Jac wrote:
Rick, then I have to be honest here and say that I really don't understand your confusion or objection. Let me walk through the logic as I understand it and tell me where I'm getting lost.
Primarily, it seems like your claim is that if a physical thing has no beginning, then we'd have reason to think that God doesn't exist. Now, I just have no idea how that follows. The argument would look something like this:
1. If a physical thing has no beginning, then there is no God
2. The universe has not beginning
3. Therefore, there is no God
Actually, that's not what I'm saying. I'm not asserting, but just trying to understand how something physical, or something which is made up of physical things, such as the universe, could be without beginning. The focus is on physical things.
to your argument above;
I wouldn't say #1, because I don't think physical things are without beginning.
I wouldn't argue #2, because I believe the universe had a beginning.
So obviously, #3 doesn't follow.
Sort of a reverse cosmological argument, eh? So the thing is, I have absolutely no idea how you would defend the first premise. Why on earth should we think it is true? You would need to show that the two ideas are mutually exclusive, and frankly, I have no clue how you would do that. I can imagine that you might could argue that a beginningless universe robs us of one particular argument for God's existence (i.e., the Kalam), but there are dozens of other reasons to think that God exists. Or you might could argue that a beginningless universe can't be squared with Gen 1, but then all you have is a rejection of biblical inerrancy, not of God's existence or even of Christianity. I mean, suppose the universe is beginningless. What do you do with the moral argument? With the resurrection of Jesus? With fulfilled prophecy? With the contingency of that very eternal universe? With the fact of intentionality? And so on?
As I said above, I'm not making an argument. I'm just questioning.
Jac wrote:
First, you say that you are conceding that immaterial things can be beginningless, but that physical things cannot. Why? Why does a beginningless physical thing cause a problem for God and a beginningless immaterial thing does not? I can't think of a single reason for that whatsoever. And when you add to that a general Thomistic perspective, you have to recognize that ALL things have an immaterial aspect (the form or the soul). If something doesn't have a form (an immaterial reality), then that something doesn't exist after all. So your argument is apparently limited not to a beginningless thing, but only with the beginninglessness of the physical aspect of a thing. So, why can the immaterial part not have a beginning but the material part must have a beginning?
I conceded that something like the number 3 can be beginningless. I'm not conceding all non-physical "things" can be beginningless. For example, Angels, the human mind/soul/spirit, I would not say are beginningless. I conceded the number three, because I just don't think it "exists"
the same way angels, and the human mind/soul/spirit exist. The number 3, as far as I know, is a concept.
Jac wrote:
The second reason is that it seems to me that your argument, as I've understood it, commits a composition fallacy. Suppose you were to go to your local college and get a tour. You were shown the lecture halls, the library, the offices, the courtyard, and so on. And after seeing all that, you said, "Wow, that's all great. Now, can I see the college?" If a philosophy student were touring you, you'd be told that was a composition fallacy. The college is not *a* thing. It is a collective thing. And so it is with the universe. The universe is not *a* thing. It is a "singular thing" in that it is the total collection of all things that are.
I said something physical, or something made up of physical things. The universe is made up of physical things.
I could be wrong, but as I see the universe, it is everything
physical that exists. I don't want to go off too much, but I will just say that there are things that exist, that I don't think are part of the universe. Again, angels, the human spirit, and of course, God. So, I'm just questioning if anything physical, or anything made up of physical things, can be beginningless.
So even if the universe is beginningless, that does not mean that any given thing in it is beginningless. The universe as it exists right now came into existence this moment. It did not exist a moment ago, and it will not exist in a moment from now. Even there we are subtly committing a composition fallacy, because the question is, "Which things came into existence?" or better, "What state of things came into existence--e.g., how are every item with the whole set of things called 'the universe' so related at this moment?" And that is what comes into existence. You would have to argue that while it is true that each thing has to come into existence, that it impossible for there to be an infinite series of things that no longer exist? I mean, my father's father is now dead. He is no longer here (ignoring issues about him being in heaven). Just because he stops existing, I don't suddenly pop out of existence. Now, if he could produce an effect (my father), and then die, and then my father can produce an effect (me), and eventually not be here, and in all that I (and those effects that come from me) not go out of existence, then why must there be a beginning to that series? What is the difference in a series of things that terminates five minutes ago or never ago if, in both cases, the termination (or lack there of) doesn't exist? In both cases the past causes are no longer existent, which means that the current effects exist in themselves and not in virtue of the past causes. You would have to show a logical reason why an infinite past is self-contradictory.
You just lost me.
The only thing I got out of that, was this:
So even if the universe is beginningless, that does not mean that any given thing in it is beginningless.
I guess I would say that the universe is composed of physical things. So if those things in the universe had a beginning, then the universe had a beginning.
Now, I fully admit that you can put forward arguments for that, but I hope you can admit that those arguments are highly contested and have always been. Perhaps you come down on the side that says that an infinite regression of past events really is impossible. But you don't get to just assert that. You need to demonstrate that, and as of now, incredulity and intuition seem to me all you've offered in that regard. And that, obviously, isn't enough.
I don't think I would assert that. It makes my head spin just thinking about it.
AGAIN, I want to insist that I do not think the universe is beginningless. I think it has a true beginning in time. I think the paper I presented is wrong. The link Hana posted offers some interesting points. But my point is that we are putting ourselves in a very precarious situation when we base our faith in God on a true beginning of the universe. It's just not the best argument to base belief in God on, at least, not as far as I can tell.
And I guess I just have trouble believing that anything physical, or anything made up of physical things, can be without a beginning. To me, that would mean whatever always existed, had to be part of God, or God's nature, however you want to word it. Which would lead to pantheism being true.
I hope I didn't make this more confusing.