Piper's attempt to get around this problem is quite comical. He refers back to Ex. 7:3-4: And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you, that I may lay my hand upon Egypt, and bring forth mine armies, and my people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great judgments. From this Piper concludes that any time thereafter, simply because God predicts the conjunction of Himself hardening Pharaoh's heart and Pharaoh not listening, that verses like Ex. 9:34-35 (And when Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants. And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, neither would he let the children of Israel go; as the LORD had spoken by Moses.), which refer to Pharaoh hardening his OWN heart -- as well as any that do not specify who did the hardening -- MUST actually mean that God did the hardening, not Pharaoh! It apparently does not occur to Piper that in such cases as 8:15 ("But when Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardened his heart, and hearkened not unto them; as the LORD had said.") the reference is simply to the "hearkening" aspect and not the hardening aspect. It is notable that Calvinists who argue about what the text "clearly" says are so hesitant to take what the text "clearly" says here at face value! (In fact, the way Miller describes it fits a perfect "reversal" of prevenient grace, and the “circle dance” of grace. Piper rightly does say that Yahweh's hand was even in Pharaoh's own hardening from the beginning; but not in a way that he believes, creating open contradiction in the text in the process. God does indeed have the ultimate discretion; but as before, this merely significantly subordinates rather than eliminates the human role.)
Moo's own attempt to answer this point is not contrived (though he footnotes to Piper on the explanation for Pharaoh hardening his own heart!), but does not really answer the point. It is agreed that "hardening" refers to an action of God that "renders a person insensitive to God and his word" [597] and that if not reversed, leads to eternal damnation. It is also agreed that God bestows mercy on His own initiative. Where the line is drawn is in the claim by Calvinists that God hardens some people such that He NEVER even offers them His mercy, or allows them a chance to accept it (though arguably, this might be done with respect to persons whom God foreknows would never accept His mercy to begin with). That can not be drawn from Paul by any means. Nor, despite Moo, is it ever said that God is "constrained" to only harden those who harden themselves first; only rather that such hardening is not done with the whim or declarative arbitrariness of the Calvinist paradigm. Moo also attempts to avoid the force of 11:25 by this time indeed contriving a "vital distinction between the individual and corporate perspectives" [599] -- if hardening is reversed on a national scale, then obviously, it MUST be reversed to some degree upon individuals. Moreover, if the "corporate card" is played, then even Moo agrees that "all Israel will be saved" in 11:26 does not mean every individual Israelite -- and there is still nothing in Paul that delivers the "why" of the hardenings. The retort that Paul says God "hardens whom he wishes" makes for the same Calvinist conundrum as the other question, "why choose this person and not the other".
19Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? 20Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?
As Esler notes, this is an answer "at the level of theological principle" and he rightly implies that it is not convincing -- for it is not an answer to the question posed. It is, as we have explained via Wilson, a way of telling men they have no right to complain. And as Morris [364] says: "Paul anticipates the question his reader will ask, but he does not answer them....Paul is saying that the questions we ask are illegitimate questions, and he lets it go at that." (emphasis added) Byrne [298] agrees: "Again, it has to be said that this hardly answers the difficulty posed, which concerned God's 'blaming' in a context where human responsibility has been suppressed. Moreover, human beings are not simply lifeless, passive clay." Cranfield [2/490] concurs as well: "But to assume that [Paul's] intention is to assert the absolute right of an indeterminate divine over the creature is to ignore the tenor of the arguments of chapter 9 to 11, not to mention the rest of the epistle." No "logic". Nor is logical response warranted: The question is like blaming one's mother for putting a cookie jar within reach so that cookies can be stolen. It is the classic "stupid question", itself internally inconsistent, for the question itself is a mild form of "resistance" against God. It is the answer to Job from the whirlwind (as Byrne even says: "The image is brought forward simply to illustrate and evoke a basic biblical dogma -- one emerging above all from the book of Job"): "What do you know, little man? What right do you have to correct me?" Byrne thus adds: "It is quite misguided to press out of the homely image more wide-ranging theological conclusions" such as Double Presdestination. Mounce [199] agrees, in his comments on 9:10-13: "Paul was not building a case for salvation that in no way involves the consent of the individual. Nor was he teaching double predestination. Rather he was arguing that the exclusion of so many Jews from the family of God did not constitute a failure on God's part to maintain his covenant relationship with Israel." He notes further from Achtemeier a common failute to distinguish between predeterminism (every thought and act is dictated by forces beyond our control) and predestination (setting of the final outcome with no determination of the route). This is just as well as our differentiation between Calvinist determinism and primary causality.
Piper is indeed on the right track when he sees that Paul is replying to those who object that if God hardens people to do His will, then it seems unjust that God blames them. But as noted, the Calvinist answer of determinism of any sort isn't at all found in these texts. Paul nowhere describes how human freedom and God's freedom interact. And as noted above, the model of Pharaoh actually fits better a negative model of prevenient grace. None of this will be answered by calling commentators like Morris and Cranfield "desperate sinners" somehow out to "evade" the "clear truth" of this blindsliding passage.
21 Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?
As I have noted, I perceive a certain unwarranted extreme in what some Calvinist writers offer in this context. White sums up in one of many ways by saying, "One is not a Potter who has no role in determining the shape, function, and destiny of the pots." [Whit.PF, 71] I would say, "One is not a Potter who does not have the determinative role in deciding the shape, function, and destiny of the pots," and freeing the pots to whatever extent to become, of their free choice, of a certain shape or function that suits the Potter's will and purpose, is itself a sovereign decision that, as far as I can see, robs the Potter of no glory whatsoever, especially since the pots would owe whatever freedom they do have to the Potter's free and sovereign decision to release them. The analogy breaks down inevitably, since pots do not make decisions (and there was no metaphor available for Paul that would express the point, since there exists no other creation-Creator relationship in which free choices can be found). The only Calvinist answer I have had to this posits such contrivances that one could "boast" of accepting a free handout, which is behaviorally absurd!
It should be noted that other uses of a "potter analogy" in Scripture readily imply that it is not merely that "pots are pots" as White says, but that the pottery has been given the free will to rebel:
Is. 29:15-17 Woe unto them that seek deep to hide their counsel from the LORD, and their works are in the dark, and they say, Who seeth us? and who knoweth us? 16Surely your turning of things upside down shall be esteemed as the potter's clay: for shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? or shall the thing framed say of him that framed it, He had no understanding?
White [44] comments on the "absurdity" of this act by men, and he is right; but he stretches the analogy past intent, thereby failing to heed Chrysostom's advice to not "apply all the details of such an illustration indiscriminately." [2/491] These analogies comment only on the superiority of God to man; to take it further -- to suppose that men are also like pots in the sense of being unable to make any decisions at all, even within a system where God has permitted it -- is unwarranted. How can White escape the force of fatalism? As Morris notes, quoting Barrett: "To stress this point, however, is to emphasize a detail in the analogy instead of the major comparison, which is between the final responsibility of the potter for what he produces, and the final responsibility of God for what he does in history." [365-6n] And Bruce [Br.Rom, 178-9] adds: "It may be granted that the analogy of a potter and his pots covers one aspect only of the Creator's relation to those whom he has created, especially to human beings, created in his own image. Pots are not made in the potter's image, and they do not in any case answer him back or find fault with his workmanship." Indeed, the "image" point is all the stronger if we understand that it means that God gave men stewardship over His creation. What potter does such a thing to his pots? The point is that God is not answerable to us [184] but can be "relied on to act in consistency with his character," so that we have no grouds at all to question His ways.
Piper [184] also stretches the analogy for his purposes, arguing that one might argue for distinctive quality as a factor had Paul spoken of “different” lumps of clay and not the same lump! But this is a false analogy. Ancient people would hardly have distinguished between the qualities of clay in such a manner; one lump would be the same as another, and a potter would get all his “lumps” from the same quarry. The distinctive already lays in how the pots are molded; and thus Piper as much admits that distinctives have a role, despite himself.
22What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction:
Paul's comment here is an answer direct to one of the issues Esler identifies: "How can the Jews now be in disfavor, what with the Temple, their political power, etc.?" The Calvinist thus again is misdirected in saying that the point is that "sinners" are in view. They are not, except in the general sense we have noted; Paul's direct target is present-day unbelieving Jews who think their success spells blessing. But even if we expand the principle allowably, nothing in this verse says a word about when and how "vessels of wrath" are designated in God's economy. It is as well to say that they are designated at the primarily causal level.
Morris [368] points out that commentators have varied on how the vessels are "fitted" -- by themselves, by God, by some combination, even by Satan (!). Morris believes that the grammar and comparison to the next verse best fits with people fitting themselves for destruction, perhaps with help from Satan.
23And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, 24Even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles?
Paul now draws a direct (and threatening!) parallel between the example of Pharaoh and the non-believing Jews of his day: "Watch out! You could be disbelieving because you're a sign to everyone else!" But now for a critical turning point: For it is at this point that our thesis of interpretation comes into most clear focus -- and ironically, TPF, the flagship for popular Calvinism, drops off at this verse -- commenting hereafter only on v. 32. But look:
25As he saith also in Osee, I will call them my people, which were not my people; and her beloved, which was not beloved. 26And it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people; there shall they be called the children of the living God.
The appeal to Hosea 2:23 and 1:10 fits hand in glove with our premise. "Mercy" and "compassion" versus "wrath" have been all about the distinction between "my people" and "not my people."
27Esaias also crieth concerning Israel, Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved: 28For he will finish the work, and cut it short in righteousness: because a short work will the Lord make upon the earth. 29And as Esaias said before, Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodoma, and been made like unto Gomorrha.
Paul now provides further probabilty-evidence that it was already predicted that only a small number out of a people who thought themselves covenant-protected would be saved from wrath. This answers the "numbers" argument.
30What shall we say then? That the Gentiles, which followed not after righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. 31But Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. 32Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law. For they stumbled at that stumblingstone; 33As it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumblingstone and rock of offence: and whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed.
As we have noted, the Calvinist seizes on verses 16 and 18 for the point that God's showing of mercy to specific persons in a manner wholly independent of the person's attributes or conduct. But then what of Romans 9:32, which explains that biological Israel has not attained righteousness "because they sought it not by faith but as it were by the works of the law"? Faith, as we have noted elsewhere, contextually means loyalty within the client-patron relationship. Verse 32 suggests that the mercy -- the fulfilling of obligations -- was withheld by God because of Israel's attributes or conduct, that is, the wrong way of seeking righteousness. Romans 9:16 becomes a statement that God will fulfill His obligations (decided of His own sovereign accord) to those with whom He has a relationship, and verse 18 adds that God will harden those with whom He has no relationship, who are not His clients.
Esler here moreover makes a critical point, acting as a corrective to Sanders' claim that Paul misrepresents Judaism of his day as "works-righteousness" oriented [283]. Paul's intent, he reads, is to say that Israel failed to obtain righteousness because, after Christ came, "they persisted with the law route rather than moving to the faith route." And this fits precisely with my earlier point: That not recognizing Christ (per Deut. 18) put non-Christian views into the position of being in rebellion to the covenant.
Our conclusion thus is that Calvinists are guilty of what Edwards [236] describes as "channeling the river of providence into a straight and shallow sluiceway of theory."
