Evidence for God from Science

Jac3510 wrote:Somebody explain to this poor fellow Leibniz' Law of Indicernibles.

In a nutshell:

Leibniz's Law

No two substances can be exactly alike. This is known as Leibniz's Law. Another way of expressing this is: No two substances can be exactly the same and yet be numerically different. If two substances were exactly the same, then they would be the same substance and would not be two separate substances.

Kenny wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:

Kenny wrote:That would only work if we start with the assumption that everything has a singular beginning. I am asking how we know the assumption is correct.

Ken

PaulSacramento wrote:No, not everything has a singular beginning.
Things that COME INTO BEING have a beginning and because you can't have infinite regression of what causes something to be, then you end up at the first cause.
Can there be more than ONE first cause? or more than one unmoved mover?
That is a good question actually.

That is the question I am asking.

PaulSacramento wrote:[Let me ask you this, since the first cause must be pure actuality ( and it must logically speaking) then it is always "doing something" , so what would the "other first cause" be doing?

For the same of argument, if we assume the first cause must be pure actuality, the other first causes would be doing something as well.

Ken

If the First cause is pure actuality then there would be nothing left for the "other causes" to do since the first cause would be "doing" it already.

neo-x wrote:

Kenny wrote: That would only work if we start with the assumption that everything has a singular beginning. I am asking how we know the assumption is correct.

Ken

neo-x wrote:Because its the most simple logical conclusion. Simple, not simpler.

That's subjective. It's the logical conclusion to you; not to me.

Ken

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:Ken, are you arguing for many gods?

No; I am arguing against a single beginning; for the possibility of multiple beginnings.

Ken

Were there false starts or something?
One god jumped the mark too early perhaps with creating?

We're not at God yet, we are still debating if a single cause is the only option.

Ken

I'm just trying to understand what you mean by multiple starts or causes (seriously).
Are you talking parallel universes or universes apart from ours being caused?

PaulSacramento wrote:

Jac3510 wrote:Somebody explain to this poor fellow Leibniz' Law of Indicernibles.

In a nutshell:

Leibniz's Law

No two substances can be exactly alike. This is known as Leibniz's Law. Another way of expressing this is: No two substances can be exactly the same and yet be numerically different. If two substances were exactly the same, then they would be the same substance and would not be two separate substances.

The identity of indiscernible (Leibniz's Law) is intended as a metaphysical principle rather than one of natural science. Nobody in the real world takes this principle into consideration when they use the term "identical". If you are going to define identical as being exact to the extent of occupying the same space, the term becomes meaningless.

Ken

PaulSacramento wrote:

Kenny wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:

Kenny wrote:That would only work if we start with the assumption that everything has a singular beginning. I am asking how we know the assumption is correct.

Ken

PaulSacramento wrote:No, not everything has a singular beginning.
Things that COME INTO BEING have a beginning and because you can't have infinite regression of what causes something to be, then you end up at the first cause.
Can there be more than ONE first cause? or more than one unmoved mover?
That is a good question actually.

That is the question I am asking.

PaulSacramento wrote:[Let me ask you this, since the first cause must be pure actuality ( and it must logically speaking) then it is always "doing something" , so what would the "other first cause" be doing?

For the same of argument, if we assume the first cause must be pure actuality, the other first causes would be doing something as well.

Ken

If the First cause is pure actuality then there would be nothing left for the "other causes" to do since the first cause would be "doing" it already.

How are you defining "pure actuality"? Are you defining it as doing all that could possibly be done? If so then I do not agree that the first cause must be "pure actuality" If you define it as "in action" then just because one thing is in action doesn't prevent something else from being in action as well. If you meant something else; please explain.

Ken

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:Ken, are you arguing for many gods?

No; I am arguing against a single beginning; for the possibility of multiple beginnings.

Ken

Were there false starts or something?
One god jumped the mark too early perhaps with creating?

We're not at God yet, we are still debating if a single cause is the only option.

Ken

I'm just trying to understand what you mean by multiple starts or causes (seriously).
Are you talking parallel universes or universes apart from ours being caused?

I am suggesting if it is possible for one thing to have always existed, it is possible for multiple things to have always existed. I'm saying whatever argument you can make for a single unmoved mover; that argument can be made for multiple unmoved movers

Ken

Kenny wrote: Right now I am looking at several blank sheets of paper, each identical, and indistinguishable from each other, yet they are not the same sheet of paper. In my tool box I have 2 socket wrenches each identical to each other, yet they are not the same tool. These items are completely separate from each other, yet they are identical inside and out. Obviously you disagree; so tell me where am I going wrong here.

Ken

That's kind of what I was thinking - but do persons who are perfect and lacking nothing necessarily have to be identical anyway? I must be playing devil's advocate here

Kenny wrote:I am suggesting if it is possible for one thing to have always existed, it is possible for multiple things to have always existed. I'm saying whatever argument you can make for a single unmoved mover; that argument can be made for multiple unmoved movers

Ken

So then, multiple beings or one being right?

Nicki wrote:

Kenny wrote: Right now I am looking at several blank sheets of paper, each identical, and indistinguishable from each other, yet they are not the same sheet of paper. In my tool box I have 2 socket wrenches each identical to each other, yet they are not the same tool. These items are completely separate from each other, yet they are identical inside and out. Obviously you disagree; so tell me where am I going wrong here.

Ken

That's kind of what I was thinking - but do persons who are perfect and lacking nothing necessarily have to be identical anyway? I must be playing devil's advocate here

Excellent point!

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:I am suggesting if it is possible for one thing to have always existed, it is possible for multiple things to have always existed. I'm saying whatever argument you can make for a single unmoved mover; that argument can be made for multiple unmoved movers

Ken

So then, multiple beings or one being right?

Multiple or one are the only choices.

Ken

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:I am suggesting if it is possible for one thing to have always existed, it is possible for multiple things to have always existed. I'm saying whatever argument you can make for a single unmoved mover; that argument can be made for multiple unmoved movers

Ken

So then, multiple beings or one being right?

Multiple or one are the only choices.

Ken

Christianity tries to have it both ways though.
A third option perhaps?

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:

Kurieuo wrote:

Kenny wrote:I am suggesting if it is possible for one thing to have always existed, it is possible for multiple things to have always existed. I'm saying whatever argument you can make for a single unmoved mover; that argument can be made for multiple unmoved movers

Ken

So then, multiple beings or one being right?

Multiple or one are the only choices.

Ken

Christianity tries to have it both ways though.
A third option perhaps?

Of course! The trinity!

K

Nicki wrote:

Kenny wrote: Right now I am looking at several blank sheets of paper, each identical, and indistinguishable from each other, yet they are not the same sheet of paper. In my tool box I have 2 socket wrenches each identical to each other, yet they are not the same tool. These items are completely separate from each other, yet they are identical inside and out. Obviously you disagree; so tell me where am I going wrong here.

Ken

That's kind of what I was thinking - but do persons who are perfect and lacking nothing necessarily have to be identical anyway? I must be playing devil's advocate here

First of all, technically speaking, no two things can be identical 100%.
But, for arguments sake, if you have 2 perfect beings and they are not identical it means that one has something the other doesn't, which means one of them is NOT perfect.

Kenny wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:

Kenny wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:

Kenny wrote:That would only work if we start with the assumption that everything has a singular beginning. I am asking how we know the assumption is correct.

Ken

PaulSacramento wrote:No, not everything has a singular beginning.
Things that COME INTO BEING have a beginning and because you can't have infinite regression of what causes something to be, then you end up at the first cause.
Can there be more than ONE first cause? or more than one unmoved mover?
That is a good question actually.

That is the question I am asking.

PaulSacramento wrote:[Let me ask you this, since the first cause must be pure actuality ( and it must logically speaking) then it is always "doing something" , so what would the "other first cause" be doing?

For the same of argument, if we assume the first cause must be pure actuality, the other first causes would be doing something as well.

Ken

If the First cause is pure actuality then there would be nothing left for the "other causes" to do since the first cause would be "doing" it already.

How are you defining "pure actuality"? Are you defining it as doing all that could possibly be done? If so then I do not agree that the first cause must be "pure actuality" If you define it as "in action" then just because one thing is in action doesn't prevent something else from being in action as well. If you meant something else; please explain.

Ken

Pure actuality:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actus_purus

in scholastic philosophy, actus purus ( literally "pure act") is the absolute perfection of God.

Created beings have potentiality that is not actuality, imperfections as well as perfection. Only God is simultaneously all that He can be, infinitely real and infinitely perfect: 'I am who I am' (Exodus 3:14). His attributes or His operations, are really identical with His essence, and His essence necessitates His existence. (Contrast this understanding with the Essence–Energies distinction in Eastern Christian, particularly Palamite, theology).

In created beings, the state of potentiality precedes that of actuality; before being realized, a perfection must be capable of realization. But, absolutely speaking, actuality precedes potentiality. For in order to change, a thing must be acted upon, or actualized; change and potentiality presuppose, therefore, a being which is in actu. This actuality, if mixed with potentiality, presupposes another actuality, and so on, until we reach the actus purus.

According to Thomas Aquinas a thing which requires completion by another is said to be in potency to that other: realization of potency is called actuality. The universe is conceived of as a series of things arranged in an ascending order, or potency and act at once crowned and created by God, who alone is pure act. God is changeless because change means passage from potency to act, and so he is without beginning and end, since these demand change. Matter and form are necessary to the understanding of change, for change requires the union of that which becomes and that which it becomes. Matter is the first, and form the second. All physical things are composed of matter and form. The difference between a thing as form or character and the actual existence of it is denoted by the terms essence and being (or existence). It is only in God that there is no distinction between the two. Both pairs - matter & form and essence & being - are special cases of potency and act. They are also modes: modes do not add anything to the idea of being, but are ways of making explicit what is implicit in it.