DivineRageFromSpace wrote:Well put, Dan, but you haven't yet refuted my example: You've only refuted the principle behind my example. Even assuming that the principle is no longer true, the argument I put forth still stands up to the arguments you've put forth so far. You've said "Moral is the natural order of things and is intrinsic", whereas I've said that "A system tends toward disorder and the population's view on homosexuality evidences this in society". You said that I misused the Second Law of Thermodynamics by attributing it to something besides Thermodynamics (and attributing it to something that is intrinsic rather than exrinsic, might I add), and this is admittedly true, but that is only the first part of the argument. You said that morals are defined by the most widely accepted view on something, and I provided an example where something became widely accepted over time. Therefore, according to "the natural order" argument, it went from being immoral to being moral, regardless of whether or not the Second Law of Thermodynamics can be used to qualify morality.
TL;DR: Good point. Now respond to the question.
Look at the part I underlined. I said no such thing. You've misunderstood me. Morals are most definitely NOT defined as the most widely accepted view of something. I explicitly denied that when I said the moral order is an objective, intrinsic part of nature and therefore exists independently of the mind. I said the moral order is
played out in society, and that just in virtue of what morality is. That doesn't mean that society determines morality. It just means that where there is no society, there is no such thing as morality (sort of like if there is no universe, there is such thing as physics).
DivineRageFromSpace wrote:Thank you, this is very insightful. However, you contradicted the point you made earlier, that "The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people". Here you said that "Society can change its mind about what is moral. That, however, doesn't determine the morality of something". So which is it? Does the society of people have to recognize the moral order for it to be moral or does morality as we're speaking of it now exist regardless of whether society recognizes it or not? If it's the latter, we're back to the beginning of the argument.
And if society can change it's mind about what is moral or not, then who's to say that they're right about it being immoral to involve a child sexually, or even fantasize about it?
Again, you misunderstood me. Society can change its mind about what is moral. That doesn't mean that society decides what is moral or not. Suppose I am taking a math test. I mark a particular answer. Later, upon thinking about it, I change my mind and then change the answer. Does my new answer change whether or not the sum really is what it is? No. It only changes whether or not I am right about that sum.
The bottom line, again, is that your argument fails because you are appealing to nature in the sense of "mother nature," that which is observed by physical science. I, however, am appealing to nature in the sense of a thing's essence--what a thing really is in and of itself. When you hear people say, "That's just human nature," they're using the word more closely to the way I am.
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Beanybag wrote:I will stop you right here because you get into a mess of what is unethical versus what is, what I think you are trying to say, unhealthy. But what is unhealthy doesn't strike me as necessarily immoral. People eat junk food and I don't see this as wrong-doing - Maybe I'd prefer them not to and maybe I wouldn't partake in such activities myself, but I won't tell them they can't. Now, I'm not a consequential, I do think certain virtues are applicable.. but I don't see this act as immoral or a-virtuous, but possibly even preventative with respect to actual moral harm. I understand that your moral system is a great deal stricter than mine (mine allows for a wide range of freedom), but I don't see this as a shortcoming.
I'd also like to say that I disagree - evil things are evil because they hurt others, and I see no such exception. As such, I'd disagree with your premise...
No, I'm not trying to say that unethical = unhealthy. The relationship between those two is the same as the relationship between evil and harm. What is evil is usually harmful; being harmful is not what makes it evil. Likewise, what is evil is usually unhealthy; being unhealthy is not what makes it evil. Beyond that, if you assert that things are evil
because they harm others, then you are a consequentialist. That's the definition of consequentialism. You can be a consequentialist, of course, but that's just where we disagree. I started my comments by saying that this is why consequentialism is an insufficient view of ethics. It allows things that are clearly unethical (e.g., sexual fantasies about children) as being ethical. You say you're being logically consistent. I agree. You are. I just see your consistency as a reductio ad absurdem proving the untenability of your position.
I think what may be wrong for one person may be okay for another - that isn't to say I think morals are entirely relative, but I do think there are context-dependent scenarios. And I'd think many people would agree - killing can be justified when it's in self-defense, eating junk food can be okay if it's in moderation and you exercise after, and partaking in fantasies can be fine if you're responsible about it and do not become obsessed.
Morality is usually context specific, and that in virtue of what it is. It is not unethical for me to sleep with my wife. It would be very unethical for you to sleep with my wife. Some things are absolutely wrong--unjustified killing. Some things are only wrong in excess (e.g., eating too much junk food). Some things are actually good in moderation (e.g., exercise) and become bad in excess (e.g., too much exercise is bad for the body--you need rest). Aretaic ethics, which is the formal name of the position I'm espousing, has no problem with any of that.
Your appeal to an order of how things ought to be is striking - just because a thing tends to be bad does not make it bad in all situations, does it? I don't particularly like this set of rules with little flexibility, it seems to deny the actual complex nature of events. There are many different aspects to every decision that each have merit and each have negative aspects as well, blanket statements about what one ought to do require context to be appropriately examined. Further, how is it that you claim to know, with certainty, what is moral and maximally optimal for humans (this seems to be an entire conversation in of itself approaching)? And why can't it vary from person to person - there are many differences and sometimes what is maximally optimal is not necessarily optimal (what is success without struggle? Should all hardship and suffering be eliminated? Yadda yadda). This is why I think ethical systems that allow for wide range of freedoms tend to be more successful, especially among varied populations.
Your confusion here stems from your equation of "the good" with "the healthy." Indeed, we can't be 100% certain what is healthy for us. We have really good guesses, but we can't KNOW. We can have scientific certainty, but as you well know, scientific certainty is necessarily probabalistic. None of that applies to ethics, because it is based on an analysis of nature (that is, of essence).
Pause. Two things are coming to mind immediately here. One, it sounds as if you're about to commit a naturalistic fallacy, and two, you seem to have missed a lot of the point of sex e.g. social aspects such as in bonobos, or more specifically in humans, the strong social and emotional bonding that can come with sex and intimacy. Sex is a complex and deep psychological and biological phenomenon and it should not be surprising that it serves multiple purposes. It sounds like you might disagree on this point, however, and I'm also willing to discuss that. But, the second point seems largely irrelevant here.
Wrong. The naturalistic fallacy appeals to nature in the sense of mother nature. I'm appealing to nature in the sense of intrinsic order. I'm speaking as an Aristotelian, not a Lockean. See my previous comments on this.
I'll start with noting that it isn't morally relevant whether or not a child can reproduce (sometimes girls hit puberty as young as 9), but whether or not it is healthy for them to engage in sex; clearly it isn't and causes demonstrable and lifelong harm in many cases. This is undesirable, clearly. But, you lose me entirely with the invocation of thought crime as disorder. It doesn't seem to follow that desire and fantasy about immoral acts is necessarily immoral.
I am particularly stuck on this line: "Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!)"
It seems you lack justification for this. There are plenty of things we might desire to do, but abstain from - and no observable harm is done. In fact, it doesn't seem to be that harm would even be a probable (or in some cases, possible) result. In fact, if certain fantasy or hypothetical scenarios help you relieve tension (punching a bag with an ex-boyfriend's face on it to relieve stress, writing an angry letter and then throwing it away). I think we must take into account psychological facts and well-being when we are considering what is maximally optimal with concerns to a human's well being, yes?
Again, your appeal to health misses the point. Something being unhealthy may be a diagnostic indicator that it is therefore immoral, but the two are not to be equated. If they are, you're just back to consequentialism again.
The reason you can't see the justification for the assertion that the desire for disorder is itself disordered is that you have not understood what I mean by 'order.' You still have in your mind the physical order of mother nature. I've said repeatedly I am talking about
intrinsic order. I'm appealing to the nature or essence of things; not to a description of how thing behave in nature. The former is an actual constituent of a thing; the latter is a pattern deduced by the human intellect and imposed upon that thing, and is therefore not an actual constituent of a thing. Put differently, the former deals with ontology; the latter with epistemology.
So to restate, my foundational premise here is that things have natures, and that natures determine to what a thing is intrinsically ordered. That includes humans, and therefore, humans are intrinsically ordered to certain things. When multiple humans get together in a construct we call society, a complex arises in which humans interact and those actions impact one another. Now, that is by nature--that is to say, humans are intrinsically ordered to interact with one another. That entails that certain actions are properly ordered and some are disordered. Murder is disordered, for instance, because it violates the natural order intrinsic to the human soul and therefore intrinsic to the society of people. When humans act in accordance with their intrinsic natures, happiness is maximized. When they don't, happiness is retarded or even diminished. That is to say, disordered acts are wrong. Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, for even desires are to be properly ordered. That is to say that to desire disorder is wrong. For all of these reasons, it is evident that sexually fantasizing about children is simply wrong.
It doesn't follow from this, of course, that "mental pedophiles" should be locked up. That gets into an entirely different debate over the nature and role of government. Just because something is wrong, it does not necessarily follow that it is within the jurisdiction of government to punish it. I shouldn't lie to my wife, but the government has no right to fine me if I do (unless that lie is with respect to a public institution--e.g., lying in a contract, which places it in their jurisdiction). I, then, would object to your use of the term "thought crime" as the word "crime" has connotations that are inappropriate for this discussion. Intentionally or not, such commentary poisons the well.
I say that this intuition is wrong and leads to morally wrong behavior. We should shun no one, especially when they seek help. Many pedophiles wish they did not have the desires they do and want help to contain their desires. It is clearly and absolutely better for a pedophile to be allowed some sort of fantastic escape than to act on such fantasies.
Further, I challenge your notion that their desires are not "natural". I have read the accounts of pedophiles who struggle with their desires and wish they did not have them - why would they choose this? There is also scientific studies to back this up (I will supply them on request). It is lamentable that they have these desires which must not be fulfilled, but to shun them without compassion does not seem moral and certainly does not seem Christ-like. It is their struggle and I think we should help them in whatever way we can so as to protect them from the temptation of fulfilling these desires.
Bottom line: fantasizing about children is dreadfully evil, and that whether it is accompanied by masturbation or not!
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What makes you think that choosing something makes it natural? I never said that pedophiles choose their fantasies. Indeed, that's another reason to view it is a disorder. When people have these kinds of problems, they do need help, and a responsible society helps them. In that case, it is rather like someone born blind. They, through no fault of their own, are unable to function in accordance with their proper nature. They're eye isn't doing what it is naturally ordered to do. Does that mean that there is nothing wrong with them? Of course not! It means just the opposite: because their eye is not doing what it is supposed to do, we have a problem, and we act to help them resolve it where we can. Just so with moral disorders. Things go wrong, and people's moral organs (so to speak) can be broken and not function correctly. We should help them where we can and where they desire it.
This is one of the reasons that they argument "homosexuals are born that way!" doesn't impress me. Even if they are, they doesn't change the fact that their desires are intrinsically disordered. Being born a particular way and with a particular desire doesn't justify any given action. The question is whether or not that action is in keeping with the natural law. Any action that intentionally deviates from that law is wrong.
Thank you for bearing with me so far . . .