Evidence for God from Science

The majority of sex-offenders probably had breakfast the day they offended.

So are you saying that the causes of these types of things cannot be known?

One thing I think is interesting is that playing violent video games has a proven link to increases aggressive behaviour, one could say that it is evidence of causation in terms of fantasising.


Dan

Beanybag wrote:

RickD wrote:

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:Also: Since our fantasies are fictitious and only have representations of others at best, is it morally acceptable by Christian standards for a fantasy to involve a member of the same sex, a very young child, etc.? After all, the fantasy is only imagined and will not necessarily be acted upon, so morals that applied to actual sex would be rendered moot.

So, you're asking if it's ok to willfully think of a young child, in a sexual manner? You don't see something seriously wrong with that?

Well.. I actually don't see the harm - no one real is being hurt. So long as fantasies like such remain in your mind, I don't see the problem. Can you explain?

And this is why consequentalism is an insufficient basis for ethics. Evil hurts people; but it's not evil because it hurts others. In the case you mention, fantasizing about children hurts yourself, because even if you never act on it, you are using your intellect/mind/will, etc. in deeply unnatural ways. That's something that's easy enough for most people to see. If I confessed to you that I sat around and looked at kiddie porn and beat off to sexual fantasies regarded three year old girls, you'd probably surmise that there was something wrong with me. And you'd be right!

But we've already gone too far, because we're focusing on the consequences rather than the act itself. You may debate whether or not I am hurting myself my engaging in such fantasies. To the extent that I engage in that debate, I'm wasting my time, because all that presumes the argument is, "It's wrong because it hurts me; it hurts me; therefore, it's wrong." So you'd be disagreeing with the second premise and presumably therefore denying the conclusion. But that's not the argument I want to make. I want to say, "It's wrong, and therefore, it's likely to hurt you; it's wrong; therefore, we aren't surprised that the general consensus is that such behavior is hurting you (whether you know it or not)." Here, I'm clearly not appealing to the damage done (to yourself or others) to prove it's wrong. The wrongness is based on something else entirely--not stated in that particular argument.

So then you ask, why is it wrong? Here, again, we debate the second premise, but the argument is profoundly different. Before, the debate was over whether or not the fantasy caused damage to determine wrongness. Now, the debate is over the criteria for wrongness generally, which goes to our definition of right and wrong. Something, on my view, is not wrong because society says so; nor is it wrong even so much because God says so (divine command theory). Something is wrong (morally speaking) if it deviates from the moral order of the universe. Notice that I am appealing to something outside of the mind here. I am presuming that there is an order to the universe. There is obviously a physical order. I am suggesting that just as there is a physical order, there is a moral order, and that moral order is implicit in our human natures. That is, human nature is such that it ought to act this way rather than that, and in acting this way, it maximizes happiness both for itself and for everyone else. The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people (it's useless, after all, to speak of morality in isolation from others!). So when we intentionally deviate from that order--which is objective, being grounded in the human nature--then we have done something wrong. We are not surprised, then, when in deviating from that moral order we cause damage to ourselves and others, since by definition that deviation means that we no longer are acting in accordance with our true natures and therefore our actions are not bringing about the fullest degree of happiness possible (indeed, it may be lessening it both for ourselves and others, perhaps in the short term, definitely in the long term).

With all this in mind, revisit the notion of fantasizing about children. Now, it is evident that the biological purpose of sex is reproduction. There may be other benefits that come with it (e.g., it's fun), but what it is for is reproduction. Children, however, cannot reproduce. In fact, having sexual relations with them can actually damage them both physically and mentally. As such, to fantasize about children is to effectively long to deviate from the natural order. It is, in fact, to desire something intrinsically disordered. Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!). Therefore, the desire for disorder is morally wrong; since fantasizing about children is fantasizing about something intrinsically disordered, then fantasizing about children is then to desire the disorder, and thus, that fantasy is itself morally wrong.

And I close by reminding you again that this view well accounts for our general moral intuitions. Societies naturally shun pedophiles. We just recognize that there is something "wrong" with them, that their desires are not "natural." We may not be able to explain our intuitions philosophically, but once we understand all of the above, it is clear why we have such intuitions.

Bottom line: fantasizing about children is dreadfully evil, and that whether it is accompanied by masturbation or not!

Jac3510 wrote:Something is wrong (morally speaking) if it deviates from the moral order of the universe. Notice that I am appealing to something outside of the mind here. I am presuming that there is an order to the universe. There is obviously a physical order. I am suggesting that just as there is a physical order, there is a moral order, and that moral order is implicit in our human natures. That is, human nature is such that it ought to act this way rather than that, and in acting this way, it maximizes happiness both for itself and for everyone else. The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people (it's useless, after all, to speak of morality in isolation from others!). So when we intentionally deviate from that order--which is objective, being grounded in the human nature--then we have done something wrong. We are not surprised, then, when in deviating from that moral order we cause damage to ourselves and others, since by definition that deviation means that we no longer are acting in accordance with our true natures and therefore our actions are not bringing about the fullest degree of happiness possible (indeed, it may be lessening it both for ourselves and others, perhaps in the short term, definitely in the long term).

With all this in mind, revisit the notion of fantasizing about children. Now, it is evident that the biological purpose of sex is reproduction. There may be other benefits that come with it (e.g., it's fun), but what it is for is reproduction. Children, however, cannot reproduce. In fact, having sexual relations with them can actually damage them both physically and mentally. As such, to fantasize about children is to effectively long to deviate from the natural order. It is, in fact, to desire something intrinsically disordered. Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!). Therefore, the desire for disorder is morally wrong; since fantasizing about children is fantasizing about something intrinsically disordered, then fantasizing about children is then to desire the disorder, and thus, that fantasy is itself morally wrong.

And I close by reminding you again that this view well accounts for our general moral intuitions. Societies naturally shun pedophiles. We just recognize that there is something "wrong" with them, that their desires are not "natural." We may not be able to explain our intuitions philosophically, but once we understand all of the above, it is clear why we have such intuitions.

Bottom line: fantasizing about children is dreadfully evil, and that whether it is accompanied by masturbation or not!

You raise a good argument, but the game isn't over here! (En garde! xD)

A system left to itself tends towards disorder, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics; and if such a system tends towards disorder, it will be more disorderly in the future. Therefore what is now considered to be the "natural order" will not be the "natural order" in the future, which is a very inconsistent moral standard to live by.

As a real-life example, take homosexuality. Homosexuality was generally regarded negatively in the eighties, with very few exceptions (and was therefore looked upon as immoral). As of late, however, it has become much more accepted among the population. So, according to the "natural order" argument, homosexuality is becoming morally acceptable because the general population is starting to accept it as natural. Correct?

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:A system left to itself tends towards disorder, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics; and if such a system tends towards disorder, it will be more disorderly in the future. Therefore what is now considered to be the "natural order" will not be the "natural order" in the future, which is a very inconsistent moral standard to live by.

As a real-life example, take homosexuality. Homosexuality was generally regarded negatively in the eighties, with very few exceptions (and was therefore looked upon as immoral). As of late, however, it has become much more accepted among the population. So, according to the "natural order" argument, homosexuality is becoming morally acceptable because the general population is starting to accept it as natural. Correct?

Fallacy of equivocation.

You're talking about entropy, which is extrinsic disorder. I'm talking about evil (in the technical sense of the word), which is intrinsic disorder. That is, I am talking about order is the teleological sense (that is, referring to a thing's final cause), not in an organizational sense. For instance, it is the very nature of the south poles of magnets to be attracted to the north poles of other magnets. That would continue to be true even if heat death were to occur and there were no magnets within range of one another. That is, maximum entropy doesn't change the basic order of nature. Or again, eyes are naturally ordered to see. That some eyes cannot see means that they have been deprived of their ability to function as they are so ordered, and that privation is called evil, as it goes against the intrinsic order of the eye. Again, even were the universe to suffer heat death and reach maximum entropy, it would not mean that eyes were no longer ordered to sight. That is, again, maximum entropy doesn't change the basic order of nature. The same is true with the moral order.

edit:

With regard to your example of homosexuality, I would emphasize that I am appealing to intrinsic order, not to imposed order. The former is a natural constituency of the thing itself; the latter is a psychological property applied to the thing by the human mind and not really a part of the thing itself. For instance, suppose I place a dozen apples on a table in a particular pattern. Is it necessary for the apples to be in any particular patten to still be apples? Of course not. In fact, the entire notion of a pattern is merely a human construct in the first place--one that I have imposed on this particular collection of apples. So if you come along later and change the pattern I put in the apples, that doesn't do anything to change the nature of the apples themselves.

Just so with society's recognition of all things moral. Things are intrinsically ordered to certain ends whether we know it or believe it or accept it or not. Our knowledge, beliefs, and preferences concerning behavior does not enter into the nature of the thing itself. So society can change its mind about what is moral. That, however, doesn't determine the morality of something anymore than changing the pattern of apples makes them more or less apples. Hopefully, society will study nature and come to a broad consensus about what is truly intrinsically ordered, and therefore, we will make moral progress. Sometimes we go the wrong way, unfortunately, and it is up to future generations to correct those mistakes in our moral reasoning.

Danieltwotwenty wrote:There might be other factors at play other than porn legalisation like social, religious, education and even environmental. The fact remains that the majority of offenders fantasise before their action.

Dan

So if someone is fantasizing about having sex with a child, would it be reasonable, then, to arrest them with "the intention to molest an underage person"? It is indeterminable whether the person is thinking to act on their fantasies until they actually act on them, and therefore the charge would be very preemptive. Furthermore, it would assume that "The subject is thinking about doing X; therefore the subject will do X", which is simply not true.

It is true, however, that offenders often fantasize about things before their action, but it does not follow that people who fantasize about things often will become offenders. That's like saying "All squares are rectangles, therefore all rectangles are squares".

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:

Danieltwotwenty wrote:There might be other factors at play other than porn legalisation like social, religious, education and even environmental. The fact remains that the majority of offenders fantasise before their action.

Dan

So if someone is fantasizing about having sex with a child, would it be reasonable, then, to arrest them with "the intention to molest an underage person"? It is indeterminable whether the person is thinking to act on their fantasies until they actually act on them, and therefore the charge would be very preemptive. Furthermore, it would assume that "The subject is thinking about doing X; therefore the subject will do X", which is simply not true.

I am not legally equating fantasising with the act of doing it, so no it would not be reasonable to preemptive arresting.

I am saying that fantasising can be a precursor to committing the act and I think it is a dangerous road to go down for yourself and possibly others.

It is true, however, that offenders often fantasize about things before their action, but it does not follow that people who fantasize about things often will become offenders. That's like saying "All squares are rectangles, therefore all rectangles are squares"

I am not saying all people who fantasise about it will do it, I am saying that it can be damaging to someone's mental stability and possibly physically/mentally dangerous to others.


Dan

Danieltwotwenty wrote:One thing I think is interesting is that playing violent video games has a proven link to increases aggressive behaviour, one could say that it is evidence of causation in terms of fantasising.

Dan

I actually thought that that was not proven at all. Please provide a source if you have seen otherwise.

I am not saying all people who fantasise about it will do it, I am saying that it can be damaging to someone's mental stability and possibly physically/mentally dangerous to others.

Okay, I think I can understand this argument. You say that the fantasies can cause anguish and harm to oneself. I don't buy that a fantasy is dangerous to others, but I can see it as being unwell for oneself - as much as I don't ultimately agree.

Jac3510 wrote:

Beanybag wrote:

RickD wrote:

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:Also: Since our fantasies are fictitious and only have representations of others at best, is it morally acceptable by Christian standards for a fantasy to involve a member of the same sex, a very young child, etc.? After all, the fantasy is only imagined and will not necessarily be acted upon, so morals that applied to actual sex would be rendered moot.

So, you're asking if it's ok to willfully think of a young child, in a sexual manner? You don't see something seriously wrong with that?

Well.. I actually don't see the harm - no one real is being hurt. So long as fantasies like such remain in your mind, I don't see the problem. Can you explain?

And this is why consequentalism is an insufficient basis for ethics. Evil hurts people; but it's not evil because it hurts others. In the case you mention, fantasizing about children hurts yourself, because even if you never act on it, you are using your intellect/mind/will, etc. in deeply unnatural ways. That's something that's easy enough for most people to see. If I confessed to you that I sat around and looked at kiddie porn and beat off to sexual fantasies regarded three year old girls, you'd probably surmise that there was something wrong with me. And you'd be right!

I will stop you right here because you get into a mess of what is unethical versus what is, what I think you are trying to say, unhealthy. But what is unhealthy doesn't strike me as necessarily immoral. People eat junk food and I don't see this as wrong-doing - Maybe I'd prefer them not to and maybe I wouldn't partake in such activities myself, but I won't tell them they can't. Now, I'm not a consequential, I do think certain virtues are applicable.. but I don't see this act as immoral or a-virtuous, but possibly even preventative with respect to actual moral harm. I understand that your moral system is a great deal stricter than mine (mine allows for a wide range of freedom), but I don't see this as a shortcoming.

I'd also like to say that I disagree - evil things are evil because they hurt others, and I see no such exception. As such, I'd disagree with your premise...

"It's wrong, and therefore, it's likely to hurt you; it's wrong; therefore, we aren't surprised that the general consensus is that such behavior is hurting you (whether you know it or not)." Here, I'm clearly not appealing to the damage done (to yourself or others) to prove it's wrong. The wrongness is based on something else entirely--not stated in that particular argument.

I think what may be wrong for one person may be okay for another - that isn't to say I think morals are entirely relative, but I do think there are context-dependent scenarios. And I'd think many people would agree - killing can be justified when it's in self-defense, eating junk food can be okay if it's in moderation and you exercise after, and partaking in fantasies can be fine if you're responsible about it and do not become obsessed.

As to why you think otherwise..

So then you ask, why is it wrong? Here, again, we debate the second premise, but the argument is profoundly different. Before, the debate was over whether or not the fantasy caused damage to determine wrongness. Now, the debate is over the criteria for wrongness generally, which goes to our definition of right and wrong. Something, on my view, is not wrong because society says so; nor is it wrong even so much because God says so (divine command theory). Something is wrong (morally speaking) if it deviates from the moral order of the universe. Notice that I am appealing to something outside of the mind here. I am presuming that there is an order to the universe. There is obviously a physical order. I am suggesting that just as there is a physical order, there is a moral order, and that moral order is implicit in our human natures. That is, human nature is such that it ought to act this way rather than that, and in acting this way, it maximizes happiness both for itself and for everyone else. The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people (it's useless, after all, to speak of morality in isolation from others!). So when we intentionally deviate from that order--which is objective, being grounded in the human nature--then we have done something wrong. We are not surprised, then, when in deviating from that moral order we cause damage to ourselves and others, since by definition that deviation means that we no longer are acting in accordance with our true natures and therefore our actions are not bringing about the fullest degree of happiness possible (indeed, it may be lessening it both for ourselves and others, perhaps in the short term, definitely in the long term).

Your appeal to an order of how things ought to be is striking - just because a thing tends to be bad does not make it bad in all situations, does it? I don't particularly like this set of rules with little flexibility, it seems to deny the actual complex nature of events. There are many different aspects to every decision that each have merit and each have negative aspects as well, blanket statements about what one ought to do require context to be appropriately examined. Further, how is it that you claim to know, with certainty, what is moral and maximally optimal for humans (this seems to be an entire conversation in of itself approaching)? And why can't it vary from person to person - there are many differences and sometimes what is maximally optimal is not necessarily optimal (what is success without struggle? Should all hardship and suffering be eliminated? Yadda yadda). This is why I think ethical systems that allow for wide range of freedoms tend to be more successful, especially among varied populations.

With all this in mind, revisit the notion of fantasizing about children. Now, it is evident that the biological purpose of sex is reproduction. There may be other benefits that come with it (e.g., it's fun), but what it is for is reproduction.

Pause. Two things are coming to mind immediately here. One, it sounds as if you're about to commit a naturalistic fallacy, and two, you seem to have missed a lot of the point of sex e.g. social aspects such as in bonobos, or more specifically in humans, the strong social and emotional bonding that can come with sex and intimacy. Sex is a complex and deep psychological and biological phenomenon and it should not be surprising that it serves multiple purposes. It sounds like you might disagree on this point, however, and I'm also willing to discuss that. But, the second point seems largely irrelevant here.

Children, however, cannot reproduce. In fact, having sexual relations with them can actually damage them both physically and mentally. As such, to fantasize about children is to effectively long to deviate from the natural order. It is, in fact, to desire something intrinsically disordered. Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!). Therefore, the desire for disorder is morally wrong; since fantasizing about children is fantasizing about something intrinsically disordered, then fantasizing about children is then to desire the disorder, and thus, that fantasy is itself morally wrong.

I'll start with noting that it isn't morally relevant whether or not a child can reproduce (sometimes girls hit puberty as young as 9), but whether or not it is healthy for them to engage in sex; clearly it isn't and causes demonstrable and lifelong harm in many cases. This is undesirable, clearly. But, you lose me entirely with the invocation of thought crime as disorder. It doesn't seem to follow that desire and fantasy about immoral acts is necessarily immoral.

I am particularly stuck on this line: "Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!)"

It seems you lack justification for this. There are plenty of things we might desire to do, but abstain from - and no observable harm is done. In fact, it doesn't seem to be that harm would even be a probable (or in some cases, possible) result. In fact, if certain fantasy or hypothetical scenarios help you relieve tension (punching a bag with an ex-boyfriend's face on it to relieve stress, writing an angry letter and then throwing it away). I think we must take into account psychological facts and well-being when we are considering what is maximally optimal with concerns to a human's well being, yes?

And I close by reminding you again that this view well accounts for our general moral intuitions. Societies naturally shun pedophiles. We just recognize that there is something "wrong" with them, that their desires are not "natural." We may not be able to explain our intuitions philosophically, but once we understand all of the above, it is clear why we have such intuitions.

I say that this intuition is wrong and leads to morally wrong behavior. We should shun no one, especially when they seek help. Many pedophiles wish they did not have the desires they do and want help to contain their desires. It is clearly and absolutely better for a pedophile to be allowed some sort of fantastic escape than to act on such fantasies.

Further, I challenge your notion that their desires are not "natural". I have read the accounts of pedophiles who struggle with their desires and wish they did not have them - why would they choose this? There is also scientific studies to back this up (I will supply them on request). It is lamentable that they have these desires which must not be fulfilled, but to shun them without compassion does not seem moral and certainly does not seem Christ-like. It is their struggle and I think we should help them in whatever way we can so as to protect them from the temptation of fulfilling these desires.

Bottom line: fantasizing about children is dreadfully evil, and that whether it is accompanied by masturbation or not![/quote]

Jac3510 wrote:

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:A system left to itself tends towards disorder, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics; and if such a system tends towards disorder, it will be more disorderly in the future. Therefore what is now considered to be the "natural order" will not be the "natural order" in the future, which is a very inconsistent moral standard to live by.

As a real-life example, take homosexuality. Homosexuality was generally regarded negatively in the eighties, with very few exceptions (and was therefore looked upon as immoral). As of late, however, it has become much more accepted among the population. So, according to the "natural order" argument, homosexuality is becoming morally acceptable because the general population is starting to accept it as natural. Correct?

Fallacy of equivocation.

You're talking about entropy, which is extrinsic disorder. I'm talking about evil (in the technical sense of the word), which is intrinsic disorder. That is, I am talking about order is the teleological sense (that is, referring to a thing's final cause), not in an organizational sense. For instance, it is the very nature of the south poles of magnets to be attracted to the north poles of other magnets. That would continue to be true even if heat death were to occur and there were no magnets within range of one another. That is, maximum entropy doesn't change the basic order of nature. Or again, eyes are naturally ordered to see. That some eyes cannot see means that they have been deprived of their ability to function as they are so ordered, and that privation is called evil, as it goes against the intrinsic order of the eye. Again, even were the universe to suffer heat death and reach maximum entropy, it would not mean that eyes were no longer ordered to sight. That is, again, maximum entropy doesn't change the basic order of nature. The same is true with the moral order.

Well put, Dan, but you haven't yet refuted my example: You've only refuted the principle behind my example. Even assuming that the principle is no longer true, the argument I put forth still stands up to the arguments you've put forth so far. You've said "Moral is the natural order of things and is intrinsic", whereas I've said that "A system tends toward disorder and the population's view on homosexuality evidences this in society". You said that I misused the Second Law of Thermodynamics by attributing it to something besides Thermodynamics (and attributing it to something that is intrinsic rather than exrinsic, might I add), and this is admittedly true, but that is only the first part of the argument. You said that morals are defined by the most widely accepted view on something, and I provided an example where something became widely accepted over time. Therefore, according to "the natural order" argument, it went from being immoral to being moral, regardless of whether or not the Second Law of Thermodynamics can be used to qualify morality.

TL;DR: Good point. Now respond to the question.

I am not legally equating fantasising with the act of doing it, so no it would not be reasonable to preemptive arresting.

I am saying that fantasising can be a precursor to committing the act and I think it is a dangerous road to go down for yourself and possibly others.

. . .

I am not saying all people who fantasise about it will do it, I am saying that it can be damaging to someone's mental stability and possibly physically/mentally dangerous to others.

I can see your logic here, although it isn't necessarily damaging to one's mental health and might actually lead one away from the subject being fantasized about. These things should be treated on a case-by-case basis, because certain fantasies might actually improve one's mental health (as opposed to repressing said fantasies). And if fantasizing about the crime was an escape from the temptation to commit the crime, then fantasizing about the crime would dramatically reduce the person's likelihood of committing the crime.

Jac3510 wrote:With regard to your example of homosexuality, I would emphasize that I am appealing to intrinsic order, not to imposed order. The former is a natural constituency of the thing itself; the latter is a psychological property applied to the thing by the human mind and not really a part of the thing itself. For instance, suppose I place a dozen apples on a table in a particular pattern. Is it necessary for the apples to be in any particular patten to still be apples? Of course not. In fact, the entire notion of a pattern is merely a human construct in the first place--one that I have imposed on this particular collection of apples. So if you come along later and change the pattern I put in the apples, that doesn't do anything to change the nature of the apples themselves.

Just so with society's recognition of all things moral. Things are intrinsically ordered to certain ends whether we know it or believe it or accept it or not. Our knowledge, beliefs, and preferences concerning behavior does not enter into the nature of the thing itself. So society can change its mind about what is moral. That, however, doesn't determine the morality of something anymore than changing the pattern of apples makes them more or less apples. Hopefully, society will study nature and come to a broad consensus about what is truly intrinsically ordered, and therefore, we will make moral progress. Sometimes we go the wrong way, unfortunately, and it is up to future generations to correct those mistakes in our moral reasoning.

Thank you, this is very insightful. However, you contradicted the point you made earlier, that "The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people". Here you said that "Society can change its mind about what is moral. That, however, doesn't determine the morality of something". So which is it? Does the society of people have to recognize the moral order for it to be moral or does morality as we're speaking of it now exist regardless of whether society recognizes it or not? If it's the latter, we're back to the beginning of the argument.

And if society can change it's mind about what is moral or not, then who's to say that they're right about it being immoral to involve a child sexually, or even fantasize about it?

With all this in mind, revisit the notion of fantasizing about children. Now, it is evident that the biological purpose of sex is reproduction. There may be other benefits that come with it (e.g., it's fun), but what it is for is reproduction.

So it's immoral for me to have sex with a sterile person, then? Or even to just fantasize about having sex with a sterile person?

DivineRageFromSpace » Tue Jun 19, 2012 1:38 pm

With all this in mind, revisit the notion of fantasizing about children. Now, it is evident that the biological purpose of sex is reproduction. There may be other benefits that come with it (e.g., it's fun), but what it is for is reproduction.


So it's immoral for me to have sex with a sterile person, then?

Lol. divine...dont make wrong jumps.

In your own words, now you are not attacking the argument but the principle behind it. Suddenly children and sterile persons are equal. If you ask Jac to stick to the rules, so should you.

neo-x wrote:Lol. divine...dont make wrong jumps.

In your own words, now you are not attacking the argument but the principle behind it. Suddenly children and sterile persons are equal. If you ask Jac to stick to the rules, so should you.

Nice try, Neo, but I was attacking his argument. His argument was that sex was for reproduction, and children and sterile persons have in common that they're both unable to sexually reproduce. Therefore, his argument is too inclusive and needs to be specified. C:

No, cuz

and children and sterile persons have in common that they're both unable to sexually reproduce

this is beyond the argument, this is introducing something in the argument which the statement is not even aimed at. There is a big difference. There are tons of non-common things between children and adults (since a sterile person falls into this category) and I can very well refute your statement and say that since you are excluding those factors thus your statement is inadequate to address the issue. You can't have it both ways, rage.