B.W., I think it is fair to say that Craig assumes the argument as a solution to a problem of his (and others’) own making. His premises and conclusion remain unproven. This is the whole problem. What is liberty? And how is it interacted with?B. W. wrote:Craig, I think is using molinsim to look into what comes first, and from what I read, I think his view is that they act together - you can’t have one without the other: You can’t predestine without foreknowing nor can you foreknow without predestining… The use of the term Middle Knowledge helps explore how this is possible, which leaves the integrity of God intact and helps gain a glimpse of the mystery.
 
In decreeing, God necessarily decrees all that will ever come to pass. Logically, God’s foreknowledge of x presupposes the necessity of x. If x will occur, then it is not the case that x might or might not occur. If God’s foreknowledge of x is not necessary, then it is contingent. No event can be foreknown unless it has by some physical or mental act been predetermined. What determines the certainty of future events is either the foreordination of the Father or some obscure act of fate. God is not a God of fate. If God had not foreordained the course of events but waited until some undetermined condition was or was not met, His decrees would be neither eternal nor immutable. So foreknowledge must presuppose foreordination.
The proposed would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, which are said to be found within every conceivable world scenario, cannot be grounded in God’s free knowledge of His creative decree - God’s creative decree is logically subsequent to, not prior to, the would-counterfactuals being proposed here. Did God spend time in eternity deliberating on such matters? Did He move from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing?
If God foreknew that Bill would do x tomorrow, then Bill cannot do anything other than x. Therefore, Bill cannot do anything other than x tomorrow. This doesn’t restrict Bill in making his choice, but it does bring to bare the claim that Bill could freely choose to do otherwise. The ability to choose as we want is a sufficient condition for moral accountability. Why is liberty so utterly insufficient that Molinists must make unsubstantiated assertions saying we must be able to choose contrary to what we will in order to be morally responsible agents?
You see, none of these propositions make any sense, either logically or, more importantly, in light of what we know about the sovereign God of scripture.
Ephesians 1:3-5
Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places,
4 even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. In love
5 he predestined us for adoption as sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will.
2 Timothy 1:8-9
Therefore do not be ashamed of the testimony about our Lord, nor of me his prisoner, but share in suffering for the gospel by the power of God,
9 who saved us and called us to a holy calling, not because of our works but because of his own purpose and grace, which he gave us in Christ Jesus before the ages began.
 Ephesians 3:7-11
Of this gospel I was made a minister according to the gift of God's grace, which was given me by the working of his power.
8 To me, though I am the very least of all the saints, this grace was given, to preach to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ,
9 and to bring to light for everyone what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all things,
10 so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.
11 This was according to the eternal purpose that he has realized in Christ Jesus our Lord.