Re: Saved by grace alone through faith alone in Christ alone.
Posted: Fri Jul 20, 2007 9:52 am
A'righty, K - let's get back to this:
To continue our discussion on the nature of faith:
Now, I do agree with you that faith is a property of sentient beings. I thin where we are differing is that I still do not see faith as a continuum. I can be convinced of something today, and then be convinced tomorrow that I was wrong. I suppose you have changed your mind on things. You have decided that you were wrong about something in the past. Would you say, then, that you "never really believed" that previous fact? You talk about examining the nature of the self, but is it not true that at that particular time, your SELF was the one who believed a fact to be true? Now, it may be true that you no longer believe it--you, your SELF--but what bearing does that have to do with the fact that at one time, you DID believe it?
Now, you asked:
So, it seems to me that the basic issue we have boiled this down to is your belief that if a person stops believing in Christ, then they prove that they were not the "type" of person to believe it all. But, from a practical perspective, what does this do to their former belief?
Let me ask the qustion this way: what is the difference on an ontological level in changing your mind about a fact in biology or math or history and changing your mind about Jesus?
Now, onto the issue of assurance:
Regarding the validity of the discussion itself (relating to "location"--that is, conclusions), I would certainly hope that you aren't expecting to CHANGE my mind any more than I am hoping to CHANGE yours. The final conclusion for MY position is that if faith is assurance, and therefore assurance is necessary. ANY position, then, then takes away from assurance takes away from faith. Every such position must first redefine faith so that it is not assurance, and they must define their doctrine so that assurance is a secondary doctrine to the Gospel that a believer may come to accept.
Again, in my personal view, both of these conclusions are wrong. Is that evidence that your position itself is wrong? Of course not, so it is not intended to be an argument. That is why I have repeatedly pointed out the exclusivity of our beliefs on this matter. If one of our positions is right, the other's must necessarily be wrong.
Now, while I feel like we made a lot of progress with our discussion of ontological faith, I think we still may be stuck here. Things have gotten very scattered, and I am going to be forced to to a line-by-line quotation here:
It seems your entire disagreement with me through this post--or better than disagreement, actually argument against--is epistemological. I suppose we can take this in the direction of "the epistemology of assurance" if that becomes necessary . . . in the meantime, I'll just say here that recognizing a logical possibility that your interpretation of reality is wwrong is NOT the same thing as recognizing the logical possibility that, within the framework of your interpretation of reality, two different conclusions to a series of events is possible.
Now, because we are talking about assurance, I'll just focus on the words "Am I now the 'real me'?" How am I to know if I am the "real me"? You say, "do I have good reasons for believing that?" Hopefully you can see, then, that for you, assurance is a matter of weighing the evidence. It is NOT guaranteed. It is inductive. It is NOT absolute. Is it not possible for today for you to make a judgment call about your personal character and decide you really have believed, but for tomorrow new evidence come to light that must be considered that would cause you to doubt that conclusion?
Therefore, in light of the very real possibility of finding counter-evidence in the future, you cannot know that you are indeed who you say you are. So I go back to my question: on what basis do you say you know you have believed that is different from, say, Barker?
Let me quote Charles Ryrie on the issue of faith as a proposition here:
Now, your charge that requiring an explicit confirmation of faith is works is simply a misunderstanding of what I mean. I am not required to vocalize in any form my personal agreement with the saving proposition. What I must do is believe God told the truth about His Son Jesus Christ. What is that truth? That everyone who believes in Him has everlasting life!
Let me make an important statement about my own position: I AM A MONERGIST. I am in NO WAY "cooperating" with God for my salvation. God does not save me in exchange for my faith. The moment I believe, He is NOT obligated to save me. Thus, it is bad theology to say that I "choose" to be saved. Remember, belief is NOT a matter of choice. I cannot choose to believe anything. I am either persuaded that something is true or I am not.
Now, it is God, by His good will and pleasure, who decided to save me, and that totally apart from anything I did or did not want. Unlike the Calvinist, though, I don't see His salvation as arbitrary. I see it simply as Him deciding to save those who believed He was telling the truth. HE decided to save me. I did not decide to save myself. It does not matter how much I want to be saved. If I never believe He told the truth, then He won't save me. Equally, it does not matter how much I do not want to be saved. If I believe He told the truth, then He saves me. That is HIS choice, not mine.
Second, this is still not deductive because of (C). You clearly distinguish here between your "current" belief (B) and your "real" belief (C). For now, you assume that they are the same, but you impliclity recongize in this proof (by the very fact that you have them differentiated) that they could turn out to be different. In other words, you cannot assume that both are the same because that is what you are seeking to prove. You are, then, begging the question.
That said, I have already shown, I think, the extent to which your assurance may be deductive. You can say this:
Let me ask you this: What bearing does your behavior have on your salvation?
Eph 2:8-10 says none. Therefore, YES, a person can be saved and live horrible, sinful lives. As it happens, you are right about the historicity of the development of the doctrine, but you have drawn the wrong conclusion, in my opinion. It was when Calvin and Luther were put under pressure by the Roman Church that they started qualifying genuine believers. It finally came to the point to where Westminster "corrected" Calvin's "error" that "assurance is of the essence of saving faith," and that assurance comes from our works. This, of course, is directly contrary to both Calvin and Luther. They recognized the truth: faith IS assurance (see Heb 11:1).
So, while you see it as being unnecessary, I see it as absolutely necessary, because it is the very definition of the thing we are talking about.
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So, as this has been long, let me summarize:
1) Faith is a property of sentient beings, but on what basis do you differentiate between a fact believed and later no longer believed and faith in Christ which no longer exists?
2) I see that assurance must be deductive. Inductive assurance is no assurance at all. On what basis do you believe you will not turn out to be a false professor as did, say, Barker, Ehrman, or Templeton? How is your assurance different than the assurance they had prior to their apostasy?
Again, sorry for the length - just trying to be complete.
God bless
To continue our discussion on the nature of faith:
Yes. It is a property. Again, for me, faith is belief. It is trust. It is assurance. It is being persuaded that something is true. My belief that 2+2=4 is absolutely no different than my belief that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God. Both are "faith."K wrote:So in discussing the ontology of faith, you see its nature of existence as being that of a property rather than a substance?
Now, I do agree with you that faith is a property of sentient beings. I thin where we are differing is that I still do not see faith as a continuum. I can be convinced of something today, and then be convinced tomorrow that I was wrong. I suppose you have changed your mind on things. You have decided that you were wrong about something in the past. Would you say, then, that you "never really believed" that previous fact? You talk about examining the nature of the self, but is it not true that at that particular time, your SELF was the one who believed a fact to be true? Now, it may be true that you no longer believe it--you, your SELF--but what bearing does that have to do with the fact that at one time, you DID believe it?
Now, you asked:
I don't see this as a valid question. Biblically, the "heart" is where a person thinks. The "heart" and "mind" are virtually indistinguishable. If I say something "in my heart," it means that I am thinking it. If I believe something "from my heart," it means that I believe it. In other words, I see no biblical distinction between "head" faith and "heart" faith..K wrote:where do you place our heart in the role of faith?
So, it seems to me that the basic issue we have boiled this down to is your belief that if a person stops believing in Christ, then they prove that they were not the "type" of person to believe it all. But, from a practical perspective, what does this do to their former belief?
Let me ask the qustion this way: what is the difference on an ontological level in changing your mind about a fact in biology or math or history and changing your mind about Jesus?
Now, onto the issue of assurance:
Regarding the validity of the discussion itself (relating to "location"--that is, conclusions), I would certainly hope that you aren't expecting to CHANGE my mind any more than I am hoping to CHANGE yours. The final conclusion for MY position is that if faith is assurance, and therefore assurance is necessary. ANY position, then, then takes away from assurance takes away from faith. Every such position must first redefine faith so that it is not assurance, and they must define their doctrine so that assurance is a secondary doctrine to the Gospel that a believer may come to accept.
Again, in my personal view, both of these conclusions are wrong. Is that evidence that your position itself is wrong? Of course not, so it is not intended to be an argument. That is why I have repeatedly pointed out the exclusivity of our beliefs on this matter. If one of our positions is right, the other's must necessarily be wrong.
Now, while I feel like we made a lot of progress with our discussion of ontological faith, I think we still may be stuck here. Things have gotten very scattered, and I am going to be forced to to a line-by-line quotation here:
Let me ask the question this way: How can YOU determine whether your OWN faith is "saving" or "apparent"?K wrote:why does the logical possibility I might be wrong about who I am (and as such whether God saved me) mean it is not "the type of saving faith we are interested in"? And by "faith now" do you mean my current faith as it stands, or the "apparent faith" I appear to have if I actually end up lacking faith in Christ later in life as I develop into who I am? I do not want to reply to this until I know what you mean.
And what about those who believed at one time (Barker) but later fell away? Did they not know themselves? If you had asked him during his believing life if he had full assurance based on KNOWING he believed, would he not have said the same thing as you have here? If, though, he can fall away, then how is it that his assurance was not justified but yours is?K wrote:Of course I can have assurance. If I can not know who I am, then I can not have assurance, but if I can know who I am, and see I have good reasons for knowing who I am, then I can have complete assurance.
Are you familiar with Augustine's idea of foundationalism?K wrote:If on the other hand by "objective assurance" you mean "justified assurance" where one is justified if they have no possibility of being wrong, then I would challenge your epistemology because I think your criteria for judging what is justified is too stringent. Do you really mean to take such a strong approach? Do you think we can only be justified if there is no logical possibility to the contrary, and if so how do you believe anything?
It seems your entire disagreement with me through this post--or better than disagreement, actually argument against--is epistemological. I suppose we can take this in the direction of "the epistemology of assurance" if that becomes necessary . . . in the meantime, I'll just say here that recognizing a logical possibility that your interpretation of reality is wwrong is NOT the same thing as recognizing the logical possibility that, within the framework of your interpretation of reality, two different conclusions to a series of events is possible.
Do you really believe God exists based on inductive reasoning? I don't. Again, I am a foundationalist. I believe that God exists because He says He does. So I strongly disagree here that assurance is assurance whether deductive or inductive. It is a simple fact that inductive truths are NEVER held with absolute certainty because they can ALWAYS be overturned with ONE future finding. Only deductive truths are held with absolute certainity. They are based on the validity of their foundational premises, not on collected data extrapolated into a generalization.K wrote:Certainly my view of assurance can be seen as inductive, but does this mean we can not be assured that God exists since we induce from the evidence around us that He exists? No. Whether inductive or deductive, assurance is assurance.
So you've faithfully followed by outline above when I said that you would have to either redefine faith and/or define assurance as a secondary doctrine!K wrote:Finally, assurance for me is not the crucial question to ask. It is more coherent for my position not to ask whether one is assured of their faith in Christ and as such their salvation, but rather the question to ask of my position is whether who I am now resembles who I will become. In other words, is who I am now the "real me"? If one can answer this affirmatively and they have their reasons for doing so, then I believe they are justified in having complete assurance of their being saved.
Now, because we are talking about assurance, I'll just focus on the words "Am I now the 'real me'?" How am I to know if I am the "real me"? You say, "do I have good reasons for believing that?" Hopefully you can see, then, that for you, assurance is a matter of weighing the evidence. It is NOT guaranteed. It is inductive. It is NOT absolute. Is it not possible for today for you to make a judgment call about your personal character and decide you really have believed, but for tomorrow new evidence come to light that must be considered that would cause you to doubt that conclusion?
Therefore, in light of the very real possibility of finding counter-evidence in the future, you cannot know that you are indeed who you say you are. So I go back to my question: on what basis do you say you know you have believed that is different from, say, Barker?
Yes, faith, for me, is believing a proposition is true. Gen 15:6 says that Abraham was saved when He believed that God was telling the truth. Rom. 4:1-4 says we are saved in the same way Abraham was. The proposition we have to believe is clearly stated in John 20:31, that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you have life in His name." I have to believe that by believing Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, then I have everlasting life.K wrote:I disagree with moving focus away from belief in Christ to simply belief in "a proposition", and even see that this move could be quite dangerous to the Gospel if further information is not given about Christ. Everything should be centred around Christ. It is now apparent to me that you believe one must explicitly affirm a proposition, but why do you not see this as making a work out of being saved?
Let me quote Charles Ryrie on the issue of faith as a proposition here:
- The basis of salvation is every age is the death of Christ; the requirement for salvation in every age is faith; the object of faith in every age is God; the content of faith changes in the various dispensations. (Ryrie, Dispensationalism Today, (Moody, 1965), 123, italics original).
Now, your charge that requiring an explicit confirmation of faith is works is simply a misunderstanding of what I mean. I am not required to vocalize in any form my personal agreement with the saving proposition. What I must do is believe God told the truth about His Son Jesus Christ. What is that truth? That everyone who believes in Him has everlasting life!
Then you still go to heaven. This is the same argument Byblos made to try to argue that I did not believe in free will, an argument from which he ultimately recanted.K wrote: Let us assume (b) is correct, that having believed God (past tense) you will have everlasting life. Yet, what if who you are when you die wants no part in this promise?!
Let me make an important statement about my own position: I AM A MONERGIST. I am in NO WAY "cooperating" with God for my salvation. God does not save me in exchange for my faith. The moment I believe, He is NOT obligated to save me. Thus, it is bad theology to say that I "choose" to be saved. Remember, belief is NOT a matter of choice. I cannot choose to believe anything. I am either persuaded that something is true or I am not.
Now, it is God, by His good will and pleasure, who decided to save me, and that totally apart from anything I did or did not want. Unlike the Calvinist, though, I don't see His salvation as arbitrary. I see it simply as Him deciding to save those who believed He was telling the truth. HE decided to save me. I did not decide to save myself. It does not matter how much I want to be saved. If I never believe He told the truth, then He won't save me. Equally, it does not matter how much I do not want to be saved. If I believe He told the truth, then He saves me. That is HIS choice, not mine.
Hopefully you can see that there was no decision to loci. God has locked HIS decision. As for the idea that God would not force someone to be with Him for all of eternity who does not want to, that, in my opinion, is a philosophical argument put forward by Arminians to give a rational basis for the idea that we can lose our salvation. It ignore the fact that when God saves us, we are born again, and that by God's power, not our own. It ignores the fact that the new nature, which coexists with our old nature, wants nothing more than to please God. It ignores the fact that we can supress the new nature until it is effectively silenced. In the end, no one will be with God who does not want to be there. I see absolutely no Scriptural position to back this argument whatsoever.K wrote:God has locked in your decision, and now forces you against your will to be with Him for eternity.
First off, I question the Scriptural basis of (A). The Bible does not say every "completely developed" person who believes. It says "everyone" who believes. In fact, there are verses that clearly state that there will be those who deny Christ in this life, and yet they will still be saved! (2 Tim 2:12-13)K wrote:I would question your use of "objective" but understand your sense. Yet, it could even be argued that my grounds for assurance are also deductive, albeit they require an extra premise. Take the following argument:
Now as long as I have sufficient grounds for believing (c), then I have an assurance that is deductive, and so according to your terminology, this would mean I have an "objective" assurance.
- a) Every completely developed person who believes in Christ, has everlasting life.
b) I currently believe in Christ.
c) My belief in Christ is a real property of who I am.
d) Therefore I have everlasting life.
Second, this is still not deductive because of (C). You clearly distinguish here between your "current" belief (B) and your "real" belief (C). For now, you assume that they are the same, but you impliclity recongize in this proof (by the very fact that you have them differentiated) that they could turn out to be different. In other words, you cannot assume that both are the same because that is what you are seeking to prove. You are, then, begging the question.
That said, I have already shown, I think, the extent to which your assurance may be deductive. You can say this:
- a) All genuine believers have everlasting life,
b) I am a genuine believer,
c) Therefore, I have everlasting life
So, again, you are forced to write-off the doctrine of assurance as a secondary matter. Now, as it stands, I have absolutely NO PROBLEM with a person KNOWING they are saved--being assured they are saved--and in fact even BEING saved, and yet still "living like the devil."K wrote:Further, you speak highly of assurance, and I have accepted so far that one having assurance of their salvation is right and proper. Yet, it has just been accepted that the doctrine of assurance matters or is a crucial aspect in proving or disproving positions like ours. To use the doctrine of assurance as a criteria to judge the validity of a position, the doctrine of assurance needs to be itself justified rather than assumed. And I am sure you have your reasons.
This is especially important to argue, since the doctrine of assurance arose due to a need to make the Reformed position of justification through faith alone more stable and coherent. Whereas Catholicism based justification in a divine regeneration of our will to be righteous which is then the basis of renewed fellowship with God, the Reformers saw justification as a once-off event pronounced on the unrighteous by faith alone. The Catholic charge was made that the Reformers doctrine of justification amounted to the tolerance of sin in the Christian life. And so a distinction was introduced between justification and sanctification where one was justified by faith but then the Christian life followed a sanctification process where we became more like Christ. But what if one was not becoming more and more Christ-like as they lived their life?! The implication was that such "Christians" were not being sanctified, and if they were not being sanctified, then they must not be justified. Is this an indirect concession that the RCC was right after all about justification? Of course not. So what happens next? A doctrine of "assurance" is plucked out from somewhere and thrown into the mix. (I am sure this is quite amusing to Byblos if he is reading )
Now while I see the doctrine of assurance as being important, I do not see it as a crucial linchpin to the validity of any position which holds that we are saved by grace through faith in Christ. To increase the doctrine of assurance to the importance of being a necessary requirement I see needs very strong arguments that such a doctrine is true and required. Yet, I still believe and have reasoned that I can have assurance of being saved on Christ's promise anyhow.
Let me ask you this: What bearing does your behavior have on your salvation?
Eph 2:8-10 says none. Therefore, YES, a person can be saved and live horrible, sinful lives. As it happens, you are right about the historicity of the development of the doctrine, but you have drawn the wrong conclusion, in my opinion. It was when Calvin and Luther were put under pressure by the Roman Church that they started qualifying genuine believers. It finally came to the point to where Westminster "corrected" Calvin's "error" that "assurance is of the essence of saving faith," and that assurance comes from our works. This, of course, is directly contrary to both Calvin and Luther. They recognized the truth: faith IS assurance (see Heb 11:1).
So, while you see it as being unnecessary, I see it as absolutely necessary, because it is the very definition of the thing we are talking about.
This goes back to the epistemological argument discussed earlier. Do we still need to take this up as its own issie?K wrote:Thus, it seems Paul does not see that conceding a logical possibility means we must be unsure, otherwise a contradiction is caused in his stated argument.
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So, as this has been long, let me summarize:
1) Faith is a property of sentient beings, but on what basis do you differentiate between a fact believed and later no longer believed and faith in Christ which no longer exists?
2) I see that assurance must be deductive. Inductive assurance is no assurance at all. On what basis do you believe you will not turn out to be a false professor as did, say, Barker, Ehrman, or Templeton? How is your assurance different than the assurance they had prior to their apostasy?
Again, sorry for the length - just trying to be complete.
God bless