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Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 12:39 pm
by August
RickD wrote:
August wrote:
RickD wrote:
August wrote:Are we going to talk about free will or Molinism here?
Isn't reconciling God's sovereignty, and man's free will, what Molinism attempts to do? I'm new to this Molinism thing, but don't we have to talk about free will, if we talk about Molinism?
No, not man's free will, man's responsibility. That is the tension that needs to be resolved.
If you don't want me to participate in this discussion, you could have pm'd me. No need to confuse me out of the discussion. :stars:
Don't fear, I'm out. If this thread is going to consist of assertions without addressing the underlying tension of what Craig and others really wish to address, that of God's sovereignty against how man can be held responsible, then I'm not interested. Free action, based on a form of free will, is the proposed solution proposed by Molinism that allows God to be sovereign, while holding man responsible for his actions. If God was not holding man responsible, then the discussion would be moot.

Craig himself says this:
Universal, divine, determinism makes God the author of sin and precludes human responsibility. In contrast to the Molinist view, on the deterministic view even the movement of the human will is caused by God. God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise. God determines their choices and makes them do wrong. If it is evil to make another person do wrong, then on this view God is not only the cause of sin and evil, but becomes evil Himself, which is absurd. By the same token, all human responsibility for sin has been removed. For our choices are not really up to us: God causes us to make them. We cannot be responsible for our actions, for nothing we think or do is up to us.

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 12:48 pm
by RickD
August wrote:
RickD wrote:
August wrote:
RickD wrote:
August wrote:Are we going to talk about free will or Molinism here?
Isn't reconciling God's sovereignty, and man's free will, what Molinism attempts to do? I'm new to this Molinism thing, but don't we have to talk about free will, if we talk about Molinism?
No, not man's free will, man's responsibility. That is the tension that needs to be resolved.
If you don't want me to participate in this discussion, you could have pm'd me. No need to confuse me out of the discussion. :stars:
Don't fear, I'm out. If this thread is going to consist of assertions without addressing the underlying tension of what Craig and others really wish to address, that of God's sovereignty against how man can be held responsible, then I'm not interested. Free action, based on a form of free will, is the proposed solution proposed by Molinism that allows God to be sovereign, while holding man responsible for his actions. If God was not holding man responsible, then the discussion would be moot.

Craig himself says this:
Universal, divine, determinism makes God the author of sin and precludes human responsibility. In contrast to the Molinist view, on the deterministic view even the movement of the human will is caused by God. God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise. God determines their choices and makes them do wrong. If it is evil to make another person do wrong, then on this view God is not only the cause of sin and evil, but becomes evil Himself, which is absurd. By the same token, all human responsibility for sin has been removed. For our choices are not really up to us: God causes us to make them. We cannot be responsible for our actions, for nothing we think or do is up to us.
I hope you're not asserting, that I'm asserting something, August. Molinism is new to me. I really need to get a clue. I have no idea what's going on here. Could someone please explain to a newb, what the whole issue is? I thought the extreme end of Calvinism, holds to God's sovereignty, while practically ignoring man's free will. And the extreme end of Arminianism, holds to man's free will, while practically ignoring God's sovereignty. And Molinism attempts to reconcile God's sovereignty, and man's free will?

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 1:08 pm
by August
RickD wrote:I hope you're not asserting, that I'm asserting something, August. Molinism is new to me. I really need to get a clue. I have no idea what's going on here. Could someone please explain to a newb, what the whole issue is? I thought the extreme end of Calvinism, holds to God's sovereignty, while practically ignoring man's free will. And the extreme end of Arminianism, holds to man's free will, while practically ignoring God's sovereignty. And Molinism attempts to reconcile God's sovereignty, and man's free will?
Sorry Rick, it is not aimed at you.

Obviously we (not including you), have differences of opinion as to what Molinism really is about.

In short, it says that God knows every possible choice people may may make in future, and He chooses to actualize the world based on those free will choices that still conforms to His will and decrees. In that way, people are still responsible for their choices, and God's plans still come to fruition.

It is all rather academic and philosophical though, and kinda tough to get a full grip on without a background in philosophy.

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 5:21 pm
by narnia4
I still don't really want to do too much reading on this conversation until Christmas is over, but Molinism seems to be a nice fit for Plantinga's "possible worlds" language that Craig has utilized as well. Plantinga has argued that this is the best possible world, something that comes up in debates on the "problem of evil". Craig has argued by using his middle knowledge God created the world in which the highest number of people will accept Christ. That strikes me as a kind of "modern human perspective" (that the sheer number of adherents would be the only issue), but I understand the point.

Something that I didn't quite get, this article-

http://www.gotquestions.org/molinism.html

It criticizes Molinism but doesn't go too hard on it, but the final paragraph says that Molinists do not hold to the classical doctrine of divine simplicity... that God is immutable and atemporal. Confusing, because I'm almost certain that Craig (certainly the most ardent defender of Molinism, at least among the big names) believes in divine simplicity.

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 10:54 pm
by B. W.
Molinism

I wish everyone had a very Merry Christmas. I am going to post some basic information on Molinism so people can review Theopedia's definition of it. I will add a few underline parts for easy reference and in next post how I understand Craig's modern concept of molinism...
http://www.theopedia.com/Molinism

Molinism is an attempt to provide a solution to the classic philosophical problems associated with God’s providence, foreknowledge and the freedom of humanity. This view may be traced to the 16th century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina - hence, the name Molinism. Specifically, it seeks to maintain a strong view of God’s sovereignty over creation while at the same time preserving the belief that human beings have self-determined freedom, or libertarian free will.

Molina’s doctrine is called scientia media, or middle knowledge, because it stands in the middle of the two traditional categories of divine epistemology as handed down by Aquinas, natural and free knowledge. It shares characteristics of each and, in the logical order of the divine deliberative process regarding creation, it follows natural knowledge but precedes free knowledge.”

“Luis de Molina’s solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma has had a revival of sorts in the latter half of the twentieth century, most notably through the efforts of William Lane Craig, Alfred Freddoso, Jonathan Kvanvig, Thomas Flint, and Alvin Plantinga. In short, these thinkers have followed the Jesuit Counter-Reformer in postulating a middle knowledge between God’s natural and free knowledge.”

Variations of God’s knowledge

“The most famous distinctive in Molinism is its affirmation that God has middle knowledge (scienta media). Molinism holds that God’s knowledge consists of three logical moments. These “moments” of knowledge are not to be thought of as chronological; rather they are to be understood as “logical.” In other words, one moment does not come before another moment in time, rather one moment is logically prior to the other moments. The Molinist differentiates between three different moments of knowledge which are respectively called natural knowledge, middle knowledge and free knowledge."

Natural Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of all necessary and all possible truths. In this “moment” God knows every possible combination of causes and effects. He also knows all the truths of logic and all moral truths.

Middle KnowledgeThis is God’s knowledge of what any free creature would do in any given circumstance, also known as counterfactual knowledge. It is also sometimes stated as God’s knowledge of the truth of subjunctive conditionals.

Free Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of what He freely decided to create. God’s free knowledge is His knowledge of the actual world as it is.

God’s knowledge and the decreed creation

The following is a synopsis of the logical order postulated in Molinism, relating the aspects (or moments) of God’s knowledge to the world He chose to create.

1.God’s knowledge of all possible and necessary truths (natural knowledge — of what could happen).

2.God’s knowledge of all feasible worlds (middle knowledge — of what would happen through free choices under certain circumstances, including counterfactuals).

3.Divine decree to create His selected world.

4.God’s Foreknowledge set through His selected decree (free knowledge — of what will come to pass).

Postulating a middle knowledge and placing it between God’s knowledge of necessary truths and God’s creative decree is crucial to the Molinist scheme. By placing middle knowledge (and thus counterfactuals) before the creation decree, God conceivably allows for man’s freedom in the libertarian sense. Placing this middle knowledge logically after necessary truths but before the creation decree also allows God to survey all feasible worlds and decide which world to actualize.

“Biblically speaking, Molinists are more in line with the Arminian view. God chooses who will be saved because He knows who would choose Him. However, Molinists are more philosophically sophisticated than the typical Arminian. For example, William Lane Craig avoids the criticism that God’s decisions are dependent on man’s decisions by holding that God’s middle knowledge is not derived from His knowledge of the world. Rather, God’s middle knowledge is based on His existing natural knowledge. In this way he hopes to uphold God’s perfect omniscience. So, today’s evangelical Molinists are basically philosophically sophisticated Arminians.”[4]

Proposed biblical evidence for Middle Knowledge

•Exodus 13:17
•1 Samuel 23:8–14
•Jeremiah 23: 21–22
•Matthew 11:21–24
•1 Corinthians 2:8

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Sun Dec 25, 2011 11:43 pm
by B. W.
Pretty confusing? So let’s review the main points again and then go through an analogy on mine that uses the concepts I gleaned from Craig on molinism and you'll either be more confused or be blest in some way.

So...May God the Father worthy of all Glory and Honor grant you a deeper understanding thru his Son, Jesus Christ, by the power and working of the Holy Spirit, of his divine will and purposes and ways… Amen

Let’s begin by reviewing…

The Main points for Molinism which are:

1-Specifically, it seeks to maintain a strong view of God’s sovereignty over creation while at the same time preserving the belief that human beings have self-determined freedom, or libertarian free will

2-Molina’s doctrine is called scientia media, or middle knowledge, because it stands in the middle of the two traditional categories of divine epistemology as handed down by Aquinas, natural and free knowledge

3-God chooses who will be saved because He knows who would choose Him. However, Molinists are more philosophically sophisticated than the typical Arminian. For example, William Lane Craig avoids the criticism that God’s decisions are dependent on man’s decisions by holding that God’s middle knowledge is not derived from His knowledge of the world.

4-Next, to understand the above stated concepts, Molinism categorizes God’s full knowledge into three parts. These three parts are interrelated and form a whole together and work together. Think of the Divine Trinity Concept as the reason for three … I’ll post the Concept of the Divine Trinity in here so you can see what I mean and then move on the analogy.

Natural Knowledge – God knows every possible combination of causes and effects. He also knows all the truths of logic and all moral truths. -- The Father has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Natural Knowledge …

Middle Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of what any free creature would do in any given circumstance, also known as counterfactual knowledge. It is also sometimes stated as God’s knowledge of the truth of subjunctive conditionals. – The Son has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Middle Knowledge…

Free Knowledge – This is God’s knowledge of what He freely decided to create. God’s free knowledge is His knowledge of the actual world as it is. – The Holy Spirit has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Free Knowledge … For example shown by how the Holy Spirit seals, empowers, teaches, sanctifies us, etc… in our real time…

Analogy

So in order to help you understand Molinism as it developed into and from what I can gather from Craig, I will use the analogy of the Godhead exercising certain aspects of his all embracing knowledge. From It I hope you see how it explains the main points of how molinism can maintain a strong view of God’s sovereignty over creation while at the same time preserving the belief that human beings have self-determined freedom, or libertarian free will, as decreed – blest upon man by God evidenced from Genesis first three chapters previously mentioned in my prior posts.

Here goes… I pray this helps more than confuses as I am blending William Lane Craig molinism into this analogy of mine so hope this helps…Amen...

God The Father has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Natural Knowledge … – knows every possible combination of causes and effects. He also knows all the truths of logic and all moral truths. God is All Knowing, All Wise, All Powerful and is as Deuteronomy 32:4, Job 34:10-12 mentions…

God The Son has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Middle Knowledge –knows what any free creature would do in any given circumstance (John 1:48-51), also known as counterfactual (what has not happened but could, would, or might under differing conditions type of) knowledge. It is also sometimes stated as God’s knowledge of the truth of subjunctive conditionals - indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true.

For example, Son enters the world to offer the condition of salvation so that those who would never return to God can now return to him through the offering of himself (…indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true because). He offers himself to all (1 John 2:2) – not just to a select few only – and from out of the ALL he saves only those who were foreseen (by the Father) to come to the Son due to the Son’s obedience to the cross. This violates no attribute of the entire Godhead, nor anything God decreed to man that granted him Free Will – ability to make decisions.

The Son (Middle) (John 1:1-4 – Jesus stands between us and the Father (middle) as God manifest in flesh to experience life as we do to restore a broken relationship, justly. God joining himself to man so that man can join himself back to God.

Subjunctive means inflections that express how the action or state is conceived by the speaker (Father) then the Son (John 5:19) expresses the wishes and actions (Heb 1:1-3) of the Father, Next, Conditionals mean expressing a condition on which something else is contingent – Christ sacrifice, for example, salvation is offered to all people in order to call out from amongst all people those that were foreseen to believe freely (John 5:24, 38). This is contingent upon God’s Word confronting the world with himself forcing a decision upon all, to either believe or not believe, in order to be saved or not saved by his hand (The Son) alone and sealed by his hand (Holy Spirit) alone. John 5:22-24 - John 6:40

This way, those that reject the -Word became Flesh- are rejected by the Godhead justly – their sin is their own, they are responsible for their own actions – God proves himself just, righteous, perfect, without sin in all his ways first to himself demonstrated also by how he is to all others by violating no decree, blessing, promise, word, gift He spoken to man -- Note the principles from: Hebrews 6:17-18, Romans 11:29, Isaiah 55:6-11, Isaiah 46:10, John 6:40, and Isaiah 45:21-23

God The Holy Spirit has all the knowledge of the Godhead and exercises Free Knowledge – knowledge of what He (Father, Son) freely decided to create. God’s free knowledge is His knowledge of the actual world as it is. –

The Holy Spirit, sent from the Father to seal forever, empower, sanctify, equip, train, teach, believers… in real time to us – right in our current now. He will also convict the World of sin, righteousness, and judgment – this is not some irresistible force but rather a force of Person (John 16:8-12 and John 5:24, 38) convicting – proving by showing one is a sinner, proving showing righteousness of Christ from heaven to earth, proving and showing that the ruler of this world has been cast out and a person can be free (John 8:34-36) to see who will believe or not believe the word sent in them (John 5:34) that is the manner how the Father draws men/women to himself – the Holy Spirit! Confronting ALL PEOPLE with a convicting choice.

Now what is the role of the Holy Spirit in the lives of those who believe in our current now as things really are?

Well, I hope that helps explain the principles of William Lane Craig molinism in a way you the reader can ponder and reflect upon. There is much more scripture to back up these points as well.

God bless you all!
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Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 8:52 am
by narnia4
I do believe that God has middle knowledge, but as I said I still have issues with Molinism and I'm not sure if it "solves the problems" that it purports to solve. The Scripture listed indicated that God does have knowledge of what people would have done under different circumstances, but does it show that "God chooses who will be saved based on who will choose Him?" or that man has libertarian free will?

One of my biggest issues is that I believe that we have other grounds for doubting the existence of libertarian free will. Scriptural, scientific, and philosophical grounds. Maybe somebody like Danny has more knowledge on the specifics on this.

And then I'm not sure exactly how Craig is avoiding the criticism under point 3, that God's decisions are made dependent on man's decisions. To me it looks like an indication like the Molinist is trying to say that God looks into the future and fits the universe to "accommodate our needs" so that we'll accept him. So how can you possible say that he isn't basing his decisions off our decisions?

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 9:08 am
by RickD
In this video that Domokunrox posted, Craig tells us what he believes about "middle knowledge". He contrasts that, a little, with what he calls the extremes of the open view, and determinism.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQElhE_ ... ata_player

Hearing Craig describe things, helped me understand a little better than just reading the different views.

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 9:29 am
by B. W.
I used my own analogy on what I think Craig is saying. Here are some of his responses from his own Reasonable Faith website – Articles section. Mr. Craig is answering questions. Very interesting as he explains his answers:
Subject: Molinism and the Soteriological Problem of Evil Once More

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=9193

Dr. Craig:

I am very troubled by your Molinist response to the soteriological problem of evil (aka "The Memo Problem," the fact that since Jesus died, millions of folks never got the Gospel Memo and thereby had no means of getting saved thru accepting Christ.) We can all agree that, say, second century Tibetans never heard the Gospel and, therefore, that not one of them had a pre-mortem chance to accept Christ.

Your Middle Knowledge response, as far as I can ascertain, is that God knew before he created these people that they would reject the Gospel, so he put them in second century Tibet where it didn't matter anyway. No harm, no foul.

Apart from the intuitive unattractiveness of this position, your view entails several difficult philosophical problems. First, you have an intelligibility problem. What does it mean to say "Before the cosmos existed God knew that Fred would reject the Gospel so God put Fred in second century Tibet"? I suspect that it means nothing. The name "Fred" can only refer to an individual in some factual context. Without that context the name "Fred" does not refer to anyone. Fred can be a 21st century Virginian or a second century Tibetan, or somebody else. But he cannot just be Fred. Your view fails to see this. Instead you assume that "Fred" refers to a human being (one with full powers of agency) even absent a factual context.

The same goes for "this person;" the term does not refer to anything until a human being is created and placed in a factual context. Thus, your view that God knew that "this person" would reject the Gospel long before he created him or her is unintelligible.

You can avoid the intelligibility problem by adding that God knew that Fred would reject the Gospel "in XYZ circumstances. " But this raises a different problem. Before God sticks Fred in second century Tibet wouldn't He have to ascertain that Fred would freely reject the Gospel in all circumstances, not just some of them? And can it really be that there were no circumstances whatsoever in which Fred would have freely accepted the Gospel? How plausible is this? Had Fred been placed in 16th century Wittenberg and been given a profound talking to by Martin Luther would he have freely rejected the Gospel? What if he had been a witness to the resurrection? Or been given visions like Moses was? Or been personally confronted by God Himself, like Paul was? Or been born and raised the son of William Lane Craig? Did God really vet all these options? If so, were there really none in which Fred would have freely accepted the Gospel? I find this deeply implausible. And if God did not vet all options, how can He say that Fred would have freely rejected the Gospel?

On a related note, I have a hard time believing that there are any human beings who would freely reject the Gospel under any and all circumstances. Anybody who knows of Jehovah's existence, His love, his plan for salvation, and who rejects it all in favor of eternal torment is literally insane. No sane human being chooses eternal flames over eternal bliss. Your view seems to require that such sane people not only exist but are plentiful. That seems to me empirically wrong. (I also suspect that there are no human beings who would accept the Gospel in any and all circumstances, but that is a different matter.)

Finally, even if we grant that Fred would have rejected the Gospel in any and all circumstances, why did God just not bother creating him? After all, this would have avoided one more monstrous bit of eternal suffering. In dealing with this matter, you raise a compossibility defense whereby it may have been impossible for God to create a certain individual, Sophie, who freely accepts the Gospel without also creating Fred. I have a hard time envisioning an omnipotent God limited in such a way, but even if He is, what prevents God from refraining from creating both Fred and Sophie? After all, Sophie has no right to be created. And given that there are an infinite number of beings God can create who would freely accept the Gospel without somebody else rejecting it, (and a non-infinite number of places for humans on earth,) why did He create a Sophie's choice for Himself?

Your Molinist response to the Memo Problem, it seems to me, creates some ugly messes that need mopping up.

Thank you for your interesting and provocative work.

Sincerely,

Steve
USA


Dr. Craig responds:

The soteriological problem of evil concerns the alleged logical incompatibility of the two claims

1. God is all-powerful and all-loving.

and

2. Some people never hear the Gospel and are lost.

The Free Will Defense attempts to show that the religious pluralist has not been able to prove a logical incompatibility between (1) and (2) and, moreover, that we can show (1) and (2) to be compatible by adding a third statement which is compatible with (1) and entails (2), to wit,

3. God has created a world having an optimal balance between saved and lost, and those who never hear the Gospel and are lost would not have believed it even if they had heard it.

Now your objection, Steve, is only to the second part of the Free Will Defense. You don’t think that (3) is possible or plausible.

We can set aside right away the objection that (3) is not plausible as irrelevant to the Free Will Defense, which requires only that (3) be possible. Like those who objected to the plausibility of Alvin Plantinga’s hypothesis that all natural evil could be due to the influence of demonic beings, so you have mistaken the role of (3) in the argument. (3) needn’t be plausible or, indeed, even true; in order to show that (1) and (2) are logically compatible (3) just needs to be possible. So is it?

You claim that it is unintelligible because of problems of reference. You state that counterfactuals involving proper names of individuals cannot have a truth value because in the absence of a context, such terms are vacuous, that is, they fail to refer to some specific person. That, of course, is correct (does “William Craig” designate the famous Berkeley logician or that fellow at Talbot School of Theology?) but irrelevant, since the canonical form of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom employed by contemporary philosophers includes a set of circumstances C which includes the whole history of the world up to the time of the choice in question. So contemporary Molinists are hardly guilty of the oversight of ignoring context.

(By the way, the same is not true of “this person.” Unlike a proper name, this expression is a demonstrative term which designates a specific individual in a situation of use. If I point to my wife and say, “This person was born in Minnesota,” that expression picks her out without any further specification. Of course, one cannot say “this person” of a non-existent person unless one has previously designated that person in some other way, e.g., “Plato was the teacher of a man named Aristotle. This man became the greatest of the Greek philosophers.”)

Now you do go on to address the correct formulation of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, noting that “you can avoid the intelligibility problem by adding that God knew that Fred would reject the Gospel ‘in XYZ circumstances.’” So that solves the problem of reference you had alleged.

But now you raise a quite different objection aimed specifically at (3). “Before God sticks Fred in second century Tibet wouldn't He have to ascertain that Fred would freely reject the Gospel in all circumstances, not just some of them?” Well, He wouldn’t have to, but that’s my hypothesis. Clearly, God could place a person anywhere He wants in human history, regardless of how that person might freely behave in different circumstances. But my suggestion is that God, being so merciful and not wanting anyone to be damned, so providentially orders the world that anyone who would embrace the Gospel if he were to hear it will not be placed in circumstances in which he fails to hear it and is lost. Only in the case of someone who would be saved through his response to general revelation would a person who would freely respond to special revelation, if he heard it, find himself in circumstances where he doesn’t hear it.

I’m mystified that you find this suggestion “intuitively unattractive.” On the contrary, I think it magnifies the goodness and abundant graciousness of God, that He would prevent anyone’s being lost though the accidents of history and geography. God is so good that He won’t allow anyone to be lost if that person would under any circumstances respond to the Gospel and be saved.

In any case, you then go to your plausibility objections. These are just irrelevant, as explained above. So long as (3) is even possibly true, which you seem to concede, it shows that (1) and (2) are logically compatible, Q.E.D.

But I can’t resist saying something about the plausibility of (3). Why isn’t (3) plausible? You suggest that God would have to vet all the options in order to actualize such a world. That’s not really true, but is in any case no problem because the doctrine of middle knowledge entails that God knows which of all the possible worlds known to Him via His natural knowledge are feasible for Him to actualize. All feasible worlds are given to Him by His middle knowledge, so sovereignly picking one is just no problem.

You suggest, more plausibly, I think, that that there are no persons whom God could have created who would under all circumstances reject His grace for salvation. Maybe you’re right; but how can you know? I just don’t think we’re in a position to make those kinds of judgements. You talk about the insanity of unbelief; and yet such persons are all around us, people who have heard the Gospel again and again, who have the Bible, who have read apologetics material, and yet who refuse to believe. In fact, I’ve had unbelievers say to me on more than one occasion, “Even if I knew that Christianity is true, I still wouldn’t bend the knee!” (Remember we're talking only of freedom-permitting circumstances here.)

How do you know that God couldn’t put together a world in which the unreached are people who wouldn’t bend the knee under any circumstances? In fact, this hypothesis has real implications for other issues like the wider problem of evil. For example, maybe only in a world involving scads of natural and moral evil could God arrange the sort of world we’re envisioning. Maybe His desire to achieve an optimal balance between saved and lost overrides the benefits of a world with less natural and moral evil. It may well be that getting the right counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in place to achieve (3) involves putting up with a lot of otherwise gratuitous evil.

Now you ask, why create “Fred” in the first place? Here’s the real nub of the issue, I think, and why you find my hypothesis unattractive. You think God could have just left Fred out. But that’s not true, if my hypothesis is correct! There may be no world feasible for God involving universal, freely embraced salvation which comes without other overriding disadvantages. Sure, God could have refrained from creating Fred (or both Fred and Sophie), but then the resulting world might have been even worse or at least no better. The hypothesis is that God has done the very best He can, given the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him.

Your claim that “there are an infinite number of beings God can create who would freely accept the Gospel without somebody else rejecting it” is guilty of the same error you alleged earlier, namely, speaking without a context. Suppose that for any possible person there may be circumstances under which he would be freely saved without someone’s being lost; it doesn’t follow that there is a feasible world in which every person would be freely saved without someone’s being lost. For the relevant circumstances may not be compossible. Your pun on Sophie’s Choice (a choice between two bad options) reveals that you haven’t yet grasped the theory of middle knowledge, for God doesn’t create such a choice for Himself. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt.

So I’m a good deal less confident than you are about our ability to pronounce on what worlds are feasible for God. Therefore, I’m not inclined to regard (3) as implausible. In any case, we both agree that it is possible, and that suffices for the purposes of the Free Will Defense.
I’ll post a few more: does this help?

Here is a link from His site for more articles like this: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/Sea ... 0&x=13&y=7
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Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 9:30 am
by August
narnia4 wrote:I do believe that God has middle knowledge, but as I said I still have issues with Molinism and I'm not sure if it "solves the problems" that it purports to solve. The Scripture listed indicated that God does have knowledge of what people would have done under different circumstances, but does it show that "God chooses who will be saved based on who will choose Him?" or that man has libertarian free will?

One of my biggest issues is that I believe that we have other grounds for doubting the existence of libertarian free will. Scriptural, scientific, and philosophical grounds. Maybe somebody like Danny has more knowledge on the specifics on this.
The existence of libertarian free will is a philosophical surd. It assumes indeterminism and an effect without a cause, as the will is not a cause in and of itself, but the faculty of choice. However, molinism simply begs the question, as I pointed out earlier, by inserting the tension as being between the human will and God's will, instead of the real tension we see in Scripture, between human responsibility based on human intent, and the sovereignty of God.
And then I'm not sure exactly how Craig is avoiding the criticism under point 3, that God's decisions are made dependent on man's decisions. To me it looks like an indication like the Molinist is trying to say that God looks into the future and fits the universe to "accommodate our needs" so that we'll accept him. So how can you possible say that he isn't basing his decisions off our decisions?
This is the other main issue. This is what Craig has to say:
"The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt."
So any claims that molinism reconciles the sovereignty of God and human free will are tenuous at best, it makes God contingent. If I have time later I will post the logical proofs.

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 9:56 am
by jlay
Any chance of a mod reopening the closed thread?

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 10:18 am
by RickD
But now you raise a quite different objection aimed specifically at (3). “Before God sticks Fred in second century Tibet wouldn't He have to ascertain that Fred would freely reject the Gospel in all circumstances, not just some of them?” Well, He wouldn’t have to, but that’s my hypothesis. Clearly, God could place a person anywhere He wants in human history, regardless of how that person might freely behave in different circumstances. But my suggestion is that God, being so merciful and not wanting anyone to be damned, so providentially orders the world that anyone who would embrace the Gospel if he were to hear it will not be placed in circumstances in which he fails to hear it and is lost. Only in the case of someone who would be saved through his response to general revelation would a person who would freely respond to special revelation, if he heard it, find himself in circumstances where he doesn’t hear it.
After reading Craig's response, I have a question,pertaining to what I see as a problem with what Craig believes here. Craig talks about Fred in Tibet, that never heard the gospel. Craig says that God placed Fred in Tibet, because God knew if Fred heard the gospel,no matter where Fred was in history, he would have rejected it anyways. Now, Craig goes on to say that "Clearly, God could place a person anywhere He wants in human history, regardless of how that person might freely behave in different circumstances." Correct me here, if I'm over thinking this. God could not have known Fred in Tibet, and still have placed Fred anywhere in history, because while God created Fred, Fred's parents also "created" Fred. Fred is a specific person, who is only who he is, because 1 specific sperm from Fred's father, met with 1 specific egg, from Fred's mother, at one precise, exact, specific time in history. Any other sperm and egg, whether from Fred's parents, or another couple, would not be Fred.
Have I completely lost my mind, or is there an explanation I'm missing, here?

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 10:22 am
by B. W.
Rick and all following this,

Here is another article that may help as well from Reasonable Faith website – Articles section concerning some common objections. I find interesting that last few sentences which I underlined.
Subject: Middle Knowledge and Free Will

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=5979


Question:

My question is about Molinism.

Molinism claims that a person will freely choose one particular way in each set of logically possible circumstances that could occur in a real world.

Is this true?

Let us take two sets of logically possible circumstances which could have occurred in the real world, but did not.

1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Sun 30/12/2007, and a waiter is asking 'Tea or Coffee’, and an omniscient being has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.

2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Sun. 30/12/2007, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and an omniscient being has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.

Are these logically possible, and distinct, sets of circumstances?

What are my counterfactuals of freedom in each of those 2 sets of circumstances?

Which way would I freely choose in each of those sets of circumstances?

If there is a definite fact of the matter about how I would choose in each of those sets of circumstances, has Molinism now been proved to be true?

Steven

Dr. Craig responds:

Your statement of Molinism isn’t quite accurate, Steven. What Molinism holds is that God knows logically prior to His decree to create a world what any person would freely do in any fully specified, freedom-permitting set of circumstances in which God might place him. If the circumstances are not sufficiently specified, then it may not be the case that a counterfactual concerning what a person would do in those circumstances is true; instead we may have a true counterfactual stating merely what he might do.

The circumstances you describe are vastly underspecified, which might at first blush lead one to think that only a “might” counterfactual would be in order here. But the joker in the deck is that you include as part of the circumstances the knowledge of your choice on the part of an omniscient, infallible being, which entails that you will choose a specific way.

So as to your four questions concerning the circumstances you envision:

(i) Are these logically possible, and distinct, sets of circumstances? In one sense, yes, for you partially describe two possible worlds up to the time t of your choosing, one of which includes an omniscient, infallible being’s foreknowledge (N. B. not middle knowledge!) of your choosing coffee and one of which includes an omniscient, infallible being’s foreknowledge of your choosing tea. On the other hand, when contemporary Molinists talk about the different “circumstances” in which a choice is made, they do not include “future-infected” facts such as an omniscient, infallible being’s knowledge of the future. Since such future-infected or “soft” facts track one’s free choices, varying as they vary, they are not useful guides in determining what free choices are available in certain circumstances. In this technical sense, then, (assuming that the hotel, waiter, etc., are the same) you haven’t described distinct “circumstances.” Otherwise, you may wind up with a so-called “collapsing counterfactual,” that is to say, the truth of its consequent clause entails the falsity of its antecedent clause, so that it cannot be true.

(ii) What are my counterfactuals of freedom in each of those two sets of circumstances? There are indefinitely many free choices that you could make in those circumstances, e.g., you get up and leave, you order a Coke, you tell the waiter to get lost, etc. Of course, if you were to do any of those things, then the omniscient being’s knowledge of what you will do would have been different. Because the omniscient being’s knowledge of what you will do is a soft fact about the past, it is not independent of how you will freely choose. In cases like this you have the power to act in such a way that if you were to act in that way, some past fact would have been different than it is. Cases like these justify the use of certain so-called “back-tracking counterfactuals” to the effect that if you were to perform some action A at t, then some fact prior to t would have been different. We run into the same sort of situation in thought experiments involving cases of time travel or backward causation.

(iii) Which way would I freely choose in each of those sets of circumstances? You’ve already let the cat out of the bag as to which counterfactual is true with respect to each set of circumstances by telling us what the omniscient, infallible being knows you will do. For this is just logically equivalent to what it is true that you will do. So, of course, if it were true that you would choose tea, then you would choose tea, and if it were true that you would choose coffee, then you would choose coffee. No mystery here!

(iv) If there is a definite fact of the matter about how I would choose in each of those sets of circumstances, has Molinism now been proved to be true? Obviously not, for what is critical for the doctrine of middle knowledge is when God has knowledge of such true counterfactuals: logically prior to His creative decree or only logically posterior to His creative decree? Traditionally all theologians agreed that God has knowledge of such counterfactuals; what was distinctive about Molina’s view was his contention that God knows them logically prior to His decree of a world, that is to say, their truth value is independent of His will. So in order to prove the doctrine of middle knowledge it is not enough to show that in any circumstances there are true counterfactuals about our choices which are known by God; it still remains to be shown that He knows them prior to His selection of the actual world.
Notice the word decree is used - very important word. Before God decreed the universe and world into existence, God knew how each person would respond to a set of circumstance. He permits them this because of what he spoke in Genesis chapters one and two too man – decreeing a blessing of a free will – ability to make certain decisions.

Now, God himself sets up the circumstance to turn men from the error of his or her ways. How? See Job 33:15-16, Job 33:17-18, Romans 1:18-21 for examples how. But the only real way to set up a set of circumstances is to send his Word into the world that sets forth a choice (John 1:1-14, John 3:14-15, John 3:16-17, John 3:18-19, John 3:20-21, John 3:36). These kinds of choices, set before all, by God, God already knows the answer too.

He still remains true to his own character Deut 32:4, Exodus 34:6-7, Psalms 18:30, Psalms 92:15 and for that reason alone He offers a choice to ALL People despite already knowing the true answer of their heart. In this he proves he is a God of Justice and his judgments are righteous and impartial. It is God who sets forth the circumstances to all, to test the heart (Jeremiah 17:9-10c).

Since God already knows the unhindered answers to the choice he puts forth to a person, if the person was foreseen to reject him completely – then God can make that person into a Pharaoh, or a forgotten member in some lost tribe in any point in history and in any group or nation, keep them alive knowing how some of their progeny will turn and become reconciled to God.

Before God decreed the universe and world into existence, God knew how each person would respond to a set of circumstances. God must therefore, to be all that he says he is, put forth an ultimate choice before man (his own circumstances that is his sent word) – to believe or not to believe and be reconciled. Look at what the following verses say…


2 Co 5:18 - Now all these things are from God, who reconciled us to Himself through Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation,
2 Co 5:19 - namely, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them, ]and He has committed to us the word of reconciliation.
2 Co 5:20 -Therefore, we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God were making an appeal through us; we beg you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God.
2 Co 5:21 - He made Him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him.


That is how and what I understand Craig is saying…

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 10:41 am
by jlay
Rick,

While Molinism seems to sound like a good solution at first, this scenario WLC addresses is exactly the problem I see with it as well.

As for me, I believe God can reach anyone, anywhere at anytime. His hand is not too short. The fact remains, as it appears to us, that some are not reached. Why? I think is beyond our sensabilities to comprehend.

The issue with contingencies.
God is not contingent. However, does this eliminate God permitting what we see as contingencies within his creation? Does contingency, (things that may or may not happen within the creation) impune the soveringty of the creator. Does it MAKE God contingent? Obviously this question goes back to Aquinas and beyond. I'm curious to hear August's response.

What does saying God can not permit contingencies do to God?

Re: Molinism discussion

Posted: Mon Dec 26, 2011 11:36 am
by B. W.
August wrote:...This is the other main issue. This is what Craig has to say:
"The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt."
So any claims that molinism reconciles the sovereignty of God and human free will are tenuous at best, it makes God contingent. If I have time later I will post the logical proofs.
This why molinism is merely a tool of theology that aids human exploring into the ways of God - Same as Calvinism is merely a theological tool that aids human exploring into the ways of God.
Molinism can correct itself – the strictness of High Calvinism prevents correction. Even the statement quoted above, under molinism can be corrected.

Molinism is more flexible and permits inquiry to further develop that uncovers the beauty of how God is and how he acts and judges in the affairs of mankind. High Calvinism instead, just tells you to adhere to a set piece guideline.

For example, look at John 3:18 – how can they believe if they haven’t heard there was even a choice to be made to believe or not to believe? Is this passage speaking of only the High Calvinist elect or all people? What is the context? This verse is a choice phrase. (dealing with High Calvinism here not all types).

John 16:8-9, John 16:10-12 tell us it is a Person of the Godhead who convicts. The word convict is elégchō; fut. elégxō and AIG Dictionary of NT Words define this word to mean: to convict, to show, to prove one in the wrong, to shame... It involves reason as Isaiah 1:18 mentions how God operates... (Isaiah 1:19-20 context denotes through reason comes choice)

Isaiah 1:18 "Come now, and let us reason together," Says the LORD, "Though your sins are as scarlet, They will be as white as snow; Though they are red like crimson, They will be like wool." NASB

This word convict implies showing, proving one is a sinner (they are shown they are wrong, etc), that there is judgment coming, etc… as text speaks of. The Holy Spirit will convict the World of men or the elect only? A person can reject this conviction or accept it (Isaiah 1:19-20)

World is kósmos; meaning World, means in this context the order, nature and arrangement of this earth in which all people live. This word was used in John 3:16 as well. Hence, it means all the world of men and women. The Holy Spirit does what in this world?

It is the agency of the Holy Spirit that draws people to Father. That is how the Father draws people – through conviction work of the Holy Spirit – not dragging people by some impersonal force but by making an offer – his circumstance imposed into the world by which people can accept or reject, freely. That proves God’s justice supreme to himself first and proven in his treatment of the world of men. No injustice with God.

Engaging people with his circumstance – His word – which creates Choice, God then most certainly can do with whomever however he wants too…justly… all under the confines of his own character/nature, proving them true… in all cases…

Does High Calvinism (only speaking of that brand) stand up to this standard of God’s own character and nature?

Remember the bone of contention with the flexible Molinism resides primarily from High Calvinism and its influences and inflexibility to accept well intentioned revision.

That is why I bring this up on the Molinism thread and please note this, I haven’t even yet began to critique its abuses by the High Armenian camp either…
"The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt."
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