Evidence for God from Science

OK, so for you:

ethics = foundational values
morality = code of conduct built upon ethics
right(good)/wrong(evil) = that which is consistent/inconsistent with a system of morality.

I think you are referring to my use of "objective" wrt the Golden Rule(?) If so, I recognize that it is an idea that only gives objective answers in some situations (many but not all) and when used truthfully (ie without special exceptions ("if I were black, I'd want to be segregated from whites", etc)).

No, I wasn't thinking of your usage of the Golden Rule at all. This response is why I asked the question. We need to be using our words the same way. Notice that in your reply here, you use the word "objective" as it relates to ideas, which is perfectly consistent with your previous definition as being not affected by personal opinion.

Now, we can use the word "objective" in that sense if you like. I would call that epistemological objectivity, but that's neither here nor there. What I want you to see and label for me is what I would call ontological objectivity. Notice in your sentence above that ideas are objective if so and so. Fine. I'm not asking about that. I'm asking about facts, not the ideas related to facts. For example, suppose you and I are sitting at a table and there are three apples there. The number of apples is an objective fact, not an ideas.

Let me give you the theory behind this. If you know it already, you can feel free to skim or skip this, but I want to be sure that we are on the same page.

Imagine an apple is sitting in front of you. In the field of the philosophy of language, there are three terms we need to distinguish in talking about that apple. The first is the word "apple." That is what we call a sign. The word "apple" in and of itself has no meaning. It is just a sound. We, as intelligent beings, invest that sound with a meaning. We use it as a sign to point to something else.

The second is the apple itself. That is the signification. An apple is an apple whether or not there is anyone there to talk about it. The sign "apple" points to the signification apple.

The third is the idea 'apple' in my mind. When you say to me, "Look at that apple," the sign "apple" leads to me to observe the signified apple, which then results in my mind producing the idea of that apple. Now, without going any further into linguistic or epistemological theory, the point I am driving at is that the idea is not the same thing as the signification.

Returning, then, to our discussion of objectivity, we apply this by recognizing that there are objective ideas--that is, an idea that is not influenced by personal opinion. To the degree that an idea is influenced by those personal values, you would call it subjective. I wouldn't use that word, but it's a common way it is used, so we can follow you on that. So we see that the IDEA may be "objective" or "subjective" as you have defined the words. With that established, I am not asking about the idea--that is, the thing conjured up in your mind as a result of a signification's signing. What I AM asking you about is the signification itself. Can you see that it has nothing to do with the mind whatsoever? Whether or not there is an apple on the table is a hard fact which is true or not true independently of any ideas I have about it.

I would call that ontological objectivity because we are not dealing with our ideas about the thing (and since all ideas occur in our mind, then all ideas are epistemological by nature). You can see, then, that this ontological objectivity is not the same thing as your epistemological objectivity. Can you see that distinction, and if so, if we reserve the word "objective" to your original definition (which I've nuanced as "epistemological objectivity"), then what would you label what I am now calling ontological objectivity?

Is there a typo here?

Yes, again - the two question, without the typo, are:

"Isn't that interpretation very subjective, sir?"
"Whether redheads are prettier than blonds is really just subjective, isn't it?"

The relative "prettiness" of blonds vs redheads depends on (is subject to) the preference of the evaluator.

Yes, then . . .

Do you see a difference? I'm trying to draw a distinction--the first is influenced by personal views, whereas the latter is defined as a personal view (the first begs the question: what is being influenced?). If you see this, what would you call the first and second? Which gets the label "subjective" and in what sense, and what is the other?

Generally, I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example.

But is not my preference (to use your word) for one over the other not "modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background"? If not, I need you to explain to me the difference. This will be important, because I need to know what words to use to evaluate your Ethics/Values->Morality->Right/Wrong scheme with reference to its objectivity or lack-thereof, or whatever other word we end up using.

Looking forward to your clarifications.

God bless

Jac3510 wrote:OK, so for you:

ethics = foundational values
morality = code of conduct built upon ethics
right(good)/wrong(evil) = that which is consistent/inconsistent with a system of morality.

Sounds good.

I think you are referring to my use of "objective" wrt the Golden Rule(?) If so, I recognize that it is an idea that only gives objective answers in some situations (many but not all) and when used truthfully (ie without special exceptions ("if I were black, I'd want to be segregated from whites", etc)).

No, I wasn't thinking of your usage of the Golden Rule at all. This response is why I asked the question. We need to be using our words the same way. Notice that in your reply here, you use the word "objective" as it relates to ideas, which is perfectly consistent with your previous definition as being not affected by personal opinion.

Now, we can use the word "objective" in that sense if you like. I would call that epistemological objectivity, but that's neither here nor there. What I want you to see and label for me is what I would call ontological objectivity. Notice in your sentence above that ideas are objective if so and so. Fine. I'm not asking about that. I'm asking about facts, not the ideas related to facts. For example, suppose you and I are sitting at a table and there are three apples there. The number of apples is an objective fact, not an ideas.

Let me give you the theory behind this. If you know it already, you can feel free to skim or skip this, but I want to be sure that we are on the same page.

Imagine an apple is sitting in front of you. In the field of the philosophy of language, there are three terms we need to distinguish in talking about that apple. The first is the word "apple." That is what we call a sign. The word "apple" in and of itself has no meaning. It is just a sound. We, as intelligent beings, invest that sound with a meaning. We use it as a sign to point to something else.

The second is the apple itself. That is the signification. An apple is an apple whether or not there is anyone there to talk about it. The sign "apple" points to the signification apple.

The third is the idea 'apple' in my mind. When you say to me, "Look at that apple," the sign "apple" leads to me to observe the signified apple, which then results in my mind producing the idea of that apple. Now, without going any further into linguistic or epistemological theory, the point I am driving at is that the idea is not the same thing as the signification.

Returning, then, to our discussion of objectivity, we apply this by recognizing that there are objective ideas--that is, an idea that is not influenced by personal opinion. To the degree that an idea is influenced by those personal values, you would call it subjective. I wouldn't use that word, but it's a common way it is used, so we can follow you on that. So we see that the IDEA may be "objective" or "subjective" as you have defined the words. With that established, I am not asking about the idea--that is, the thing conjured up in your mind as a result of a signification's signing. What I AM asking you about is the signification itself. Can you see that it has nothing to do with the mind whatsoever? Whether or not there is an apple on the table is a hard fact which is true or not true independently of any ideas I have about it.

I would call that ontological objectivity because we are not dealing with our ideas about the thing (and since all ideas occur in our mind, then all ideas are epistemological by nature). You can see, then, that this ontological objectivity is not the same thing as your epistemological objectivity. Can you see that distinction, and if so, if we reserve the word "objective" to your original definition (which I've nuanced as "epistemological objectivity"), then what would you label what I am now calling ontological objectivity?

How about objective ideas = "objective ideas" and objects = "objects"?

Is there a typo here?

Yes, again - the two question, without the typo, are:

"Isn't that interpretation very subjective, sir?"
"Whether redheads are prettier than blonds is really just subjective, isn't it?"

The relative "prettiness" of blonds vs redheads depends on (is subject to) the preference of the evaluator.

Yes, then . . .

Do you see a difference? I'm trying to draw a distinction--the first is influenced by personal views, whereas the latter is defined as a personal view (the first begs the question: what is being influenced?). If you see this, what would you call the first and second? Which gets the label "subjective" and in what sense, and what is the other?

Generally, I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example.

But is not my preference (to use your word) for one over the other not "modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background"? If not, I need you to explain to me the difference. This will be important, because I need to know what words to use to evaluate your Ethics/Values->Morality->Right/Wrong scheme with reference to its objectivity or lack-thereof, or whatever other word we end up using.

I said "I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example", but preferences ARE subjective. Sorry for the confusion.

As to "Isn't that interpretation very subjective, sir?", I'm not sure what you're trying to get at - that interpretations are subjective?

Looking forward to your clarifications.

God bless

How about objective ideas = "objective ideas" and objects = "objects"?

But aren't there real things in reality that aren't objects? Is love an object? What about pain? Dreams? The color red? What about a thing's nature or essence? It wouldn't make very much sense to say that a thing's essence is an object, because then, there would be an object within an object!

So I go back to my question - if we use the word "objective" only to describe ideas that are not influenced by personal opinion, then what word do we use to describe significations such as the ones above? That is, what word are we going to use when we are talking about things in and of themselves, regardless of our ideas about them?

I said "I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example", but preferences ARE subjective. Sorry for the confusion.

OK, so we have one side of the equation done - preferences are subjective. Good. What about the reverse? Is it true that everything subjective is in some sense based on preference, given your definition above?

As to "Isn't that interpretation very subjective, sir?", I'm not sure what you're trying to get at - that interpretations are subjective?

It was just a sample sentence to show that the word "subjective" can be used in two different ways. Your answer to the above question should suffice. If we can get these last few words hammered out, then I'll offer my evaluation of your ethical system as summarized so that we can get to the heart of the ontological/nature issue of morality.

Thanks again!

Jac3510 wrote:

How about objective ideas = "objective ideas" and objects = "objects"?

But aren't there real things in reality that aren't objects? Is love an object? What about pain? Dreams? The color red? What about a thing's nature or essence? It wouldn't make very much sense to say that a thing's essence is an object, because then, there would be an object within an object!

So I go back to my question - if we use the word "objective" only to describe ideas that are not influenced by personal opinion, then what word do we use to describe significations such as the ones above? That is, what word are we going to use when we are talking about things in and of themselves, regardless of our ideas about them?

I was considering concepts such as "love", "pain", "dreams", or "red" objective ideas since they really only exist in our minds. If you prefer, how about "objective concepts"?

I said "I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example", but preferences ARE subjective. Sorry for the confusion.

OK, so we have one side of the equation done - preferences are subjective. Good. What about the reverse? Is it true that everything subjective is in some sense based on preference, given your definition above?

No, I think "subjective" is subject to experiences, "inertia" (it's always been that way), fears, and other factors in addition to preferences.

As to "Isn't that interpretation very subjective, sir?", I'm not sure what you're trying to get at - that interpretations are subjective?

It was just a sample sentence to show that the word "subjective" can be used in two different ways. Your answer to the above question should suffice. If we can get these last few words hammered out, then I'll offer my evaluation of your ethical system as summarized so that we can get to the heart of the ontological/nature issue of morality.

OK

Thanks again!

Wayne, I didn't forget about you. I was at a conference in Dallas, TX. I will get back to you on this shortly.

No problem, enjoy your conference.

Life is back to normal! And doubly good for me -- looks like I'll be published in two journals and a book next year. I'll let you all know more details as I get them

Anyway, Wayne, back to our discussion:

We're just about finished, I think, defining our terms. So let's look at where we are:

waynepii wrote:

Jac3510 wrote:

waynepii wrote:How about objective ideas = "objective ideas" and objects = "objects"?

But aren't there real things in reality that aren't objects? Is love an object? What about pain? Dreams? The color red? What about a thing's nature or essence? It wouldn't make very much sense to say that a thing's essence is an object, because then, there would be an object within an object!

So I go back to my question - if we use the word "objective" only to describe ideas that are not influenced by personal opinion, then what word do we use to describe significations such as the ones above? That is, what word are we going to use when we are talking about things in and of themselves, regardless of our ideas about them?

I was considering concepts such as "love", "pain", "dreams", or "red" objective ideas since they really only exist in our minds. If you prefer, how about "objective concepts"?

A "concept" can only occur in the mind, but we can use the phrase "objective idea" if you like, but we are going to have to be VERY careful about connotations. Let us look at the word "idea" as modern philosophers--that is, those who follow analytic philosophy--look at it. Much of this comes from Gottlob Frege and his essay "On Sense and Reference" (click here for a Wikipedia overview). Let me quote a particular interesting section from that work and then comment on it:

• The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 'Bucephalus'. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part of a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another. In the light of this, one need have no scruples in speaking simply of the sense, whereas in the case of an idea one must, strictly speaking, add to whom it belongs and at what time. (p. 25-26, emphasis added)

Briefly, we need to know how he is using the words "reference" and "sense." A "reference" is that to which a sign points (by "sign," I mean any word or other such notation). The signs "the evening star" and "the morning star" have precisely the same reference--that is, the phrases refer to the same object, the same thing, the same reference.

They have, on the other hand, a different "sense." The phrases "the evening star" and "the morning star" are not strictly synonymous, even though they point to the same thing. Or, to use another example, imagine a table with a single piece of fruit on it: an apple. If I say, "Look at the apple" or "Look at the fruit," both the signs "apple" and "fruit" have the same reference, but the word "apple" is not synonymous with the word "fruit." That is, they have the same reference, but the signs have different senses.

Thus far, every philosopher would agree with Frege, I think. But here, as an analytical philosopher, he makes the above quoted statement. For him, the sense, sign, and reference all bring to your mind an idea. That idea is in your mind and your mind alone. I may be looking at precisely the same object (the apple) and may have a congruent idea in my mind, but my idea is my idea and your idea is your idea, even if they are the same. In fact, the word "idea" is only a sign that refers to the thing in our minds.

But just here, the sign "idea" differs than the sign "apple." For the sign "apple" refers to the same thing for both of us--in context, the particular apple on the particular table. But the idea of the apple in both of our minds is not the same reference; for the sign '"the idea of the apple" refers to your idea and to my idea, but my idea is not your idea and your idea is not my idea. For Frege, they are separate experiences, that is, separate references all together.

Though not often laid out in this level of detail, this has become the common meaning of the word "idea" (thanks in no small part to the rampant Cartesianism in Western society!). But if that is the case, there is, as Frege notes, no such thing as an "objective idea" at all, for, by definition, each idea strictly belongs to a subject "I". This goes back to the original definition of "subjective" which you did not opt for, that is, a thing which is rooted in the mind. You opted for the more popular, less philosophical definition of "that which is uninfluenced by personal ideas or values."

Perhaps you can see, then, how these words become confused when you use then so fluidly! But let us try to follow both Frege and you on this. You can say, in some way, that the idea of the apple, though completely and totally yours and in no way mine (regardless of how similar our ideas are), is "objective" in that it is uninfluenced by your personal value system. If you wish to use the words this way, then by all means, confirm this, but in doing so, we are still leaving another idea undefined. Imagine the apple on the table is red. Whether or not you have seen the apple and have the idea, it is certainly red. The apple exists as it does in and of itself. I have been saying throughout this entire thread that it is objectively red, but I cannot say this with you, because you have defined the words "objective" and "subjective" with complete reference to our ideas about them. But what if I want to speak of things in and of themselves and not our ideas about them? Unless you are an Idealist, you certainly must acknowledge that things exist independently of our minds!

Perhaps, then, we can call them "things in and of themselves" as opposed to "things as we perceive them"? The latter of these would be an epistemological issue, and there we would use the words "objective" and "subjective" as you have so defined them. Further, the word "idea" would be limited ONLY to the second phrase. As you have defined the words, "things in and of themselves" would be neither objective (as nothing in and of itself is "influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice") nor subjective (as nothing in and of itself is "modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background") and finally nothing in and of itself is an idea, since ideas only exist in our minds.

With all this said, there is another way to use "idea", but then we would have to define the Thomistic system of thought, and for our purposes neither of these systems ultimately matter. All I am trying to do is establish a framework by which we can make the proper distinctions in our words--that is, where we can use our signs to point to the same references!

waynepii wrote:

Jac3510 wrote:

waynepii wrote:I said "I wouldn't use "subjective" in cases of preference such as your blond/redhead example", but preferences ARE subjective. Sorry for the confusion.

OK, so we have one side of the equation done - preferences are subjective. Good. What about the reverse? Is it true that everything subjective is in some sense based on preference, given your definition above?

No, I think "subjective" is subject to experiences, "inertia" (it's always been that way), fears, and other factors in addition to preferences.

That's fair - so looking for a common denominator between all of these, can we agree that our experiences, our traditions, our fears, and our preferences (and still other factors!) all combine to make up our worldview? And in this case, when we say an idea is subjective, we are saying so because we are allowing some aspect of our worldview to modify or influence it? If so, then can we reduce this to the simple statement, "Everything subjective is in some sense based on our worldview"?

So the two words I've introduced are "worldview" and "things in and of themselves" as opposed to "things as they are perceived." The former is the compilation of our fears, experiences, prejudices, traditions, preferences, etc., whereas the latter two serve to distinguish between subjective/objective ideas and things in and of themselves apart from how we think about them. Hopefully, if I have come to understand how you are using all these words and am now using them in ways that you can agree with, then we can start applying them to the discussion at hand.

Thanks for your patience!

I understand what you are saying, though I am having trouble understanding why they need to be said. Why not start to make your point and if some of these issues come up, it should be easy to clarify them at that point. Remember, I am looking for a clear, concise, reliable, and repeatable means of determining what objective morality's "verdict" is on any given issue.

I understand what you are saying, though I am having trouble understanding why they need to be said.

I'll tell you the same thing I told my wife when I was tutoring her in philosophy: you have to know your abc's before you can spell. She would complain and complain that the concepts we were talking about weren't relevant, not understanding that in order to get to the relevant concepts, we needed to get the foundational ones first.

All this needs to be said because you have consistently misunderstood the argument that ALL of us here have been making for a long time now. So we are laying the foundations by YOUR standards so that I can cast the argument that in YOUR terms. Basically, we are having to redefine pretty much every word to use them as you want to rather than use them as they are normally used in this field. Now, that's fine, and I don't mind doing it. I don't care what words we use. I care about the MEANING. I think we've managed to get that established.

Why not start to make your point and if some of these issues come up, it should be easy to clarify them at that point.

We tried that for how many pages? That's why we have to define our terms FIRST.

Remember, I am looking for a clear, concise, reliable, and repeatable means of determining what objective morality's "verdict" is on any given issue.

Which means about as much as asking me to draw a circle without a drawing utensil. Epistemological questions are answered using vocabulary defined by ontology. If, then, you have one ontology and I have another, it is IMPOSSIBLE to answer your epistemological question. That is why we are doing the hard, but necessary work, of getting to a common ontology.

NOW

I think we've managed to achieve the bulk of that, and I'm going to assume from this response that you have agreed with my last post. In that case, it should not be very difficult to press forward. We have now gotten a common vocabulary, let us look at the methodology we will use to answer your question:

1. Proper vocab (check)
2. Moral ontology and and metaphysical implications(next)
3. Moral epistemology and methodological implications(last)

With that said, let us examine (2). I am interested in looking at what morality is as a thing in and of itself. As such, I am not interested in our ideas about it, be they objective or subjective, as those questions fall under (3). In general, I want to ask you a few questions:

Remembering that the word "wrong" only refers to that which is inconsistent with a code of conduct based on a society's foundational value system:

1. Is there anything INHERENTLY wrong about slavery, rape, or torture?

Please note what I am NOT asking you. I know that YOU THINK it is wrong based on YOUR code of conduct that is consistent with YOUR value system (which is, presumably, a value system we both adhere to!). I am asking if murder, in and of itself, apart from our ideas about it, is necessarily inconsistent with ALL codes of conduct and ALL foundational value systems. Or, on the other hand, is it possible for a society to embrace a value system (ethic) that would translate into a code of conduct that would permit murder, thus, by your definition, rendering it "right"?

Implications:

It should be clear to you that no action is, in and of itself, right and wrong. All actions, BY YOUR DEFINITIONS, are right and wrong relative to the culture in which they are performed. YOU said that an action is right if it is consistent with a society's code of conduct, and a society's code of conduct comes from its foundational values.

Now, the word "inherently" points to the nature of the thing itself, in our case, the nature of right and wrong. Thus, by your definitions, since right and wrong are "inherently relative", we can say that ontologically speaking morality is relative. There can be no absolute morality by your definitions.

2. Is there anything INHERENTLY foundational about any given value, such as, for example, the equality of all men?

Please note what I am NOT asking you. I know that YOU THINK the equality of all men is foundational (which is, presumably, a value we both adhere to!). I am asking if the equality of all men, in and of itself, apart from our ideas about it, is necessarily foundational in ALL societies. Or, on the other hand, is it possible for a society to embrace a value system (ethic) contrary to the equality of all men?

Implications:

It should be clear to you that no value is, in and of itself, foundational. All ethics, BY YOUR DEFINITIONS, are relative to the culture that establishes then. YOU said that a value is foundational if a society establishes it, yet there seems to be nothing preventing any given society from embracing one value system over another as foundational.

Now, the word "inherently" points to the nature of the thing itself, in our case, the nature of foundational values. Thus, by your definitions, since these values "inherently relative", we can say that ontologically speaking ethics are relative. There can be no absolutely foundational value by your definitions.

So we reach this tentative conclusion: if the words "right", "wrong", "morality", and "ethics" are defined with respect to society, then all morality and value systems are non-absolute and completely relative. Thus, I CANNOT say "X is wrong." I can, in fact, only say, "X is wrong relative to this culture; but X is right relative to that culture."

I agree. I've said right along that societies establish their own codes of conduct, and that most get refined over time.

OK, so then you agree that murder is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG. Rape is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG. Torture is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG.

Therefore, you have come to agree with the first premise in the moral argument for God's existence, which is the original statement that you FIRST DISAGREED WITH:

Allow me to quote you:

You wrote:Or are you claiming a given act can only be "evil" (or "heinous", or "wrong", or ... ) given the existence of God? THAT I strongly disagree with.

When I said that something can only be "evil" or "heinous" or "wrong," I mean it in the sense of INHERENTLY evil, heinous, or wrong. If God does not exist, then no act can be inherently wrong, as you've now admitted.

Remember what the moral argument actually says:

1. If God does not exist, objective morality (that is, inherent right and wrong) cannot exist;
2. But objective morality does exist (that is, things are inherently right and wrong);
3. Therefore, God exists.

You have come to agree with (1). Now, I actually believe that you would agree with (2) as well, but it would take the same kind of discussion we've been having for the last, what, month or two now? In any case, it only took eight pages to get you to see what we mean when we say that right and wrong cannot exist (inherently speaking) if God does not exist.

Go back and reread the whole thread if you have time. Whenever I, or Byblos, or J, or anyone, used the word or phrase "objective morality," we were NOT using it in an epistemological sense of "not influenced by personal ideas." We were using it, as we said the entire time, in the sense of rooted outside of the mind; that is, what something is in and of itself; that is, what something is inherently. You can see, then, that objective morality, in that sense, CANNOT EXIST if God does not exist.

I would like to press you on (2), as that now becomes the crux of the matter. Before I launch into evidence on why I believe that you DO believe things are inherently wrong, let me just ask you an emotional question first, with the full acknowledgment of the fact that this is hardly intended to be a positive argument:

Are you truly prepared to say that, in some cultures, that murder, rape, torture, and slavery are actually the morally RIGHT thing to do and that, in fact, in those cultures, to not murder, rape, torture, or embrace slavery would be morally WRONG (relative to that culture)? Are you REALLY okay with that? Would you REALLY be okay with people murdering one another because it was the RIGHT thing to do? Would you stand up and defend them and say what they were doing was RIGHT if it was consistent with THEIR fundamental value system? By that, I mean would you actually stand up and say that, while murder may be wrong for YOU, it is perfectly acceptable for THEM? Would you be that intellectually honest with your position?

Jac3510 wrote:OK, so then you agree that murder is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG. Rape is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG. Torture is NOT INHERENTLY WRONG.

Therefore, you have come to agree with the first premise in the moral argument for God's existence, which is the original statement that you FIRST DISAGREED WITH:

Allow me to quote you:

You wrote:Or are you claiming a given act can only be "evil" (or "heinous", or "wrong", or ... ) given the existence of God? THAT I strongly disagree with.

When I said that something can only be "evil" or "heinous" or "wrong," I mean it in the sense of INHERENTLY evil, heinous, or wrong. If God does not exist, then no act can be inherently wrong, as you've now admitted.

You're putting words in my mouth - what I said was

Me wrote:Or are you claiming a given act can only be "evil" (or "heinous", or "wrong", or ... ) given the existence of God? THAT I strongly disagree with.

conspicuous by its absence is the word "inherent". My point of view has not changed, although my expression of it may have been refined a bit. That point of view is ...

• Morality is defined by society
• There is a fairly reliable "moral compass" that can be used to evaluate various societies' moralities - namely the GR.
• Morality tends to evolve over time, generally becoming more in line with the GR over time.

Remember what the moral argument actually says:

1. If God does not exist, objective morality (that is, inherent right and wrong) cannot exist;
2. But objective morality does exist (that is, things are inherently right and wrong);
3. Therefore, God exists.

You have come to agree with (1).

Not true. For a truly objective morality to exist, it would have to be based on something external to us. I have not "come to agree" with this, it is and always has been obvious. I have always said that right and wrong have been defined by society. And the GR, of course.

Now, I actually believe that you would agree with (2) as well, but it would take the same kind of discussion we've been having for the last, what, month or two now? In any case, it only took eight pages to get you to see what we mean when we say that right and wrong cannot exist (inherently speaking) if God does not exist.

Go back and reread the whole thread if you have time. Whenever I, or Byblos, or J, or anyone, used the word or phrase "objective morality," we were NOT using it in an epistemological sense of "not influenced by personal ideas." We were using it, as we said the entire time, in the sense of rooted outside of the mind; that is, what something is in and of itself; that is, what something is inherently. You can see, then, that objective morality, in that sense, CANNOT EXIST if God does not exist.

Some of the refinement in my expression of my point of view came about as I realized what you (collectively) meant by terms such as "objective morality", sorry for the confusion.

I would like to press you on (2), as that now becomes the crux of the matter. Before I launch into evidence on why I believe that you DO believe things are inherently wrong, let me just ask you an emotional question first, with the full acknowledgment of the fact that this is hardly intended to be a positive argument:

Are you truly prepared to say that, in some cultures, that murder, rape, torture, and slavery are actually the morally RIGHT thing to do and that, in fact, in those cultures, to not murder, rape, torture, or embrace slavery would be morally WRONG (relative to that culture)? Are you REALLY okay with that? Would you REALLY be okay with people murdering one another because it was the RIGHT thing to do? Would you stand up and defend them and say what they were doing was RIGHT if it was consistent with THEIR fundamental value system? By that, I mean would you actually stand up and say that, while murder may be wrong for YOU, it is perfectly acceptable for THEM? Would you be that intellectually honest with your position?

Minor point, the term "murder" is judgmental - if I "murder" someone, I have violated society's dictums. I assume you meant "kill", correct? (Currently, killing is considered acceptable in certain circumstances in all societies - self defense, capital punishment, wars, etc. The "acceptable" circumstances are defined by society. As to whether our society's allowable circumstances are justifiable or not is a topic for another discussion, for now let's just accept them as they are).

Am I "OK" about a society that considers killing, rape, torture, and slavery morally RIGHT? Of course not. By MY society's code, and my personal code such things are wrong, and I would (and have) endeavor to cause the society in question to evolve their code to be more in line with most contemporary codes of conduct.

Wayne,

Are you saying that without your societal codes you wouldn't KNOW that murder is wrong? Did someone have to sit you down as a child and specifically explain to you that murder was wrong?

Morality is defined by society
There is a fairly reliable "moral compass" that can be used to evaluate various societies' moralities - namely the GR.
Morality tends to evolve over time, generally becoming more in line with the GR over time.

Is the GR an actual thing, or an idea?
What is a moral compass?

Morality tends to evolve over time, generally becoming more in line with the GR over time.

Seems to me that immorality is at an all time high. I'd like to see some evidence of your claim.

waynepii wrote:You're putting words in my mouth - what I said was

Me wrote:Or are you claiming a given act can only be "evil" (or "heinous", or "wrong", or ... ) given the existence of God? THAT I strongly disagree with.

conspicuous by its absence is the word "inherent". My point of view has not changed, although my expression of it may have been refined a bit. That point of view is ...

• Morality is defined by society
• There is a fairly reliable "moral compass" that can be used to evaluate various societies' moralities - namely the GR.
• Morality tends to evolve over time, generally becoming more in line with the GR over time.

Understood. What I am telling you is that my original statement presumed "inherent". That's why we had to have the long discussion, because YOU used the word differently, just as you used the word "objective" differently. Now, I don't care if you want to use the words differently. Fine. We can use YOUR words. The fact is that NOTHING CAN BE INHERENTLY WRONG IF GOD DOES NOT EXIST.

Not true. For a truly objective morality to exist, it would have to be based on something external to us. I have not "come to agree" with this, it is and always has been obvious. I have always said that right and wrong have been defined by society. And the GR, of course.

Read closer, Wayne. I strictly defined "objective" in terms of being "inherent." Let me state the argument AGAIN using YOUR words:

1. If God does not exist, things cannot be inherently right or wrong
2. But things are inherently right and wrong
3. Therefore, God exists.

Now, you have come to agree with (1), which is the original claim that I made that you disagreed with, apparently because you were unfamiliar with the way the word is commonly used in philosophical and theological circles.

[/quote]Some of the refinement in my expression of my point of view came about as I realized what you (collectively) meant by terms such as "objective morality", sorry for the confusion.[/quote]
That's why I wanted to have the discussion about what words MEAN. No apologies necessary. What is necessary is that we be sure we are speaking the same language.

Minor point, the term "murder" is judgmental - if I "murder" someone, I have violated society's dictums. I assume you meant "kill", correct? (Currently, killing is considered acceptable in certain circumstances in all societies - self defense, capital punishment, wars, etc. The "acceptable" circumstances are defined by society. As to whether our society's allowable circumstances are justifiable or not is a topic for another discussion, for now let's just accept them as they are).

Am I "OK" about a society that considers killing, rape, torture, and slavery morally RIGHT? Of course not. By MY society's code, and my personal code such things are wrong, and I would (and have) endeavor to cause the society in question to evolve their code to be more in line with most contemporary codes of conduct.

No, I didn't mean "kill." I meant "murder" and every other word I used. I was referring to that which we consider to be murder.

Let me give you a concrete example. I live in the south (in Atlanta, GA). Suppose I am treated rather poorly by a black customer service representative at a local store. Suppose, then, I go home, get my gun, return to the store, and kill him on the basis that blacks ought to be killed. You and everyone around me would be horrified. Not only did I commit murder, but (arguably worse) I did it out of racist overtones. My action, and my attitude, were WRONG even by your definition of the word.

However, suppose we now go to a country where racism is extolled as a foundational virtue. There, to kill a man of another race if he mistreats you is considered an upright thing to do, for it proves the superiority of your own race. Now, by your definitions, if I do precisely the same thing there, it is not wrong. It is, in fact, RIGHT.

Now, YOU say that BASED ON YOUR CULTURE, you think it is wrong (and certainly, it would be, based on American values). What I am asking is if you are prepared to defend my right to commit the act that you personally consider to be MURDER so long as it happens in my culture as me having done the RIGHT thing? If not, why not? If so, I want you to admit here and now that what the Nazis did to the Jews was NOT WRONG, that it was RIGHT in THEIR CULTURE. If you want to preface that with, "Well, according to American culture, it was wrong, but . . ." then fine. But if you are going to be consistent, then I want to see you defend the Holocaust as being morally acceptable according to Nazi ethics.

Well done Jac !
-
-
-