domokunrox wrote:Jac3510 wrote:Actually, you have this backwards. DS doesn't depend on that. DS concludes with that. The argument is:
Stop right there. Read what I said again. "What Jac has
specifically argued and
his claims (backed by his research)
in regards to DS"
So, no, I don't have it backwards. Stop trying to confuse me.
I've seen people quote others out of context. It's funny to see people quote themselves out of context.
Here's what I was responding to:
You wrote:What Jac has specifically argued and his claims (backed by his research) in regards to DS and the nature of God's existence; is (predication) in short entirely dependent on the idea that God's "attributes" have no distinctions. Specifically, the ontological ones and "within" God (whatever he means by within).
Now, perhaps you phrased this wrong, but your sentence there says that my claims are "entirely dependent on the idea that God's "attributes" have no distinctions." That is what
you wrote. And that is what I said was wrong, and it is wrong. My claims are not dependent on the idea that God's "attributes" have no distinctions. As I said already, you have it backwards. In fact, the idea that God's attributes have no distinctions is dependent on my claims and the nature of God's existence.
That's part of the problem with your whole attempt at critiquing my argument. You, like most anti-DS advocates, are simply ignoring the arguments
for DS (which, at the end of the day, amounts to little more than begging the question). The less charitable interpretation of your attempt is that it is just an incoherent non-sequitur. Here are the two options in syllogistic form so that you and other readers can see this more clearly. On the charitable assumption, your argument is:
- 1. DS entails God's attributes are all identical with one another;
2. But God's attributes are not identical with one another (that is, they are distinct from one another);
3. Therefore, DS is wrong
That's just a standard modus tollens. It's valid in this form. But the real problem is how you then go about defending (2). As a point of fact, I've never seen you or anybody else (not even WLC) offer a proper defense of (2). They just say it
has to be the case, that it is just
obvious. Some of the more sophisticated defenders (like Alvin Plantinga) say it must be true given a commitment to Platonism, and Platonism is can be conceived as supporting (2). But in the end, (2) never amounts to much more than an assertion. A better argument for (2) would be;
- 1. Either God's attributes are identical with one another or they are not;
2. DS entails God's attributes are all identical with one another;
3. But DS is false;
4. There is no warrant for claiming God's attributes are identical with one another other than DS;
5. Therefore, there is no warrant for claiming that God's attributes are all identical with one another;
6. Unwarranted claims should not be held true;
7. Therefore, we should not claim that God's attributes are identical with one another;
8. Therefore, we should claim that God's attributes are not identical with one another.
This would be a perfectly valid defense, but note that the falsity of DS is found as a premise. It should be clear when so phrased why you cannot logically appeal to the distinction of God's properties as a defeater of DS without begging the question. You need to show that DS is false on some other terms. As I said before, you can do so by attacking it's internal coherence. The other way to do so is by attacking it's consistency with Scripture. Frankly, you haven't done either of those in any of your arguments thus far.
The uncharitable way, by the way, to interpret you so far would be something along these lines:
- 1. DS entails that there are no parts in God;
2. If God's attributes are to be conceived of as parts, then DS is false;
3. But God's attributes are not to be conceived of as parts;
4. Therefore, DS is false.
Now, I'd rather not assume that you aren't making such an asinine claim as that. So I'm going with the more charitable interpretation. Of course, you could offer a totally different interpretation of your words, still, and that's fine, too.
Jac3510 wrote:1. God is simple;
And what is "simple", Jac? What constitutes that?
Is it "simple"
by identity? Is simple a substance? Is this the only "simple" substance that exists?
We got problems, Jac.
Have you really not read
anything about DS?
"Simple" is just a positive way to state a negative attribute. When we say "God is simple," we are merely saying, "God is not composite." That is, "God is not composed of parts," and "parts" there is understood absolutely. God cannot be "broken up" and analyzed into more basic pieces. For instance, I can say this:
H = {X, Y, Z, etc}
Where "H" = "The Human Substance", {} = "The Set of Properties", "X" = "a rational mind," "Y = "bipedalism," "Z" = "binocular vision," etc. In theory, you could describe a human in this way by defining all the attributes that make a human a human. In good analytical philosophical language, you could identify all the
essential properties, list them all together, and you would thereby have a complete description of "Human."
On this model, simplicity says you
cannot say
G = {X, Y, Z}
Were X, Y, and Z = the essential properties of God (e.g., omniscience, omnibevolence, etc.). God is not
composed of essential properties.
It should be clear, then, that "Is simple a substance" is a meaningless question. That would be like saying, "Is tall a substance?" Now, if you are trying to ask if God is a substance, then the answer is no. So Aquinas says,
- The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. (ST Ia.3.5.ad 1)
We can speak of God's "substance" in an analogous way. But God transcends every time of genus, even the genus of substance.
And yes, there are truly simple
substances. Angels, for instance, are simple substances. They are not as simple as God, however, since being substances, their nature must be actualized, meaning that by nature their essence exists in potentiality to existence. They are, then, at least act/potency composites relative to their own existence. As such, what we ought to say is that some substances are more or less simple relative to others. Only God is absolutely simple.
Jac3510 wrote:2. That which is simple has no distinctions of any kinds;
What is a "distinction"? What constitutes that?
If I have a physical substance that is only made up of that single substance 100%, is that simple?
A distinction is anything that is not identical with the whole with which it is identified (it is precisely in this sense, by the way, that we affirm the simplicity of the soul, but that's another debate). In other words, if you can think of anything, any part, any aspect of any particular idea, then that thing, part, or aspect is a "distinction." Since I am not identical with my hand, we make a distinction between my body and my hand. Since I am not not identical with my thoughts, we make a distinction between my thoughts and me, and so on.
And no, a 100% single substance wold not be simple for the simple reason that it would be extended. Take a hunk of absolutely pure gold. There is nothing in this hunk of metal other than the element gold. It is a composite entity--it has internal distinctions--in multiple ways. First, it is extended. Since every individual gold atom is not identical with the entire lump, you could number every individual gold atom. You could distinguish them from the whole, such that the whole is composed of the collection of them all. You could also distinguish between this region and that region. Perhaps I could cut it into four quadrants, for instance. This hunk of gold would be composed of these four quadrants.
The point is that
all bodies are necessarily extended, and therefore, no body, by necessity, can be considered simple, since all bodies (being extended) admit to internal distinctions.
Jac3510 wrote:And exactly how is God applicable
3. God has attributes (e.g., omnipotence, omniscience)
So, by your definition, are God's attributes "parts"?
Of course not. What kind of question is that? That would be like an atheist saying to you, "So by your definition, Jesus is not God?" That's absurd. Just as the essence of Christianity is that Jesus is God, so the essence of DS is that God's attributes are not parts. But you cannot say that God's attributes are not parts
unless you affirm DS. Put differently,
to deny that God's attributes are parts is to affirm DS.
Jac3510 wrote:4. Therefore, there is no real distinction of any kind between God's attributes.
Here is the problem, Jac. You haven't clarified what kind of substance God
IS. It is begging the question to assume that I have conceded what "simple" and "distinctions" are. Nevermind that 4 contradicts 3.
If you in fact did conclude that there is "no real" distinction between God's attributes (We don't ever know what that is, yet), then how are you even speaking in plurality? Attribute
(s)
And I can't help by the fact that you said "no real". What does that mean? That needs to be explained, too.
Once again, I have to assume that you haven't studied the position you are critiquing. God is not a substance at all. His essence is pure existence. It is not question begging to assume that you have conceded what "simple" and "distinctions" are. Far from question begging, it is making the charitable assumption that you are familiar with the terminology. And the fact that you think that (4) contradicts (3) further demonstrates not only your ignorance, but in fact your gross ignorance, on this subject matter.
Allow me to quote from Alvin Plantinga on this matter. He wrote a book titled
Does God Have a Nature? in which he argued that God is NOT simple. He said:
- Now I think the intuition—call it the sovereignty-aseity intuition—underlying the doctrine of divine simplicity must be taken with real seriousness. Suppose God has essentially the property of being omnipotent and suppose that property is an object distinct from him, is uncreated by him and exists necessarily. Then in some sense he does depend on that property. For in the first place he could not have existed if it had not; its existence is a necessary condition for his existence. And secondly he couldn’t have the character he does have, couldn’t be the way he is, if omnipotence didn’t exist or weren’t the way it is. (p. 34)
And again,
- Among a thing’s properties is its nature or essence . . . if an object is distinct from its essence, then its essence is in some way
a cause of that thing, so that the latter is dependent—causally dependent—on the former. . . . If God were distinct from such properties as wisdom,
goodness and power but nonetheless had these properties, then . . . he would be dependent on them in a dual way. First, if, as Aquinas thinks, these properties are essential to him, then it is not possible that he should have existed and they not be ‘in’ him. But if they had not existed, they could not have been in him. Therefore he would not have existed if they had not. . . . The point is that he would be dependent upon something else for his existence, and dependent in a way outside his control and beyond his power to alter; this runs counter to his aseity. Secondly, under the envisaged conditions God would be dependent upon these properties for his character. He is, for example, wise. But then if there had been no such thing as wisdom, he would not have been wise. He is thus dependent upon these properties for his being and the way he is . . . and there is nothing he can do to change or overcome it. . . . And this doesn’t fit with his existence a se. (p.30)
What Plantinga is recognizing in all this is that since, on his view, God has parts, God is not simple. In fact, he is arguing that since God is not simple, having parts, He is therefore
dependent on those parts. Plantinga is positively and intentionally denying God's
aseity.
That you seem to fail to understand this just tells me that you don't understand the position that you are critiquing.
Jac3510 wrote:I cannot emphasize this enough. Look at the underlined part in your comments above and compare that to what I am actually saying. My equation of the attributes is based on DS. My argument FOR DS is not based on my equation of the attributes.
And I cannot emphasize this enough that THESE 3 premises and the conclusion is a completely illicit process. Nothing in here is even coherent with itself. You need to get right down to the grit and explain how premises 1, 2, and 3 are in any coherent way axiomatic to conclude 4.
You ought not throw words around that you don't understand. An illicit process is a formal fallacy in which a term is distributed a premise and not in the conclusion. So, take the following as an example:
- 1. All cats are animals.
2. No cats are dogs.
3. Therefore, no dogs are animals.
There is no fallacy of that sort in my argument, which I will repeat here for your sake and for the sake of any poor souls who are still trying to wade through all this nonsense. So I said,
- 1. God is simple;
2. That which is simple has no distinctions of any kinds;
3. God has attributes (e.g., omnipotence, omniscience)
4. Therefore, there is no real distinction of any kind between God's attributes.
Far from being an illicit process, this is a valid argument. You either have to show that one of the premises (1)-(3) is false or else you have to accept the conclusion. As it is, the premises are very easy to understand. A simple being (1) is, by definition, a being that has no distinctions within it of any kind (2). We attribute things like omniscience and omnipresence to God--we call those "attributes" (3). Since a simple being has no distinctions in it, and since God is simple, then those things we attribute to God cannot therefore be distinguished one from another.
Jac3510 wrote:And let me just say in passing here that there are two widely employed tactics for arguing against DS: arguing that it is philosophically incoherent and that it is inconsistent with Scripture. You are taking the first approach, and that is perfectly fine. But if you are going to do that, you have to really do it--you have to show that the doctrine is intrinsically and inescapably self-contradictory within the framework of its own assumptions.
Well, I just did. Lets see if I can find more assumptions on your part that don't work philosophically. Lets chug along.
No, you haven't. You've demonstrate a gross understanding of DS. Do you think that asking definitions constitutes an objection? Do you think that claiming a logical fallacy where there is none constitutes such an objection?
There is a reason I told you early on that I don't respect your philosophical acumen. There are real objections to be made against DS. If you want to learn them, then read my thesis (chapter two, in which I provide 34 pages of such arguments!). The stuff you are saying here is just absurd. You really ought to be embarrassed by it.
Jac3510 wrote:But if the Thomistic view on metaphysics is correct, then the objection stands and is very forceful. But more than that, you seem to have just confused yourself. Divine Simplicity is really a negative claim. It is the claim that God is not composed of parts. So the arguments from that are very simple. Anything that entails composition in God is to be rejected. Thus;
And what constitutes "PARTS", Jac? I cannot stress it enough that is it begging the question to assume that something is true, and I have not conceded it. We have a fundamentally and drastic worldview on "PARTS" and "COMPOSITION", and how it is applicable to the VERY SUBSTANCE IN QUESTION.
Do you realize that what you "cannot stress enough" is that you don't understand
the definition of a term? This is not MY definition, Dom. This is THE definition. EVERYONE accepts it. If you don't accept it, it is because YOU don't understand what it means. Once again, it is not begging the question to use standard terminology. The debate is not over the meaning of "part." The debate is over whether or not God has them. If He does not, He is simple. If He does, He is not. If you deny simplicity, you are saying that God has parts.
That is what the words mean, Dom.
Jac3510 wrote:1. DS claims that God is not a composite being;
2. Some views make God a composite being;
My view isn't that God is a composite being; I don't even know what you mean by composite yet and I can already tell you that I don't agree. Thats how ridiculous 1 and 2 are.
Did you REALLY just write that? You don't know what I mean, but you know you disagree? REALLY?
Jac3510 wrote:So the question is whether or not the attributes you mentioned here (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) are identical with God or not. If they are not identical with Him, then He is a composite being. That's just definitional. In other words, if those attributes are not identical with God, then we would say that God is a being that has the following set of properties: x, y, z, etc.
Well, first off. These "attributes" we are talking about. We don't even agree if they make something a "composition". Even less, how this even applies to the substance of God. Never mind anything else.
I refer you back to Plantinga's comments above. Again, I remind you and the reader that He is writing to prove that God is not simple. For you to say, "God is not composed of attributes, yet God is not simple" is self-contradictory drivel. What your statement boils down to is this:
- 1. A simple being is not composed of parts.
2. God is not composed of parts
3. So God is not simple
That's the uncharitable reading I'm really trying to stay away from. But your refusal to acknowledge the basic terms you are debating makes it hard to get away from. You say, "Never mind anything else." On that, you are right. If you don't even know what your terms mean, then there is nothing else to say!
Jac3510 wrote:On the other hand, if those attributes are identical with God, then He is not composite and you have simply affirmed DS and the first syllogism applies as to the relations between the "various" attributes.
Ok, I am going to go ahead and write out your syllogism here.
God is omniscient
God is omnipotent
Omniscient is omnipotent
That right?
Let me go ahead and write a syllogism of my own
Jac is siting
Jac is reading
Siting is reading
That right?
Jlay responded correctly to this poor argument already, but let me go with it all the same. The only thing you are missing is one premise. I'm going to restate your argument correctly:
- 1. God is simple (= non-composite)
2. God is omniscient
3. God is omnipotent
4. Omniscient is omnipotent
5. Jac is simple (= non-composite)
6. Jac is siting
7. Jac is reading
8. Siting is reading
Can you guess where your argument fails? (4) is true if (1) is true. By the same token (8) is true is (5) is true. But (5) is not true, and therefore, (8) is not true.
Jac3510 wrote:You clearly haven't read any Thomists on any of this. May I recommend to you volume 2 of Frederick Copleston's History of Philosophy? I think you will find the reading there helpful. I certainly did.
Anyway, the point is that we all (proudly) recognize that Thomas borrowed heavily from Aristotle. Absolutely no one seeks to deny that. But that's hardly an objection to Thomas' metaphysics. You can't say he was wrong because he borrowed from Aristotle . . . that would be a genetic fallacy. Of course, you could try to do the work of showing why Aristotle was wrong, in which case, I wish you the best of luck, because he was not.
What my specific objections are about Aristotle is quite easy. We've seen the painting before. Aristotle is gesturing with his hand down saying "THIS is the true reality". We've had this conversation before, Jac. Aquinas had taken his philosophy and while it seemed like it was a good fit with Christianity at the time, it really wasn't. We figured that out once the scientific revolution went into full swing.
Yes, I remember that exchange. You offered your misunderstanding of the painting. I responded, saying:
- Either your understanding of the debate the picture represents in flawed or your explanation of it is. The issue wasn't about what is "true reality," that is whether there were ideal forms beyond nature or whether nature itself is true reality. The question is where true forms exist. For Plato, true forms exist only in a Third Realm, whereas for Aristotle, all forms (thus, true forms) exist in the things they inform. Thus, Aristotle denied the reality of abstract objects, whereas Plato founded is philosophy on them. Thus, Aristotle was an empiricist (in the classical default, non-Humean sense), whereas Plato was a rationalist. Aristotle believed that all knowledge original came through the senses, whereas Plato believed that all knowledge was inherit in the person, and "learning" was really the process of "remembering" innate ideas. To go on to argue, then, that Aristotle thought that only things that could be compared against nature were real or that if there were no perceptible qualities in things then there was nothing there is just absurd and shows a gross misunderstanding of classical empircism. It's simply an anachronistic reading of Hume back into Aristotle and a confusion of scientism with Aristotelianism.
Rather than admit your error, you just said, "There are many ways to look at the picture, but what I described is word for word the simpler account." As a matter of fact, your view is not "simpler." It is wrong. It points, as is common with you, to a basic misunderstanding of the subject matter.
The simple fact, dom, is that you don't know what you are talking about.
Anyway, if you want to try to overturn DS, it isn't enough just to say "Aristotle was wrong" (even if you knew what Aristotle meant, and you have proven that you don't). You have to show why Aristotle was wrong on the issues that provide the basis for DS. You've not done anything
close to that.
Jac3510 wrote:Second, I don't even know what the underlined part refers to. I've read both Aristotle and Thomas extensively and talked with a lot of Aristotelians and Thomists, and I've never heard ANYONE make that claim or anything remotely close to it. I'm just going to ask you to quote Aristotle and Aquinas here. Provide your source or I'll just write you off as making stuff up.
I can tell you, by the way, that "this is incorrect." You'll find no such quote from either of them.
What they believe about God is implicit by their philosophy. For example, plants, animals, and people have a differing gradation of "soul".
What does having differing gradation of the soul have to do with whether or not Thomists are willing to admit they are Aristotelian? Once again, you fail to understand the subject matter, because even if they did not make that admission, an error in one place does not entail an error in another (that's a genetic fallacy). In the second place, Aristotelian/Thomists are right in their discussion of the gradation of the soul (have you even bothered to read
De Anima or are you just rejecting the position out of incredulity? I have read it. You should invest some time doing so, too. After, of course, you learn your basic definitions). And finally
all Thomists admit that they agree with and get their philosophical ideas on the soul from Aristotle. Are you not aware of the fact that not only does Aquinas appeal regularly to
De Anima (which is the latin title of Aristotle's book
Peri Psyches), but in fact he even wrote a commentary on it?!?
Jac3510 wrote:So all you have here are a bunch of assertions . . . so let me just ask:
1. How is it "clear as day" that my "specific objections (which ones, by the way?) are false" if "God is Perfect, and his 'substance' is not analogous to any other 'substance'"? Please demonstrate.
Specifically, your objections that pretty much run along the lines that "If it doesn't agree with DS, you can't rationally hold trinity doctrine", "If you don't agree with DS, you can't have objective morality because of the Eur Dilemma", and probably anything else along the lines of "If you don't agree with DS..."
Lastly, if there was any (contingent) substance that is analogous to perfect substance (God, eternal), thats a contradiction. It would be calling it something it IS NOT and CANNOT BE.
*sigh*
I asked you to list and demonstrate where my arguments are false "clear as day." You listed a few objections of mine, but you never offered a demonstration. At best, you offered a seemingly unrelated incorrect assertion. Why in the blazes would you think that we do not stand in analogy God? That is precisely what we do and what we are. Nothing else is possible. To suggest that we are not analogous to God is to suggest that we are not analogous to existence or causality, and that would be to say that there is no way that we can say that we exist or cause. Do you not see how blatantly ridiculous such a claim is?
Please, dom, please go actually read something on this subject. Go buy
An Interpretation of Existence by Etienne Gilson and
An Elementary Christian Metaphysic by Joseph Owens. Go read
The Last Superstition and
Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide by Edward Feser. Heck, just go read Aristotle himself. Start with his logical works, then do his categories, then the the physics, then de anima, and then his metaphysics. Or read Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles, or if you want to do the hard work of trying to do his Summa Theologica (without the necessary training to appreciate it), and least read it alongside a good commentary Reginald Gerrigou-Lagrange has an excellent one available for free online here:
http://www.thesumma.info/one/index.php
Jac3510 wrote:2. How is it "clear as day" that my given the qualifiers in (1) my objections are "purposely misleading"? I note that not only do you need to show that my objections are misleading, but that they are purposefully so. Please demonstrate.
It is misleading. How are you even advocating that the eur dilemma is a valid argument if you don't hold the DS position? That is purposely and predatorily misleading people. Think about that again for a few minutes. Then look at where you are typing it. Then look at who you are typing to around here. You can't be serious. At first I thought it was a joke, but then looking at it again this past month. You were serious, and I was shocked you would even make such an argument.
I am serious. And it is a serious argument made in the literature. I refer you to Erik Wielenberg's article,
“Dawkins’s Gabmit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity,” Philosophia Christi 11 (2009): 113-27. If you don't want to take the time to read the article, just read pp. 148-51 of my thesis, where I give an overview.
In the meantime, I will point out that incredulity is not an argument (once again).
Jac3510 wrote:3. How is "DS being a complete hunk of FUD to boot as a result"? As a result of what? What is your argument?
Well, the way you present it, Jac. Its awful. Maybe DS is a good and rational doctrine after all. Maybe I actually do agree with it, but you didn't explain it right. Your presentation of it however is awful.
I'm giving you my feedback, and weather or not you want to take it is up to you. Honestly, I hope you take what I am saying and go back to the drawing board with it because I don't think we're very far apart at all. Its just a matter of definitional and coherency issues. Specifically, the illicit process I have pointed out.
Perhaps you should stop making so many assumptions and start asking questions. You can't say my presentation is "awful" when you don't even understand the basic terms. Now, if you want to just admit that you can't follow the language, then that's fine. There's no shame in that. It took me two years of studying to figure it out. Ask Byblos how long he's been working on it. But you
present yourself as someone who knows something about philosophy.
Now, I'm working on a book titled
Making Simplicity Simple. Initial reviews from some sample sections have been positive. Maybe you'll find that presentation more helpful. In the meantime, I strongly advise you to stop arguing so vehemently against a position that you do not understand. If you fail to understand something,
just ask. I am
not saying that I do a great job of explaining it. DS is a VERY difficult doctrine to understand and explain. I say as much on the FIRST PAGE of my thesis, and I've made that admission here countless of times. I think I've even quoted scholars saying as much
in this thread. What I am saying, again, is if something confuses you, then argue less and ask more. You're more likely to learn something.
Jac3510 wrote:The only assertion I'll agree with you on is that I think you don't know what you are talking about. My personal assessment of your philosophical acumen is very low. And that is not because you disagree with me, by the way. It is because you make assertions without backing them up and assign fallacies to statements incorrectly all while misrepresenting historical positions.
Well, my personal assessment of you is that you approach the subject too cocky. Its even more cocky then I get, and thats pretty bad. You say that I make assertions, and sure I do. Some of it is simply my take on it based on a few axioms that I really like to defend. But lets not pretend you're not making assertions, either.
The difference in me and you is that I'm making assertions based on years of research on a very narrow topic. The only reason I'm "cocky" is because the certainty with which you argue such a grossly ignorant position.
I say this YET AGAIN: I do not and would not fault you for rejecting DS. It is a truly hard doctrine, not just to understand, but to accept. I do not and and would not fault you for saying that you don't know the arguments on its behalf and that they seem very opaque. The material you have to understand in order to appreciate the arguments is very old, and no one studies it unless they do so intentionally. It is not taught in seminary (unless you go to a conservative Catholic one). It is not taught in secular philosophy programs. Anthony Flew, God rest his soul, was wrong in a lot of things, but he was a good philosopher--one of the few good atheist philosophers. And even he admitted to not understanding,
to not even having read, Aristotle.
Dom, I
truly don't think less of you or of your philosophical acumen because you don't know the intricacies of this argument. Few people do. The ONLY reason I do is because I had an odd professor (Richard Howe of Southern Evangelical Seminary) who was very into this. Moreover, I try very hard not to transfer my expertise in this very small, very narrow area, into other areas of philosophy. So I don't hold it against you
in the least for not knowing this stuff.
What I
do hold against you is the force with which you make such irrational arguments,
as if you understand this material
when you clearly don't. Where you see cockiness you ought to see indignation. I'm not even asking you to let me "teach" you anything. I am saying if you don't understand something, ask. If you think you see a weakness, point it out. And if you want to argue about this position, at least go read some of the literature that I've made freely available to you so that we can have an intelligent, informed conversation.
Jac3510 wrote:Again, all I see are a bunch of assertions.
Who are these other men? What was this other school? What makes their findings more rational? What makes them more biblical?
Men who wanted to stop looking at their perceived reality and try to work backwards. What makes their findings more rational is that they stopped looking at the way our perceived reality was, and instead came up with some different ideas. They tried them out and see if they would work. They did work, and then it begin to make much more rational sense that the ideas are the 1st in order; Not the substances that Aristotle gestured down at.
I've already addressed this ad nauseum.
Jac3510 wrote:All you've done, dom, is make assertions, and that without evidence. There is a beautiful Latin phrase that applies very well here:
quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur
I'll let you Google that if you don't already know.
No, I don't need to google it.
My response? Right back at ya, Jac.
Ah, but I
have given arguments. Many of them. What you've given is little more than incredulity and a failure to understand basic definitions.
Jac3510 wrote:Dom, do you in particular, I would appreciate it if you would read those two sources and tell me where they are mistaken--not in general assertions but if you would take specific comments and demonstrate where the mistake is.
Thank you
I'll give it a look
[/quote]
I would appreciate that.
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All, I know the above was very long. I took way too long typing it all out. I don't have the energy for too many long posts of that nature. If you worked your way through all of that, then you have my condolences! I take it that you must be very interested in this subject. I'll only, then, offer a plug for myself on that point. As I have said to both Dom and BW, I am in the process of trying to write a book on this subject that gets rid of all the technical speak (or as much of it as possible) and keeps things as simple as I can. I have had to stop writing for two weeks, but I will resume on March 10 and hope to have it finished by the end of March. I will make it available for free when it is finished.
Thanks.