Y'all please don't feel the trolls.
The epistemology v ontology issue is, of course, important. It's worth noting that nothing in my argument provides an attempt to offer an explanation of how we know whether this or that is wrong. But this is a really important thing for us to understand so that we see the real power of argument. Look at these sentences:
- Slavery is wrong.
Slavery is not wrong.
Ice cream is evil.
Humility is good.
Protecting the environment is good.
Disagreeing with Jac is wicked.
Agreeing with Kenny is righteous.
So all of these statements employ moral language of the A type. It is obvious that they all cannot be true. But that isn't the question my argument poses. My question is, is it possible that any even
could be true? If so, then objective moral values exist. Why? Because
in order to be true, we must meaningfully predicate moral language to acts themselves, and that presupposes objective moral value.
Put differently, if objective moral values do NOT exist, then all of those sentences are reduced to b2 type sentences. But if all of those are to be understood in that sense, then none of them are either true or false. That is, if there are no objective moral truths, then none of those sentences have any truth value, and as such, none of them are either true or false.
Thus, when someone asks, "Well, how do you know if X is really wrong then?" we respond, "First, you tell me if it is even
possible for anything, including X, to be wrong." If so, then they have admitted that they are predicating moral language to acts, and therefore, they have admitted objective moral values exist, per the second premise of the argument. On the other hand, if someone asks, "Well, I don't think that X is wrong," then we ask, "Ok, then what is something you
do think is wrong (or right, for that matter)?" Whatever they answer, "Well, I don't think that X is wrong, but I do think Y is," then they've again admitted to the argument from moral predication.
Again:
the moment anyone states that anything is right or wrong, they have predicating moral language to acts and have therefore assumed that objective moral values exist. The argument about whether or not we are CORRECT in predicating moral language is entirely immaterial. It is only related in that if I mistakenly attribute moral language to something--for instance, if I think lying is permissible but it turns out upon further investigation that I was wrong--then I have, again, admitted to the existence of objective moral values.
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And Byblos, I don't think this argument can be used to prove just anything exists. It works with objective moral values because we think that our predication of moral values is meaningful. If we deny that such predication is meaningful, then we deny the thing in question is real. Take these sentences:
- Fleebistats are blue.
Fleebistats are heavy.
Fleebistats are not nice.
So we know what blue, heavy, and not nice all mean. But do these propositions mean anything? Of course not, because there is no such thing as a Fleebistat. That is, "blue" doesn't have a referent. It doesn't answer to anything whatsoever in reality. Put more philosophically, the accident "blue" doesn't inhere in anything, and therefore, the language is meaningless.
In my argument, the question is whether or not the sentence "Slavery is wrong" is meaningful. Note well:
it doesn't matter whether the sentence is true. That's where trolls play. The question is whether or not it could even be true in principle. Perhaps we may study the issue and find out that it is true. Or perhaps we may study it and find out it is false. Both both the truthfulness and falseness of the proposition both presume that the proposition could possibly be true--that is, that it is the type of sentence that is meaningful. If the sentence, though, reduces to a b2 type sentence ("I prefer there be no slavery") then the proposition is neither true nor false, because the sentence has no truth value. That, of course, is why Kenny's idiotic attempts to say that his beliefs about something being right and wrong are enough to ground objective moral value are just that: idiotic. Either his belief is predicating moral language to the act itself (a b1 type statement), which is therefore reducible to an A type statement, and therefore objective moral values exist; or else his belief is employing moral language to convey his preferences (a b2 type statement), which therefore means that no objective moral values exist and, in fact, his statement that his opinion is that slavery is wrong is, strictly speaking, meaningless at best and false at worst.
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And K, the answer isn't to beat someone who thinks that slavery is okay. It's to
enslave them. Once they are enslaved, ask them if they think it's okay.
But again, may I encourage you all . . .