Evidence for God from Science

Guys, the whole issue of the Ontological argument is, like WLC mentioned, IF.
IF once accepts A, then B can follow and that is a big "IF".

dom wrote: your opinion (for lack of a better word) sucks . . . you are very lost . . . Hilarious, right? . . . YOU LOSE! GOOD DAY, SIR!

I'm not arguing with a child. When you decide you want to act like an adult, let me know.

Jac, I appreciate your taking the high road on this, and not returning insults with Dom.

PaulSacramento wrote:Guys, the whole issue of the Ontological argument is, like WLC mentioned, IF.
IF once accepts A, then B can follow and that is a big "IF".

That doesn't help, Paul. EVERY argument works that way. Take the KCA:

That which comes into existence must have a cause
The universe came into existence
Therefore, the universe must have a cause

IF we accept A and IF we accept B, then C HAS to follow. That's the way argument works. And that is the whole problem with the OA. It just assumes that God is the type of thing that has to exist. If one denies that, then the argument doesn't work. If someone asks why they should accept it, you can't use the OA to prove it. You have to have a rather detailed discussion on the nature of existence, and once you have demonstrates why someone ought to accept it, then you don't need the OA anymore.

Actually, what the OA IS good at and what it IS useful for has nothing to do with demonstrating God exists, but everything to do with showing what properties God must have. As I said before, it works as something like a divine attribute generator. If the maximally great/greatest conceivable being (however you want to talk about it) really exists, then that which is the greatest must be attributed to it. So if it has power (which it must), then it must have maximum power, and thus, it must be omnipotent. If it has intelligence, it must have maximum intelligence, and thus must be omniscient. If it can love, it must be maximally loving, and thus it must be omnibenevolent. And so on.

So the OA is useful theologically. It is useful philosophically for grounding that theology in reason. But apologetically for proving God exists? It's an utter waste of time and it ought not be used. Stick with arguments that work.

Jac3510 wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:Guys, the whole issue of the Ontological argument is, like WLC mentioned, IF.
IF once accepts A, then B can follow and that is a big "IF".

That doesn't help, Paul. EVERY argument works that way. Take the KCA:

That which comes into existence must have a cause
The universe came into existence
Therefore, the universe must have a cause

IF we accept A and IF we accept B, then C HAS to follow. That's the way argument works. And that is the whole problem with the OA. It just assumes that God is the type of thing that has to exist. If one denies that, then the argument doesn't work. If someone asks why they should accept it, you can't use the OA to prove it. You have to have a rather detailed discussion on the nature of existence, and once you have demonstrates why someone ought to accept it, then you don't need the OA anymore.

Actually, what the OA IS good at and what it IS useful for has nothing to do with demonstrating God exists, but everything to do with showing what properties God must have. As I said before, it works as something like a divine attribute generator. If the maximally great/greatest conceivable being (however you want to talk about it) really exists, then that which is the greatest must be attributed to it. So if it has power (which it must), then it must have maximum power, and thus, it must be omnipotent. If it has intelligence, it must have maximum intelligence, and thus must be omniscient. If it can love, it must be maximally loving, and thus it must be omnibenevolent. And so on.

So the OA is useful theologically. It is useful philosophically for grounding that theology in reason. But apologetically for proving God exists? It's an utter waste of time and it ought not be used. Stick with arguments that work.

Actually, you example is NOT an "IF" one at all.
We KNOW that everything that exists (in our universe)has a cause and a beginning, there is no if's about that.
That is not the same as stating ..."If everything that exists has a cause..." because that implies the possibility that something may not have a cause so for the premiss to be disregarded all one has to do is accept the possibility that something may not need a cause.

As for the Ontological argument, it works to whatever degree one accepts the "IF" part of it.

PaulSacramento wrote:Actually, you example is NOT an "IF" one at all.
We KNOW that everything that exists (in our universe)has a cause and a beginning, there is no if's about that.
That is not the same as stating ..."If everything that exists has a cause..." because that implies the possibility that something may not have a cause so for the premiss to be disregarded all one has to do is accept the possibility that something may not need a cause.

As for the Ontological argument, it works to whatever degree one accepts the "IF" part of it.

You seem to be confusing a hypothetical with a categorical syllogism. That's just a matter of form. Any hypothetical can be converted to to a categorical and vice-versa.

The KCA is stated as a categorical, obviously. But, just as with a hypothetical, every premise in a categorical syllogism requires affirming. That's true of the OA, the KCA, and everything in between. I mean, let's look at Plantinga's and Anselm's versions of the OA to demonstrate this rather clearly:

Anselm:

• 1. Suppose (with the fool) that God exists in the understanding alone.
  2. Given our definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
  3. But this being can be conceived to exist in reality. That is, we can conceive of a circumstance in which theism is true, even if we do not believe that it actually obtains.
  4. But it is greater for a thing to exist in reality than for it to exist in the understanding alone.
  5. Hence we seem forced to conclude that a being than which none greater can be conceived can be conceived to be greater than it is.
  6. But that is absurd.
  7. So (1) must be false. God must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.

Plantinga:

• 1. It is possible that a maximally excellent being exists
  2. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists in a possible world
  3. If a maximally excellent being exists in a possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds.
  4. If a maximally excellent being exists in every possible world, then it exists in reality.
  5. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.

Notice that in neither of these is there an "IF" statement. The important premise in Anselm is (4). IF we take that to be true, then the argument follows pretty easily. In Plantinga, the important premise is actually (1). IF we take that to be true, then the argument follows rather easily. I think that Plantinga's version is better stated, but it makes the circularity of the whole notion easier to see, too. He may as well say, "It is possible for God to exist necessarily," which sounds innocuous enough, but really is incredibly controversial. It SOUNDS innocuous, because the word "possible," but in the strict language of the logic, "possible" doesn't mean "it might or might not be the case that." Rather, following (2), what it means is that it is actually the case that God exists necessarily in a possible world. So the real question for Plantinga is whether or not the notion of God as existing necessarily is true in ANY possible world. His argument just assumes--or better--asserts that it is.

Anyway, my point is just that in both Anselm and Plantinga, the argument is easy to accept IF you accept the driving principle--for Plantinga it is (1) and for Anselm it is (4). But these aren't in a hypothetical construction. That shows that the "IF" applies to all types of argumentation, including the Kalam. Returning to that example, the big argument isn't really over (1)--although some, of course, do dispute it for a variety of reasons (I discuss some of them here if you want something to read). This important premise--important in the sense that it is comparable to Plantinga's (1) and Anselm's (4)--in the KCA is (2). Did the universe come into existence? Science seems to suggest as much, and some philosophers think that is provable. Other philosophers don't think it's provable by shear reason (I'm in that school of thought), and many scientists think that the Standard Model needs to be refined and that it does the universe did NOT come into existence. Now, whether you think the philosophers or scientists are right is neither here nor there. My point is imply that the KCA is built on a big IF -- IF (2) is true, then the conclusion follows.

So, bottom line, to say that the OA is true IF one accepts certain ideas isn't helpful at all. That's true with all types of arguments.

So, bottom line, to say that the OA is true IF one accepts certain ideas isn't helpful at all. That's true with all types of arguments.

Perhaps BUT IF is pretty much the foundation of the OA.
I can argue that IF 1+1 = 3 then 3-1 = 1 BUT the only way to accept that is to disregard what we KNOW to be true.
The OA is based on a view that can't be verified and is based on take IF above anything else.
ex:
Plantinga:

1. It is possible that a maximally excellent being exists
2. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists in a possible world
3. If a maximally excellent being exists in a possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds.
4. If a maximally excellent being exists in every possible world, then it exists in reality.
5. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.

Well, there is no reason to admit the possibility of 1, to begin with BUT evne if we did, we have to take another "leap" AND accept the "IF" in point number 3, so we have 3 big "IF's"
1) The possibility of a max excellent being
2( that being existing in a possible world
3) IF all the above is true, we still have to possibly accept that it can exist in ALL possible worlds.

My point is that the argument is not a strong one UNLESS one is willing to start from the position of IF and since I am not ( using me as an example) then the argument doesn't work at all.

Actually, (3) in Plantinga is pretty non-controversial. But let that pass a moment. Answer me this: how is it different to say we have to accept (1) in Plantinga for the argument to follow and say that we have to accept (2) in the KCA? Or, to put the same question differently, why is it that having to accept (1) in Plantinga's OA makes this an "IF" argument moreso than having to accept the (2) in the KCA?

Jac3510 wrote:Actually, (3) in Plantinga is pretty non-controversial. But let that pass a moment. Answer me this: how is it different to say we have to accept (1) in Plantinga for the argument to follow and say that we have to accept (2) in the KCA? Or, to put the same question differently, why is it that having to accept (1) in Plantinga's OA makes this an "IF" argument moreso than having to accept the (2) in the KCA?

Not sure why you would think that 3) in Plantig's argument is non-controversial...even if we beleive in a a max excellent being in a possibel world, there is no reason to believe that being can exist in all possible worlds.

But in regards to the KCA, it requires a "less" leap simply because our experience shows the FACT that all things that come into being have a cause in this universe.
Our experience does NOT show that for the OA.

PaulS wrote:
Not sure why you would think that 3) in Plantig's argument is non-controversial...even if we beleive in a a max excellent being in a possibel world, there is no reason to believe that being can exist in all possible worlds.

A max possible being would have to be omnipresent, or he wouldn't be the maximum possible being. And being omnipresent would mean he would have to exist in all possible worlds.

RickD wrote:

PaulS wrote:
Not sure why you would think that 3) in Plantig's argument is non-controversial...even if we beleive in a a max excellent being in a possibel world, there is no reason to believe that being can exist in all possible worlds.

A max possible being would have to be omnipresent, or he wouldn't be the maximum possible being. And being omnipresent would mean he would have to exist in all possible worlds.

That assumes that when we accept a maximally excellent being we associate that excellence with Omnipresence and all the other "omnis" right?

PaulSacramento wrote:

RickD wrote:

PaulS wrote:
Not sure why you would think that 3) in Plantig's argument is non-controversial...even if we beleive in a a max excellent being in a possibel world, there is no reason to believe that being can exist in all possible worlds.

A max possible being would have to be omnipresent, or he wouldn't be the maximum possible being. And being omnipresent would mean he would have to exist in all possible worlds.

That assumes that when we accept a maximally excellent being we associate that excellence with Omnipresence and all the other "omnis" right?

Well, yaaaaa!

(3) is not controversial because it is embedded in (1). That is, a maximally excellent being must exist in all possible worlds, and if it doesn't, then it is not maximally excellent, insofar as it could be more excellent still if it so existed in all other worlds. That, by the way, is in turn built on his distinction between excellence and greatness . . . all of that is just to say it's definitional. If you reject (3), it is because you have rejected (1).

As to the KCA v OA, so, for you, the difference is only in the relative audacity of the driving premise? So it's easier for you to accept (2) of the KCA than it is (1) of Plantinga's OA (or (4) of Anselm's), and therefore, the KCA is not an "IF" but the OA is?

You do realize that people who find (2) of the KCA incredible would be just as incredulous of it as they are the OA, right? And someone like dom who thinks they understand the argument and are persuaded by it is unlikely to claim that the OA is any more of a leap than the KCA is. So you're going to need to do better than suggest that the difference in the premises is one relativity in difficulty. If you can't find any objective differences--and I contend you can't--I restate yet again what I've been saying to you all along: appealing to the "if" nature doesn't help us one iota.

fdit:

Crossposting -- I think the little exchange between yo u and Rick well illustrates my first paragraph and why the real issue is (1) and not (3).

So, maximally excellent = Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent, correct?
Based on WHOS definition of "maximally excellent'?

Guys, as you know I agree with the OA and even more so the KCA, BUT I am coming from this from thr view point of the skeptic and, from there, the OA holds less water than the KCA.

I can, as a skeptic, agree that everything that has a beginning must have a cause because I KNOW that to be the case.
I do NOT know that a maximally excellent being exists and even IF I agreed, I don't have to accept that a max excellent being has to be anytong other than excellent and excellent is NOT defined as ALL anything.
Definition of EXCELLENT
1
archaic : superior
2
: very good of its kind : eminently good : first-class

PaulS (playing the role of skeptic ) wrote:
So, maximally excellent = Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent, correct?
Based on WHOS definition of "maximally excellent'?

First, I believe that's Plantinga's definition, and it's his argument. Second, it would have to logically be THE definition. Any maximally excellent being would have to have those attributes, because omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, etc. are the maximum.

I do NOT know that a maximally excellent being exists and even IF I agreed, I don't have to accept that a max excellent being has to be anytong other than excellent and excellent is NOT defined as ALL anything.

Then as a skeptic, you'd not be honest. Shame on you, skeptic.