Re: Morality Without God?
Posted: Sat Oct 20, 2012 2:22 pm
Hey there Protector,The Protector wrote:Spock,
Thank you for your kind and thoughtful reply. In some ways I think I understand your argument better, but in others I’m afraid I’m still not quite clear on where you stand. Please allow me to address the points you’ve made in your reply. If you feel you have addressed them elsewhere and I either missed them or didn’t quite understand them, then please accept my humble apologies and simply direct me to the relevant post (or copy and paste if you’re feeling particularly generous)
I very much appreciate your respectful tone and desire for rational discourse. I would ask in return for your patience regarding any imperfections in my attempts to answer your excellent probing questions.
There are a number of points that need clarification.The Protector wrote: This is what I thought, but it has me a bit confused. You had argued that the Golden Rule establishes objective morality without the need for God (obviously, please correct me if I’ve misstated your position). Here, though, you acknowledge that the GR is merely a measure of the morality of certain acts that one may perform, and that implies it is measuring something that exists (or perhaps “carries value” or “has meaning” would be better if we don’t want to speak of abstractions as “existing?”) apart from either the measure itself or man’s recognition thereof; after all, heat (that is, variations in energy, molecular motion) exists wholly apart from either the thermometer or man’s recognition of it (I know there are philosophers who would dispute this claim, but it seems we agree here). To sum, then, the GR does not establish morality, it merely is presumed to discern it—or at any rate discern the degree to which an act is moral. But the moral argument at issue is not that morals cannot be discerned without God, the argument is that objective morals (objective in the absolute sense) cannot exist (or “have meaning?”) in the absence of God. That you presume the GR allows you to discern the moral value of a given act does not in any way demonstrate that this moral value exists (or can exist) in the absence of God, does it? After all, Craig does not say that people cannot discern moral values and duties without God—indeed, you’ve criticized him for saying that people can discern them too readily! But this discernment—this taking measure of—is really all you say the GR does here, is it not?
Protector: "you acknowledge that the GR is merely a measure of the morality of certain acts"
Your use of the word "merely" implies that the GR serves only as a test for what is moral and nothing else. That is not correct. I assert that the GR plays a central role in our understanding of what we mean by "moral." I assert that it, in conjunction with self-love, is a rational explanation of our moral intuitions. So the question is this: Does my moral theory account for all of our moral intuitions? This is why my theory is testable. All a challenger needs to do is to present a valid moral intuition that is not rationally explained by the two principles I propose and my theory will be falsified.
Protector: "that implies it is measuring something that exists (or perhaps “carries value” or “has meaning” would be better if we don’t want to speak of abstractions as “existing?”) apart from either the measure itself or man’s recognition thereof"
It is good that you seem to recognize the problem with the word "exists." It is a vortex of endless dispute. So the first question is this: Do we need to settle the question of what it means for an abstract object to "exist" before we can understand theories based upon them? If so, then all mathematics crumbles to dust because we have exactly the same problem with answering questions about the "existence" of abstract numbers. What makes an equation like 1 + 2 = 3 true? Is its truth independent of human opinion? I think so. Does that mean that it "exists" independently of humans? I don't know. I don't even know what it means for abstract objects to "exist." That sounds like a category mistake naively drawn from a false analogy of what we mean when speaking of physical objects existing. I say "category mistake" because any physical thing that exists has a property of "whereness" which simply does not apply to abstract objects. Whitehead and Russel wrote three volumes of impenetrable philosophical discourse trying to give a philosophical ground to mathematics. Obviously, we don't need the answer to such questions in order to successfully use the theory. The only reason this issue has come up at all with respect to morality is because theists think they can use it to prove theism. I think that their whole program is blatantly absurd. We cannot establish the actual existence of God with such metaphysical speculations woven from ambiguous words that we don't even understand!
Protector: "To sum, then, the GR does not establish morality, it merely is presumed to discern it—or at any rate discern the degree to which an act is moral."
I see no meaningful distinction between "establishing the existence of X" and the "ability to measure X." Is there any other topic where we would make such a distinction?
Protector: "the argument is that objective morals (objective in the absolute sense) cannot exist (or “have meaning?”) in the absence of God."
You have introduced an undefined concept of "objective in the absolute sense." Your comment is based on a presumed understanding of what it means for abstract objects to "exist" but as I showed above, that concept is not understood even for something as lucid as numbers.
Protector: "After all, Craig does not say that people cannot discern moral values and duties without God—indeed, you’ve criticized him for saying that people can discern them too readily!"
My complaint was never that Craig says "people can discern them too readily" but rather his appeal to that intuition as the only support for his second premise. It's is fine to appeal to something as "obvious" as a motivation for further investigation, but it is logically fallacious to base his argument on such an unsupported appeal.
Protector: "this discernment—this taking measure of—is really all you say the GR does here, is it not?"
No, it is not. My argument is that we have a complete explanation of our moral intuitions based on the truth of two principles:
1) Self-love: All rational beings desire what is best for themselves. The axiom is "self loves self."
2) The Golden Rule: This is the principle of moral symmetry, justice, fairness. We can objectively determine if something is fair. This principle is founded upon the principle of indifference. We have no objective a priori reason to prefer one over another. Any morally valid statement must be symmetric under an interchange of the agent and the person affected by the agent. This is how we teach children morality. We ask them "How would you feel if I did that to you?".
If we can objectively measure something, then it functions as an "objective reality" regardless of our ability or inability to articulate the philosophical grounds for its "existence." Again, we are turning on the pole of an unsolved philosophical riddle - the meaning of the "existence" of abstract objects like numbers and moral values.The Protector wrote: Also, while a measure may in itself be objective, it does not necessarily follow that what is being measured is an objective construct. What reason do we have for supposing that “moral value” is akin to temperature and the GR to a thermometer in this regard, as opposed to, say, being analogous to “cognitive ability” and an Intelligence test?
That's a central reason why some folks reject the "objective" existence of moral values. How do they differ from aesthetic values which probably are not objective? Or are aesthetic value objective? The fact that we have no certain answers to such questions exposes yet again the futility of trying to prove God from such ambiguous philosophical speculations.The Protector wrote: Moreover, a thermometer is a quantitative test (albeit of man-made interval units), but it seems to me that a measure of moral value would be dealing with qualitative data, would it not? It would be akin to a thermometer with two labels: “Hot” and “Cold;” such a thermometer would tell us very little about the temperature, except inasmuch as it might be perceived by the person who designed the thermometer. So too with a measure with outcomes labeled “Moral” and “Immoral.” Does that make any sense?
No, I do not believe in moral "duties" because the concept of duty implies a legislative agent. I have no moral intuitions based on such a concept. Something is morally right or wrong because of what it is, not because someone said so. This is how Craig not-so-secretly imports his conclusion into his second premise and so begs the question.The Protector wrote: If the GR is merely a test or measure of the morality of human actions, do you hold that humans have moral duties?
Thank you for your kind words. My best wishes to you and yours.The Protector wrote: I did not realize you were the husband of whom Butterfly has spoken so highly! I pray you are both blessed with many more happy years together.
When I said "prefer" I meant it in the sense that no individual should have special rights or considerations, all things being equal. I am using the word "prefer" in a moral sense. We shouldn't have double standards.The Protector wrote: To your point: I apologize for not realizing that “prefer” is commonly used in this way; as I said before, I have no training in philosophy or formal logic, and I appreciate your patience with me as I struggle with these concepts. Even so, when you apply it to human actions and morality, it seems to me that the implication must be the use of “prefer” in the more common sense of the word: that is, to desire a given outcome (or outcomes) over others—to find them “preferable.” To say that one expects no single outcome over any others is to say that no particular pattern of outcome is anticipated, but rather one anticipates (over the long run) observing all outcomes in equal frequency. If we are consistent in our usage of the word “prefer,” then when we continue the analogy and apply this to human actions by saying that, since we are all human, we should prefer no one human face over the other would be to say that we do not expect any one human face over any other. This doesn’t make much sense to me. Coupled with all the stuff about symmetry in physics, it strikes me that you are trying to draw an ought from an is, but this may just reflect my poor knowledge of physics. I hope that you might be so kind as to elaborate and clarify these points for me.
As for the "is/ought" problem - I addressed that in an earlier post today where I explained that I think it is a confusion that is not relevant to the discussion.
As explained, we must begin somewhere. Love is the correct primitive concept. Craig begins with the concept of "objective morality" as the primitive concept. I think that is an error because morality can be reduced to and explained in terms of love. The explanation is very satisfying and coheres completely with our moral intuitions. This contrasts with Craig's theory of Divine Command which is totally arbitrary, meaningless, and contrary to our moral intuitions which state that morality is based on the nature of the action and its effect on others and so has nothing to do with what anyone says. Indeed, Craig's argument is contrary to the concept of objective morality because he says that morality is dependent entirely upon the God's arbitrary commands. If God's commands are not arbitrary, then they are based on the objective goodness of the things he commands in which case moral values would NOT be based on God's commands. A Thomist approach is to say that values are grounded in God's nature AND they form the basis of his commands, but I see no need for such speculations since we have a perfectly good and complete theory of morality given by the two principles of Self-love and the Golden Rule.The Protector wrote:Okay, so you are simply asserting it. But what is it? Where does it come from? I mean, you’ve denied that abstractions “exist,” so is love merely a concept that has sprung from the minds of mankind? Something else?Spock wrote: What is love (baby don't hurt me)? That is, as you are using it here.
All philosophy and science requires primitive concepts that cannot be defined in terms of other words else we would fall into an infinite regress or self-referential loop. I think love is the proper "primitive concept" and that morality is the logic of love. Here is how the wiki explains it:
In mathematics, logic, and formal systems, a primitive notion is an undefined concept. In particular, a primitive notion is not defined in terms of previously defined concepts, but is only motivated informally, usually by an appeal to intuition and everyday experience. In an axiomatic theory or other formal system, the role of a primitive notion is analogous to that of axiom. In axiomatic theories, the primitive notions are sometimes said to be "defined" by one or more axioms, but this can be misleading. Formal theories cannot dispense with primitive notions, under pain of infinite regress.
It is no trick - unless by trick you mean a call to intellectual integrity. We are discussing the most important issues in life. Neither rhetorical tricks nor accusations of such have any place in a serious discussion like this. Is it a trick for me to appeal to what you believe? If I were in your shoes I would be delighted every time anyone brought up my Lord Jesus Christ who is the paragon of all truth and virtue! Indeed, that is what I would pray for.The Protector wrote:You’ve made similar replies to other people here, and I must say this is quite a trick. We ask questions to try to better understand your perspective from an atheistic position, and instead of responding you take us to task for not displaying a better Christian understanding of these things. If I was a less charitable man I might call this a “rhetorical ploy.” Obviously I would not ask this of Jesus Christ, because I believe he is the living God. I ask this of you because you believe there is no God. While I cannot presume to know what Christ would say in reply, my best guess would be something similar to what he said to the Rich Young Ruler who addressed him as “good teacher.”Spock wrote: Why is love "good?" By what standard?
Would you ever ask that question of Jesus? If not, why not? If so, what do you think his answer would be?
You accuse me of a "rhetorical trick." OK - if it was a "trick" then what was I trying to accomplish with my trick? The question was asked in all sincerity. I was appealing to your understanding that "love" is a primitive concept, even if defined by Christ.
Now you said "I ask this of you because you believe there is no God." Where did you get that idea? I reject theism of the kind taught in the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) because I don't think it is true, but I do not assert that "there is no God" of any kind because such knowledge is beyond me. Besides, I am inclined towards something like the Perennial Philosophy which sees Mind or Consciousness as the Ground of Being. Perhaps there is only one "Self" that we all are part of. I am not committed to any metaphysical system because I don't have any certain knowledge about such things.
Christ may indeed have answered that "God alone is love" in analogy with "God alone is good" but that doesn't help us define "love" any more than it helps us define "good." Both concepts must exist independently of our God-concept or they won't function as predicates and the statements would be reduced to the tautological "God alone is God" with no content.
When I say that morality is the logic of love, I mean that as a description of my moral theory which is based on the concept of love with that love being modulated through the logic of the Golden Rule.The Protector wrote:“Morality is the logic of love” is a seductive phrase, but I’m not sure what reason you have for positing it, and I certainly don’t see how it answers my question. In response to my question, “Why must a moral theory ‘cohere with love’,” this response is essentially equivalent to, “Because a moral theory must cohere with love.” What does it mean for a moral intuition to be “authentic?” I imagine your question here is rhetorical and you would answer that love makes a person’s moral intuitions authentic. But why? On your view, as an atheist, what logical reason do you have to believe this? What has led you to this conclusion?Spock wrote: Why must a true moral theory "cohere with love?"
Because moral theory is the logic of love. Could a person with no love have any authentic moral intuitions?
1) Self-love: All rational beings desire what is best for themselves. The axiom is "self loves self."
2) The Golden Rule: This is the principle of moral symmetry, justice, fairness. We can objectively determine if something is fair. This principle is founded upon the principle of indifference. We have no objective a priori reason to prefer one over another. Any morally valid statement must be symmetric under an interchange of the agent and the person affected by the agent. This is how we teach children morality. We ask them "How would you feel if I did that to you?".
Any moral theory must "cohere with love" because love is the root of our moral intuitions. A person without love is "morally handicapped" to use Craig's phrase.
I am critical of Craig for asserting that our moral intuitions are sufficient as a basis for the second premise of his syllogism that proves God.The Protector wrote: And what is this about “moral intuitions?” Weren’t you critical of Craig for citing moral intuitions? Perhaps you explained this already and I’ve just forgotten (again, simply let me know if that is the case), but what role do “moral intuitions” play in your theory of moral values?
The "role" that moral intuitions play in my theory is that they are what my theory is designed to explain. I assert that my theory accounts for and explains all our moral intuitions. This makes for an easy test to see if my theory is true. All you need to do is state a moral intuition that cannot be explained by my theory.
Everyone's.The Protector wrote: Whose moral intuitions?
Thanks again for the great post. It really helps to have such probing questions stated so clearly.
All the very best,
Spock