Against Platonism

[domokunrox]

No it doesn't. Read it again:

• 2. If God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition of His various properties

Look, Dom. IF God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition. That's definitional (on Platonism). Obviously, if God's properties ARE identical to one another, then God is not a composition (at least, not a composition of properties). But if they are NOT identical to one another, then He IS a composition of properties. He is composed of the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.

The only alternative to this is nominalism--that properties aren't real at all. If that's the case, then God isn't a composition of properties at all since there are no such thing as properties. Now, are you a nominalist? If not, then you believe that properties are real. And if properties are real, then they really exist in God. And if they really exist in God and are distinct from one another, then there are multiple really existent properties in God--which is to say, God is a composition of properties.

Then it appears that we disagree on what a composition is.

Because I disagree with...
Omniscient is (of identity) Omnipotent

I find this invalid, but just because I find this invalid doesn't mean someone who has both these attributes is a composition. We are NOT in any position to state a contradiction in relations of ideas.

So the property "being omniscient" is a real property in God; it is not the same as the property "being omnipotent," which is a real property in God. So you have TWO DISTINCT PROPERTIES IN GOD. If you take away the property "being omnipotent" such that it doesn't exist, then God changes. If that property doesn't exist, then God does not exemplify that property. Therefore, God is dependent on that property to exist the way He does.

That's not just an assertion. That's a necessary corollary. My eyes are blue--I exemplify the property "having blue eyes." If that property did not exist--if no one had that property--then I would be different from the way I am now. That is, the way I am now is dependent on that property. I am composed of that property and myriads of others. A Platonist is a realist, so he sees properties as really existing things. You can say Platonists are wrong in that, of course. You can then feel free to try to develop your own understanding of universals. If you aren't a Platonist and reject realism of all kinds, you are left with nominalism. So, again, are you a nominalist? I know you like Descrates. He was a nominalist. Are you following him there?

No, God is necessarily connected to his attributes. Its a relation of ideas.

Our understanding of God is that he has ALL POSSIBLE PERFECTIONS (or at Plantinga says "Maximal Greatness"). We understand what this means and it is COMPLETELY REAL, INNATE KNOWLEDGE. This is REALISM. God is THE reality.

So, let me clarify.
God has all possible perfections (Omniscient, Omnipotent, and so forth...) (Realism, Necessary connection)
but
Omniscient is (of identity) Omnipotent (or anything else) (Not valid proposition, Violates law of non-contradiction)

It follows easily. Here it is again:

• If God is dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does not exist a se, is not sovereign, and requires a cause of some sort to explain why this set of properties are so composed as to constitute God.

Again, notice the conditional--IF God is dependent on anything other than Himself. Is He? Well, if He is dependent on His properties, then the answer is "yes." If He is not dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does exist a se and is sovereign, and thus the premise doesn't apply. You need to watch the "ifs" and trace the flow of the argument better.

As far as sovereignty goes, it has a wide range of applications. If any one of them is violated then God is not sovereign. The particular aspect of sovereignty being violated here is His dependence on something else. I cannot claim to be sovereign over what I am dependent on.

None of this is at all controversial in the literature. Craig, Plantinga, and Moreland would agree with everything I've said so far (I get most of this from them!). Plantinga has simply suggested that we ought to reject the notion that God exists a se and that we redefine sovereignty and limit it to God's control over what He did create. Craig is in the middle of writing an entire book on the subject, so I don't know his solution yet. I'll read it when it comes out. For now, he's openly acknowledge in Philosophical Foundations that Platonism appears incompatible with God's aseity.

Well, my view is still biblical. Because God has all perfections, He is Sovereign. I don't find myself in any contradiction in this matter. I look forward to Craig's book, but I have a feeling I am going to disagree with him. Otherwise, I'm sticking with something like Plantinga's position.

A thing is a defined existent.
The first four "things" you mentioned are not "things" at all. They are non-things. What is a "thing" is the concept of a square circle. That CONCEPT is a thing. It just turns out that that concept refers to nothing in reality. A dream is a thing.

God is not a thing. He is not defined, nor is He an existent. God is Being, the technical jargon being "subsistent existence." Properties, however, are things (on realism, whether Platonic or Aristotelian), unless, of course, you are a nominalist (e.g., Ockham, Descartes).

That's why I titled this thread "Against Platonism." If you are a nominalist, then this thread has nothing to do with you. You can't read an argument against Platonism as a nominalist and then complain that the argument is using words in a way you, as a nominalist, wouldn't use it. But if you are not a nominalist, then you have to agree that properties are things (that is what non-nominalism IS). And if properties are THINGS, and God has properties, then you have THINGS in God. Moreover, if those THINGS are not identical with one another, then you have many THINGS in God, and God is dependent on those THINGS, since those THINGS make up His nature (e.g., would God be God if He didn't have the property of omniscience?).

So the real issue here is whether or not you are a nominalist. Are you?

No, I don't consider myself a nominalist. A nominalist is still anti-realist, and I'm as realist as they come. I'm not sure how to categorize myself.

Rational realist foundationalism, *shrug*.

[jlay]

I dont have near the philosophizen u two do. But i am curious by what authority is omniscience or omnipotence a property? I understand these are terms man has assigned to apprehend God. But since God is not a material object how can He have properties?

[domokunrox]

Jlay, that's an incredibly good question and I am glad you asked it.

"Property" is more of an Aristotelean word most of the time. "Substance" is another word that takes on another meaning as well that I don't agree with.

I tend to stick to words like attributes, or understanding. IMO, its just far better to say you understand instead of trying to make all kinds of claims like "properties" and "parts" to God. It just makes logical sense to say you understand why 1 attribute of God is not identical to another.

For example, we understand the doctrine of the trinity, but I wouldn't say its "parts". I would say that God has 3 dimensions that we can understand. Its perfect because if there wasn't Christ then God wouldn't have perfect love. If there was no Holy Spirit, then God wouldn't have perfect comfort for those who choose to love him back. Again, it just makes sense to say that you understand 1 dimension of God is not identical to the other because it wouldnt make logical sense when it HAS TO MAKE SENSE BECAUSE YOU UNDERSTAND THE REALITY.

So, yeah, good question, jlay.