Evidence for God from Science

Jac3510 wrote:Dom, it's widely agreed that Hilbert's paradox isn't logically self-contradictory. It's just strongly counter-intuitive, but counter-intuitive is in no way the same as self-contradictory.

By who? Lets think about that again. An ad populum fallacy standing in front of an appeal to authority isn't going help here.

I strongly disagree with it ENTIRELY on the metaphysics. What kind of analysis do you want me to put on it? Calling "actual infinity" counter-intuitive is an understatement. If it does not obey the rules of arithmetic, it is NOT LOGICAL. Period.

Jac3510 wrote:Look, if you want to have a serious discussion, you need to recognize that your mere pronouncements don't amount to an argument, persuasive or otherwise. Calling me silly, discounting my views as nothing more than Humean, labeling the contrived, attributing motives, etc. . . . even if you are right, it doesn't prove your case, because you are just asserting. What it does is demonstrates a complete lack of interest (or ability) in engaging in ideas with which you disagree, amounting to little more than veiled personal attacks. I mean, if you want to be so shallow in your thinking, then fine, but just don't be surprised when people stop taking you seriously. You'll be like all the shallow minded atheists out there who are convinced that they're arguments are SO AMAZING that theists run and hide. And every time a theist quits talking to them, they become more convinced of the matter, when truth be told, we just all get tired of their mindless banter.

Jac, this is a serious discussion. You're taking this WAY too personal. We're both theists here, believe in the same God, etc. However, asserting that it is even POSSIBLE or PROBABLE that an infinite set theory ACTUALLY EXISTS in REALITY is silly for an empiricist.

I incorporate some strict empiricism philosophy. Yet, how do you accept this?

Look at my angle on this (shorthanded)

There is first and foremost, I have no reason to believe anything exists because I am NOT perfect. Yet, I have the idea of another mind other then my own that has ALL possible perfections (God), and my existence (mental substance) is contingent upon that single perfect mind.
If I stop right here, I would be a solipsist or some sort of existentialist in the very least. I can only be certain that my imperfect mental substance and God exists.
Yet, I continue. In order to believe that there is a reality outside of my own mind and what I may suggest exists outside of my mind (spatial extension). Aside from my mind and his perfect mind, God MUST BE the foundation to my knowledge of reality.
God has a NECESSARY CONNECTION that the supposed perceptions of my senses along with rules of math and logic are, REAL.
It is necessary to believe in God's truth in order to maintain that I can examine reality WITH confidence
Mathematics are exclusive, narrow, and absolute. Actual infinites do not follow the rules of mathematics.
Therefore, they DO NOT exist in the REALITY that God has created. NECESSARY CONNECTION!
If Actual infinites do EXIST in reality, then God is a deceiver. NECESSARY CONNECTION!

Jac3510 wrote:Your positions are defensible, Dom. The school you represent is respectable. I disagree with it, but it's respectable. You, however, disrespect it and those you disagree with when you conduct yourself as you are doing. A little humility is in order for all of us. I'm as guilty as sin when it comes to polemics and bald assertions, and I'm the first say that when I fall into that, I'm at my poorest.

Now, if you'd like to have a serious conversation about anything, I'm perfectly open to it. My wife is going out of town, so I'll have some time to do the time thread, for instance. But if you continue your history of calling ideas silly and making broad assertions, as if highly refined positions can be so easily dismissed, then I promise you it won't last long.

Jac, you're again taking this far too personal. The KCA is a philosophical proof. Empirical science, as you've demonstrated quite nicely, breaks down in trying to solve this puzzle. This however doesn't mean you should give up, shrug your shoulders and go "Probably". Thats just apathetic.

Jac3510 wrote:You do realize that Aquinas was an empiricist, right? And besides, do you even understand the definition of motus?

I know he is.

Motus? What of it? Are you going to argue metaphysics misrepresented? Motion has NO NECESSARY CONNECTION to anything else moving in empirical epistemology. None at all. Calling it the first motion does NOT matter.

I can see the motion. I cannot see the "Has to".

There is no "HAS TO" in gravity holding us down to the ground. None whatsoever.
Ball "A" in motion approaching Ball "B", making contact with Ball "B", and Ball "B" Moving". There is no HAS TO to its movement. None whatsoever.

domokunrox wrote: strongly disagree with it ENTIRELY on the metaphysics. What kind of analysis do you want me to put on it? Calling "actual infinity" counter-intuitive is an understatement. If it does not obey the rules of arithmetic, it is NOT LOGICAL. Period.

Then demonstrate it. Don't just assert it.

Jac, this is a serious discussion. You're taking this WAY too personal. We're both theists here, believe in the same God, etc. However, asserting that it is even POSSIBLE or PROBABLE that an infinite set theory ACTUALLY EXISTS in REALITY is silly for an empiricist.

It's not a serious discussion when you spend more time on personal attacks than you do interacting with ideas presented. It reduces to a rather boring game of rhetoric and sophistry.

I incorporate some strict empiricism philosophy. Yet, how do you accept this?

Look at my angle on this (shorthanded)

There is first and foremost, I have no reason to believe anything exists because I am NOT perfect. Yet, I have the idea of another mind other then my own that has ALL possible perfections (God), and my existence (mental substance) is contingent upon that single perfect mind.

You've already gone too far. What makes you think there is a mental substance? Descartes' "I think therefore I am" fails, because he assumes there is an "I" that is doing the thinking. If he were going to be consistent, he should have said, "There are thoughts" and stopped there. There is very little we can profit from via Descartes, except to learn what not to do.

His mistake, which is the same you seem to be making here, was to require logical/mathematical certainty for accepting a posteriori statements ("what-statements" in classical philosophy). I can forgive him for that, since he was a mathematician by trade and training. That was his mode of thinking. I can't forgive modern philosophers or philosophers in training for it, because they aren't mathematical geniuses (usually).

If I stop right here, I would be a solipsist or some sort of existentialist in the very least. I can only be certain that my imperfect mental substance and God exists.

Based on the argument you've suggested so far, you can be sure of neither.

Yet, I continue. In order to believe that there is a reality outside of my own mind and what I may suggest exists outside of my mind (spatial extension). Aside from my mind and his perfect mind, God MUST BE the foundation to my knowledge of reality.
God has a NECESSARY CONNECTION that the supposed perceptions of my senses along with rules of math and logic are, REAL.
It is necessary to believe in God's truth in order to maintain that I can examine reality WITH confidence
Mathematics are exclusive, narrow, and absolute. Actual infinites do not follow the rules of mathematics.
Therefore, they DO NOT exist in the REALITY that God has created. NECESSARY CONNECTION!
If Actual infinites do EXIST in reality, then God is a deceiver. NECESSARY CONNECTION!

I disagree with almost every word of this. Why is idealism not an option? Assuming I grant the existence of God (which I wouldn't, based on your argument), why should I even assume He is good and would not want to deceive you? What makes you think that what you know is reality, anyway? You invent a non-deceiving God to justify your belief in an external reality, but why should that require God to actually create a reality? What's to say that God isn't just giving you a "real" experience. There are way, way, way too many assumptions here, most of them theistic in nature, and none of them warranted.

I would highly recommend you pick up Etienne Gilson's The Unity of Philosophical Experience. It would be well worth your time. Best of all, it's a very easy read, very enjoyable, and substantive to boot.

Jac, you're again taking this far too personal. The KCA is a philosophical proof. Empirical science, as you've demonstrated quite nicely, breaks down in trying to solve this puzzle. This however doesn't mean you should give up, shrug your shoulders and go "Probably". Thats just apathetic.

I'm not taking anything personally. I couldn't care less if we engage in these conversations or not. Do you think when I sign off of these forums I sit around and think about what you think about me or my positions? Sorry, but I regard my time as a bit more valuable than that. I do, however, sign on here from time to time to see how conversations are going, and if I have something to contribute, I do. If I'm going to take five or ten minutes to have an exchange of ideas with you, then I expet you to take the ideas seriously. If you aren't going to do that, then that's fine or ten minutes I can spend doing a lot more important things.

So much for taking things personally. A piece of advice for you: don't impute motives to others. You usually end up being wrong, and moreover, it usually end sup with you projecting something of yourself on the other.

Second, the KCA is not a philosophical proof as popularly presented. The second premise is usually defended on scientific grounds. That means it is NOT a philosophical proof. It is a scientific argument, and as stated, it is wrong, because the second premise cannot be proven scientifically. It can only be suggested, implied, or warranted. It's not apathetic to call things what they are. It's rigorous honesty. What is apathetic is letting ourselves get away with sloppy thinking.

The only way to make the KCA a philosophical proof is to defend (2) on philosophical grounds alone (so, without appeal to science). Craig and others try to do it by insisting that since proper infinities are impossible, and a beginningless universe entails a proper infinity, then a beginningless universe is impossible. But the argument fails for multiple reasons. First, you have to demonstrate that proper infinities cannot exist in nature. Second, even if you can do that (and I'm not denying that you can), a beginningless universe does not entail an infinite universe, because at best, you can only demonstrate that a proper infinity cannot exist at one time. But a beginningless universe would not exist all at the same time (especially on A-Theory). In fact, the KCA would suggest an improper or potential infinity, which absolutely is possible and does exist in nature. So as a strictly philosophical proof, the KCA just fails. If you are going to use it, you need to use it properly: as an inductive, scientific proof. The conclusion is much stronger that way: the evidence strongly implies and justifies our belief in a temporal beginning of the universe, and anyone who thinks that there is no beginning is therefore suggseting something contrary to what the evidence implies. Therefore, such a person needs not only to provide a warrant for their belief in a beginningless universe, they also need to provide a warrant for rejecting the implications of the evidence as we have it. That strongly shifts the burden of proof to them, something the KCA has traditionally been unable to do.

Motus? What of it? Are you going to argue metaphysics misrepresented? Motion has NO NECESSARY CONNECTION to anything else moving in empirical epistemology. None at all. Calling it the first motion does NOT matter.

I can see the motion. I cannot see the "Has to".

There is no "HAS TO" in gravity holding us down to the ground. None whatsoever.
Ball "A" in motion approaching Ball "B", making contact with Ball "B", and Ball "B" Moving". There is no HAS TO to its movement. None whatsoever.

Of course there is no necessary movement. Aquinas' position is not dependent on necessary movement. It is predicated on the premise that some things are in motion. If some things are in motion, then it is necessary by supposition that some things have to move. Aquinas' arguments are cosmological and thus a posteriori. To argue that his arguments fail because there is no "have to" in movement is to argue that nothing is in motion, that there is no motus of any kind. If that's your argument, then fine. I'll just shrug my shoulders and look at you funny. Anyone who says there is no motion in the universe is just being absurd, and if that's the distance they are willing to go to to protect their unbelief, then fine. The moment, however, you accept the reality that there is motion in at least SOME things, you've granted the first premise of the argument. From there, Aquinas points out that whatever is in motion is being put in motion by something else (which he demonstratse by an analysis of motion). But that regress cannot go on forever, for then there would be no First Mover (note the order: Aquinas does NOT say that there must be a First Mover because there can be no infinite regress. He says there can be no infinite regress because then there would be no First Mover). Therefore, if anything is in motion, then there is a First Mover putting it in motion. But if there is a First Mover, it itself must be unmoved, otherwise, it would need something to move it. Therefore, the First Mover is an Unmoved Mover, and since movement is nothing but the reduction of potentiality to actuality, then the First, Unmoved Mover must by definition be pure actuality. For if it had potentiality, then it would not be the First Mover, for something else would be required to reduce that potentiality to actuality. But anything that is Pure Act is God. So God exists.

THAT, Dom, is a philosophical demonstration. And it works even if the universe has always existed like some atheists would like to think.

Jac3510 wrote:It's not a serious discussion when you spend more time on personal attacks than you do interacting with ideas presented. It reduces to a rather boring game of rhetoric and sophistry.

Really? Ok, so I'm making personal attacks? Ok, lets keep that mind.

Jac3510 wrote:You've already gone too far. What makes you think there is a mental substance? Descartes' "I think therefore I am" fails, because he assumes there is an "I" that is doing the thinking. If he were going to be consistent, he should have said, "There are thoughts" and stopped there. There is very little we can profit from via Descartes, except to learn what not to do.

You unfortunately know little about it.

There is only a mental substance, AT THIS POINT. I have no justification or rational basis that there ABSOLUTELY is a physical reality. Our sense experience is dubitable (we are imperfect). We cannot be ABSOLUTELY certain.
I think, I exist. There is no assumption here. If I have doubt about everything. Physical reality, general "facts", the supposed rules of logic and math cannot be trusted, AT THIS POINT.
Who is doing the doubting? "I" is necessary for doubting. "I" doubt my sense experience. "I" doubt general "facts" are real. "I" doubt the supposed rules of logic and math.
I cannot doubt that I am doing the doubting.

Right now, I THINK i'm experiencing a discussion at Godandscience.org. I can doubt that the experience is real, but I cannot doubt that I THINK i'm experiencing this discussion.

The idea is indubitable as ONLY as an idea. Thoughts are the result of thinking. Thinking requires a thinker.
Where is "there"? I have to doubt that "there" exists. Where is "there", Jac? No justification "there" exists.

Jac3510 wrote:His mistake, which is the same you seem to be making here, was to require logical/mathematical certainty for accepting a posteriori statements ("what-statements" in classical philosophy). I can forgive him for that, since he was a mathematician by trade and training. That was his mode of thinking. I can't forgive modern philosophers or philosophers in training for it, because they aren't mathematical geniuses (usually).

It is not a mistake requiring logical certainly for accepting a posteriori statements. There is no justification whatsoever that to ask "what?" when you're not even CERTAIN it really is there.
It does not require a mathematical genius. We don't even know if math and logic really exists, yet.

Jac3510 wrote:Based on the argument you've suggested so far, you can be sure of neither.

I can be absolutely sure that "I" exist as a mental substance. Not existing as a spatial extension, yet.

I have the idea of God in my mind as a perfect mind that is not my own. My mind is dubitable and imperfect. How did I get this idea?

Nothing in my experience and my mind is perfect. How does an imperfect mind come up with the idea of perfect mind? It must be the case that the idea of God is innate in my mind. It must be that the idea of a perfect mind was placed there by the perfect mind. The cause must be greater then its effect. Therefore, we have knowledge that God exist and is beyond sense experience.

I can augment this argument further

The idea of God is by definition a being with all possible perfections
Existing in reality is more perfect then not existing
Therefore, God must exist by definition

Jac3510 wrote:I disagree with almost every word of this. Why is idealism not an option? Assuming I grant the existence of God (which I wouldn't, based on your argument), why should I even assume He is good and would not want to deceive you? What makes you think that what you know is reality, anyway? You invent a non-deceiving God to justify your belief in an external reality, but why should that require God to actually create a reality? What's to say that God isn't just giving you a "real" experience. There are way, way, way too many assumptions here, most of them theistic in nature, and none of them warranted.

Wait, hold the presses! Idealism is an option for you? What do you think I'm doing? You're begging the question here. Several times.

You couldn't be more wrong. I've assumed nothing (I had to doubt everything and build with no knowledge at all), while you assume there is a "real" experience. You have a presupposition, Jac.

You can call me a foundationalist. I had to be absolutely certain that there is a foundation and I had to build upon that.
You however, already have a structure in place. On WHAT FOUNDATION? You assume there is one based on sense experience.

See the difference?

Jac3510 wrote:I'm not taking anything personally. I couldn't care less if we engage in these conversations or not. Do you think when I sign off of these forums I sit around and think about what you think about me or my positions? Sorry, but I regard my time as a bit more valuable than that. I do, however, sign on here from time to time to see how conversations are going, and if I have something to contribute, I do. If I'm going to take five or ten minutes to have an exchange of ideas with you, then I expet you to take the ideas seriously. If you aren't going to do that, then that's fine or ten minutes I can spend doing a lot more important things.

Yes, you are. You're getting worked up because I said empiricism is silly to even consider such thing as actual infinites as "probable" or "possible". Its quite the opposite. How is this controversial to you?

Jac3510 wrote:So much for taking things personally. A piece of advice for you: don't impute motives to others. You usually end up being wrong, and moreover, it usually end sup with you projecting something of yourself on the other.

I'm pretty casual, actually. We disagree. Whats wrong with that? Where did I cry foul?

Jac3510 wrote:Second, the KCA is not a philosophical proof as popularly presented. The second premise is usually defended on scientific grounds. That means it is NOT a philosophical proof. It is a scientific argument, and as stated, it is wrong, because the second premise cannot be proven scientifically. It can only be suggested, implied, or warranted. It's not apathetic to call things what they are. It's rigorous honesty. What is apathetic is letting ourselves get away with sloppy thinking.

So, the 2nd premise is "usually" defended on scientific grounds? I disagree. I think people commonly just point out that science agrees. Some people won't question science, but if they accept it than let them. What seems to be the problem?

Jac3510 wrote:The only way to make the KCA a philosophical proof is to defend (2) on philosophical grounds alone (so, without appeal to science).

If they agree, and its uncontested. Why does it matter?

Jac3510 wrote:Craig and others try to do it by insisting that since proper infinities are impossible, and a beginningless universe entails a proper infinity, then a beginningless universe is impossible. But the argument fails for multiple reasons.

Ok, lets hear it.

Jac3510 wrote:First, you have to demonstrate that proper infinities cannot exist in nature.

This is the realm of science. Not philosophy. You've committed the naturalist fallacy here.

Jac3510 wrote:Second, even if you can do that (and I'm not denying that you can),

What are you saying?

Jac3510 wrote:a beginningless universe does not entail an infinite universe, because at best, you can only demonstrate that a proper infinity cannot exist at one time.

Infinite in what way?

This way?
<-----------|---------------|
Inf
Or this way?

<------------|--------------->
Inf

Both are wrong, btw.

Jac3510 wrote:But a beginningless universe would not exist all at the same time (especially on A-Theory).

I deny B-Theory for many reasons.

Jac3510 wrote:In fact, the KCA would suggest an improper or potential infinity, which absolutely is possible and does exist in nature.

improper or potential infinites are NOT actual infinites. They are finite because they are bound by zero. Unless you want to say zero isn't a number?

Jac3510 wrote:So as a strictly philosophical proof, the KCA just fails. If you are going to use it, you need to use it properly: as an inductive, scientific proof. The conclusion is much stronger that way: the evidence strongly implies and justifies our belief in a temporal beginning of the universe, and anyone who thinks that there is no beginning is therefore suggseting something contrary to what the evidence implies. Therefore, such a person needs not only to provide a warrant for their belief in a beginningless universe, they also need to provide a warrant for rejecting the implications of the evidence as we have it. That strongly shifts the burden of proof to them, something the KCA has traditionally been unable to do.

I disagree. The burden of proof is on them. The KCA does a good job at that.

Who has the burden of proof to prove actual infinites exist?

Jac3510 wrote:Of course there is no necessary movement. Aquinas' position is not dependent on necessary movement. It is predicated on the premise that some things are in motion. If some things are in motion, then it is necessary by supposition that some things have to move. Aquinas' arguments are cosmological and thus a posteriori. To argue that his arguments fail because there is no "have to" in movement is to argue that nothing is in motion, that there is no motus of any kind. If that's your argument, then fine.

You misunderstood. Its outright not empirical. I have not argued that "nothing" is in motion. Thats quite false. We can see motion and leaves us an impression. But there is no NECESSARY CONNECTION to motion.

A motion "force" is not empirical.

Jac3510 wrote:I'll just shrug my shoulders and look at you funny. Anyone who says there is no motion in the universe is just being absurd, and if that's the distance they are willing to go to to protect their unbelief, then fine. The moment, however, you accept the reality that there is motion in at least SOME things, you've granted the first premise of the argument.

Absolutely not! I've never asserted something so absurd.

Jac3510 wrote:From there, Aquinas points out that whatever is in motion is being put in motion by something else (which he demonstratse by an analysis of motion). But that regress cannot go on forever, for then there would be no First Mover (note the order: Aquinas does NOT say that there must be a First Mover because there can be no infinite regress. He says there can be no infinite regress because then there would be no First Mover). Therefore, if anything is in motion, then there is a First Mover putting it in motion. But if there is a First Mover, it itself must be unmoved, otherwise, it would need something to move it. Therefore, the First Mover is an Unmoved Mover, and since movement is nothing but the reduction of potentiality to actuality, then the First, Unmoved Mover must by definition be pure actuality. For if it had potentiality, then it would not be the First Mover, for something else would be required to reduce that potentiality to actuality. But anything that is Pure Act is God. So God exists.

THAT, Dom, is a philosophical demonstration. And it works even if the universe has always existed like some atheists would like to think.

The problem here is that you're saying that something in motion is put into motion by something else. You're talking about a FORCE.

In empiricism, if there is no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there.

Causality (motion) is relation of events INSIDE nature. Its perfectly acceptable to question the causality of events INSIDE nature, but its a invalid argument and illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism to say what the cause of ALL of nature would be.

Here I will famously quote David Hume

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principals, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics (Thomism scholasticism), for instance, let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

domokunrox wrote:Really? Ok, so I'm making personal attacks? Ok, lets keep that mind.

Yes, you are. Would you like me to highlight all the ones you are making and that you have made? I couldn't care less, personally. I told you, I don't spend any time thinking about you or this place when I'm not here. I'm just telling you that you are undercutting your credibility with your tone.

There is only a mental substance, AT THIS POINT.

No there isn't. Prove it. What is 'mental'? What is a 'substance'? What makes you think either of these exist?

I have no justification or rational basis that there ABSOLUTELY is a physical reality. Our sense experience is dubitable (we are imperfect). We cannot be ABSOLUTELY certain.

Which is Descartes' mistake, and you've bought into it, apparently.

I think, I exist. There is no assumption here.

Of course there is. You assume that there is an "I" doing the thinking. What makes you think that is the case? Consider the word "It" in "it is raining." You see raindrops, so you say "It is raining." You don't say "I am raining." So why is it that when you see thoughts, you say "I am thinking" rather than "There are thoughts"?

If I have doubt about everything.

No you don't. You appear to have accepted a doctrine Gilson calls mathematicism.

Physical reality, general "facts", the supposed rules of logic and math cannot be trusted, AT THIS POINT.

The rules of logic can always be trusted. Your "I think, therefore I am" assume the rules of logic--the first principles, in particular.

Who is doing the doubting? "I" is necessary for doubting. "I" doubt my sense experience. "I" doubt general "facts" are real. "I" doubt the supposed rules of logic and math. I cannot doubt that I am doing the doubting.

Why is an "I" necessary for doubting or thinking? You're making a serious assumption here. You're being inconsistent with your own methodology. And if "you" doubt the rules of logic, then I propose you undergo Avicenna's test for demonstrating the undoubtable nature of the First Principles: "Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned."

Right now, I THINK i'm experiencing a discussion at Godandscience.org. I can doubt that the experience is real, but I cannot doubt that I THINK i'm experiencing this discussion.

Sure you can. You can doubt that there is a "you" that is doubting. Maybe there are just thoughts--and maybe some of them are doubting thoughts. But you have no excuse to presume that there is an "I" behind them, much less the more specific notion of a "mental substance." Moreover, the very nature of this "I" is up for major debate (it is debated, actually, all the time among ethicists). What is it? Is it an enduring agent? Is it a series of conscience moments (whatever those are) bounded together by some assumed criteria? If so, what criteria?

No, there's plenty to doubt here. You've proven nothing. Nor can you, because you've made a fundamental mistake on the nature of philosophy. You've confused it with math and logic. Math is math. Logic is logic. Philosophy is philosophy. Each of them have their own tools. When you make any of them identical with the other, you destroy the intellectual contents of them all.

The idea is indubitable as ONLY as an idea. Thoughts are the result of thinking. Thinking requires a thinker.

Says who? Why should I believe that?

Where is "there"? I have to doubt that "there" exists. Where is "there", Jac? No justification "there" exists.

"There" is a placeholder required by the English language to make linguistic sense, as in "It is raining." What is the "It" that is raining? Nothing. It's just the way English operates. Now you seem to be confusing linguistics with philosophy. "There are thoughts" does not presume the existence of a "there." It's a linguistic expression recognizing the fact that attribution of real existence necessitates in language a proposition, which necessitates a subject and predicate, which necessitates at least two concepts, one predicated to the other. Here, "there" is an empty concept acting as a placeholder for "existence."

Still, I suppose you could reduce the sentence to merely, "Thoughts are." That's more defensible than "I am thinking."

It is not a mistake requiring logical certainly for accepting a posteriori statements. There is no justification whatsoever that to ask "what?" when you're not even CERTAIN it really is there.
It does not require a mathematical genius. We don't even know if math and logic really exists, yet.

Methodological doubting presumes logic. You can't doubt the law of non-contradiction. Second, no a posteriori statement can be accepted with mathematical certainty. The reason is the difference in the natures of math and extramental reality. All mathematical statements are analytical and thus are either necessarily true or false. Such is never the case when dealing with extramental reality. Statements of the form "x is why," whenever y is a non-essential property of x, are always a posteriori, and therefore are not subject to analytical certainty. That's just definitional.

I can be absolutely sure that "I" exist as a mental substance. Not existing as a spatial extension, yet.

I disagree. You make think you can be certain, but you be certainly wrong. You're just making too many unwarranted assumptions, and the wrong ones, to boot.

I have the idea of God in my mind as a perfect mind that is not my own. My mind is dubitable and imperfect. How did I get this idea?

What makes you think that you have a mind that possesses such a thought? The thought of a perfect mind exists, but so does the thought of Godandscience forums. What makes you think that you are thinking of them or that either of them?

Nothing in my experience and my mind is perfect. How does an imperfect mind come up with the idea of perfect mind? It must be the case that the idea of God is innate in my mind. It must be that the idea of a perfect mind was placed there by the perfect mind. The cause must be greater then its effect. Therefore, we have knowledge that God exist and is beyond sense experience.

Now you are assuming that you are an enduring agent. You are assuming that not only is there an "I," but this "I" has had other experiences. How do you know that? You don't. You're just assuming it.

I can augment this argument further

You haven't even gotten it off the ground.

The idea of God is by definition a being with all possible perfections
Existing in reality is more perfect then not existing
Therefore, God must exist by definition

What makes you think that God is a being? I would disagree with that. What makes you think that God is perfect? Plenty of people would disagree with that. What makes you think there are such things as perfections? What makes you think there is such a thing as a reality for this "God" to exist in? What makes you think that existing is more perfect than not existing? In fact, I'd charge that last question proves the argument false, because it is just incoherent. If something doesn't exist, then it is neither more nor less perfect than anything else. You can only think of something insofar as it exists. Even nonexistent things like unicorns can only be thought because they exist in our mind. As Parmenides said:

• Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my
  saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that
  can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is
  impossible for anything not to be, is the way of. conviction,
  
  for truth is its companion.. The other, namely, that It is not,
  and that something must needs not be, - that, I tell thee, is a
  wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is
  not - that is impossible - nor utter it;

It is impossible to even think of nonexistence, for the very thought of nonexistence conceptualizes nonexistence as a thing. Thus, you cannot speak of anything being better or worse than something that does not exist, for in doing so, you create the very existence of the supposedly nonexistent thing. The argument thus fails, as do all ontological arguments that rely on that premise.

Wait, hold the presses! Idealism is an option for you? What do you think I'm doing? You're begging the question here. Several times.

I'm not an idealist, but that's because my philosophy has ruled it out. At this point in your philosophy, it hasn't been ruled out, so I ask again, why is it not an option? And if you are going to accuse me of begging the question, point it out. Otherwise, I leave you with this: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur

You couldn't be more wrong. I've assumed nothing (I had to doubt everything and build with no knowledge at all), while you assume there is a "real" experience. You have a presupposition, Jac.

Assertions arguments do not make. I've pointed out multiple assumptions along the way, several fallacies in your arguments, etc. As far as me assuming a reality, yes, I do. But I'm not a Cartesian. I don't follow his mathematicism. Again, I would suggest you pick up The Unity of Philosophical Experience. You can get it right now for a whopping $15. I'd send you my copy for free, but I already gave it away.

You can call me a foundationalist.

Why would I do that? You aren't a foundationalist? I am.

I had to be absolutely certain that there is a foundation and I had to build upon that.

That's not foundationalism. That's mathematicism.

You however, already have a structure in place. On WHAT FOUNDATION? You assume there is one based on sense experience.

On the foundation of properly basic beliefs, which is what foundationalism is, and which is why foundationalism is rejected by Cartesians.

See the difference?

I do. Do you?

Yes, you are. You're getting worked up because I said empiricism is silly to even consider such thing as actual infinites as "probable" or "possible". Its quite the opposite. How is this controversial to you?

There you go imputing motives again. I'm still waiting on your proof since it is so obvious to you.

I'm pretty casual, actually. We disagree. Whats wrong with that? Where did I cry foul?

I didn't say you weren't casual. I said you were imputing motives and engaging in personal attacks.

So, the 2nd premise is "usually" defended on scientific grounds? I disagree. I think people commonly just point out that science agrees. Some people won't question science, but if they accept it than let them. What seems to be the problem?

You think that most people who use the KCA have the philosophical training necessary to provide a defense of the second premise based on nuanced discussions of the A-Theory of time and Hilbert's Hotel? Some do, but most of the people I meet (and I teach this stuff for a living) just point immediately to the Big Bang. Take Hugh Ross, for instance. This is a quote taken from his website:

• In this scenario the big bang no longer represents the creation of space-time. Additionally, it may seem that this multiverse model seriously undermines one of the strongest arguments for God's existence, namely the Kalam cosmological argument. However, as addressed in a previous TNRTB, theBVG theorem developed by Arvind Borde, Alex Vilenkin, and Alan Guth demonstrates that this pre-existing inflating space must have a beginning.

There you go. Scientific defense of the second premise. In Craig's book, he spends a significant number of pages defending the Big Bang and refuting (scientifically) various models that propose a beginningless universe. And yes, there are philosophical arguments, but there are even Christian philosophers who are not convinced by them. See, for instance, R. Douglas Geivett's comments in "Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism," in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Stan W. Wallace (Ashgate, 2003), p. 51. If you don't have the book, you can read the page in question here.

If they agree, and its uncontested. Why does it matter?

Because they are agreeing to a faulty argument. It's a sin against honesty, unless you think that deceiving people into believing a true proposition is ethically acceptable. I don't, and you do us all harm when you lead people to accept a conclusion based on a faulty premise.

This is the realm of science. Not philosophy. You've committed the naturalist fallacy here.

Wrong. It's a philosophical question, not a scientific question. But even if I agree with you, that just makes your position even worse, because the philosophical demonstration of the second premise of the KCA is built on the impossibility of actual infinities. If you are making that, too, a scientific argument, then the KCA is indefensible apart from science, which renders my case against it even stronger.

What are you saying?

That I am not convinced that they are actually impossible, but that even if they are, that's not the reason I reject the KCA's philosophical evidence anyway. I've explained elsewhere on these boards why that is.

Infinite in what way?

This way?
<-----------|---------------|
Inf
Or this way?

<------------|--------------->
Inf

Both are wrong, btw.

Why give me two options if you are going to say that either are wrong anyway? Anyway, Thomas' argument against infinite multitudes goes as follows:

• This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental.

I am sympathetic to this argument, but I also understand that it has been seriously challenged in recent years by Cantor's work. As such, I haven't come to a conclusion on this particular issue yet. Perhaps you have studied Cantor and can say one way or another. I haven't. But again, even if we end up agreeing with Aquinas, tI think along with Aquinas that the KCA still fails; thus he, agreeing with you that actual infinities cannot exist, still rejected the KCA.

I deny B-Theory for many reasons.

So do I. Your point?

improper or potential infinites are NOT actual infinites. They are finite because they are bound by zero. Unless you want to say zero isn't a number?

Zero is not a number. In fact, neither is One. But then again, I'm not a Platonist. Here are Aquinas' thoughts on the matter:

• Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.

For more, I'd highly recommend Armand Maurer's "Thomists and Thomas Aquinas on the Foundation of Mathematics" in The Review of Metaphysics , Vol. 47, No. 1 (Sep., 1993), pp. 43-61. Specifically, on page 51, Maurer states

• Numbers themselves originate through an act of our mind. For Aquinas, neither zero nor one is a number; one is the starting point of what today are called natural numbers. Each natural number is an aggregate of ones, produced by adding one to its immediate predecessor; for example, four is produced by adding one to three. In other words, each number is caused by taking one several times.

I imagine you disagree, but that goes back to the Platonism argument. I've told you before, I'm not a Platonist. I've given you some extensive reasons as to why I am not, too.

I disagree. The burden of proof is on them. The KCA does a good job at that.

Assertions again.

Who has the burden of proof to prove actual infinites exist?

No one. You are claiming that they cannot exist. Therefore, you have the burden of proof. If scientists prove that the universe never had a beginning (and I'm using "prove" in the loosely scientific sense--I really mean, "If the data strongly warrants the claim that . . .") then that is sufficient to demonstrate that we have good reason for believing that they do exist, shy of reasons to believe that they don't.

You misunderstood. Its outright not empirical. I have not argued that "nothing" is in motion. Thats quite false. We can see motion and leaves us an impression. But there is no NECESSARY CONNECTION to motion.

You have me wondering if you understand the definition of motus.

A motion "force" is not empirical.

Yes, it is. By definition. Motion is not a "force." What do you think motion is for Aquinas (since that's the context of the argument we are talking about)? If you need some help there, I've linked to my thesis before. Alternatively, Craig does an excellent job (mostly) of describing the concept in his exposition of Aquinas' argument (which he thinks succeeds) in his book The Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz (see especially pages 161ff).

The problem here is that you're saying that something in motion is put into motion by something else. You're talking about a FORCE.

No, I'm not. Motion is not a force. You really need to either read Craig's book or my thesis. Or Feser's's Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide.

In empiricism, if there is no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there.

Causality (motion) is relation of events INSIDE nature. Its perfectly acceptable to question the causality of events INSIDE nature, but its a invalid argument and illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism to say what the cause of ALL of nature would be.

Here I will famously quote David Hume

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principals, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics (Thomism scholasticism), for instance, let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

That's not empiricism--or, at least, not the only brand of it. That's Cartesianism. And just as I'm not a Platonist, I'm not a Cartesian. Anyway, even if I grant your view of motion here, it doesn't affect Aquinas' argument, because you are using the word differently than he is.

Jac3510 wrote:Yes, you are. Would you like me to highlight all the ones you are making and that you have made? I couldn't care less, personally. I told you, I don't spend any time thinking about you or this place when I'm not here. I'm just telling you that you are undercutting your credibility with your tone.

Because I told you to don't be silly? Wow, sorry I hurt your feelings, Jac. And you're just telling me that I'm undercutting my credibility with that tone? Thanks for that piece of information.
I mean, I don't know what I would do without you. I can hardly imagine that someone else would simply dismiss my credibility because they do not like how I say something.

Jac3510 wrote:No there isn't. Prove it. What is 'mental'? What is a 'substance'? What makes you think either of these exist?

These questions are just trivial. Mental substance is the only thing that does exist if nothing else does. Your mind is the only thing that exists, so far.

Jac3510 wrote:Which is Descartes' mistake, and you've bought into it, apparently.

No, Its rational to do so until its proven otherwise. Are you saying we aren't mistaken?
We aren't ever mistaken with our 5 senses? Never been wrong?
"Facts" like "fire is hot" or "triangles have 3 sides" can't just be something we simply dreamt about?
The supposed laws of math and logic could never have been put into our minds by some sort of evil person?

We can't accept these things until we are certain where we got all these ideas from.

Jac3510 wrote:Of course there is. You assume that there is an "I" doing the thinking. What makes you think that is the case? Consider the word "It" in "it is raining." You see raindrops, so you say "It is raining." You don't say "I am raining." So why is it that when you see thoughts, you say "I am thinking" rather than "There are thoughts"?

No, jac. I don't assume that there is an "I'.

You cannot just go "am doubt". That doesn't make ANY sense. Neither does any placeholder you're trying to smuggle in.
There is nothing else, YET. There is no such thing as raindrops. There is no such thing as "it", "there", "here", etc.

Jac3510 wrote:No you don't. You appear to have accepted a doctrine Gilson calls mathematicism.

No, sir. This isn't mathematicism. Stay on topic.

Jac3510 wrote:The rules of logic can always be trusted. Your "I think, therefore I am" assume the rules of logic--the first principles, in particular.

No sir. You cannot trust these rules, yet. It doesn't assume anything.

Jac3510 wrote:Why is an "I" necessary for doubting or thinking? You're making a serious assumption here. You're being inconsistent with your own methodology. And if "you" doubt the rules of logic, then I propose you undergo Avicenna's test for demonstrating the undoubtable nature of the First Principles: "Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned."

Why is it necessary? Answer it for yourself, who is doing the doubting?

Quoting Descartes
“Even if my mind is being deceived about everything, it must be that I have a mind.”

I must exist “res cogitans”
A non-physical, thinking substance

Jac3510 wrote:Sure you can. You can doubt that there is a "you" that is doubting. Maybe there are just thoughts--and maybe some of them are doubting thoughts. But you have no excuse to presume that there is an "I" behind them, much less the more specific notion of a "mental substance." Moreover, the very nature of this "I" is up for major debate (it is debated, actually, all the time among ethicists). What is it? Is it an enduring agent? Is it a series of conscience moments (whatever those are) bounded together by some assumed criteria? If so, what criteria?

Ah, there you go, Jac.

The words
I doubt

Presumes the truth that “I” exists.

You cannot have doubt without the "I'.

Jac3510 wrote:No, there's plenty to doubt here.

Who is doubting?

Jac3510 wrote:You've proven nothing. Nor can you, because you've made a fundamental mistake on the nature of philosophy. You've confused it with math and logic. Math is math. Logic is logic. Philosophy is philosophy. Each of them have their own tools. When you make any of them identical with the other, you destroy the intellectual contents of them all.

Philosophy doesn't exist, yet. First I need to prove God exists.

Jac3510 wrote:Says who? Why should I believe that?

Look! You did it right this time.

First, you figured out that a thought isn't your own, then you asked why you should believe that? You doubt it, and said "I".

Jac3510 wrote:"There" is a placeholder required by the English language to make linguistic sense, as in "It is raining." What is the "It" that is raining? Nothing. It's just the way English operates. Now you seem to be confusing linguistics with philosophy. "There are thoughts" does not presume the existence of a "there." It's a linguistic expression recognizing the fact that attribution of real existence necessitates in language a proposition, which necessitates a subject and predicate, which necessitates at least two concepts, one predicated to the other. Here, "there" is an empty concept acting as a placeholder for "existence."

Well, it looks like you're getting it except there is no "It" or "There". Not yet. Don't get into linguistics. We haven't misrepresented anything. Well, I haven't at least. Seems like you are arguing it to avoid "I".

Jac3510 wrote:Still, I suppose you could reduce the sentence to merely, "Thoughts are." That's more defensible than "I am thinking."

Guess not. And we're back! You cannot say thoughts are. Where did the thoughts come from?

Again, I can doubt that I am experiencing God and Science discussion boards, but I cannot doubt that I think I am experiencing God and Science discussion boards.
Ideas are indubitable as ideas. Do you understand? At this point, the contents of the idea can be wrong. I have to first prove God exists.

Jac3510 wrote:Methodological doubting presumes logic. You can't doubt the law of non-contradiction. Second, no a posteriori statement can be accepted with mathematical certainty. The reason is the difference in the natures of math and extramental reality. All mathematical statements are analytical and thus are either necessarily true or false. Such is never the case when dealing with extramental reality. Statements of the form "x is why," whenever y is a non-essential property of x, are always a posteriori, and therefore are not subject to analytical certainty. That's just definitional.

Doubting doesn't necessarily presume logic. Logic, at this point cannot be trusted. If logic can be trusted, we could do math. Again, it is as follows
So, then we began to ask, what of math and logic?
Socrates is a man
All men are mortal
Then Socrates must be mortal

2+2=4

All triangles have 3 sides and the sum of all their angles is 180 degrees

Must these statements also be certainly true even if I'm wrong about everything else?

But then he comes up with reason to doubt that. What if there is an evil genius who put those thoughts in my mind? How would I know that I am not on a strange planet where all my math and logic is programmed into me by an alien presence?

Jac3510 wrote:I disagree. You make think you can be certain, but you be certainly wrong. You're just making too many unwarranted assumptions, and the wrong ones, to boot.

Thats fine, you can disagree. I've made no assumptions. I've only gone as far as what I cannot doubt any further.

I must exist as a mental substance
Ideas are indubitable as ideas

Thats all we need to proceed.

Jac3510 wrote:What makes you think that you have a mind that possesses such a thought? The thought of a perfect mind exists, but so does the thought of Godandscience forums. What makes you think that you are thinking of them or that either of them?

Because I exist as a mental substance. Ideas are indubitable as ideas. There certainly is a difference between the idea of a perfect mind and Godandscience forums.

Jac3510 wrote:Now you are assuming that you are an enduring agent. You are assuming that not only is there an "I," but this "I" has had other experiences. How do you know that? You don't. You're just assuming it.

No, I don't assume I'm an enduring agent. Where have I said that? Point it out.

Jac3510 wrote:What makes you think that God is a being? I would disagree with that. What makes you think that God is perfect? Plenty of people would disagree with that. What makes you think there are such things as perfections? What makes you think there is such a thing as a reality for this "God" to exist in? What makes you think that existing is more perfect than not existing? In fact, I'd charge that last question proves the argument false, because it is just incoherent. If something doesn't exist, then it is neither more nor less perfect than anything else. You can only think of something insofar as it exists. Even nonexistent things like unicorns can only be thought because they exist in our mind. As Parmenides said:

No, you're starting to read your divine simplicity doctrine into here. Lets keep that out.

What makes me think that God is perfect, and that there are such things are perfections?
It must be the case that the idea of God is innate in my mind. It must be that the idea of a perfect mind was placed there by that perfect mind.

Difference between God and Unicorns? Surely you must be joking?
You are convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. You hear this, you understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding.

Here is the argument, without the shorthandedness
If that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

Jac3510 wrote:It is impossible to even think of nonexistence, for the very thought of nonexistence conceptualizes nonexistence as a thing. Thus, you cannot speak of anything being better or worse than something that does not exist, for in doing so, you create the very existence of the supposedly nonexistent thing. The argument thus fails, as do all ontological arguments that rely on that premise.

You're a fool in your heart, not in your mind. Its in your understanding, it follows to exist reality. You may not like ontological arguments for various presuppositions.
Even you agree and question what perfection is.
Again, nothing in my experience and my mind is perfect. How does an imperfect mind come up with the idea of perfect mind? It must be the case that the idea of God is innate in my mind. It must be that the idea of a perfect mind was placed there by the perfect mind. There is no other explanation.

Jac3510 wrote:I'm not an idealist, but that's because my philosophy has ruled it out. At this point in your philosophy, it hasn't been ruled out, so I ask again, why is it not an option? And if you are going to accuse me of begging the question, point it out. Otherwise, I leave you with this: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur

Correct, you carry a presupposition. I'm going to hold it to you all the way, Jac. Again, you're begging the question. How do you figure that Idealism is not an option? You answer it. How did you get such an absurd idea? You're going to beg the question in order to make an equivocation.

Jac3510 wrote:Assertions arguments do not make. I've pointed out multiple assumptions along the way, several fallacies in your arguments, etc. As far as me assuming a reality, yes, I do. But I'm not a Cartesian. I don't follow his mathematicism. Again, I would suggest you pick up The Unity of Philosophical Experience. You can get it right now for a whopping $15. I'd send you my copy for free, but I already gave it away.

No assumptions, Jac. I've only doubted as far as I could, till I could not doubt any further. The mind will be able to solve the puzzles we face. I prove God exists BEFORE there is a physical reality we can believe in, I do it before there really are such things as general "facts", and I do it before there is such things as philosophy, math, and logic.

YOU on the other hand, prove all that AFTERWARD without any CERTAINTY.

Jac3510 wrote:Why would I do that? You aren't a foundationalist? I am.

You're not a foundationalist.

Jac3510 wrote:That's not foundationalism. That's mathematicism.

No, its foundationalism.

Jac3510 wrote:On the foundation of properly basic beliefs, which is what foundationalism is, and which is why foundationalism is rejected by Cartesians.

Descartes IS foundationalism.
Cartesianism
Rationalism
Foundationalism
Doubt and certainty

Descartes had the first REAL answer to modern philosophy with the new Copernicus science. We needed to move away from Aristotelian theory.

Jac3510 wrote:There you go imputing motives again. I'm still waiting on your proof since it is so obvious to you.

I'm not giving you a motive. Why are you so resistant on your own philosophy to its rational conclusion? Nature is phenomenon in your philosophy. There is no necessary connections. Its a naturalist fallacy.

Jac3510 wrote:I didn't say you weren't casual. I said you were imputing motives and engaging in personal attacks.

Well, I'm not. We got different clashing philosophies. Have fun with it. I am.

Jac3510 wrote:You think that most people who use the KCA have the philosophical training necessary to provide a defense of the second premise based on nuanced discussions of the A-Theory of time and Hilbert's Hotel? Some do, but most of the people I meet (and I teach this stuff for a living) just point immediately to the Big Bang. Take Hugh Ross, for instance. This is a quote taken from his website:

No, they don't. That doesn't mean the KCA is a bad argument. Just your experiences with others who use it.

Jac3510 wrote:

• In this scenario the big bang no longer represents the creation of space-time. Additionally, it may seem that this multiverse model seriously undermines one of the strongest arguments for God's existence, namely the Kalam cosmological argument. However, as addressed in a previous TNRTB, theBVG theorem developed by Arvind Borde, Alex Vilenkin, and Alan Guth demonstrates that this pre-existing inflating space must have a beginning.

There you go. Scientific defense of the second premise. In Craig's book, he spends a significant number of pages defending the Big Bang and refuting (scientifically) various models that propose a beginningless universe. And yes, there are philosophical arguments, but there are even Christian philosophers who are not convinced by them. See, for instance, R. Douglas Geivett's comments in "Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism," in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate, ed. Stan W. Wallace (Ashgate, 2003), p. 51. If you don't have the book, you can read the page in question here.

Its great that these scientists/atheists have taken notice of the KCA. They don't have an answer. Even more evidence that science (empiricism) is a "God" of the gaps.

Jac3510 wrote:Because they are agreeing to a faulty argument. It's a sin against honesty, unless you think that deceiving people into believing a true proposition is ethically acceptable. I don't, and you do us all harm when you lead people to accept a conclusion based on a faulty premise.

This is the first time I've heard someone say that you can deceive someone into a truth.

Its an oxymoron.

Jac3510 wrote:Wrong. It's a philosophical question, not a scientific question. But even if I agree with you, that just makes your position even worse, because the philosophical demonstration of the second premise of the KCA is built on the impossibility of actual infinities. If you are making that, too, a scientific argument, then the KCA is indefensible apart from science, which renders my case against it even stronger.

No, Jac. You're flip flopping on me now. You've made a naturalist fallacy. Own up to it.

Jac3510 wrote:That I am not convinced that they are actually impossible, but that even if they are, that's not the reason I reject the KCA's philosophical evidence anyway. I've explained elsewhere on these boards why that is.

You're talking about ACTUAL infinites, right? Not potential FAKE infinites, right?

At this point, lets drop the KCA argument. I'm going to pound that infinite idea out of you, so you can finally take it out of the "possibly exists" column.

Jac3510 wrote:Why give me two options if you are going to say that either are wrong anyway? Anyway, Thomas' argument against infinite multitudes goes as follows:

You gave up, already? That was fast.

Jac3510 wrote:I am sympathetic to this argument, but I also understand that it has been seriously challenged in recent years by Cantor's work. As such, I haven't come to a conclusion on this particular issue yet. Perhaps you have studied Cantor and can say one way or another. I haven't. But again, even if we end up agreeing with Aquinas, tI think along with Aquinas that the KCA still fails; thus he, agreeing with you that actual infinities cannot exist, still rejected the KCA.

You empiricists reject the KCA because you're empiricists! Do you understand this?

Jac3510 wrote:So do I. Your point?

I'm convinced theres only 2 options. We'll see if Aristotelean theory of time falls into either A or B theory. Thats the other thread, and we'll figure it out when I get to it.

Jac3510 wrote:Zero is not a number. In fact, neither is One. But then again, I'm not a Platonist. Here are Aquinas' thoughts on the matter:

Zero is a number. This discussion just took a turn for the worse.

Jac3510 wrote:

• Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.

For more, I'd highly recommend Armand Maurer's "Thomists and Thomas Aquinas on the Foundation of Mathematics" in The Review of Metaphysics , Vol. 47, No. 1 (Sep., 1993), pp. 43-61. Specifically, on page 51, Maurer states

I'm pretty sure Plato's school were pretty violent about if zero was a number. When it was all said and done, it was a number. They also argued about negative numbers, fractions, the decimal point, etc.

Jac3510 wrote:

• Numbers themselves originate through an act of our mind. For Aquinas, neither zero nor one is a number; one is the starting point of what today are called natural numbers. Each natural number is an aggregate of ones, produced by adding one to its immediate predecessor; for example, four is produced by adding one to three. In other words, each number is caused by taking one several times.

I imagine you disagree, but that goes back to the Platonism argument. I've told you before, I'm not a Platonist. I've given you some extensive reasons as to why I am not, too.

I know you're not a platonist. You have reasons, but I'm not going to question them. Zero is not a number, and do you also concur with aquinas that 1 isn't a number.....right?

I cannot find the words.

Jac3510 wrote:No one. You are claiming that they cannot exist. Therefore, you have the burden of proof. If scientists prove that the universe never had a beginning (and I'm using "prove" in the loosely scientific sense--I really mean, "If the data strongly warrants the claim that . . .") then that is sufficient to demonstrate that we have good reason for believing that they do exist, shy of reasons to believe that they don't.

No, they suggest actual infinity exists. Burden of proof is on them. I'm am only providing philosophical evidence against for them, so they can see why I reject it. I don't need to.

Jac3510 wrote:Yes, it is. By definition. Motion is not a "force." What do you think motion is for Aquinas (since that's the context of the argument we are talking about)? If you need some help there, I've linked to my thesis before. Alternatively, Craig does an excellent job (mostly) of describing the concept in his exposition of Aquinas' argument (which he thinks succeeds) in his book The Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz (see especially pages 161ff).

No, its not.

Something moves, its in motion.
You say theres an unmoved mover.
You talking about a force.

This is not empirical.

Again here is my quote.

In empiricism, if there is no perceptible qualities, there is NOTHING there.

Causality (motion) is relation of events INSIDE nature. Its perfectly acceptable to question the causality of events INSIDE nature, but its a invalid argument and illegitimate extension of the concept of empiricism to say what the cause of ALL of nature would be.

Jac3510 wrote:That's not empiricism--or, at least, not the only brand of it. That's Cartesianism. And just as I'm not a Platonist, I'm not a Cartesian. Anyway, even if I grant your view of motion here, it doesn't affect Aquinas' argument, because you are using the word differently than he is.

Its not Cartesianism. I'm not using the word differently. If you have misrepresented metaphysics, thats on you.

OK, Dom. If you insist . . . let's try it this way.

1. RE: your ontological argument - You think you have proven that you are a mental substance. Fine. We agree on this proposition: "Thoughts exist." Now, take that premise, and prove to me that "I" am "thinking" those "thoughts." While you are at it, be sure not to use logic, since you say logic can't be proven yet.

2. RE: the KCA - riddle me this. Suppose scientists come with a testable theory showing that the universe can be beginningless. How does that affect the KCA?

3. RE: Aristotelianism - you say we need to get away from it. Why?

4. RE: Numbers - you think zero is a number. Fine. So what is a number? I don't mean the symbol (e.g., "0"). That I assume you agree is just a conventional sign that points to something. What is the thing that the sign points to that we call numbers?

5. RE: The Prima Via - Since you say that you are not using the word motion (motus) differently from Aquinas, can you give me a definition of the word, because when you call it a force, you are fundamentally misunderstanding it. When you take that misunderstanding and tell me that I am misrepresenting metaphysics, you are making a serious charge. Defend it or retract it.

Beyond that, if you think I've committed a naturalistic fallacy, demonstrate it rather than assert it. Stop imputing motives, as that's just a personal attack and goes directly against the board guidelines. And let's tone down the snarkiness, shall we? Statements like these:

• Wow, sorry I hurt your feelings, Jac. And you're just telling me that I'm undercutting my credibility with that tone? Thanks for that piece of information.
  I mean, I don't know what I would do without you.
  
  smuggle in.
  
  Stay on topic.
  
  We haven't misrepresented anything. Well, I haven't at least.
  
  You're a fool in your heart,
  
  How did you get such an absurd idea?
  
  Own up to it.
  
  I'm going to pound that infinite idea out of you
  
  You gave up, already? That was fast.
  
  Do you understand this?
  
  This discussion just took a turn for the worse.
  
  I cannot find the words.

Do not move the conversation forward, and that was all from a single post. And see your PMs.

Well, this is the best thread in eons.

jlay wrote:Well, this is the best thread in eons.

Are you serious? You must not have read the Leviticus and Gayness thread. I mean, how many encore threads do we really get? (Wait, don't answer that . . .) I'm just saying, compared that one, this one isn't worth the time it takes to read!

Any thread where I'm learning stuff is a good thread for me.

Maybe this is no longer the correct thread, but I still have some questions (for Jac or someone else, doesn't matter) with ID as a "God of the gaps" argument. Couldn't it be true that arguments like Paley's watchmaker don't necessarily concede a mechanistic view of nature, but could be used to argue merely that there are complexities in nature that are best explained by an intelligent designer? Help me out here, admittedly this argument would be probabilistic but I don't see how its a "gap argument" if complexity indicates that God designed everything and not just the gaps.

An illustration might be useful. Let's say instead of a watch you happen upon a chair. The chair is naturalistic, the features (you can use your imagination for what they actually are) aren't necessarily what we usually associate with a carpenter's work. And yet upon closer inspection, we see a clearly carved signature from the carpenter who made the chair. From that we can infer that what looks like it could almost be naturalistic is indeed designed, and once we accept that fact we can understand how each part of the chair could have been made purposefully. The signature is what first led the person who happened upon the chair to believe that it didn't come about naturally at all.

So with the arguments generally used today, I'm still not sure if they can be called "gaps" in the science if what you are trying to do is take advantage of the science that is there. Granted, current scientific theories could be overthrown by something newer (although frankly we're coming to see more and more complexity in nature, not less... the idea that this should be reversed is very counter-intuitive to me), but calling it a "God of the gaps" seems like an uncharitable interpretation.

To repeat something I mentioned in passing that wasn't commented on, if using positive scientific evidence is as much a God of the gaps as using "gaps" in scientific knowledge is "God of the gaps", then the entire scientific discipline should be considered one big "gap". Any scientific discovery could be called a God of the gaps or a "science of the gaps" or whatever. I imagine that secularists would never agree to that approach, at least not if they understood the implications.

In summary, I think that often the ID movement does concede things it shouldn't concede. It isn't always perfect. But I feel like a better term to express this should be used, otherwise the phrase "God of the gaps" is being used to express exactly opposite things. Its being used equally to describe scientific theories and the lack of scientific theories. The only way I could see to do that is if you rule out God as a viable explanation in the first place (and hence the secularists consistent use of the term).

Hmm, is anyone arguing that IDers not only make things more difficult for themselves than they have to (I'd agree on that count), but that they concede things that ultimately would rule out theism as a live option (I'd disagree to that strongly)?

Narnia,

my experience has been that there is a lot of confusion (even within ID) as to just what they are trying to demonstrate.

I saw a presentation from Meyer where he goes through the basics and seems to boil it down to a multiple competing hyposthesis, which is also something Darwin used. In other words, we can observe the origins of information in computer programing, language, etc. We can see that abstract become reality. So, we have all these examples that show information doesn't just appear out of nowhere, but has to arrive from an abstract concept. There isn't another hyposthesis where this can be accounted for. So, we would be wise to make the same deduction regarding DNA. DNA is information. Information is best explained as arrising from an intelligent mind.
Complexity is another issue they deal in, and I think this is where the gaps issue comes into play and where most the criticism is voiced. Anyone is welcome to correct me if I'm off base.

I wrote to Meyer's group a while back, and asked them about the issue of function. I think function is much more important than complexity. For example, scissors are about as simple a device that you will find, but one knows that the function of scissors preceded the scissors themselves. In other words, the mind conceived an abstract idea and design, and then brought it into being.
Again, we can see examples all around us of how function preceeds design, and design preceeds the things actual existance. For example. Someone conceives the thought that it would be easier to be able to change the channel on the TV without having to get out of the chair. At this point, function exist. (ding, ding) But, only as an abstract thought. Then, that being conceives a design, (also abstract) and then the being creates the device. (abstract becomes actual) It would be absurd to say that the device was designed and then a function found for it. (not to say that accidental functions aren't a reality. A widgedoo may turn out to be a great door stop, but no one would infer that this is the function the widgedoo was designed for.)
So, we can ask the question, "what is the function of the eye? The circulatory system? the earth's atmosphere, the carbon cycle? etc." No one can deny a the function of an eye. No one can deny the funciton of logic or the mind? But how does a mindless, immaterial, purposeless universe account for function? It can't. It can only say that the function of the human eye, and its orchestration with all the other funcitioning systems in the human body are a result of slight changes over long periods of time. And that these slight changes plus time can take you from molecules to man. Now, the "rational, scientific" (cough) thing to do is to dismiss everything we KNOW and OBSERVE about function and gamble on slight changes + time getting us a human eye. I mean think about your eye for a moment, and what it is capable of. It's function is to see. But how does material know that seeing is better than not seeing? Especially considering that not seeing prevents any concept of sight to begin with. And how could material conceive "better" sight? HOw could it conceive the function of a tear duct, and the function of tears to lubricate the eye, and the function of an optic nerve to transmit information, and the function of a brain to interpret this information? Our world is saturated in function, yet a Darwinists has to willfully ignore the obvious to embrace the absurd. Function is just a by-product. But that is a problem because function, by definition, infers a purpose and design. So, science either has to say that nothing actually has a function, or that function is an illusion. Or, they have to willfully ignore what function points towards. Well, there is a 3rd option. And that is to follow where observation would lead.

The ID movement may be overly committed to irreduciable complexity, and at the expense of function, thus painting themselves into their own corner. It's sad because function is the elephant standing in the corner.

jlay wrote:Narnia,

my experience has been that there is a lot of confusion (even within ID) as to just what they are trying to demonstrate.

I saw a presentation from Meyer where he goes through the basics and seems to boil it down to a multiple competing hyposthesis, which is also something Darwin used. In other words, we can observe the origins of information in computer programing, language, etc. We can see that abstract become reality. So, we have all these examples that show information doesn't just appear out of nowhere, but has to arrive from an abstract concept. There isn't another hyposthesis where this can be accounted for. So, we would be wise to make the same deduction regarding DNA. DNA is information. Information is best explained as arrising from an intelligent mind.
Complexity is another issue they deal in, and I think this is where the gaps issue comes into play and where most the criticism is voiced. Anyone is welcome to correct me if I'm off base.

I wrote to Meyer's group a while back, and asked them about the issue of function. I think function is much more important than complexity. For example, scissors are about as simple a device that you will find, but one knows that the function of scissors preceded the scissors themselves. In other words, the mind conceived an abstract idea and design, and then brought it into being.
Again, we can see examples all around us of how function preceeds design, and design preceeds the things actual existance. For example. Someone conceives the thought that it would be easier to be able to change the channel on the TV without having to get out of the chair. At this point, function exist. (ding, ding) But, only as an abstract thought. Then, that being conceives a design, (also abstract) and then the being creates the device. (abstract becomes actual) It would be absurd to say that the device was designed and then a function found for it. (not to say that accidental functions aren't a reality. A widgedoo may turn out to be a great door stop, but no one would infer that this is the function the widgedoo was designed for.)
So, we can ask the question, "what is the function of the eye? The circulatory system? the earth's atmosphere, the carbon cycle? etc." No one can deny a the function of an eye. No one can deny the funciton of logic or the mind? But how does a mindless, immaterial, purposeless universe account for function? It can't. It can only say that the function of the human eye, and its orchestration with all the other funcitioning systems in the human body are a result of slight changes over long periods of time. And that these slight changes plus time can take you from molecules to man. Now, the "rational, scientific" (cough) thing to do is to dismiss everything we KNOW and OBSERVE about function and gamble on slight changes + time getting us a human eye. I mean think about your eye for a moment, and what it is capable of. It's function is to see. But how does material know that seeing is better than not seeing? Especially considering that not seeing prevents any concept of sight to begin with. And how could material conceive "better" sight? HOw could it conceive the function of a tear duct, and the function of tears to lubricate the eye, and the function of an optic nerve to transmit information, and the function of a brain to interpret this information? Our world is saturated in function, yet a Darwinists has to willfully ignore the obvious to embrace the absurd. Function is just a by-product. But that is a problem because function, by definition, infers a purpose and design. So, science either has to say that nothing actually has a function, or that function is an illusion. Or, they have to willfully ignore what function points towards. Well, there is a 3rd option. And that is to follow where observation would lead.

The ID movement may be overly committed to irreduciable complexity, and at the expense of function, thus painting themselves into their own corner. It's sad because function is the elephant standing in the corner.

Very well said . Much better than I could have done

And this goes right to why I've become increasingly disinterested in the ID movement. They tend to major on things like irreducible complexity and fine tuning, but in doing so, are giving away the issue of function (or in traditional terms, teleology). This, to me, is massively problematic, because physics couldn't care less about function. In fact, when you really get into the nitty gritty of it, it turns out that a materialistic worldview fundamentally denies the reality of function all the way around. Function, it turns out, is a human invention. And the reason is exactly what Jlay so wonderfully pointed out -- even simple machines, like scissors, exist for a purpose, but that purpose logically precedes the thing's material composition. So we see teleology in human artifact (e.g., scissors), but it is absolutely obvious that a materialistic worldview cannot account for teleology in natural machines (e.g., the heart).

When IDers give away the teleological argument (which is exactly what Paley's watchmaker argument does), they give away not only the best argument in their arsenal, but they implicitly accept the notion that teleology either does not or cannot exist in nature. And that, I would suggest, is severely problematic. Granted, there are some versions of theism that are compatible with that view, but they all tend to be "ghost in the machine" type views--Newton and Paley's view that nature, including our bodies, is a grand machine, mechanistically determined by the interaction of passive materials governed by external force. And somehow, the spiritual is said to interact with this (in our case, the soul inhabits the body). So you have the introduction of things like the mind/body problem and the debate about how physical reality affects spiritual reality (and thus debates over things like occasionalism). The worst part is not that we allow ourselves to be forced to create and answer problems such as the ones just mentioned that may not be answerable, but we let materialists get away with the notion that the universe really is materialistic. They really can just ignore us. We can "do science" with them, so long as we all agree that nature is mechanistic. If we want to go back to our churches and seminary classrooms and see where a spiritual concept fits in that, they couldn't care less. Unicorns and tooth fairies.

So, to me, the bottom line is that the ID movement is creating a culture that is fundamentally opposed to theism. It's ironic in the definitional sense of the term, but ID is making it easier to be a practicing atheist (or, alternatively, for Christians to be practical atheists, intentionally or not!)

edit:

J, did you ever get a response back from Meyer's group?

Yes, Jac I did.

I simply asked them if they were aware of the criticisms from Classical Theist as it related to function. The response was cordial but the responder didn't seem too concerned or familiar with the objection. Unfortunately, we changed servers since then, and a lot of my old emails are history.

jlay wrote:I simply asked them if they were aware of the criticisms from Classical Theist as it related to function. The response was cordial but the responder didn't seem too concerned or familiar with the objection.

Hmm. Somehow, I'm not surprised. A bit disappointed, but not surprised. I spent quite a bit of time last year with several PhDs and MAs in philosophy (none of them Aristotelian save one), and pretty much all of them had a very surface understanding of it themselves. It's such a shame.

The funny thing is that secular philosophers of science are "rediscovering" Aristotle and they don't even know it. You should Google "the new essentialism" sometime. These guys are completely secular for the most part, and they say that they aren't going back to Aristotle, but if you really know Aristotle, you realize that they're doing just that (what they aren't doing is going back to the popular misconception of Aristotle's telos--as if inanimate objects' "purpose" was somehow conscious )

Unfortunately, we changed servers since then, and a lot of my old emails are history.

Doubly disappointing!

Interesting. I highly doubt an IDer would actually deny function, but maybe put it on their list of things they're attempting to prove instead of evidence? Surely Paley would agree that the watch has a "purpose" and the IDer thinks that design has a "function"? Feel more confused about what ID is trying to prove then I did going into this discussion... I'll agree that it could (and has been) construed in the way you two are mentioning, but I don't know that it has to take that form.

Full disclosure, I have some sympathy for at least certain ID-related arguments for probably self-serving arguments. One interesting thing when I first started looking into "proofs for God" was how most of the arguments could be reduced to a handful of arguments (although sometimes some of the best arguments are forgotten, unfortunately). The fine tuning argument was something that I thought about often before I knew its name or anything about the formal argument, so naturally when I found out that professionals argued about the very thing I thought about I gravitated toward that one. "It couldn't have just happened!" is one of the claims I hear most from those Christians with no apologetic training are confronted by secularists... and I do think that's sort of an intuitive argument that isn't without its validity when you get into it.

Another one (not ID related) is the principle of sufficient reason. Not a complicated one, but when I saw the fleshing out Alexander Pruss did of that particular argument I naturally gravitated to that as well. And once again, I think its an argument that a lot of people intuitively believe. Its interesting that its actually atheists who have to deny what most people believe is common sense and even then atheists tend to act like what they're denying actually does exist (but now I'm just getting off topic).