Evidence for God from Science

Byblos wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:

Byblos wrote:Paul you seriously baffle me (and trust me, I'm not easily baffled ).

First you come up with an absolute gem like this one:

PaulSacramento wrote:Where on earth did you get that idea?
God forgives those that ask forgiveness AND repent of their sins.
Repentance doesn't just mean "feel sorry about what they did", it means accepting the consequences of their actions and making amends for them.
Think of it this way:
You did something horrific and you realize that and now ask God for forgivness and you repent, that repenteance means that the full FORCE and WEIGHT of what you have done becomes self-realized, you feel/understand/bare ALL the pain that you h ave caused and you are compelled to seek forgiveness from those wronged and to make amends in whatever way possible.
People speak of "just repent" and you'll be fine as if the act of repentance comes "free" and with no consequences.
When one truly seeks forgiveness and truly repents, God's Holy SPirit awakens them to ALL they have done.

Then you immediately follow it with this:

PaulSacramento wrote:Actually, if we are to take the bible as literal and concrete (that is another story of course) then Yes, according to the telling of the great flood in Genesis, God did commit Genocide when He killed "all the inhabitants" of Earth.

Seriously, what is up with that man?

Note what I said:
IF we take the bible as LITERAL AND CONCRETE...
Fact is that there is no reason for us to take ALL of the bible that way since it was not written that way.
For us to take something in it's literal sense we must first KNOW what type of literature it is, yes?
One thing I have found is that bible literalist AND bible critics have in common is their reluctance to do just that.

Ah, I see what you're trying to say. Thanks for the clarification.

I. Species of Moral Realism

Claims - and accusations - of moral realism typically extend along some or all of the following dimensions. Roughly put:

(1) Cognitivism - Are moral judgments capable of truth and falsity?
(2) Theories of truth - If moral judgments do have truth values, in what sense?
(3) Objectivity - In what ways, if any, does the existence of moral properties depend upon the actual or possible states of mind of intelligent beings?
(4) Reductionism - Are moral properties reducible to, or do they in some weaker sense supervene upon, nonmoral properties? (5) Naturalism-Are moral properties natural properties?
(6) Empiricism - Do we come to know moral facts in the same way we come to know the facts of empirical science, or are they revealed by reason or by some special mode of apprehension?
(7) Bivalence - Does the principle of the excluded middle apply to moral judgments?
(8) Determinateness - Given whatever procedures we have for assessing moral judgments, how much of morality is likely to be determinable?
(9) Categoricity - Do all rational agents necessarily have some reason to obey moral imperatives?
(10) Universality - Are moral imperatives applicable to all rationalagents, even (should such exist) those who lack a reason to comply with them?
(11) Assessment of existing moralities - Are present moral beliefs approximately true, or do prevailing moral intuitions in some other sense constitute privileged data?
(12) Relativism - Does the truth or warrant of moraljudgments depend directly upon individually- or socially-adopted norms or practices?
(13) Pluralism - Is there a uniquely good form of life or a uniquely right moral code, or could different forms of life or moral codes be
appropriate in different circumstances?

Here, then, are the approximate coordinates of my own view in this multidimensional conceptual space. I will argue for a form of moral realism which holds that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamentally non-epistemic sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry; that it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for moral judgments or how determinately such judgments can be assessed; that there is reason to think we know a fair amount about morality, but also reason to think that current moralities are wrong in certain ways and could be wrong in quite general ways; that a rational agent may fail to have a reason for obeying moral imperatives, although they may nonetheless be applicable to him; and that, while there are perfectly general criteria of moral assessment, nonetheless, by the nature of these criteria no one kind of life is likely to be appropriate for all individuals and no one set of norms appropriate for all societies and all times. The position thus described might well be called 'stark, raving moral realism', but for the sake of syntax, I will colorlessly call it 'moral realism'. This usage is not proprietary. Other positions, occupying more or less different coordinates, may have equal claim to either name.

PaulSacramento wrote:Is Philosophy objective or subjective?

Spock wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:Is Philosophy objective or subjective?

Is the interpretation of the Bible objective or subjective?

Spock wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:Is Philosophy objective or subjective?

Is the interpretation of the Bible objective or subjective?

Byblos wrote:

Spock wrote:

PaulSacramento wrote:Is Philosophy objective or subjective?

Is the interpretation of the Bible objective or subjective?

Is truth knowable?

Beanybag wrote:Spock and Butterfly (those who are trying to attack the morality of God). These attacks hold on two conditions: 1) Morality is outside of God (and thus, he's not real) or 2) God is not the God of the Bible. In either case, God has not committed an atrocity. To get people to believe this is to get them to undermine their belief in the Biblical God. So, in order to convince them that God is not moral, you must first convince them that God is either not real, or is not the God of the Bible. The Biblical God may have committed genocide, but this does not make him immoral. To say otherwise is to misunderstand the very position you are attacking.

Spock wrote:If we cannot judge what the Bible says about Yahweh then we cannot judge Yahweh to be moral (good) or immoral (bad) and all moral qualities the Bible attributes to Yahweh are emptied of meaning.

Beanybag wrote:

Spock wrote:If we cannot judge what the Bible says about Yahweh then we cannot judge Yahweh to be moral (good) or immoral (bad) and all moral qualities the Bible attributes to Yahweh are emptied of meaning.

Again, this is based on a misunderstanding of the moral philosophy of God.

Spock wrote:

Beanybag wrote:

Spock wrote:If we cannot judge what the Bible says about Yahweh then we cannot judge Yahweh to be moral (good) or immoral (bad) and all moral qualities the Bible attributes to Yahweh are emptied of meaning.

Again, this is based on a misunderstanding of the moral philosophy of God.

I think I understand your argument - please correct me if I am wrong. I think you think that God's nature defines morality. Therefore, anything God does is necessarily good which means that if God commanded the Israelites to slaughter babies, then slaughtering babies in that context is "good." Is this what you meant?