K posted before I finished my reply -- he is exactly correct and said much of the same thing I did in fewer words. I hope his words will bring some light to my own:
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jenna wrote:ok, Jac, i did not want to re-post your earlier comment, for your sake so you would not have to scroll for my answer. what exactly do you mean by individuation? and i read your response to Crochet above. how is my belief logically impossible? especially when it is possible for the human family to be called "one" but still have more than one member? the God family is no different
I think it is different with God. So, by "individuation" I mean "that which makes something a distinct individual." Again, let's take apples as our example. I can have one apple or three hundred apples. What I never have is just "apple." I always have
an apple (however many "ans" is beside the point). So what makes this one
this apple and that one
that apple? The philosophical way of asking that is, "What is the principle of individuation?"
The philosophical way of answering that is, "
Matter is the principle of individual for
material things." In other words, this apple is this one precisely becaue it is made up of this bit of matter, and that apple is that one precisely because it is made up of that bit of matter. So the bit of matter is the principle of individuation. It isn't the fact that both are apples that makes them different. It's the fact that this apple is made up of this bit of matter and that apple is made up of that bit of matter.
If you agree with that, you'll quickly be able to see that is true for
all material things of the same kind. Two apples, two birds, to humans, two dogs, whatever. Of course, if two things are a different
kind of thing, then what makes them different things is less their matter and more their nature. An apple and a dog are, in fact, made up of different bits of matter. But what makes them different is what they are. The matter of the apple is arranged this way and has these properties because it is an apple; the matter of the apple is arranged that way and has those properties because it is a dog.
All of that is pretty easy when we are considering material things--rocks, trees, stars, photons, dogs, apples, oranges, humans, atoms, whatever. But when we start thinking about immaterial things, then the story changes.
Let's go back to our trusty apple again. Don't think about a particular apple. Try, if you can, to just think about the general concept of "apple." That is, think about the essence or nature of apples. Now think about another general concept of "apple" that is identical to your first concept in absolutely every single way, such that there is literally no way to distinguish between this concept of apple and that concept of apple. Here's my question: do you have two concepts or are the two really just the same concept?
My assumption is that you'll agree that you don't really have two concepts at all. The only way I can think of to make those "two" concepts to really be distinct is to say that at one moment I was thinking about this concept and at a later moment I was thinking about another, discrete, though identical concept. Here, what differentiates the two concepts from each other is the fact is when they were thought about, but that's probably stretching it. The fact is, "two" concepts that are identical in absolutely every single way whatsoever are, in fact, just the same concept. If you want to distinguish two concepts, you have to show how one is different from the other. So the concept of a green apple really is different from the concept of a red one.
What that shows us is that, when dealing with non-material things, the principle of individuation isn't matter. And that seems obvious in retrospect because, after all,
immaterial things aren't material, so they have no matter to individuate them! And if they aren't individuated by matter, then the matter can't distinguish them. No, when dealing with immaterial realities, the principle of individuation is the essence or nature itself.
So suppose I have two real apples. Both have one common nature--one real essence--between them: their "appleness" you might say. What differentiates these two, what individuates them, is their matter. But the essence, the concept, the nature itself, is immaterial. So what individuates that nature is just the nature or essence itself.
I hope the application to God is obvious. If God is Spirit, if He is immaterial, then what individuates Him cannot be matter. God doesn't have a body like apples do. But jenna, this is the problem I'm trying to get you to address for me. If isn't a material thing, then what individuates the one and the other so that they can be, as you said, two different beings? If God is immaterial, then we can only differentiate at the level of nature or essence and not at the level of matter.
But if two different things have different natures, then they aren't just different things but different kinds of things!. But then you have two different
kinds of Gods! But that's why your family analogy is impossible. I am the same
kind of thing as my wife: we're both human. But if the Father and the Son are the same
kind of thing, then they both share in the same divine nature (like my wife and I share in the same human nature); but whereas material things (like my wife and I) that share in a common nature can be individuated and so distinguished by our bodies, God isn't material. So what is there to distinguish the Father from the Son? You're left with the problem of two identical concepts. It turns out, that there is only one God after all! They aren't two beings. They are just one being.
The upshot is that, if you insist that there really are two distinct beings, then you are saying either:
1. One has the divine nature and so is God and the other is not; or
2. Both share in a common nature and are thus individuated materially (which would make both of these beings material creatures and thus not God); or
3. Neither has the divine nature and so neither is God.
Those are your only possibilities if you are going to insist that the Father is God and the Son is God but that both are distinct beings. That's why I told Nessa before, classical Christianity--the Trinity properly taught--does not and has never said that God is three beings. Given all of the above--and the reasoning above IS the very reasonsing the church used--they've always said that God is exactly ONE being, not three (and even more nuanced, God is Being Itself, and not A being at all; such that the Father, Son, and Spirit are all each Being Itself).