Evidence for God from Science

Jac3510 wrote:I agree with you that (2) is deeply problematic. That premise assumes that the universe cannot be necessary of its own nature (one of the options he allows in (1)). But why make that assumption? Granted, Craig calls God a necessary being, but what makes God necessary and the universe not? Hume recognized just this issue. On this point, I would highly recommend you read Erik Wielenberg's “Dawkins’s Gabmit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity,” Philosophia Christi 11 (2009): 113-27.

Jac, after reading that I am interested in which definition you, or even predominant Christian philosophers (of divine simplicity) would endorse?

Although divine simplicity may end up needing its own thread, it is ironically a lot to think about

Definition of what, exactly? Of simplicity? Necessity? Sorry, I'm unclear on what you are asking.

Jac3510 wrote:Definition of what, exactly? Of simplicity? Necessity? Sorry, I'm unclear on what you are asking.

Sorry, I mean there are three definitions of God used in that paper, and I would assume divine simplicity falls under (3) since that is what is covered. I'm just not sure if that definition is sometimes modified in any way to reject Hume's criticisms, or if that definition is perfectly use able.

"(GH3)There exists a necessary, nonphysical, simple, superhuman, supernatural intelligence that created the universe and has no external explanation."

Basically, Hume's criticisms aren't dealt with in the paper but Dawkins' are. Do you know of a paper that deals with another, modified version of (GH3) to reject Hume or is (GH3) defended how it is.

Ah, I see. Yes, I accept GH3, as do all classical theists. Unfortunately, almost all (popular) Christian philosophers reject it these days in favor of GH2. There are a lot of reasons for that -- there has been a major impact from process philosophy whether they want to admit it or not, and the rise of Molinism has had a lot to do with it, too.

Anyway, if you adopt GH3, then Hume's criticisms are dealt with. The argument of the paper can be summed up simply, insofar as it just presents a trilemma:

• 1. Dawkins' argument presupposes and is effective against GH1, which no one really holds (except, perhaps, Mormons); it is ineffective against GH2; but
  2. Hume's argument presupposes and is effective against GH2, which most modern philosophers hold (except classical theists); it is ineffective against GH3; but
  3. Contemporary Christian scholars tend to reject GH3 for a variety of reasons;
  4. Therefore, theists must either accept GH1, GH2, or GH3; but
  • 4a. If they accept GH1, then they must account for Dawkins' argument; or
    4b. If they accept GH2, then they must account for Hume's argument; or
    4c. If they accept GH3, then they must account for various Christian scholars' arguments (e.g., WLC, Alvin Plantinga, etc.).

Now, as I said above, I think that Dawkins and Hume are right regarding their respective criticisms. Dawkins is just laughable because he thinks he's attacking a common view of God. But Hume is much more subtle, and I think that Christians have not seriously considered his argument from Dialogues 9. The only way I see out of it is to adopt divine simplicity.

Going back to the OP, that's why Craig's argument doesn't work. In order for it to work, he has to assume GH3, but he does not. He accepts GH2. The problem is that there is no way to justify the second premise of his argument on GH2.

As far as resources go, I wrote a thesis on it in my blog, but as Rick has noted, it's rather technical. I'm going to try to put it in easier language next year. In the meantime, if you want to do some research on the subject, I would highly recommend reading Edward Feser's Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide and The Last Superstition. While neither are written in direct response to Hume, if you grasp what he writes in those books (and he is an excellent writer and teacher!), then I think you'll have more than enough at your disposal to see the weakness in the Dialogues.

edit: In other words, GH3 is perfectly usable, overcomes Hume's argument as stated (and by extension, Dawkins'), and is one I would endorse. Most contemporary Christian philosophers, though, reject it (unfortunately) in preference for GH2.

Jac3510 wrote:And as usual, dom continues to show that he doesn't understand what he's talking about and is unfamiliar with current literature and state of the debate.

Uh, no. Apparently, it you who is unfamiliar or just simply inexperienced here. If you really feel this way, then it seems that you're either years behind on this issue, I'm years ahead of you, or you're just playing devil's advocate here. Atheists and some other Agnostics have made objections that are similar or exactly to what you've shown in recent years. They are wrong. Every single time.

I don't debate him anymore for that very reason. If anyone wishes to read the paper I linked to, which is a professional philosophical analysis, and they are free to do so. And if they wish to take dom's word for it then that's fine too. I have made my case and I'm fine with it.

You don't think I read the paper you linked to? This "professional philosophical analysis" is actually just amateur hour if what you are presenting is an objection to the LCA.

(GH1)There exists a contingent, physical, complex,superhuman, supernatural intelligence that created the universe and has no external
explanation.

An explanation DOES NOT REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION! Thats a fallacy! Nevermind that the description is incorrect anyway. The word "complex" is arbitrary.

(GH2)There exists a necessary, nonphysical, complex, superhuman, supernatural intelligence that created the universe and has no external explanation.

An explanation DOES NOT REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION! Again, a fallacy! Nevermind that this description is also wrong. The word "complex" is arbitrary.

(GH3)There exists a necessary, nonphysical, simple, superhuman, supernatural intelligence that created the universe and has no external explanation.

An explanation DOES NOT REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION! Again, a fallacy! Description is, again, wrong. The word "Simple" is arbitrary.

(GH3a) There exists a necessary, nonphysical, simple, largely incomprehensible something-or-other that created the universe and
has no external explanation

An explanation DOES NOT REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION! Again, a fallacy! The word "Simple" is arbitrary.

Also, now this thing is a "largely incomprehensible something or other"?

You know what this reminds me of?

Einstein wrote:The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible

Look Jac, its one thing to come into a discussion and say something is a bad argument because of X
But when you're argument is "Its a bad argument because its a BLANK of the gaps (A epistemological strawman) and heres how I deal with it (Divine simplicity), then what you're really doing is just being a Shill for a Divine simplicity doctrine.

I'm not saying don't offer solutions, but when you're saying that atheists have a good argument against the existence of God (That argument doesn't exist, I assure you), so instead deal with the gap argument with a doctrine I endorse, then you're just a Shill. I don't even do that with any piece of philosophy I subscribe to, and I"m pretty hard and abrasive on people.

You should rethink you're contribution here.

Wao...maybe a simpler argument can be use for this class. I like this one:
1-Everything that begins to exists has a cause
2-The universe (time and space) began to exist
3-The Universe has a cause

Now
1-Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2-Time and space began to exist
3-The cause of time and space is outside it
4-That cause has to me timeless and spaceless

Then
1-God by definition is outside time and space
2-We know time and space have a beginning
3-Since everything that begins most have a cause
4-God created the beginning of time and space

I think that mostly universally, the concept of God is that he never had a beginning, he is infinite. Forced to consider this then these arguments could help. But if your God is contingent to some type or other of time then it wouldn't work. I have an atheist friend that rejects the notion of an uncaused cause, because he says everything has to have a cause!

Echoside wrote:

Jac3510 wrote:I agree with you that (2) is deeply problematic. That premise assumes that the universe cannot be necessary of its own nature (one of the options he allows in (1)). But why make that assumption? Granted, Craig calls God a necessary being, but what makes God necessary and the universe not? Hume recognized just this issue. On this point, I would highly recommend you read Erik Wielenberg's “Dawkins’s Gabmit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity,” Philosophia Christi 11 (2009): 113-27.

(1) The universe has to be contingent.It can't be necessary unless it's totally deterministic, that's too problematic to accept.It has to be contingent because it's the product of causes (Big bang) and it's collection of things that are themselves contingent.

That is not the fallacy of composition becuase every part in the natural world is contingent. If all the parts are the same we can make a generalization about composition. The Nizkor project:

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacie ... ition.html

" It must be noted that reasoning from the properties of the parts to the properties of the whole is not always fallacious. If there is justification for the inference from parts to whole, then the reasoning is not fallacious. For example, if every part of the human body is made of matter, then it would not be an error in reasoning to conclude that the whole human body is made of matter. Similiarly, if every part of a structure is made of brick, there is no fallacy comitted when one concludes that the whole structure is made of brick."


(2) "God a necessary being, but what makes God necessary and the universe not?" Hume was wrong. God and the world are not on a par. God is eternal and the world is not. God created the world (if God exists he created the world) that means it is contingent upon him. He is not continent becasue he was not created was always was.

Metacrock wrote:

Echoside wrote:

Jac3510 wrote:I agree with you that (2) is deeply problematic. That premise assumes that the universe cannot be necessary of its own nature (one of the options he allows in (1)). But why make that assumption? Granted, Craig calls God a necessary being, but what makes God necessary and the universe not? Hume recognized just this issue. On this point, I would highly recommend you read Erik Wielenberg's “Dawkins’s Gabmit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity,” Philosophia Christi 11 (2009): 113-27.

(1) The universe has to be contingent.It can't be necessary unless it's totally deterministic, that's too problematic to accept.It has to be contingent because it's the product of causes (Big bang) and it's collection of things that are themselves contingent.

That is not the fallacy of composition becuase every part in the natural world is contingent. If all the parts are the same we can make a generalization about composition. The Nizkor project:

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacie ... ition.html

" It must be noted that reasoning from the properties of the parts to the properties of the whole is not always fallacious. If there is justification for the inference from parts to whole, then the reasoning is not fallacious. For example, if every part of the human body is made of matter, then it would not be an error in reasoning to conclude that the whole human body is made of matter. Similiarly, if every part of a structure is made of brick, there is no fallacy comitted when one concludes that the whole structure is made of brick."


(2) "God a necessary being, but what makes God necessary and the universe not?" Hume was wrong. God and the world are not on a par. God is eternal and the world is not. God created the world (if God exists he created the world) that means it is contingent upon him. He is not continent becasue he was not created was always was.

You're not taking Hume seriously enough here. In the first place, you don't get to just declare that it's too problematic to accept that the world is deterministic. On the contrary, quite a few philosophers (theistic and atheistic) have accepted just that proposition. But more to the point, if we allow composition in God, then we are allowing that a composite being can be necessary. The way classical theists denied the necessity of the world was by denying the necessity of any composite being; in other words, all composite beings are contingent. This is something even Christian philosophers have recognized. Alvin Plantinga actually goes so far as to reject God's aseity (traditionally defined) on this very fact. He agrees that God is a contingent being, insofar as He is contingent on His parts (e.g., the properties of omniscience, omnipresence, etc.). He, though, is a Platonist, and he believes in the literal existence of the "Platonic menagerie" (his term). Of course, each of the items in that menagerie are non-composite (that is to say, simple), so he doesn't have a problem with saying God is necessary in a derived way--He is necessarily composed in a necessarily unique way of necessarily existent (simple) properties that He and He alone possesses.

What Hume points out, though, is that if we allow this kind of "necessity," then there is nothing preventing us from making the same claim about the universe. The universe certainly appears contingent. Things in our daily experience are obviously contingent. Yet if we are to allow by fiat that God is necessary in His complexity even though we cannot explain it, then goose and gander, we cannot fault the atheist for arguing that at some (unknown) point there can be some property of necessity in the universe itself. Again, it would be the same kind of necessity that Plantinga allows in God. The whole is necessary in a derived sense, in that it is necessary composed of necessary parts necessary arranged in this or that way for necessary reasons. That we do not know and cannot explain that necessity does not matter, for neither can Plantinga know or explain the necessity of God. It is simply something he declares.

On this, Hume is correct. The only answer is indeed the right answer. No composite being (even God, if He is composite) is necessary. Only simple beings can be declared necessary. The universe, however, is not simple. God is, and therefore God (and God alone) can be declared necessary.

edit:

I really would recommend you read the article I linked to. It is very helpful on this matter.

Jac3510 wrote: What Hume points out, though, is that if we allow this kind of "necessity," then there is nothing preventing us from making the same claim about the universe. The universe certainly appears contingent. Things in our daily experience are obviously contingent. Yet if we are to allow by fiat that God is necessary in His complexity even though we cannot explain it, then goose and gander, we cannot fault the atheist for arguing that at some (unknown) point there can be some property of necessity in the universe itself. Again, it would be the same kind of necessity that Plantinga allows in God. The whole is necessary in a derived sense, in that it is necessary composed of necessary parts necessary arranged in this or that way for necessary reasons. That we do not know and cannot explain that necessity does not matter, for neither can Plantinga know or explain the necessity of God. It is simply something he declares.

Cleanthes' Gambit (from Hume) as presented in Wielenberg's article, has following two premises (and others (3)-(5) depend on them):

Wielenberg wrote: (1) Either (a) the natural universe exists contingently and was created
by a necessarily existing complex God or (b) the natural universe
itself exists necessarily.

(2) (a) and (b) account for the existence of the natural universe equally
well, and (b) is simpler than (a).

where in (2), it would be unnecessary to select (a), since (b) is more simple. And as I understand it, this would be at odds with the PSR's step 4). Basicly, the claim in (2) seems to be that the universe as it happens now is so self-evident, that it does not need an explanation at all.

I understand PSR so that it tries to find reason for all things, and then classifies accordingly. The Cleanthes's Gambit appears false, because it is hard to see why the universe would happen to exist as it is, necessarily. It is easy to comprehend various scenarions how universum could happen different as it is now (in contrast to what is the case for e. g. mathematics). For example, a universum (i. e. collection of contingent things) could exist e. g. without life. In order to have necessary universe, there would need to be only one possible actualization how it could happen, so that it could still be called as universe, which is clearly not the case. So therefore, happening of this actual universe needs a sufficient reason to explain it.

It is easy to comprehend various scenarions how universum could happen different as it is now

You're begging the question. If the PSR can leave us with one composite being (God), then it can in principle leave us with any composite being (e.g., the universe). What Hume shows is that the moment you allow, in principle, a composite being to be the necessary being--that is, the moment you allow a composite being to satisfy the requirements of the PSR--then the universe itself may qualify for such a being. For you to just assert that the universe doesn't work because it could be other than it is begs the question because you are assuming the very thing you are trying to prove: namely, that the universe is not necessary. Hume can say that it must be necessary--or, at least, we are logically bound to regard it as necessary--precisely via the PSR. After all, if something MUST exist, and the universe does exist, then the universe MUST exist, and that as it does. To just assert it could exist otherwise doesn't prove anything because it does not, in fact, exist otherwise. So perhaps it is merely an illusion to suggest that the universe could be other than it is. This is all the more obvious if we admit a multiverse in which an infinite number of universes exist.

In short, you don't get to just assert that since the universe is a composite thing it cannot be necessary but then turn around and say that God is both composite and necessary. For the moment you attempt to say, "There is some reason we don't know why God must exist as He does," then you must admit the same possibility to Hume regarding the universe. And since Hume's universe requires less beings, then Ockham's razor binds us to reject God as a necessary inference.

With that said, what I'm arguing is that we can use Hume's argument to our advantage. What he rightly shows is that either 1) a composite being can be a necessary being, or else 2) only a simple being can be a necessary being. If we insist God is composite, we must opt for the former, but in that case, the universe may be just as necessary as God and we ought to reject the theistic argument. But, in point of fact, it is obvious that (1) is false. A composite being cannot be necessary, which is what your intuition is telling you with reference to the universe. Therefore, we should adopt (2). And since the universe is not simple, it cannot be the necessary being. We should therefore assert that God exists and that He is simple.

Jac3510 wrote: With that said, what I'm arguing is that we can use Hume's argument to our advantage. What he rightly shows is that either 1) a composite being can be a necessary being, or else 2) only a simple being can be a necessary being. If we insist God is composite, we must opt for the former, but in that case, the universe may be just as necessary as God and we ought to reject the theistic argument. But, in point of fact, it is obvious that (1) is false. A composite being cannot be necessary, which is what your intuition is telling you with reference to the universe. Therefore, we should adopt (2). And since the universe is not simple, it cannot be the necessary being. We should therefore assert that God exists and that He is simple.

As I understand, the point made is that anything (complex) else than universe would share same composition-type than the universe. Therefore, if a composite being can exist by nature of its necessity, the universe can also (and finally, parsimonian principle applies). The 'an explanation' (in PSR's No (2) ) cannot be anything composite, because otherwise 'an explanation' would still have explanation for its composition. Yes, Hume seems to be correct in here, and then option 4c

Jac3510 wrote: 4c. If they accept GH3, then they must account for various Christian scholars' arguments (e.g., WLC, Alvin Plantinga, etc.).

would be the only one left. The 'an explanation' is not explained by anything else but itself. I have to admit though, that I am not aware of problems in GH3 given by Craig, Plantinga, etc.

But then, Hume has another problem for GH3 as well. Why to demand intelligible explanation for the universe, when we are any case left with something simple, but incomprehensible? We could maybe say that the beginning of the universe is something incomprehensible, yet non-theistic, when theism is considered somehow more complex explanation. So basicly, if we are left with incomprehensible explanation anycase, shouldn't we apply parsimonian princible again? Then we would be left with something incomprehesible that is non-theistic (while still rejecting physical explanation for the universe, though).

Wielenberg, citing Hume's Dialogues wrote: Cleanthes, for his part, at one point rhetorically asks Demea:
“[H]ow do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of
the Deity, differ from skeptics or atheists, who assert that the first cause of all
is unknown and unintelligible?” Through the characters of Cleanthes and
Demea, Hume seeks to highlight the tension between the God Who Explains
and the God Who is Simple. The greater this tension, the more obscure is
(GH3). One worry lurking here is that (GH3) turns out to be equivalent to
this hypothesis:

• (GH3a) There exists a necessary, nonphysical, simple, largely incomprehensible
  something-or-other that created the universe and
  has no external explanation.

In Wielenberg's (GH3a) modification to (GH3), 'largely incomprehensible something-or-other' seems to point to a mind due to lack of other viable options, where mind is a substance which cannot be explained completely without itself, due to free will. An intelligent simple mind is better explanation (explaining the universe that is rationally understandable, non-chaotic) than just plain 'incomprehensibility' (offering no explanation for such thing), thus consideration of leaving it out must be rejected. PSR's 'an explanation' should be therefore 'a simple mind that has no external explanation'.

While this doesn't seem to point to a certain mind directly, I see no reason why it wouldn't be compatible with PSR's God. It looks like there is a gap of reasonings between 'an explanation' and God, but that alone doesn't rebut its reasoning to GH3a (otherwise saying would be moving the goalposts). The 'an explanation' may be God for other reasons outside PSR.