Posted: Fri Oct 14, 2005 3:22 pm
Relativism boils down to good and evil not existing-they are just handy constructs made my man to make himself feel good or something like that.
"The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands." (Psalm 19:1)
https://discussions.godandscience.org/
Thanks Forge, welcome back.Forge wrote:And since they are, according to Relativism, man-made, thay can be man-unmade. So why have laws in the first place?
Correct?
By the way Bgood, I haven't met you before. Welcome!
The scenario you presented does nothing to say morals are "relative" though. By the very fact your scenario presents a "moral dilemma" does not signify morals are relative. If anything they signify Forge has run into a dilemma where two moral values he can't help but to believe "absolutely" exist, clash with each other. Therefore he has to trade off which absolute value is less important than the other. By the very fact he has to go through this process of weighing which absolute value is more important than another, does not so much as prove moral relativity, but if anything further provides evidence that we consider them to be "absolute".BGoodForGoodSake wrote:However in this case it is too personal so the train and everyone on it is doomed to destruction.Forge wrote:This is hard. I would like to say, because we are not obligated to perform a wrong action for good ends, that I would not push the man... but...
This is crux of the matter. This is the origin of moral-relativism.
Not that I am a proponent, only trying to provoke thought and understanding.
You're right! In this account, moral relativism doesn't make sence, I was speaking from the point of an athiest evolutionist.AttentionKMartShoppers wrote:But, BGood, what you're saying...assumes that anarchy is bad, society is good...so relativism still doesn't make sense-since it supposes certain things to be good and bad...seconds before claiming the opposite
You are quite right, I need to think harder to see through the eyes of a moral relativist. Let me sleep on this one.Kurieuo wrote:The scenario you presented does nothing to say morals are "relative" though. By the very fact your scenario presents a "moral dilemma" does not signify morals are relative. If anything they signify Forge has run into a dilemma where two moral values he can't help but to believe "absolutely" exist, clash with each other. Therefore he has to trade off which absolute value is less important than the other. By the very fact he has to go through this process of weighing which absolute value is more important than another, does not so much as prove moral relativity, but if anything further provides evidence that we consider them to be "absolute".BGoodForGoodSake wrote:However in this case it is too personal so the train and everyone on it is doomed to destruction.Forge wrote:This is hard. I would like to say, because we are not obligated to perform a wrong action for good ends, that I would not push the man... but...
This is crux of the matter. This is the origin of moral-relativism.
Not that I am a proponent, only trying to provoke thought and understanding.
Kurieuo
If I may help a little, I'm not sure if there may be some confusion as to what "moral relativism" you were originally advocating. I've found there are two understandings of moral relativism, and they often get equivocated.BGoodForGoodSake wrote:You are quite right, I need to think harder to see through the eyes of a moral relativist. Let me sleep on this one.
Am I right in calling this philosophy "strict morals, flexible applications"?Kurieuo wrote:One understanding is that one can only make moral judgements "relative" to a given situtation. This is because situations differ, such as the situations you presented to Forge. Sometimes this is what I've found people mean by "moral relativism", and I personally have no problem with this concept, for in moral dilemmas decisions become blurred and will likely differ to a situation not involving as much or no moral dilemma.
I think you grasp the general idea of what I mean. I would perhaps re-phrase it though as, "absolute moral values, relative applications". Where by "absolute" I advocate moral values existing unchangingly, and by "relative applications" I mean they are applied relative to a particular situation.Forge wrote:Am I right in calling this philosophy "strict morals, flexible applications"?Kurieuo wrote:One understanding is that one can only make moral judgements "relative" to a given situtation. This is because situations differ, such as the situations you presented to Forge. Sometimes this is what I've found people mean by "moral relativism", and I personally have no problem with this concept, for in moral dilemmas decisions become blurred and will likely differ to a situation not involving as much or no moral dilemma.
Now I see "moral values" as being raw qualities such as "honor", "nobility", "respect", "honesty", "kindness", "bravery" and so forth, which everyone seems to recognise as good (and if they didn't, we would perhaps call them morally corrupt). What we see in the Hudson Bay example, is a different application due to beliefs held, but what seems apparent is that the values you and I would identify as good appear to remain the same.Facts are descriptive, answering the question, What is the case? A fetus is or isn't human. Euthanasia is or isn't an example of murder. Values, on the other hand, are prescriptive, answering the question, "What ought to be the case? One ought not murder. Life ought to be more important than choice.
Unjusified killing of human beings (murder) has been wrong in every culture at every time in history; what has changed is the concept of justification. Hitler justified killing Jews because he considered them subhuman. In the Hudson Bay tribes, children strangled their own parents as an act of kindness instead of letting them live to what they saw as an unproductive old age. "Dying for the sake of the group was a point of honor in these tribes." They underlying moral rule that it is noble to die for the welfare of many is one all cultures share. Indeed, that's what soldiers do." (Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-air).
But this is semantics.Kurieuo wrote:You may have noticed that whereas you used "morals" in giving a title to the philosophy, I used "moral values". To take your "murder" case, you a right it now has to be determine whether X was murder. And this involves knowing facts about the world and the circumstance the killing took place within. For example, would strangling your parents be murder? I've heard tribes in Hudson Bay would strangle their parents once they got too old. Children had an obligation to perform this ritual act and if an elder had no children to perform this duty, the custom was to request the service from friends. Refusal was viewed as a humiliation for the person making the request for dying for the sake of the group was a point of honor in these tribes.
Does this mean morals really are relative? No. I see that apparent moral differences often only represent differences in perception of the facts of a circumstance and not a conflict in the values themselves. To quote Gregory Koukl (where I obtained the Hudson Bay tribe example from):Now I see "moral values" as being raw qualities such as "honor", "nobility", "respect", "honesty", "kindness", "bravery" and so forth, which everyone seems to recognise as good (and if they didn't, we would perhaps call them morally corrupt). What we see in the Hudson Bay example, is a different application due to beliefs held, but what seems apparent is that the values you and I would identify as good appear to remain the same.Facts are descriptive, answering the question, What is the case? A fetus is or isn't human. Euthanasia is or isn't an example of murder. Values, on the other hand, are prescriptive, answering the question, "What ought to be the case? One ought not murder. Life ought to be more important than choice.
Unjusified killing of human beings (murder) has been wrong in every culture at every time in history; what has changed is the concept of justification. Hitler justified killing Jews because he considered them subhuman. In the Hudson Bay tribes, children strangled their own parents as an act of kindness instead of letting them live to what they saw as an unproductive old age. "Dying for the sake of the group was a point of honor in these tribes." They underlying moral rule that it is noble to die for the welfare of many is one all cultures share. Indeed, that's what soldiers do." (Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-air).
Kurieuo