Divine Simplicity

[Jac3510]

You've answered both ways. The statement I made was whether it was purely rationally definable and you answered "Of course it is" and then go on to agree that it is not "purely" raionally definable. I do reject the appearance of age argument on the basis that the argument assumes God is a deceiver. However, it's entirely possible (although I don't believe it probable) that Man has mistaken the appearance of age as a result of our limited observations and perspective. If that were the case, it would have nothing to do with God's intention to deceive or not. It would simply be that some men have mistakenly interpretted the available evidence and come to an erroneous conclusion. When you claim that special revelation must not contradict itself, you appear to me to assume man's capacity to understand is complete and that special revelation eliminates any mystery. What you may be reducing by your approach to "rationally definiable" may in fact be elevating the approach over the source and assuming more than that which has been specially revealed is in fact intended to declare.

I didn't answer it both ways, Canuck. I broke it into two questions (since the way it was phrased was a little loaded):

1. Is it rationally definable? Yes, via general revelation;
2. Is it purely rational, that is, knowable in its completeness apart from SR? No, it is not. The rest of my answer explained that.

My point with regard to SR being rational was that it must be understandable by people. If it isn't, it is incomprehensible (I see no middle ground here: a proposition is either comprehensible or it is not). But revelation, by definition, reveals something, and thus must be comprehensible. But that which comprehends is the mind, and therefore, the thing comprehended becomes rational.

So, I'll answer your question again, the same way I did before. We can know quite a bit about God's existence with unaided reason (pure rationality); with the aid of SR, we can know more about God's existence. SR, however, doesn't negate GR.

I don't agree with this. It may be adequate from our perspective and in that capacity perhaps I'm splitting hairs. But it's not necessary to assume that our capacity and capabilities are adequate and by that to assume that God is not greater than our ability to comprehend or to discover. That's the basis of the need for special revelation in the first place. Certain elements are knowable and discernable through natural observation. Even special revelation, by definition exceeds that, and further special revelation is sufficient I believe to what we need to know but it is not all there is to know. The sending of Christ as the living word demonstrates that as well in my opinion. Assuming an absolute dualistic, system may be an easier approach in this regard, but it is, in fact, not necessary to eliminate skepticism about one's own perspective. In fact, I think it's healthy to hold even one's own perspective in question. In fact, I think the idea that we can't start our with skepticism about our own perspective has more in common with what has developed into humanism and materialism. If we accept that we are created and that there is a God who supercedes the sum of our own existence and knowledge then we begin from a position of professed inability to understand everything and a dependence upon that creator to reveal to us that which we cannot by our own devices perceive and then understand. That doesn't fit into a dualistic all or nothing viewpoint of course. Perhaps the viewpoint espoused is what is determining some of the conclusions.

The bolded words above show that you agree with what I'm trying to say, and so I'm going to have to take your criticisms at this point to be my being unclear. The fact that you believe that we can know some things about God apart from SR is all I am saying. I am not saying we can know EVERYTHING about God without SR. I'm not even saying we can know everything about God WITH SR. The question is, "What CAN we know?" Certainly GR reveals some things. I take the doctrine in this thread, simplicity, to be one of them. Now, perhaps upon investigation, we will find that GR does not reveal it. This could be for two reasons: first, it could contradict it. Perhaps GR actually reveals that God is a composite being, contra the doctrine. Or, second, we could conclude that we do not have enough information, and thus, we conclude that we must be skeptical about our perspective (which is precisely what I said above). In any case, I've not argued for any absolute dualism. I'm interested in what GR shows us about God's nature.

As it stands, I think SR supports the doctrine of simplicity as well (Deut 6:4, among other verses, comes to mind). But there we are dealing more with exegesis than pure reason. That's why I focus on the former. If SR teaches that simplicity is wrong, then arguments for simplicity based on GR must be flawed for the simple reason that truth cannot contradict itself. In that case, we have to deal with the arguments from GR either way, so I suggest that we follow Paul and start there.

This really surprised me and it''s why I answered so quickly earlier on. You're making a universal absolute statement here that requires only one exception to disprove. I'm not complete in my reading of all the early Church Fathers but I've read enough to know that projecting Thomastic assumptions anachronistically backward upon them is quite a remarkable claim. Before I take the effort to show otherwise, is this really what you're wanting to say, or am I misunderstanding you?

You are misunderstanding me. I am a Thomist, but I'm also a Dispensationalist among many other classifications. Doctrines are systemitized over time. Even the Trinity did not get a final formulation for a few centuries. I'm sure that you will find some aspects of Thomism that are not present in the CFs, just as you'll find, in the CFs, some contrary ideas. As I already pointed out, Aquinas was an Aristotelean, but Augustine, for example, was a Platonist. What you will find rather universally, however, is the core idea that I'm presenting in this thread: namely, Divine Simplicity (DS). That was born out of their discussions on impassibility.

Second, even if you show me a few references of CFs who even rejected DS, I've already provided quotes of several who accepted it. The point, then, is that what I'm arguing has for has historical roots as far back as the second and third centuries. It was, in fact, the predominant position. Showing an occasional exception doesn't change any of that.

Finally, EVEN IF I was wrong (which I'm not), it wouldn't change the fact that you still have to deal with the arguments themselves. If the history of interpretation is all that matters, then we may as well all go back to being Roman Catholic. But that's all invalid anyway, because to argue as much is to commit a genetic fallacy. The origin of an idea has no bearing on its validity. Ideas are weighed on their own merits, not on their origins.

Bottom line: yes, the CFs held to the core doctrines of simplicity and impassibility; one exception wouldn't change that fact; and even if all this were wrong, to use this as a basis for disproving DS is to commit a genetic fallacy.

We're dealing with more than just General Revelation. We're also dealing with the assumptions made by the one's interpretting the evidence and the conclusions mafe. For the record, I agree with you that God can be known in part through General Revelation and that Paul clearly understood that.

What assumptions are those?

I'm not going to let you off the hook that easily. When you bring a system of thinking and organizing to written revelation that carries with it assumptions both logically and culturally outside of that which was assumed and intended by the original authors and intended audience then you do more than change the message. Your analogy is both fallacious as the message of the gospel is not mathmatics (which interestingly assumes the dualist assumptions of your ealier comments) and further the imposition of a foreign philosophy and approach to frame and organize things within an original piece of literature may result in eisogesis into the text rather than exegesis out from it. I suspect we agree with that in general, but perhaps there's some different applications taking place.

First off, I'm not a dualist, and if you misread that into my comments, as I said above, I'll write that off as my being unclear. Please quote where I implied dualism of any kind, and I'll be more than happy to clarify myself. Second, "the message of the gospel" is not an issue here. I would argue that the Gospel itself is NOT a matter of GR; it is STRICTLY a matter of SR. I would also argue that DS is not related to the Gospel. Third, I've not once appealed to a Scripture in this thread, and thus, by definition, it is impossible to have any eisogesis. Fourth, just like the Bible is not a science book, it is not a philosophy book. I'm bringing in " a system of thinking and organizing to written revelation that carries with it assumptions both logically and culturally outside of that which was assumed and intended by the original authors and intended audience" about as much as OEC does when they try to compare Genesis 1-2 with modern science. There's not outside system here. The Bible makes propositional statements. General revelation yield propositional statements. Those statements have to be understood rationally. The only assumption I'm making here is the law of non-contradiction. Surely you have no problem with that. Finally, there is no analogy to be fallacious. I wasn't making an analogy when I warned you of a genetic fallacy. I was stating a fact, which is the same statement I made above. Whether or not DS comes from Greek philosophy has no bearing on whether or not it is true. To say it is false or invalid because it comes from Greek philosophy is to commit a genetic fallacy. Period. That's just a fact. Now, if it turns out to be false because it contradicts Scripture (or reason), and that because it has false assumptions, then it is up to you (or whoever), to demonstrate that. In that case, you are objecting to the reasoning itself, not the source.

So, if you please, let's talk about the assumptions that are incompatible with Scripture, or let's leave off this and get on with looking at the doctrine itself.

You don't think so? You don't think Thomastic thinking and tradition hasn't made assumptions both as the nature of special revelation and then examined the text and applied the assumptions implicit to the organization and reconciliation of scriptural passages, concepts and in turn built theology upon it?[/quote
I'm sure that there are Thomists who have interpreted the Bible incorrectly because they imposed their system on it. But that's not a statement about Thomism, anymore than it is about OEC when OECers do it. That's more genetic fallacy. But in any case, you didn't respond to my statement. I already told you why it isn't hermeneutical. We aren't dealing with texts. Aside from Deut 6:4 that I mentioned in this very post, where have I mentioned any verses in this thread? I haven't, so this isn't an issue of interpretation. Not interpretation of SR, anyway.

You again appear to be framing the question dualistically to assume that Paul meant what your Thomastic tradition assumes and if someone doesn't agree with that implicit assumption then they must be disagreeing with Paul and not with your Thomastic tradition. It's an interesting assumption, but I don't buy it. Neither do I assume there isn't probably common ground, but I don't accept the all or nothing construct you're assuming.

There's that charge of dualism again. I don't even know what you are talking about. What do you mean by the word "dualism"? As commonly used, it refers either to the relationship between the body and the mind (thus, substance dualism, composite dualism, monism, etc), or it refers to the idea of a Good God vs. an Evil God.

So, can you please explain to me what the heck you are talking about, because, frankly, you have me utterly lost!

You don't believe that the incorporation of the Greco-Roman pagan traditions at the time of Constantine impacted the theological understandings and took them in a path different than what Christianity was before that?

I've addressed most of what you've said, although dropped the last few elements which I can address more as we go if you wish.

I don't believe that Greco-Roman pagan traditions matter in the least one way or the other. I'm not a Greco-Roman pagan. I know that a rational study of GR leads me to conclude DS is a true doctrine. I know the CFs held to the same. I know Aquinas' arguments on the matter (along with Anselm, Augustine, Ambrose, Cyril, Ireneaus, Martyr, and others) make sense as well. Whatever happened in historical theology is beside the point. Obviously, I don't agree with something just because the CFs (or Aquinas) said it. But you brought them up, not me. I've consistently appealed to basic logic.

Now, would you care to boil your position down for me to a clear statement on what you do hold? I can't tell if you are advocating agnosticism (in the sense that we can't know anything about God because He is incomprehensible) or just anti-Catholicism or if you have some other positive belief that you haven't mentioned yet. Perhaps this is due to the fact that I don't know what you mean when you say I'm using a "dualist" system.

With that said, I would like you to answer the rest of my post when you have time. I asked several questions there that I thought were rather important, and much of what I've said in this post is just an expanded form of what was said in the latter half of that one. And finally, I'd like your thoughts on the actual argument I have put forward for DS. There are others as well, but the basic one I put forward is definitely rather basic, but definitely, I think, a good starting point. I've been fair in answering your criticisms, and will continue to do so. Perhaps, then, you could address my actual argument, and then criticize it where you think you see a false assumption?

[B. W.]

Divine Simplicity

No Orthodox Christian I know of would disagree with the following statemants:

1. God has no body;
2. God is pure form (He has no matter);
3. God's essence is identical to His nature;
4. God's existence is not external to His essence;
5. God is in no genus and thus no species of genus;
6. God has no accidents (that is, no non-necessary features);
7. God has no composition of parts;
8. God does not enter into the composition of anything external to Himself.

However, Number 8 needs clarification in regards to what the Bible teaches about Jesus Christ in Philippians 2:6-11. Also such a statement would also prove that God is indeed not all powerful either as well as could not have walked in the cool of the day with Adam and Eve in the Garden or have a personal relationship with those whom he has created. Nor could God send the Holy Spirit into our hearts as that implies that God can enter into the composition of something external to Himself. So Jac can you clarify number 8 for us?

Next, the term Divine Simplicity needs to be rephrased so modern readers can understand it better and number 8 in my opinion needs revised and clarified. As it stands now, the term Divine Simplicity for a moderern reader suggest the same thing as a simple organism in biological terms. In other words, God is reduced to being like some giant amoeba — a simple organism.

In my college days, my atheistic Biology professor brought this out in his lectures as he always had to take a cynical swipe at Christianity. For him, if God created everything, including simple organisms, like amoeba, then for him for God to be Divine Simplistic God has to be of the same order as a 'Divine Simple Cell Organism." Sorry, but that is how he brought this point out (Mocking as it is — it does raise a good point concerning how old terms and words can have impact on future modern interpretations).

That is why the phrase, Divine Simplicity, in my opinion, should be re-phrased as 'God is Simply God' for the very arguments posed by Divine Simplicity. However, Point 8 brought out by Jac would need to be defined better as well.

Next concerning the Historical Points concerning Classical Theism

Classical Theism is the “classical view of God” that has dominated Christian theology since the earliest Hellenistic Church fathers. It is used to investigate what makes God “perfect.” There are three basic talking points that define Classical Theism and they are: One, God is “immutable,” unchangeable. This means that God never changes in any respect at all. God is therefore taught as being pure actus puru, meaning He has having absolutely no potentiality to change whatsoever.

Next, secondly, God viewed also 'timeless' which means God is 'sequence-less' because God is incapable of change. In other words God cannot act in any sequence for that in and of itself indicates the potential for God to change. 'Timelessness” leads to the Third talking point that God is “impassible,” which means that God must be “above” experiencing emotion. Experiencing emotions infers that God would be affected by something outside of himself. This would be impossible because God has no potentiality for any change at all. These three talking points make up Classical Theism in which explores and proves God is “perfect” because to be perfect one has to be eternally-the-same.

Classical Theism's “eternally-the-same” conception of God's “perfection” has its historical roots firmly affixed in ancient Greek philosophy beginning with Parmenides. It developed further from Plato. In Plato's “Republic” it was argued that the must be gods unchanging for them to be gods. For the gods to be perfect, they cannot be improved or diminished, because what is truly perfect must absolutely be unchanging.

This argument is repeated by later Greco-Roman philosophers and later incorporated by early Church fathers. Also borrowed was Aristotle's “unmoved mover” concept as well. In fact a Jewish philosopher named Philo also wrote about same concepts around the same time Jesus walked in Israel. It appears that the early Church also borrowed from Philo. Hence, we have classical theism dating back before Christ and incorporated into church doctrine and that is “the eternally-the-same and affected-by-nothing conception of perfection.”

Was it wrong for the early Hellenized early Church Fathers to borrow such concepts and Christianize them?

The answer would be No and Yes. No because Paul in Acts 17 used Greek religion and philosophy to convert philosophers to Christ. It is not wrong to use examples from philosophy, sciences, current events / issues, social, political issues, etc into sermons to help people come to Christ. However, it is wrong to use these to legitimize philosophy, science, social and political issues, etc as these are not leading people to Christ.

Whatever the motives of the early Hellenized Church Fathers had for incorporating the ideas form Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle into Christian thought may have begun for noble purposes for leading people of their day and time to Christ, has now in my opinion has become an exercise to legitimize these ideas as Christian not leading people to Christ. So a question must be asked, has "Classical Theism's" mode of logic become the supreme measure of all things concerning God or does it point to Christ?

Classical Theism exploration of what makes Perfect Perfection can wind up making people understand that God is non-relational and impersonal because for God to be eternally-the-same and affected-by-nothing, He has to be an Unmoved Mover. Think about it, this logic is from human beings and reduces God to conform and bow to human ideas of what makes perfect-perfect and where is Christ in it all?

So Jac, where is Christ Jesus in Classical Theism and how does Classical Theism lead people to Christ? It may be well for those residing on Mars Hill but for the rest of humanity who lives not on Mars Hill - how does Classical Theism lead people to Christ?
-
-
-

[Canuckster1127]

B.W.,

Thanks for putting this up. It's much more clear than what I was trying to say in my ramblings early on and much more precise.

What I've been trying to say is that much of what I see in the traditional western approaches appears to me, to pick up on the Platonic Greek thinking of perfection and then to smuggle that into the conversation, so to speak, as an assumed which in turn, as I see it now, puts an emphasis upon those attributes of God that tend to cast God more in the light of transcendent, unknowable, holy to the elimination of human interaction etc. That in turn builds later into a form of Substitutionary Atonement (which I basically agree with by the way) that puts God the father in a punative light and then further puts some strain upon the triune God by turning God the Father and God the Son into a sort of Good Cop/Bad Cop act where God the Father is transcendent and distant to what I believe now is an untenable point.

I believe the Hebrew concept of perfection, while not necessary mutually exclusive with the greek or western perspective puts a great emphasis upon the elements of being whole, complete and mature. I know that some of this ties into process theology and open theism so it's a vitally important element.

To take the personal elements out of it, I'm not projecting intentionally any of these things upon Jac. I'm just trying to explain what I'm thinking and why.

Just take this as more rambling on my part. I know it goes well beyond the point of this thread and as such it is not fair to Jac. I just wanted to put a little context to what I'm thinking and why I responded as I did.

blessings,

bart

[Jac3510]

No Orthodox Christian I know of would disagree with the following statemants

Not to quibble, B.W., but several of these statements are flatly rejected by most theologians today (of which Craig and Moreland are but two quick examples). 3, 4, 6, and 8 are especially sticky point among most dissenters today. But, anyway . . .

You asked two specific questions: first, for a clarification of (8), and second, how classical theism leads one to Christ. To this, I will add a third implied question, namely, as to how classical theism does not render God distant and unrelational, which seems to contradict Scriptures.

Regarding the first, when we say that God does not enter into the composition of things, we mean that God, as God--that is, His very essence (which, remember, is idential with His existence)--does not become a part of the substance of anything else. To this, two objections can be immediately raised, which you did.

1. But does God, as God, enter into the substance of flesh in the Incarnation: "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us."
2. Does not God, as God, enter into humans upon their regeneration when they are filled with the Spirit?

To the first, we may quote the Council of Chalcedon:

• We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union

In short, it has always been the teaching of orthodoxy that there were (and are) two natures in Christ, not one. The Divine Nature did not comingle with the human nature to produce some hybrid God-Man with a nature both unlike God and unlike Man. Put simply, in the person Christ, both the divine and the human nature coexist. Thus, it is not true that God, as God, enters into the substance of flesh in the Incarnation, even though the Divine Person (the Word) does.

To the second, we may point out that God cannot be contained in all the universe, much less in any one human being. Further, just as the Holy Spirit is said to fill all believers, the same is said of both the Father and the Son. In fact, what the Scripture means when it says that the Spirit is "in" us is that we are in a special relationship with the omnipresent Spirit--indeed, with God Himself--that unbelievers are not. It is not true, then, that God, as God, enters into the substance of flesh with the filling of believers.

Regarding the second, we can answer in four ways.

First, classical theism can be used to bring a person to Christ in that it most fully and most completely explains the hypostatic union. The most amazing, if not underappreciated, sentence in all of Scripture is "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." Much rides on how we understand this, because how we understand it will directly affect our understanding of the atonement. If we overemphasize Christ's deity, we lose His humanity, and thus, His sacrifice is not one of man for men; Christ can no longer be our high priest. Yet if we overemphasize His humanity, we lose the Divine Person, and thus, His death can no longer sufficiently cover all sin. What, then, does the Bible mean by the statement? No answer is possible except that which was put forward by the Church Fathers.

But if we accept that view, we immediately find ourselves face to face with a plethora of problems about God Himself. To these, only Classical Theism provides a sufficient answer.

Second, classical theism provides a powerful apologetic not only for God's existence but for the truth of Christianity. It has long been noted that the traditional arguments for God--the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments--have to be presented collectively, because no one argument brings one sufficiently to belief in the God of Christianity. But Classical Theism, with its emphasis on all perfections in one Being, does this amazingly well. As an apologetic, it has lost its luster, I believer, not because it is a bad argument or unconvincing, but because it requires a firm understanding of metaphysics, which, sadly, our culture today is woefully uneducated on!

Third, it guards against theological errors that drive people away from Christ, most notably process theology and open theism.

Fourth, one may note that the question is based on a false premise. It is certainly true this knowledge should, in some form or fashion, ought to be useful in bringing a person to Christ, but it is not true that that is the goal of this knowledge. Why should it be? Is it the goal of all other forms of knowledge? Is the purpose of math, science, medicine, and history to bring a person to Christ? Certainly, all of these fields can point us in His direction if we look for Him, but they serve their own purposes. I would rather argue that while Classical Theism has, like these other fields, evangelistic and apologetic potential, it has a far greater purpose: namely, the knowledge of God. Put simply, the knowledge of God is not a means to an end; it is the end to which all means should be subjected. This means that this knowledge is desirable for its own sake. What can be greater to know than God?

This is true even if Classical Theism is false! For if it is false, then some other version of theism must be true. And whatever that is, it ought to be known for its own sake. Certainly, it will also have apologetic, devotional, and evangelistic value (as does CT), but those are merely useful applications of this knowledge.

Regarding the third, it is true that, on the surface, CT makes God appear distant and non-relatable. We can respond four ways.

First, it is also true that, on the surface, the Old Testament makes God appear wrathful and angry and the New Testament makes Him appear gentle and calm. Yet any biblicist knows that such an appearance vanishes on closer inspection. The same is true with our doctrine. The distance of God appears as distant only because His otherness--His total uniqueness--is put on bold display. Yet who would deny that is a Scriptural truth? We stand in awe of the God of CT. But more importantly, we stand in total and complete ignorance of Him. We have no way of knowing Him unless He chooses to disclose Himself to us. Thus, the need for God's relationship is actually highlighted. He can be known only as He reveals Himself, which, again, is a great Scriptural truth!

Second, we can point out that the difficult also vanishes in a study of the doctrine itself. For CT teaches that God is the primary cause of all things. Thus, while He is eternally distant and wholly other, still more, He is closer to us that even our own bodies, for He is the very cause of every action with our bodies. He holds them together from moment to moment. He sustains all things. So while He is distant, He is also immediate. Tell me, B.W., is that not perfectly consistent with Scripture?

Third, the fact that we are made in God's image removes the barrier of knowability. We can look within ourselves and learn something of God, not because we are the same as Him, but because we are analogous to Him. Though many have fallen into the error of looking at human emotions, will, and intellect, and attributing those directly to God, we can avoid this and learn a great deal about Him by recognizing that within Him--in fact, His very essence--is something to which our own attributes correspond. We are like God, which makes human life so very precious. And because it is so very precious, it means that God surely loves us and desires a real relationship with us.

Fourth, and finally, we can point out that the difficulty is due only to our own finiteness. We have never been in a timeless, eternal relationship. Indeed, the word "relationship" itself seems to imply temporality, for it means that we "relate" one to another in some contingent way. But such a concept is absurd with an impassible God. Like everything else, then, we see that even human relationships are a gift of God--an analogy--that we may understand something of what it means to transcend into being united with Him. C. S. Lewis spoke of "transposition" in his book The Weight of Glory. The Bible speaks of it as well. Just as the Law, and all things associated with it, were mere shadows of the New Covenant, so all things in this world are mere shadows of what God really is. They tell us something of God, but are not to be taken as God Himself. They tell us something what it means to be united with Him, but are not to be taken as being united with Him in and of itself.

All four of these reasons, then, point to fact that, far from making God unrelatable, I belive that Classical Theism makes God the most relatable, for we are given myriads of ways to understand just what it really and truly means to be with Him, as Jesus said:

• I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message, that all of them may be one, Father, just as you are in me and I am in you. May they also be in us so that the world may believe that you have sent me. I have given them the glory that you gave me, that they may be one as we are one: I in them and you in me. May they be brought to complete unity to let the world know that you sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me. (John 17:20-23)

If I missed anything, let me know. And Canuckster, as you deferred to B.W., I'll take this as sufficient to respond to your post as well. If either of you see that I've missed anything, please let me know.

In that case, I return again to my question, are we to accept the definition of Divine Simplicity that I've suggested here on the basis of the single argument I put forward? If not, why not?

[Byblos]

In that case, I return again to my question, are we to accept the definition of Divine Simplicity that I've suggested here on the basis of the single argument I put forward? If not, why not?

I will list some of the so-called intellectual difficulties arising from the doctrine of Divine Simplicity and let you tear them apart Jac.

The first difficulty is that the doctrine is incomprehensible or contradictory. On the one hand God is said to be simple and on the other he is described as having attributes (mercy, justice, etc). But if God has attributes, then he is not simple. The doctrine further defines God's attributes as being identical to Him. In other words, he IS his attributes. But if that's the case, then the attributes themselves lose all comprehensiveness as they become God. So how can God have different attributes and yet remain simple?

The second one is that the doctrine entails that God has no intrinsic contingent properties but the fact that he willed this world into existence, he could also have willed other worlds into existence, or none at all. The act of willing something in and of itself is an intrinsically contingent property, and therefore, makes the doctrine contradictory.

The third one is that in all possible worlds God could have created, His beliefs must be different from one to the other insomuch as He believes there are certain animals in one world that do not exist in another, therefore His beliefs are intrinsically contingent. (I really didn't understand how this one is different than the second, perhaps Jac's reply will answer that as well).

[B. W.]

In that case, I return again to my question, are we to accept the definition of Divine Simplicity that I've suggested here on the basis of the single argument I put forward? If not, why not?

I will list some of the so-called intellectual difficulties arising from the doctrine of Divine Simplicity and let you tear them apart Jac.

The first difficulty is that the doctrine is incomprehensible or contradictory. On the one hand God is said to be simple and on the other he is described as having attributes (mercy, justice, etc). But if God has attributes, then he is not simple. The doctrine further defines God's attributes as being identical to Him. In other words, he IS his attributes. But if that's the case, then the attributes themselves lose all comprehensiveness as they become God. So how can God have different attributes and yet remain simple?

The second one is that the doctrine entails that God has no intrinsic contingent properties but the fact that he willed this world into existence, he could also have willed other worlds into existence, or none at all. The act of willing something in and of itself is an intrinsically contingent property, and therefore, makes the doctrine contradictory.

The third one is that in all possible worlds God could have created, His beliefs must be different from one to the other insomuch as He believes there are certain animals in one world that do not exist in another, therefore His beliefs are intrinsically contingent. (I really didn't understand how this one is different than the second, perhaps Jac's reply will answer that as well).

Jac, Classical Theism has flaws and in order to rectify those flaws — it becomes philosophically contradictory as Byblos pointed out. This makes for great discussion for those on Mars Hill. Classical Theism's philosophic and logic traditions are from ancient Greek philosophic tradition. It is not wrong to do this but it would be wrong to say these philosophic and logic traditions are superior and are the only way to understand God's perfection.

The Ancient Philosophic / Logic traditions ramble endlessly and contradict each other often in order to support illogically derived conclusions. With all due respect, what Classical Theism leaves out is one, the bible, and two how the Lord reveals who He is and is Like from the pages of the bible, lastly, it fails to take note of these and fails compare the Lord's character and nature honestly with the tenants of the Classical Philosophic tradition that Classical Theism is entrenched in. So is it bending the bible to conform to Ancient Philosophic / Logic traditions or not? Or is it a tool to understand the simple complexity of God

Does this say Classical Theism is wrong? No — only that it needs to be updated so that those that hear of it can understand it. As it stands now, only those trained in its secret knowledge can digest the ramblings. There are parts that need revision and correction. By this I mean that certain adherences to Plato and the philosophers must be compared to what the bible says about God and where they do not fit — toss out the philosophic traditions of men.

Like Bart pointed out - that Hebrew mode of thinking regarded the mature, holistic, and the relational is what and how to understand what makes perfect — perfect: fits with what the bible reveals about God and helps us to gain a glimpse of the Lord so we can understand him a bit better.

God is not impersonal — out there — who never weeps — who never interacts for to do so would make him less than God. In fact, he is personal, he within us, interacts with his people in many diverse ways, he is Simply God who is…

If God cannot enter into the composition of anything external to Himself then the Holy Spirit cannot be within us, nor would there the means to circumcise the heart. Not so with what the bible teaches on these subjects. Of course classical theism will have a very confusing long winded answer for this that in the end is contradictory and only understood by those residing on Mars Hill.

God so Love that he Gave… God was grieved he made man…God choose Jacob…. God called out to Adam and Eve…God ate with the elders of Israel and they saw his foot… The Lord appear and wrestled with Jacob…All indicates a relational God very concerned in the affairs of humanity and by no means aloof and cannot enter into the world of Humanity.

What people have a difficult time to understand about the philosophic tradition of Classical Theism is the impersonal picture of God that it ultimately paints which defies what one reads from the scripture. If one brings this point out, they are bashed with philosophic jargon and circular ramblings.

So I guess I have to ask how would Classical Theism answer this question (which is not a trick question but one often asked which does relate to this subject indirectly):

Can God make something he cannot destroy?
-
-
-

[B. W.]

For anyone wanting to know more about Divine Simplicty please see the full article below from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Divine Simplicity

First published Mon Mar 20, 2006

According to the classical theism of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and their adherents, God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence. This is the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). It is to be understood as an affirmation of God's absolute transcendence of creatures. God is not only radically non-anthropomorphic, but radically non-creaturomorphic, not only in respect of the properties he possesses, but in his manner of possessing them. God, we could say, differs in his very ontology from any and all created beings.

-
-
-

[Canuckster1127]

My concern remains primarily that it appears to me that the tenets prescribed are philosophically eisogeted into the framework used to read the Scriptures rather than independently exegeted from the text. It's one thing to separate general revelation from special revelation, it's another to make special revelation subject to the general by constructing assumptions that you begin with and then make scripture subject to them on the assumption that it has fewer contaradictions. What some call "contradictions" others call "mystery".

Further when the original authors culturally would not have intended or the orginal audience would not have read scripture in the prescribed manner, then you've moved beyond analogy for the purposes of illustration to actually incorporating the analogy as the equal or greater of scripture itself.

To then elevate a particular approach into an all or nothing proposition, or a false dilemma whereby it is elevated as more desirable by the measure of it's own internal validity over it's objective mapping to the cultural and exegetical context of special revelation (the Bible) then I have concerns. Why not seek to understand the text on its own terms and where there is mystery or presumed contradiction from a western static perspective, then seek to understand how the text was understood by its original authors and audiences and move from there making the systematics subject to the text?

Because I'm self trained in this area, I regret that I may be using the terminology incorrectly. Aren't these reasonable questions to ask however?

[Byblos]

My concern remains primarily that it appears to me that the tenets prescribed are philosophically eisogeted into the framework used to read the Scriptures rather than independently exegeted from the text. It's one thing to separate general revelation from special revelation, it's another to make special revelation subject to the general by constructing assumptions that you begin with and then make scripture subject to them on the assumption that it has fewer contaradictions. What some call "contradictions" others call "mystery".

Further when the original authors culturally would not have intended or the orginal audience would not have read scripture in the prescribed manner, then you've moved beyond analogy for the purposes of illustration to actually incorporating the analogy as the equal or greater of scripture itself.

To then elevate a particular approach into an all or nothing proposition, or a false dilemma whereby it is elevated as more desirable by the measure of it's own internal validity over it's objective mapping to the cultural and exegetical context of special revelation (the Bible) then I have concerns. Why not seek to understand the text on its own terms and where there is mystery or presumed contradiction from a western static perspective, then seek to understand how the text was understood by its original authors and audiences and move from there making the systematics subject to the text?

Because I'm self trained in this area, I regret that I may be using the terminology incorrectly. Aren't these reasonable questions to ask however?

Of course they're reasonable questions to ask, among Christians. But when you debate non-Christians and particularly atheists, you can't very well hit them over the head with scripture (when talking philosophy that is). Here's how I see it, imagine for one second there's no bible (and whatever else that entails), no religion at all (I know I sound like John Lennon). Imagine there's only a belief in a creator ... or not. The philosophical argument still stands. I think that's the point Jac is arguing from (and the purpose for classical theism from the onset). IMHO.

[Canuckster1127]

That's a good point, and of course it ties directly into apologetics and the purpose of this board.

My concern is that it can do more than lead someone to the door however, it can lay the tracks for a systematic framework or approach that can be maintained after and some of the concepts and conclusions can run counter to what has been revealed and the foundations upon which we are to walk relationally with God and one another.

It may also be that I'm straining at gnats and overanalyzing it. I'm aware of a propensity in myself to overreact or counter react to elements like this for personal and emotional reasons and that's not always healthy either.

[B. W.]

Point I would like to point out is dealing with atheists and I mean a highly intelligent suave atheist. For example, if your conversation leads into the area the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) the highly intelligent suave atheist would just let you talk and explain Divine Simplicity.

While you think you have the initiative by expounding the glories of the logic posed by the doctrine Divine Simplicity, this highly intelligent suave atheist would be wise to just sit back and let the DDS use and explanations of logic prove the Doctrine Divine Simplicity as being incoherent. This atheist would bring this point out repeatedly by DDS proponents expostulations. By that tactic he proves just how incoherent DDS is to anyone else listening.

So a better approach would be how to make DDS simpler and not so incoherent. As it is now, best not to use it in debates with highly intelligent suave atheists as they'll bend it to prove incoherency. Now, if incoherency is the standard of measure to prove truth, then it stands that incoherency equals truth and DDS is supreme.

In my opinion, it is best not to use DDS or be lead into discussing DDS with a highly intelligent suave atheist. The set up and trap makes one look more foolish than wise.

Next, what usually winds up happening when DDS proponents speak with fellow Christians who point out DDS incoherency is that DDS and its expostulations have become so out there and incoherent that objectors just end up shrugging their shoulders in frustration and move on. DDS proponents then think they have won, but have they?

Example of incoherency:

Amos 6:8, “The Lord GOD hath sworn by Himself, saith the LORD, the God of hosts: I abhor the pride of Jacob, and hate his palaces; and I will deliver up the city with all that is therein.” JPS

Principle of DDS: God's sameness

Is there a difference between God abhorring something and his mercy?

Is God's Mercy the same as His Hate?

-
-
-

[Jac3510]

Not ignoring you Byblos. Just been crazy busy this week. I should be able to get to your questions either tonight or tomorrow. The short answer is that there are stock responses to them - that doesn't make them bad questions, of course. There are stock answers precisely because those are obvious questions, and they are obvious questions because in many ways DS is counter-intuitive.

Will be back!

[Jac3510]

OK, Byblos. So better late than never, I say!

The first difficulty is that the doctrine is incomprehensible or contradictory. On the one hand God is said to be simple and on the other he is described as having attributes (mercy, justice, etc). But if God has attributes, then he is not simple. The doctrine further defines God's attributes as being identical to Him. In other words, he IS his attributes. But if that's the case, then the attributes themselves lose all comprehensiveness as they become God. So how can God have different attributes and yet remain simple?

Actually, Aquinas dealt exactly with this, where he flatly asserts that "Virtue and wisdom [that is, God's attributes] are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us." (STI:Q3:A6). This is similar to the entire argument about God having emotions. You could phrase that argument this way:

1. Simple beings do not have emotions;
2. God has emotions;
3. Therefore, God is not a simple being.

But we challenge the second premise, for the word "emotions" is not univocally applied to both man and God. God may have something that corresponds to man's emotions, or more precisely, man's emotions may correspond in some way to God's being, but they are not precisely the same.

Now, this is true because emotions are an attributes, and we cannot univocally say that both man and God have attributes. He is pure essence. Thus, you rightly state that "if God has attributes, then He is not simple," but you wrongly suppose that the word "attributes" means the same thing when referring to men and God.

We can look deeper at this, too. We must point out that God is not distinct from His nature (see STI:Q3:A3). This is a very important idea--foundational, really, and it marks, in many ways, the heart of the controversy. Most modern philosophers hold to what may be called a relation or non-constituent ontology. They would say that a thing's nature is a collection of abstract properties that are exemplified in individuals. Against this, classical philosophers may hold to what is called a constituent ontology, in which a thing's nature is not a collection of abstract properties, but rather as part of the thing itself. You and I are both human beings. That is our nature, but we are distinguished by our individual matters. So we go back to the old fashioned form/matter distinction.

Now, if we adopt this particular metaphysic, then it's easy to see that God's nature is not separate from His essence. In men, it is, for our humanity is not the same as our existence. Thus, even though we are both men, we are separate men. Having the same nature does not make us the same being. But God's nature is self-instantiating, and thus, anything that shares in God's nature is God (which, by the way, takes us directly to the divinity of Christ). In fact, God's nature is existence, or again, more precisely, what we call existence is actually God's nature. And this takes us directly to Paul's assertion that all things move and have their being in Him.

We can then move directly to answer your question. If God is the same as His nature, and God's nature is omnipotence, then God = omnipotence; but God's nature is also omniscience, so God = omniscience. And thus, omnipotence = omniscience. Frankly, I don't have any more problem with that then I do the idea that the Godhead is Three PERSON'S subsisting in One BEING. Yet how could it be any other way? To be perfect power is just another way of thinking about being perfect knowledge. Is God not Mind? Does God have some energy outside of Himself that He draws from? Of course not. His power and His knowledge are one and the same. He created the universe with a mere word, a mere thought. There is no real distinction in His thought (which is mind) and His power (which is act). Likewise, these two attributes are just another way of thinking of His perfect presence, for God is perfectly--that is, completely and totally--perfect in every place in every time. But does this not make perfect sense when you think on it? The Biblical concept of "knowing" something is to be in intimate fellowship with it. Yet if God is in all things, as the Scriptures declare, then God absolutely knows all things, and indeed His omnipresence really is His omniscience and His omnipotence. The same could be said of His perfect love, for what is perfect love if not perfect goodness? Yet what is perfect goodness if not the absolute lack of nothing? Evil is actually a privation, yet in God, there is no privation, for privation is that which falls short of what God actually is. Thus, perfect Goodness and Perfect Love are actually Perfect Completion, which is precisely the same as His perfect knowledge, power, or presence.

All these things are, then, one in the same, or various ways of looking at the same thing. We humans have been given these attributes in an equivocal way. Our emotions, knowledge, will, personality, morality, etc. are all reflective of or analogous to God's absolute existence as perfection. So I really fail to see any problem with DDS on this matter.

The second one is that the doctrine entails that God has no intrinsic contingent properties but the fact that he willed this world into existence, he could also have willed other worlds into existence, or none at all. The act of willing something in and of itself is an intrinsically contingent property, and therefore, makes the doctrine contradictory.

If you remember earlier in the thread, I said that composition can have two different meanings. I should have said three. Again, they are:

1. Composition of parts;
2. Composition of essence and existence;
3. Composition of potentiality and actuality.

Your question concerns the third. This is a bit technical, but it is extremely important, because this is the primary reason I hold to DS. In fact, I cannot see how anyone who has ever used the Cosmological Argument is not forced to accept this; further, to reject this is to deny, I believe, that God is actually God!

Now, potentiality is that which could be but is not; actuality is that which really is. Choice happens when there is potentiality that is reduced to actuality. I have a choice between A and B, and thus, the choice, not yet made, consists only of a potentiality. Yet when I choose B, B becomes actuality, and potentiality is lost. The actualized B may give rise to other potentialities, perhaps C, D, and E, but A is no longer potential.

Next, notice that all cause/effects are really potential/actual compositions. You are playing pool. You shoot the cue ball into the eight ball, which falls into the corner pocket. There was great potentiality before the actuality happened, and, in fact, what actually happened was the reduction of potential into actual. That's all causal events are.

Here, then, we have the foundation of ALL forms of the Cosmological Argument (be that Leibniz, Aquinas, or Kalaam), namely, that every contingent actuality (that is, every action that was reduced from potentiality) must have been reduced by another actuality, for a potentiality cannot reduce itself; yet there cannot be an infinite regress of such reductions; therefore, there must be a First Cause in which there is no potentiality, but is, rather, pure Act. Let me quote Aquinas on this:

• It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. (STI:Q2:A3)

Now, the point is that, in God, there is no potentiality. God is pure act--pure actuality. This lines up perfectly with the identification of His nature with existence. And note the consequences of denying this! If there is potentiality in God, then He cannot be the First Cause, and there must, then, be something that preceded Him. The Cosmological Argument insists on a First Cause that is pure act. If this is not God, then God is not God! Turning again to Aquinas, he explains this in STI:Q3:A1:

• Now it has been already proved, that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality.

Notice that although potential is temporally prior to actuality, actuality is logically prior to potentiality. In other words, although there are possibilities before that possibility becomes a reality (speaking of time), it is only the actualization of the thing itself that presents the possibilities. Return to our example of the pool game. The only reason you have the potential to hit the eight ball into the corner pocket is because the eight ball is on the table, and the fact that it does happen demonstrates what did not happen. But take away the actual eight ball, and what potentiality is there? None, of course. And more to the point, potential doesn't reduce potential to actual. It takes an actual thing to reduce potential into potential. So the order is always ACTUAL->POTENTIAL->ACTUAL. It is never POTENTIAL->ACTUAL->POTENTIAL. Thus, actuality takes logical precedence in our discussion.

But if this is the case, then there is, again, no potentiality in God. If God is absolutely first, then no potentiality can come before Him. God is pure actuality.

What, then, of God's free will? Could He have chosen differently than He did? Does that not seem to imply potentiality, and thus compositeness in the third sense? We concede this only if we are willing to give up God's divinity! But thankfully, we don't have to.

Consider if I have a choice to do A or B. I choose B, and thus, the potentiality A is lost. B is real. It is actual. Notice carefully where the potentiality is. Is it in me or in the action? It is in the action! I reduced the event from the potential of A/B into actual B. When God chooses to do something, He does it from all of eternity, being timeless. He did not consider possible choices and then act on one of the existing potentials. Rather, He has acted from eternity. His action is perfectly libertine. But when we say that God "could have" done it another way, we are not speaking of potentiality in Himself, but only of temporal potentiality in the events. Yet God is not temporal, and the actuality is Himself. Freedom, for God, is not to be understood in temporal terms of seeing two possibilities and then reducing them into actuality. It is to be understood as His absolutely unfettered actualization of His Will.

The third one is that in all possible worlds God could have created, His beliefs must be different from one to the other insomuch as He believes there are certain animals in one world that do not exist in another, therefore His beliefs are intrinsically contingent. (I really didn't understand how this one is different than the second, perhaps Jac's reply will answer that as well).

The answer to this is to note that just like emotions, knowledge is not the same thing in God as it is in us. As noted above, God's actions are purely of Himself. He doesn't temporally consider other possibilities and then choose at a later time to do something. His is one of eternal willing into being. He acts, and we infer potentiality of what did not happen. We speak of that as God choosing not to do something (and in this way, we see, again, that human choice is yet another example of analogy to God's being).

The article that both I and CSLL referenced in the emotions thread discusses this. It says:

• Suppose I freely do or will X rather than Y. To say that this choice is free is to say that in the very same circumstances it was possible for me to will Y or perhaps not to will at all. According to the first view, my willing X rather than Y somehow brings it about that the content of God's knowledge is in some way different from what it would have been if I had willed Y. However, it is important to note that my willing X rather than Y does not introduce into God some perfection he does not in some way already super-abundantly possess. After all, I will X or Y only because these possibilities are already there for me because of God's inclining me toward fulfillment. It is also important to note that the badness of the bad choice is not a positive something, but the privation or falling away from what is proper and right. So God's knowledge is different from what it would have been, had I chosen differently, but my action does not perfect or fulfill God. . . .
  But there are difficulties for this proposal. One difficulty is that it seems to involve thinking of God as composite. God is the uncaused cause and a necessary being. If one then says that in some respects God is caused, that some aspects of God are contingent (for example, in some way his willing and knowing creatures is in some way dependent on creatures), then it seems that one must distinguish the uncaused part of God from the caused part of God, since nothing, not even God, can be both uncaused and caused in the same respect. But it does not seem possible for any composite being to exist necessarily. The whole will depend upon the parts, but the parts could not be necessary beings--as parts, they must depend on their place within the whole. And so, just of itself, the composite being might or might not be. As we saw above, the Creator cannot be a contingent being.

Much as we've said above, Lee points out that if there is contingency in God's knowledge, then God is not really God. So what is the answer? He suggests the following:

• Thus, according to the second view, even our concepts that properly apply to ourselves, understanding, willing and love, cannot be directly applied to God in the sense that they apply to ourselves. Since our concepts of features found in ourselves present to our minds realities or natures that do not entail their existing, these realities or natures cannot be aspects of God's necessarily existing essence. Thus, to say that God understands or that God wills or loves, should not be taken to mean that what is presented to our mind by those concepts are intrinsic aspects of God. Rather, such statements should be understood as being indirect or analogical: God understands, should be understood somewhat as: creatures are related to God in a way that is in some respects similar to the way what is understood is related to one who understands, and God is in himself what it takes to be the term of that relation. God wills creatures to be = contingent beings are related to God in a way that is in some respects similar to the way objects willed are related to a free agent, and God has in himself what is necessary to be the term of that relation.

This, if our speaking of God's knowledge is only analogical our knowledge, we have no warrant for assuming that His knowledge makes Him contingent as it does us. As I said early in this post, we can see that God's attributes are really all one in the same with His essence. Thus, as God upholds all things without being contingent on them, so He also knows all things (actualities and their potentialities) without being contingent on them.

ANYWAY

I know this has been long, so the summary is as follows:

1. The word "attributes" should not be taken to refer to something intrinsically separate from God, as if His knowledge, power, love, etc. were necessarily different from His own being as they are in us;
2. God's willing things into existence does not imply potentially because God is not temporal, and therefore, since there is no potentiality, there is no contingency; and
3. Like both 1 and 2, God's beliefs should not be thought of as precisely the same as our own. There is no potentiality in God, and, in fact, His knowledge is the same as His essential nature.

Your thoughts?