Evidence for God from Science

Actually, K, I think we might be making a lot of progress. The bottom line up front is that the root of the issue may be our use of the word "substance." I'll get to that, but let me address the rest of your posts as well.

1. Regarding the basis of philosophy, I don't think we are that far apart. As you said yourself:

I do start out embracing "being", and I guess immediately thereafter myself. I just do not embrace my existence based on logical reasoning (which I don't see as possible), but rather I embraced my existence based on what I call a practical rationality. With a foundation to begin from, I begin reaching and accepting other conclusions.

I particularly appreciate your emphasis on practical rationality. Let me say, again, that when I start with being, I am not starting with my being, but rather, with being generally. That says nothing of whether or not all things are one or not (an issue that plagued the Greeks) . . . perhaps, at this stage, anyway, the post-moderns are exactly right in most of their challenges to our ability to really know anything. Perhaps everything is only a single substance. Fine. What, I think, is evident is that something exists, even if it isn't you. That leads to the question, "What do you mean by existence?" And that, I think, is where good philosophy starts. Let me put it this way:

The basis of philosophy is reality: that which is.
The first question is metaphysics: what is that which is?
The second question is epistemology: how do we know that which is?
The third question is linguistics: how do we communicate what we know?
The final question is hermenutics: how do we understand what we communicate?

The problem with Descarte--and pretty much all modern philosophy (thanks, in large part, to Kant)--is that it starts with epistemology. It asks, "What can I know?" But what is the implied subject of "to know"? Actually, Descarte is asking, "What can I know about reality?" because knowledge must be about something to be knowledge at all. Thus, you have to define what "reality" is, which is the study of metaphysics and being, before you can ask the epistemological question of how it is known.

In light of all that, I point out that the question of the nature of humans--what and how we are--is metaphysical and thus comes before epistemology. Perhaps much to the chagrin of many Christians, I don't think we need the first word of Scripture to understand what a human is, although I thoroughly expect Scripture to shed additional light. Such is the nature of progressive revelation.

Finally, on this, I see why you say you start with God. In the sense that you actually start with being, I can agree. A proper study of being leads necessarily to God's existence in that it discovers subsistent existence, which is a fancy way of pointing to your argument from contingency. I would, then, be interested in your thoughts on the above, as I think our differences may be in nuance and wording, not anything deeply substantial.

2. Which leads to substance. You are right that I don't agree that God is a substance, on which I am following Aquinas. For me, God cannot be a substance because "He is not the subject of any accidents, but also because in Him essence and existence are identical, and consequently He is not included in any genus whatever."

Now, I can understand, I think, why you take the view of substance you do. It's not too different from the classical definition, as that which "stands under" the thing itself and receives the characteristics and properties we call accidents. It is, in a word, fundamental, and the important idea is that it is in itself (unlike redness, say, which is not in itself, but in the substance). Descarte defined substance as "a being that so exists as to require nothing else for its existence," which I would expect you to reject, for the simple reason that, as a Christian, the only thing that requires nothing for its own existence is God. There are philosophical problems with such a definition as well, such as the fact that it leaves no room for efficient causality, but we can leave all that aside, as I don't think it applies to you.

For me, then, I don't see how a thing can be a substance if it does not have both form and matter, for matter without form is in fact no thing, and form without matter may be a universal, but certainly not an individual, and only individual things can have properties. That is why I don't see either form or matter as being a substance, but rather, a thing is a substance when it has both form and matter. So if you understand substance as something having both form and matter, I fall back on all my original problems. Your view seems a bit different. You say that substance isn't just form, but that forms themselves are substance, which implies that substances underly form. I can only assume that, for you, substance also underlies matter? I'm not sure, then, how you would actually define substance . . . "the thing that underlies form or matter" . . . or "a thing that can have properties," but then we fall back on the definition of "thing," which would be hard to define without referring to substance.

In any case, if you can work out a consistent set of definitions here, then I actually don't think I would have a problem with your view of substance dualism, as you wouldn't seem to require the soul to be a substance in the same sense that I would use the word, and, as such, it could almost be more like an aspect, as I have described earlier, though I don't know how you would feel about that characterization. I'm very much looking forward to your thoughts so far.

3. Finally:

The body is a human body because it is able to interface with human form (or was able to before it expired).

Given the view of substance above, I think I can see what you mean by this, and can broadly agree. So let's leave off this thought until we clarify our terms.

Byblos wrote:I'm glad you guys revived this topic as I was reading it with great interest (although I must admit it is beyond my level of philosophic comprehension). In any case, I just wanted to comment on that last tidbit from my perspective as a Christian who has roots in the Antiochian Church. We do not put much emphasis on burial (mourning, yes, but not burial). I'm not entirely certain if this is related to the limited real estate available or some other religious factor but we don't bury our dead in individual graves like in the West. I've always taken that as an utter insignificance attached to the physical body after death because 1) we're still alive in spirit, and 2) because we will eventually receive a new body. Having lived my entire adult life in the West, this practice almost seems barbaric to me now but it is what it is. My personal opinion aside, I must do some research to confirm it.

I got a laugh out of this. Maybe my mother has Antiochian roots and doesn't know it. She says when she dies, she just wants us to cremate her and not worry about it, because she won't be there, and she won't be needing that body any more, anyway.

I'm still a bit Western, so it feels weird, but then again, I have no real objection whatsoever . . . don't you hate it when your philosophy and theology forces you to admit that some of what you hold is absolutely nothing more than cultural convention?

Jac3510 wrote:Actually, K, I think we might be making a lot of progress. The bottom line up front is that the root of the issue may be our use of the word "substance." I'll get to that, but let me address the rest of your posts as well.

1. Regarding the basis of philosophy, I don't think we are that far apart. As you said yourself:

I do start out embracing "being", and I guess immediately thereafter myself. I just do not embrace my existence based on logical reasoning (which I don't see as possible), but rather I embraced my existence based on what I call a practical rationality. With a foundation to begin from, I begin reaching and accepting other conclusions.

I particularly appreciate your emphasis on practical rationality. Let me say, again, that when I start with being, I am not starting with my being, but rather, with being generally. That says nothing of whether or not all things are one or not (an issue that plagued the Greeks) . . . perhaps, at this stage, anyway, the post-moderns are exactly right in most of their challenges to our ability to really know anything. Perhaps everything is only a single substance. Fine. What, I think, is evident is that something exists, even if it isn't you. That leads to the question, "What do you mean by existence?" And that, I think, is where good philosophy starts. Let me put it this way:

The basis of philosophy is reality: that which is.
The first question is metaphysics: what is that which is?
The second question is epistemology: how do we know that which is?
The third question is linguistics: how do we communicate what we know?
The final question is hermenutics: how do we understand what we communicate?

The problem with Descarte--and pretty much all modern philosophy (thanks, in large part, to Kant)--is that it starts with epistemology. It asks, "What can I know?" But what is the implied subject of "to know"? Actually, Descarte is asking, "What can I know about reality?" because knowledge must be about something to be knowledge at all. Thus, you have to define what "reality" is, which is the study of metaphysics and being, before you can ask the epistemological question of how it is known.

In light of all that, I point out that the question of the nature of humans--what and how we are--is metaphysical and thus comes before epistemology. Perhaps much to the chagrin of many Christians, I don't think we need the first word of Scripture to understand what a human is, although I thoroughly expect Scripture to shed additional light. Such is the nature of progressive revelation.

Finally, on this, I see why you say you start with God. In the sense that you actually start with being, I can agree. A proper study of being leads necessarily to God's existence in that it discovers subsistent existence, which is a fancy way of pointing to your argument from contingency.

I can accept much of what you say above, at least there is nothing I am strongly reacting to.

1/ A small difference between us I see is how we accept those first truths (that something exists). How we arrive is perhaps not that important though since we both reach the same point. You accept "something exists" (even if not our own existence) by appeal to its obviousness - much like the philosophy lecturer I had a few years ago. Accepting based on the obviousness of something seems quite common. However, I wrestled to accept such truths based on their obviousness, perhaps in part because I personally placed a very high regard for logical reason being able to solve riddles and puzzles. Thus, I was forced out of logical reasoning into what I term a "practical rationality" which I'm glad you can also appreciate.

The only logical alternative if one does not accept such truths is nihilistic insanity. An insanity caught in a loop of acceptance and denial of one's existence (for example, I exist, but how can I logically prove I exist, I can't, but how can I prove I don't exist, I can't do that either, so I exist, but how can I logically prove I exist...).

2/ You accept existence on the basis it is evident something exists. Thus, you call the basis of philosophy reality. Interestingly you look to begin with something external to ourselves - objective reality - although philosophy which involves our asking questions reasonably starts with us (your "first question" above). This is similar to myself in that I look to begin with something external to myself - God. Sequentially however, yours makes greater sense since to deduce God as the proper basis requires having firstly started out with objective reality. Given everything (reality) has its existence in God... God who has always been is existence itself - "pure Being" - so it seems to me that the identity of that basis (reality) is actually God. God is therefore still the real (hidden perhaps?) basis of philosophy. Agree/disagree?

3/ Isn't asking the metaphysical question "what is that which is?" an espistemological question? For the question seeks to know something, regardless of whether or not such knowledge is justified. Do you believe all knowledge is necessarily true? I believe not. Can someone have a mistaken knowledge about something? I believe so.

While I understand what you are getting at, I find it hard to comprehend how you divorce epistemology from the equation. I would say it is actually embedded into the first question - trying to know what it is that exists. The second question as you put it is perhaps tied more closely in with epistemic justification...

4/ You say that, "the question of the nature of humans--what and how we are--is metaphysical and thus comes before epistemology." Yet, here again, I'm not sure I fully grasp how you divorce such questions from the knowledge they seek (epistemology). Furthermore, the "how" you are asking here was linked to epistemology in the second question of your outline above, so it does seem a little confusing if not confused. I know I'm getting tired, and boggled trying to sort through my thoughts here, so perfectly understandable if it was a slip.

Jac wrote:I would, then, be interested in your thoughts on the above, as I think our differences may be in nuance and wording, not anything deeply substantial.

I am not sure given the differences above, whether they really matter. It seems we've gone off course to the original topic. However, in general it is seeming more to me like we are discussing how many angels are dancing on the point of a needle. Certainly, some thoughts could possibly reveal some larger and meaningful differences (perhaps in the area of epistemology with knowing and truth??), but I'm happy to leave them for another discussion topic.

I will have to get to the "substance" stuff in another post, as it is quite late (or early in the morning) and I'm quite tired... I'm hoping most of my post above is coherent.

Kurieuo wrote:I can accept much of what you say above, at least there is nothing I am strongly reacting to.

1/ A small difference between us I see is how we accept those first truths (that something exists). How we arrive is perhaps not that important though since we both reach the same point. You accept "something exists" (even if not our own existence) by appeal to its obviousness - much like the philosophy lecturer I had a few years ago. Accepting based on the obviousness of something seems quite common. However, I wrestled to accept such truths based on their obviousness, perhaps in part because I personally placed a very high regard for logical reason being able to solve riddles and puzzles. Thus, I was forced out of logical reasoning into what I term a "practical rationality" which I'm glad you can also appreciate.

The only logical alternative if one does not accept such truths is nihilistic insanity. An insanity caught in a loop of acceptance and denial of one's existence (for example, I exist, but how can I logically prove I exist, I can't, but how can I prove I don't exist, I can't do that either, so I exist, but how can I logically prove I exist...).

I'd be inclined to agree that the way we reach our starting point is less important than the starting point itself. I don't think that our methods for reaching it are radically different, anyway

2/ You accept existence on the basis it is evident something exists. Thus, you call the basis of philosophy reality. Interestingly you look to begin with something external to ourselves - objective reality - although philosophy which involves our asking questions reasonably starts with us (your "first question" above). This is similar to myself in that I look to begin with something external to myself - God. Sequentially however, yours makes greater sense since to deduce God as the proper basis requires having firstly started out with objective reality. Given everything (reality) has its existence in God... God who has always been is existence itself - "pure Being" - so it seems to me that the identity of that basis (reality) is actually God. God is therefore still the real (hidden perhaps?) basis of philosophy. Agree/disagree?

Agree, with the nuance that I don't necessarily start with something external to ourselves so much as it starts with something that extends beyond ourselves but are necessarily a part of. I'm sure you would agree it makes no sense for us to talk about the total of reality as if we were not a part of it, just like it makes no sense to talk about ourselves as distinct from reality. Reality is what undergirds everything, ourselves included.

3/ Isn't asking the metaphysical question "what is that which is?" an espistemological question? For the question seeks to know something, regardless of whether or not such knowledge is justified. Do you believe all knowledge is necessarily true? I believe not. Can someone have a mistaken knowledge about something? I believe so.

While I understand what you are getting at, I find it hard to comprehend how you divorce epistemology from the equation. I would say it is actually embedded into the first question - trying to know what it is that exists. The second question as you put it is perhaps tied more closely in with epistemic justification...

I don't think it is at all. "What is reality?" is an ontological question. "How do I know what reality is?" is an epistemological question. The Scholastics distinguished between first and second intentions, which may be helpful for us. A first intention refers to the thing itself, whereas the second intention refers to the sign that points us to the thing. Thus we can talk about apples in the first intention. We can talk about the word "apples" in the second intention.

Certainly, then, there is a sense in which the question, "What is reality?" is epistemological, but only in the second intention, in that it looks at the nature of the question itself rather than the object to which the question points. In any case, it seems to me you want to read the question, "How do I know what is reality?" That is an epistemological question, but that's why it is covered in epistemology. We can't start there, though, because the question assumes that there is a reality to be known and an I to know it. What, though, are "I"s and "reality"? That's in the realm of ontology or metaphysics. Again, the question, "How do I know what an I is" is epistemological. If you insist on epistemology coming first, you get into an infinite regress, which is logically absurd.

So, no, I'm afraid you might have your cart and horse a little mixed up. Epistemology isn't embedded in ontology. Ontology is embedded in epistemology.

4/ You say that, "the question of the nature of humans--what and how we are--is metaphysical and thus comes before epistemology." Yet, here again, I'm not sure I fully grasp how you divorce such questions from the knowledge they seek (epistemology). Furthermore, the "how" you are asking here was linked to epistemology in the second question of your outline above, so it does seem a little confusing if not confused. I know I'm getting tired, and boggled trying to sort through my thoughts here, so perfectly understandable if it was a slip.

Hopefully the above will help. To put our specific question in the ladder I have suggested, I will begin with the assumptions that humans and souls are real and thus are a part of reality:

1. What is the human soul? (metaphysics)
2. How do I know what the human soul is? (epistemology)
3. How do I talk about what the human soul is? (linguistics)
4. How do I understand talk about what the human soul is? (hermeneutics)

Our question in this thread, then, is metaphysical, not epistemological. As such, I have a problem with any Cartesian or Kantian approach to it, as it approaches it from an epistemological perspective, which, hopefully you can see, begs the question and is thus logically invalid in the first place.

K wrote:I am not sure given the differences above, whether they really matter. It seems we've gone off course to the original topic. However, in general it is seeming more to me like we are discussing how many angels are dancing on the point of a needle. Certainly, some thoughts could possibly reveal some larger and meaningful differences (perhaps in the area of epistemology with knowing and truth??), but I'm happy to leave them for another discussion topic.

I will have to get to the "substance" stuff in another post, as it is quite late (or early in the morning) and I'm quite tired... I'm hoping most of my post above is coherent.

It's important in the same sense that our definition of "substance" is important. How we approach the question is fundamental to how we will answer it. That's hardly angels on the head of a needle! Ultimately, if the way we approach reality is wrong, how can we expect our understanding of it to be right? Or put differently, if an entire view (say substance or composite dualism) is based on a faulty approach to reality, how could we possibly think that it is actually reflective of how reality really is?!?

Anyway, you don't have to respond to this if you don't want to (but obviously, you can). I'm still looking forward to your response to the issues on substance when you get the chance, which is more directly related to the thread anyway.

Jac, before getting to your post, I refreshed myself on "substance" in Moreland *cringe* (I know you have something against this guy, although I'm not entirely sure why...) and William Craig's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview book, which I highly recommend. I figured I could write or scan what is written on "substance", and we start from there as a basis, however re-reading over this thread and this post of mine, I am not really sure it is necessary.

First, having re-read over this thread, it seems to me what you are calling "two aspects" (language unfamiliar to me) could be very similar to what I call "two substances". For example, I see that the causal relationship between the physical and immaterial ("mental") substances, unified together into one human person, are immediate. You see this as only possible in your body and mind aspects under one substance. That our thoughts are causally linked to our brain is evident by the intentionality with which we carry out actions, or vice-versa if a doctor touches a part of a person's brain with an electrode it can produce a mental experiece like a memory to occur. Neither of us would dispute that a causal link exists between the mental and physical, our difference seems more a matter of the language we employ.

Second, you believe when our physical body dies, some underlying bodily essense in our substance survives and is sustained by God through his giving us a temporary spiritual body. I believe when our physical body dies (material substance) that our soul (an immaterial substance) survives and is sustained by God who then raises us to life with a new spiritual body. Correct me if wrong, but in both instances, it seems to me there is an intermediary phase (no matter how brief on your view) where we are without a body until God imparts to us new bodies. Again, despite slight differences in languistical concepts used, you could say we are very similar in thought.

Third, I really need to clarify some things I wrote which I think has caused you much confusion. You originally asked the question, "do all substances have both form and matter (in the Aristotelean/Thomistic sense of the words)?" I hesitated, but better understand what you are asking now. The core of my response was (underlined):

K wrote:To me a human entity is comprised of two distinguishable substances - soul and body. I hesistate to identify 'soul' = 'form' and 'body' = 'matter' although they most closely correspond to each other. I feel 'soul' is more than mere 'form'. Conceptually, I picture the human 'soul' as an ethereal substance which is full of potentiality (sight, taste, touch, smell, hearing, spirituality, emotion, etc). The disembodied soul is sustained in God.

Thus, my response would be in the affirmative - all substances have form and matter. Evidentially I was not confident in my response due to terminolgies used, so you responded and reiterated the same question writing:

Jac wrote:Substances aren't just form. Substance, rather, "signifies being as existing in and by itself, and serving as a subject or basis for accidents and accidental changes." As I'm sure you know, forms can't change. Excluding God, the only way for substance to exist is if it has both form and matter. (God is excluded because He is "being as existing in and by itself"."

So, I am asking you if you recognize that all substances have both form and matter?

I responded back this time with the following:

K wrote:Firstly I agree that substances are not just form. I'd further agree forms do not change, where I understand "form" to be like the design blueprints of creature (whether a human being, an angel or some animal). Each have different forms / different designs. Perhaps God could add to or change a human person's human form, which greatly complicates the metaphysical issues involved, but lets leave that discussion aside.

I then seem to have confused matters by saying (underline emphasis added):

K wrote:Now where I disagree is that "substance" has both form and matter... As I mentioned earlier in this thread some time ago:

• To give quick examples as to what I mean by substance, water is a substance which has the properties of "wetness" or "transparency". A fruit such as an orange is a substance which has properties like an orange skin, roundness and tastes a certain way. So by substance, I simply mean that something can be classified as a substance if it possesses properties. Properties like mass or weightlessness, colour, a type of sound, shape, etc.

Now obviously, in the paragraph I quoted just before this one I already declared I agree substances are not just form. They are something more, what else? Well, err matter. But now I appear to be saying they don't necessarily have matter??? I am confused myself here as to what I meant. Perhaps a mind lapse.

I certainly do not adhere to a "bundle substance theory" where a substance consists only of its various properties. Certainly a substance contains properties that stand under it, however there is also an individuated essense. What I think happened, is my mind keeps wanting to equivocate "form" and "matter" to "soul" and "body", however I know this is not their correct use. What I am guessing I was really saying was that a substance does not have a "soul" and "body" (obviously so, since that is what we have been debating!). Other than that I am at a loss.

Let me be clear, I do believe a substance has both form (as I've previously defined) and matter (whether comprised of physical or spiritual stuff).

Four - I previously responded to you:

I know from other threads I've read that you don't believe God consists of a substance. Whereas I would say God consists of a substance since He possesses certain properties - goodness, rightousness, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc. I also understand you might simply believe God to be all form, consisting of nothing material. I feel I could agree with you, although its not something I've reflected deeply on.

To clarify what I mean here, I am not saying that God is a substance which only consists of properties like goodness, righteousness, etc. Rather, in order for properties to exist together as a unified whole I believe that they need to "stand under" a substance. The fact God has certain properties to me predicates a substance. I am open to your alternative (I have no firm position on this), however logically I just cannot see how it can be otherwise.

Five - now I've responded with some things I felt needed clarifying, I will respond to the rest of your post next time. However, there really isn't really that much I'd disagree with, which would now probably be more apparent to you. I feel this post will go a long way to helping further discussion...

Jac3510 wrote:2. Which leads to substance. You are right that I don't agree that God is a substance, on which I am following Aquinas. For me, God cannot be a substance because "He is not the subject of any accidents, but also because in Him essence and existence are identical, and consequently He is not included in any genus whatever."

This is certainly something I will have to explore further. Given we do actually agree on a great deal, despite slightly varying concepts, perhaps we would agree on this also. I just need to reconcile properties being a necessarily criterion for a substance... for example, to what does God's properties belong if He is not a united substance that possesses them??

Jac3510 wrote:Now, I can understand, I think, why you take the view of substance you do. It's not too different from the classical definition, as that which "stands under" the thing itself and receives the characteristics and properties we call accidents.

Yes! This is definitely true. How would your idea of "substance" differ? My understanding it that you take a very traditional/classical view of substance also?

Jac3510 wrote:It is, in a word, fundamental, and the important idea is that it is in itself (unlike redness, say, which is not in itself, but in the substance). Descarte defined substance as "a being that so exists as to require nothing else for its existence," which I would expect you to reject, for the simple reason that, as a Christian, the only thing that requires nothing for its own existence is God. There are philosophical problems with such a definition as well, such as the fact that it leaves no room for efficient causality, but we can leave all that aside, as I don't think it applies to you.

This is correct again.

Jac3510 wrote:For me, then, I don't see how a thing can be a substance if it does not have both form and matter, for matter without form is in fact no thing, and form without matter may be a universal, but certainly not an individual, and only individual things can have properties. That is why I don't see either form or matter as being a substance, but rather, a thing is a substance when it has both form and matter. So if you understand substance as something having both form and matter, I fall back on all my original problems.

Ok, and so given my last post, it should become obvious you now fall back on all your original problems. Perhaps we could explore your language to help demolish these problems, because evidently I still believe we are in essential agreement as highlighted in my previous post.

So I am wondering how you define "aspect". What is an aspect? You say our substance possesses both a material and immaterial aspect. How does this differ from a human person possessing both a material and immaterial substance?

Jac3510 wrote:Your view seems a bit different. You say that substance isn't just form, but that forms themselves are substance, which implies that substances underly form. I can only assume that, for you, substance also underlies matter?

It would be more correct to say "forms show a substance exists". For example, a human form possesses the capacity for all five physical senses, plus I believe a spiritual sense. Various animals have different forms with different capacities. For such a form to have any substance, I feel it can't just be specifications, but have some "substance" to it. Thus, a substance to me, as hopefully became clear in my previous post, is form + essense.

I am not sure if you would equivocate "matter" with "essense", but as form (properties, capacities, etc) stands under a substance, so too does an essence.

Jac3510 wrote:I'm not sure, then, how you would actually define substance . . . "the thing that underlies form or matter" . . . or "a thing that can have properties," but then we fall back on the definition of "thing," which would be hard to define without referring to substance.

Hopefully I have now been crystal clear. Let me know if you are still confused.

Jac3510 wrote:In any case, if you can work out a consistent set of definitions here, then I actually don't think I would have a problem with your view of substance dualism, as you wouldn't seem to require the soul to be a substance in the same sense that I would use the word, and, as such, it could almost be more like an aspect, as I have described earlier, though I don't know how you would feel about that characterization.

That is what I am thinking. To me a substance might be to you an aspect. I feel however we both accept a very traditional view of substance, so I'm not too sure we necessarily disagree on what a substance is afterall. However, I feel it would be beneficial to explore what an "aspect" to you is, and perhaps this will help reveal the precise difference between our understanding on "substance".

Many blessings Chris.

PS. I'd like to keep any YEC feelings out of this post, and leave personal emotions, etc to the side. For I feel we have been more productive here than on other issues, and would hate the waters here to receive cross-contamination (if that makes sense).

Jac, before getting to your post, I refreshed myself on "substance" in Moreland *cringe* (I know you have something against this guy, although I'm not entirely sure why...) and William Craig's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview book, which I highly recommend. I figured I could write or scan what is written on "substance", and we start from there as a basis, however re-reading over this thread and this post of mine, I am not really sure it is necessary.

Philosophical Foundations is a good book. I don't have anything against Craig and Moreland . . . I just think they are wrong in their metaphysics. They both reject the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), which I accept. There are, of course, a lot of things that go with that . . . I'm not sure the logical order. For instance, Craig (and I believe Moreland) is a Molinist--which you cannot be, as I understand it, and accept DDS; both are substance dualists, which is at odds with DDS. I don't know, in their case, whether they first rejected DDS and then developed these other ideas, since DDS was no longer a factor, or if they embraced those views first, which required them to reject DDS. In any case, you can't hold to the one and the others at the same time. As I comment below, this has a very direct bearing on our own conversation.

I am in agreement with the rest of your first post, and I think the clarifications helped quite a bit. Moving on, then, do your next:

This is certainly something I will have to explore further. Given we do actually agree on a great deal, despite slightly varying concepts, perhaps we would agree on this also. I just need to reconcile properties being a necessarily criterion for a substance... for example, to what does God's properties belong if He is not a united substance that possesses them??

Well, this is one of the many reasons that I hold to DDS, which I believe you reject. In the strictest sense, I wouldn't say that God has any properties. He is His properties; they are all exactly identical. In fact, using the plural "they" is only convential in the same way as looking at George Washington and the first president of the United States and asking if "they" are the same person. Our grammar requires a plural, but the concept turns out to be singular.

Anyway, if you don't hold to God's simplicity, you do have an issue here, and you will have to argue that God is a substance if for no other reason than the definition of the substance is that which stands under a thing and owns all of its properties (a definition with which Moreland agrees; see chapter two of his and Rae's Body and Soul).

Yes! This is definitely true. How would your idea of "substance" differ? My understanding it that you take a very traditional/classical view of substance also?
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This is correct again.
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Ok, and so given my last post, it should become obvious you now fall back on all your original problems. Perhaps we could explore your language to help demolish these problems, because evidently I still believe we are in essential agreement as highlighted in my previous post.

So I am wondering how you define "aspect". What is an aspect? You say our substance possesses both a material and immaterial aspect. How does this differ from a human person possessing both a material and immaterial substance?

I think we are pretty much agreement on how we are using the word 'substance.' We seem to be both understanding it as "that which 'stands under' a thing and receives properties." I think we both agree, then, that all substances have both matter and form--the "thatness" and "whatness" of a thing, respectively.

To answer your question, an aspect is a feature, quality, or nature of a particular thing. In that way, it is more similar to a property than to the substance itself. Let's use a rock to illustrate the differences.

In a rock, you have several things we can talk about: its substance (that which receives all predication), its matter (that out of which it is made), its form (that which it is), and its properties (that which is predicated to it, i.e., hardness, heaviness, browness). Clearly, substance <> matter <> form <> properties. I would say that the middle two, form and matter, are aspects of the rock. It has a material aspect and a formal aspect. I suppose you could say that it has proprietorial aspect as well . . .

What I mean is that form is obviously immaterial. It isn't "made out of" anything. Matter is material, that is, what a thing is "made out of." But matter, unlike form, isn't really anything. You can conceptualize the form 'treeness.' You can't really conceptualize formless matter--primal matter, it is often called. It doesn't come into existence--it isn't really anything--until given form (which isn't suprising given the definition of form). So everything has a material aspect (matter) and an immaterial aspect (form). That includes our rock. What the rock is--its rockness--isn't material. What it is, is immaterial. That 'aspect' of the rock we call form.

I, for one, happen to think that personhood is an immaterial aspect of humans. I don't rightly believe that a person, in and of itself, is a substance, per se. So I believe that humans have a material aspect--what they are made of, which we commonly speak of as their body--and an immaterial aspect--what they actually are, which we speak of as their soul. The difference in the human and the rock is the immaterial aspect is more complex, in that a rock is not a person, whereas a human is. What I mean is that the rock's immaterial aspect--its form--is rather simple, whereas the human's immaterial aspect--his soul--is more complex, for the soul serves not only to inform and animate the material body, but it also serves as the ground for personhood, and that due to the nature of human souls as opposed to the nature of, say, rocks.

On the other hand, if we say that a person has both a material and immaterial substance, then we have to say that both the body and the soul have form and matter. There are all kinds of questions of relations that come up that I find difficult, if not impossible to answer, such as the relationship between personhood and the body (if, presumably, we are to ground personhood in the substantial soul) and the mechanism by which the soul and body interact. I think we've come far enough in our understanding of both science and philosophy that we can agree that Descarte's pituitary gland isn't quite a good enough answer here!

It would be more correct to say "forms show a substance exists". For example, a human form possesses the capacity for all five physical senses, plus I believe a spiritual sense. Various animals have different forms with different capacities. For such a form to have any substance, I feel it can't just be specifications, but have some "substance" to it. Thus, a substance to me, as hopefully became clear in my previous post, is form + essense.

I am not sure if you would equivocate "matter" with "essense", but as form (properties, capacities, etc) stands under a substance, so too does an essence.

I would actualy understand the words "form" and "essence" to be broadly synonymous. If I may quote my favorite online source for such discussions:

• Furthermore, essence is also in a manner synonymous with form, since it is chiefly by their formal principle that beings are segregated into one or other of the species. Thus, while created spiritual things, because they are not composed of matter and form, are specifically what they are by reason of their essences or "forms" alone, the compounded beings of the corporeal world receive their specification and determination of nature, or essence, principally from their substantial forms.

But insofar as you are saying that forms and matter are indicative of a substance, for the substance is that which receives the properties of a thing, I am in agreement with you here.

That is what I am thinking. To me a substance might be to you an aspect. I feel however we both accept a very traditional view of substance, so I'm not too sure we necessarily disagree on what a substance is afterall. However, I feel it would be beneficial to explore what an "aspect" to you is, and perhaps this will help reveal the precise difference between our understanding on "substance".

Many blessings Chris.

Let me know how my thoughts on 'aspect' compare with our statements about 'substance.' It would be rather amusing if all of this turned out to be merely a definitional disagreement. Actually, I don't think it is quite as trivial as that, given the fundamental issue of DDS in this, which is not something we have to get into here, but if we could at least identify where we part company, we would, at least, be more clear on where we stand

Blessings back at ya

PS. I'd like to keep any YEC feelings out of this post, and leave personal emotions, etc to the side. For I feel we have been more productive here than on other issues, and would hate the waters here to receive cross-contamination (if that makes sense).

Perfect sense. As I said in the other post, forgive any hard feelings. None were intended, and I truly don't hold anything against anybody.

I would rather point out that to dwell so much in what the soul is, why it "is" who it is will be so endless and merely time wasted, and to ask "What's the purpose?" instead.

There have been thousands of reported cases where people experience removing their conscious selves from the body when they "died". In the activity of "Astral Projection" one can remove themselves from the body at will composed from diligent practice, and there are those who can go into a trance and seem to be in an altered state of consciousness, or reality, apart from hearing, sight, feeling, taste and smelling. All of these instances suggest that we are something apart from the body, but the body cannot be "living" without a connecteion to a divine Source. This now raises me to question whether we can ever truly be disconnected from our Home. There are those who can visually see these divine connections, and this implies that we are composed of more than just a soul. There are those who firmly believe that as a result of technology in Atlantean and Lemurian times, there are those who are descendants of clones. These clones do not have a soul, but only contain that spark of divinty that all who have souls also have. Some call this the Spirit. We all also have access to something called the Christ Consciousness, or the Christ Mind. We also have ethereal minds, or co-creating tools. Some people say that all of our metaphysical make-up in wholeness is our Soul. There are some who would question whether our Soul, or we as souls are safe when it come to judgement. Well, guess what, because you are a Soul and you are Love, the Kingdom is your inheritance by default. Your soul is not for sale and who could put a price on something God created perfectly incorruptable and sinless? Only in this world of the body are we separate from our brother and our divine inheritance. This boils down to what Jesus Christ said, "Be in this world, but don't be of it."

Peace and Love all ways.
This is
Robert S. Wolverton