H. sapiens brains. As I say, it's the connections that count.

"Some might classify this as evidence that mental states are reducible to physical states, yet this only demonstrates that the mind is causally connected to the brain and not that they are identical."

Well, I would say it demonstrates ignorance of how the mind relates to the brain, not that it is, or isn't, directly derivable from it.

[Audie]

Evolution might be a story that explains the physical, however there is nothing to explain our consciousness, intentions, creativity, spirituality and the like -- and why we amongst all creatures possess such to a high degree.

So as it turns out, evolution is too simple. While it explains humans as physical animals, it explains very little about what makes humans "human". It doesn't really explain much about us at all.

"To such a high degree". Think 'bout that.

I have, please explain how the physical body accounts for consciousness in any way and you'd have solved a centuries old problem (i.e., the mind-body problem).

What is consciousness?

[hughfarey]

What is consciousness?

Well, who knows? The ability to formulate the question "What is consciousness?" perhaps? But then, maybe bonobos do that too - they just aren't telling us.

[Audie]

What is consciousness?

Well, who knows? The ability to formulate the question "What is consciousness?" perhaps? But then, maybe bonobos do that too - they just aren't telling us.

I just heard a few words the other day from a neurophysiologist on the subject, and managed not to retain much of that little.

He did tho identify the center of consciousness in the brain, and said some things about its characteristics. A subject to pursue, when I am not pursuing this phase of my career.

[Kurieuo]

Evolution might be a story that explains the physical, however there is nothing to explain our consciousness, intentions, creativity, spirituality and the like -- and why we amongst all creatures possess such to a high degree.

So as it turns out, evolution is too simple. While it explains humans as physical animals, it explains very little about what makes humans "human". It doesn't really explain much about us at all.

"To such a high degree". Think 'bout that.

I have, please explain how the physical body accounts for consciousness in any way and you'd have solved a centuries old problem (i.e., the mind-body problem).

What is consciousness?

Behaviourism which has largely dominated psychology the last century, would have us believe when push comes to shove that animals (cows, pigs, chickens and mice) and humans merely respond to stimuli. Consciousness is an emergent property, epiphenomenal in relation, and ought to be ignored to instead focusing upon observable behaviours and physical properties.

After all, "we all know" if you can't see it, someone's consciousness, then it doesn't really exist right?

[Audie]

Evolution might be a story that explains the physical, however there is nothing to explain our consciousness, intentions, creativity, spirituality and the like -- and why we amongst all creatures possess such to a high degree.

So as it turns out, evolution is too simple. While it explains humans as physical animals, it explains very little about what makes humans "human". It doesn't really explain much about us at all.

"To such a high degree". Think 'bout that.

I have, please explain how the physical body accounts for consciousness in any way and you'd have solved a centuries old problem (i.e., the mind-body problem).

What is consciousness?

Behaviourism which has largely dominated psychology the last century, would have us believe when push comes to shove that animals (cows, pigs, chickens and mice) and humans merely respond to stimuli. Consciousness is an emergent property, epiphenomenal in relation, and ought to be ignored to instead focusing upon observable behaviours and physical properties.

After all, "we all know" if you can't see it, someone's consciousness, then it doesn't really exist right?

Dont you suppose neurophysiologists are a little bertter than that?

[Kurieuo]

"Some might classify this as evidence that mental states are reducible to physical states, yet this only demonstrates that the mind is causally connected to the brain and not that they are identical."

Well, I would say it demonstrates ignorance of how the mind relates to the brain, not that it is, or isn't, directly derivable from it.

Ignorance? I think there are strong positive reasons for reject the mind being dependant upon the brain. The common argument for dependency is normally something like Bruce Hinrichs notes in his book The Science of Readings Minds:

• "When a person reads a sentence, hears a speech, experiences an emotion, or thinks a thought, a cluster or network of brain cells fires in a certain pattern with particular intensity and timing."

All of us have no doubt also heard of experiments of one’s brain being touched with an electrode, causing a mental experience such as a memory to occur. Does that mean as many want to believe, that we really are determined by, reducible to a physical chemistry of sorts?

Some like yourself consider this evidence that mental states are reducible to physical states, yet this only demonstrates that the mind is causally connected to the brain and not that they are identical.

Further, you have conceded the distinctiveness of mental and physical states when I said, "Mental properties are quite radically different from anything physical..." you responded with "True..."

It seems obvious that physical properties do not have the same features as mental properties. I.e., mental events such as thoughts, feelings of pain and sensory experiences do not contain physical qualities like mass, spatial dimensions and space location, are not composed of chemicals, and do not have electrical properties. As Keith Maslin summarised in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, "physical occurrences do not just appear to be different from consciousness; they are utterly different, so utterly different in fact, that it is inconceivable how the physical could produce the mental."

If you agree with this, then it follows you ought to agree with self-awareness, that is, self-presenting properties and the subjective nature of experience (in other words "consciousness", there you go Audie it's been defined).

What do I mean by self-presenting, well consider the following example:

• Perceiving a ripe tomato may mean one visually experiences red. There is a qualitative difference between how red looks to us and green. Coconut milk may offer a sweet taste and, once again, there is a qualitative difference between the taste of coconut milk and the taste of bitter beer. (George Graham, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. 2nd edn. [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998], 201)

Mental properties such as the taste of beer, having the thought that a tomato is ripe, or experiencing red, are "self-presenting properties." They present themselves directly to the subject, they are psychological attributes, they are directly present to a subject because that subject simply has them immediately in his field of consciousness.

We have "private access" to our own mental life—a privileged first-person perspective of knowing our own thoughts and felt sensations. In other words, we are self-aware and aware to other things around us. Our mental states “incorrigible,” that is, in a way we cannot mistake. If one sees Graham’s ripe, red tomato, it seems impossible for them to be mistaken that they are consciously experiencing a red sensation. Right?

Yet, the science tells us what one perceives as a red tomato is actually a tomato which absorbs and reflects different wavelengths of light! That is the physical explanation. Yet, this does not destroy the fact that a red quality was incorrigibly "subjectively experienced."

Howard Robinson notes that:

• The notion of having something as an object of experience… does not figure in any physical science. Having something as an object of experience is the same as the subjective feel or the what it is like of experience. (Howard Robinson, Matter and Sense [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 7)

It's true isn't it, that the actual object of experience is categorically something that can't be explained in physical terms? Maslin comments on object of experience:

• All that is essential to pain is the way it feels. What may, or may not be taking place neurologically is irrelevant, since all that is required is that if a sensation seems to you to be painful, then it is painful… Because mental states are not necessarily identical with brain states, since we can genuinely imagine the one without the other, they are not identical at all.

Do you see clearly now, how the distinctive difference between physical and mental states or properties, the existence of self-presenting properties and subjective states of experience, is a strong argument against any kind of physical reductionism i.e., reducing mind to mere physical matter?

[Kurieuo]

"To such a high degree". Think 'bout that.

I have, please explain how the physical body accounts for consciousness in any way and you'd have solved a centuries old problem (i.e., the mind-body problem).

What is consciousness?

Behaviourism which has largely dominated psychology the last century, would have us believe when push comes to shove that animals (cows, pigs, chickens and mice) and humans merely respond to stimuli. Consciousness is an emergent property, epiphenomenal in relation, and ought to be ignored to instead focusing upon observable behaviours and physical properties.

After all, "we all know" if you can't see it, someone's consciousness, then it doesn't really exist right?

Dont you suppose neurophysiologists are a little bertter than that?

What you talking about?