Evidence for God from Science

touchingcloth wrote:I agree broadly with this, but certain concepts in modern physics muddy the waters of our ability to understand even what a thing itself is. For example quantum mechanics - and in particular the uncertainty principle - raises the very real possibility that there is a limit to how well our representations of things can correlate with the things themselves.

Anyway, that's a bit of a digression and I think that the Aristotelian view of epistemology is sound in essence. Jac - I'd be interested if you could elaborate on how hylomorphism provides an argument against same sex marriage? My understanding is that it is a theory of the physical rather than the moral, so I guess your argument must lie more in Aristotelian ideas of teleology rather than epistemology?

Correct, although I would also add that I don't see how you can separate Aristotelian teleology from Aristotelian epistemology, since the latter's assumption of hylomorphism seems to entail the whole actuality/potentiality distinction (or to stay away from Latin anachronism, the entelecheia/dunamis distinction). But if you admit that, then I don't see how you avoid Aristotle's explanation of causality, which entails final causality. But where there is final causality, there is teleology; where there is teleology, you have a full blown essentialism. And once you have a full blown essentialism, the argument against same sex marriage is rather easy to ground.

So let me just return the question to you. If you see validity in Aristotelian epistemology and its necessary employment of hylomorphism, how do you avoid a full blown essentialism? And if you don't, where do you think the Aristotelian argument against same sex marriage breaks down?

edit:

I should note here that an atheist could, theoretically, adopt a full blown essentialism and, I think, have a strong rebuttal to the Moral Argument as it is normally stated. I mean that an atheist can ground objective moral values in an essentialist universe. The problem with that tactic is that it would seem that Aristotelian essentialism necessarily leads a person to monotheism, insofar as we have to conclude with Aristotle that there is, in fact, a Simple First Cause, and with Aquinas that this cause is Pure Act, and if Pure Act, then the work of natural theology is well on its way. Atheism, then, seems out of the question. But it does at least allow a person to ground objective moral values in the universe itself without appealing directly to God.

Jac3510 wrote: I don't see how you can separate Aristotelian teleology from Aristotelian epistemology, since the latter's assumption of hylomorphism seems to entail the whole actuality/potentiality distinction
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I don't see how you avoid Aristotle's explanation of causality, which entails final causality. But where there is final causality, there is teleology; where there is teleology, you have a full blown essentialism. And once you have a full blown essentialism, the argument against same sex marriage is rather easy to ground.
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where do you think the Aristotelian argument against same sex marriage breaks down?

I'm not sure I agree with hylomorphism - I don't have a strong background in philosophy, but in terms of epistemology I hold the view that we are limited to dealing with representations of things only, but I don't see this as a barrier to knowledge about things themselves. I'm afraid I don't know nearly enough about Aristotelian actuality/potentiality/causality/essentialism to say whether or not I agree with it.

I wasn't asking a loaded question anyway, I'd just like to see your take on the argument against same sex marriage from hylomorphism writ large, because other than having the hunch that it involves teleology I don't know what specifics you have in mind

Correct, although I would also add that I don't see how you can separate Aristotelian teleology from Aristotelian epistemology, since the latter's assumption of hylomorphism seems to entail the whole actuality/potentiality distinction (or to stay away from Latin anachronism, the entelecheia/dunamis distinction). But if you admit that, then I don't see how you avoid Aristotle's explanation of causality, which entails final causality. But where there is final causality, there is teleology; where there is teleology, you have a full blown essentialism. And once you have a full blown essentialism, the argument against same sex marriage is rather easy to ground.

Jac, I find this ironic that I would say this in this thread, but I really like when you use big words. It really turns me on!!

Jac, I find this ironic that I would say this in this thread, but I really like when you use big words. It really turns me on!!

You pervert

RickD wrote:Jac, I find this ironic that I would say this in this thread, but I really like when you use big words. It really turns me on!!

You know, I didn't even notice when I wrote it how that sounded. I misunderstood TC to say he was in basic agreement with Aristotle's form/matter distinction and I judged by his mentioning of teleology that he was familiar with Aristotelian language. I wrote that more like a PM to someone who would have been very familiar with jargon. My apologies . . .

touchingcloth wrote:I'm not sure I agree with hylomorphism - I don't have a strong background in philosophy, but in terms of epistemology I hold the view that we are limited to dealing with representations of things only, but I don't see this as a barrier to knowledge about things themselves. I'm afraid I don't know nearly enough about Aristotelian actuality/potentiality/causality/essentialism to say whether or not I agree with it.

I wasn't asking a loaded question anyway, I'd just like to see your take on the argument against same sex marriage from hylomorphism writ large, because other than having the hunch that it involves teleology I don't know what specifics you have in mind

Sorry, TC, I misread you. My fault. But given your clarification, two things:

1. Your view of epistemology is the dominant one today. But I think you should consider more its implication about our ability to know things in and of themselves. Let me admit right now that I haven't read any analytical works on epistemology from the last ten or twenty years, but I can tell you that the traditional position as espoused by men such as Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, Russel, Quine, etc. is that, due to what we know--the representation of things rather than the things themselves--the obvious inference is that we therefore cannot know anything about the extra mental world. Descartes tried to get around this by appealing to God, but I'm sure you can imagine why that position isn't very influential today (except among the minority of Christian Cartesians, which thankfully is a small group indeed).

2. Concerning your actual question:

Again, you are right that it is based on Aristotelian teleology. The argument is multifaceted, but let me just give you some broad assertions and if you want more details let me know.

a) The male and female genitals are naturally oriented to one another, where "naturally oriented" refers to their being related such that they have a specific end, and the reaching of this end is both allowed and assisted by the structure of the organs.
b) That end is procreative.
c) Procreative acts are necessarily male female/unions (likewise, male/female genitalial unions are essentially procreative).
d) Human children are dependent on their parents for many years.

When all of these facts are considered, what we end up recognizing is that sex naturally leads to children, and children need to be raised. Nature/God/whatever has so designed us that we want sex, and usually lots of it, especially when we are younger and have the energy to care of the children it produces, which in turn suggests that large families are what nature intended (for whatever reason). Given the nature of that dependence however, it is evident that a single mother is going to have a far more difficult time providing for and raising those children than if she has a partner--the most obvious candidate for that partner being the father (something we recognize, by the way, in law when we require fathers to pay child support even for children they unintentionally fathered--even when they attempted to prevent fathering those children!). Further, the nature of that dependence is long term, suggesting a long term relationship between the parents. All that paints the fundamental picture of marriage--a male/female union in which children are produced and reared. Obviously, we could go a lot further in terms of the above details and defenses, but that's sort of a sketch.

So it seems that marriage, or something like it, is implicit in the very design of our sexual organs and the development of human children. But from here it is not hard to see the problem with so-called same-sex marriage. There are several:

1. Marriages are essentially sexual unions. But it is not at all apparent that same-sex physical relationships are sexual. That is, when two men or two women engage in a sexual act, they are not having sex (intercourse) anymore than you are having sex with your hand (or whatever device your prefer) when you masturbate. Again, the sexual act is essentially procreative (even if it never produces children, for again, the basic design of the union is procreative). But that would mean that two men or two women could never have a sexual relationship, strictly speaking, and therefore what they would have is not a marriage.

2. Marriages are essentially procreative. This follows on their being essentially sexual, which is essentially procreative. This is not to say that all marriages necessarily produce children, but remember that the sexual nature of the relationship is grounded in the teleology of the sexual organs, not in whether or not children are actually realized from any given sexual encounter. As same-sex relationships cannot be procreative, their relationship cannot be classified as a marriage.

There are, of course, other issues that can come into play that are more consequentialist in nature (e.g., children need a father figure; sodomy is physically dangerous, clearly unintended by nature, etc.). But the above provides the basics.

Now, all of this just shows that, ontologically, marriage is essentially and necessarily a male/female sexual union and that alone. "Same sex marriage" is as oxymoronic as "square circle." This does not address, in and of itself, the question of whether or not homosexual relationships are immoral, and even if we concede that they are, it does not prove that society ought to outlaw them. But I think you can see that if we can get at least as far as the above, a lot of the arguments on this issue go away or, at least, miss the point entirely.

Jac3510 wrote:1. Your view of epistemology is the dominant one today. But I think you should consider more its implication about our ability to know things in and of themselves. Let me admit right now that I haven't read any analytical works on epistemology from the last ten or twenty years, but I can tell you that the traditional position as espoused by men such as Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, Russel, Quine, etc. is that, due to what we know--the representation of things rather than the things themselves--the obvious inference is that we therefore cannot know anything about the extra mental world. Descartes tried to get around this by appealing to God, but I'm sure you can imagine why that position isn't very influential today (except among the minority of Christian Cartesians, which thankfully is a small group indeed).

I think the most modern approach seems to be borrowing the idea from logical positivism that knowledge obviously does exist, intuitively. Science clearly finds facts about the natural world and these seem objectively true across all subjective realities. While logical positivism seemed to create a self-contradiction, the idea that reality exists and we can obtain extra-mental knowledge is still asserted. We're simply still trying to find out as why.

As for your explanation that without hylemorphism, knowledge is impossible, that statement itself is self-refuting, from what I gather, and seems question begging. I'm content to assume the existence and possibility of knowledge without having a fully functional understanding of it yet, though.

Beanybag wrote:I think the most modern approach seems to be borrowing the idea from logical positivism that knowledge obviously does exist, intuitively. Science clearly finds facts about the natural world and these seem objectively true across all subjective realities. While logical positivism seemed to create a self-contradiction, the idea that reality exists and we can obtain extra-mental knowledge is still asserted. We're simply still trying to find out as why.

As for your explanation that without hylemorphism, knowledge is impossible, that statement itself is self-refuting, from what I gather, and seems question begging. I'm content to assume the existence and possibility of knowledge without having a fully functional understanding of it yet, though.

So logical positivism is self-refuting, but it ought to be accepted; and hylomorphism is self-refuting, and therefore ought to be rejected? I'd accuse you of being inconsistent, but since you seem okay with the self-refutation of logical positivism, I don't think that would phase you.

As far as finding out "why" knowledge is possible, the answer is that things have essences and that hylomorphism is correct. Beyond that, would you care to explain how hylomorphism is self-refuting and question begging (two mutually exclusive categories, by the way . . . an idea can't be both. If it's one it's not the other)? Or are you content with a bald assertion?

Jac3510 wrote:

Beanybag wrote:I think the most modern approach seems to be borrowing the idea from logical positivism that knowledge obviously does exist, intuitively. Science clearly finds facts about the natural world and these seem objectively true across all subjective realities. While logical positivism seemed to create a self-contradiction, the idea that reality exists and we can obtain extra-mental knowledge is still asserted. We're simply still trying to find out as why.

As for your explanation that without hylemorphism, knowledge is impossible, that statement itself is self-refuting, from what I gather, and seems question begging. I'm content to assume the existence and possibility of knowledge without having a fully functional understanding of it yet, though.

So logical positivism is self-refuting, but it ought to be accepted; and hylomorphism is self-refuting, and therefore ought to be rejected? I'd accuse you of being inconsistent, but since you seem okay with the self-refutation of logical positivism, I don't think that would phase you.

As far as finding out "why" knowledge is possible, the answer is that things have essences and that hylomorphism is correct. Beyond that, would you care to explain how hylomorphism is self-refuting and question begging (two mutually exclusive categories, by the way . . . an idea can't be both. If it's one it's not the other)? Or are you content with a bald assertion?

You assert that without hylomorphism, knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is possible, therefore hylomorphism is true. But, you can't know knowledge is impossible without assuming that hylomorphism is true, and thus, knowledge is possible. Because, the statement "knowledge is impossible" is self-refuting. So, you have asserted hylomorphism via argument ex nihilo. Knowledge may not be known to be possible without hylomorphism, and under the assumption that hylomorphism is true, it might seem that only hylomorphism is true, but we can't know that for sure.

also, I have not accepted that logical positivism is true. I've only assumed that knowledge is possible. The argument that logical positivism made towards breaking down the knowledge wall was still an admirable one, even if it ultimately failed. It's one tenant that we've stuck with and want to explain. It used to be popular to assume, like other philosophers, that extra-mental knowledge was impossible - but with the progress of science, we wish to reject this idea. It seems clear that we can gain knowledge of the extra-mental world, even if we don't understand how. I think it's a fine point to assume it's possible while still trying to find out how.

Beanybag wrote:You assert that without hylomorphism, knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is possible, therefore hylomorphism is true. But, you can't know knowledge is impossible without assuming that hylomorphism is true, and thus, knowledge is possible. Because, the statement "knowledge is impossible" is self-refuting. So, you have asserted hylomorphism via argument ex nihilo. Knowledge may not be known to be possible without hylomorphism, and under the assumption that hylomorphism is true, it might seem that only hylomorphism is true, but we can't know that for sure.

Are you even sure that the question "Do you know knowledge is possible?" is even meaningful? Better, is knowledge an object of knowledge? It can't be, because such would be viciously circular. That's where you (along with much epistemological debates I've read) seem to be making your mistake. So let's look at the syllogism you suggested:

1. Knowledge cannot be possible unless hylomorphism is true
2. Knowledge is possible
3. Therefore, hylomorphism is true

I've argued for (1). You argue that proving (2) requires assuming knowledge is possible, the very thing under consideration. And you would be right, if I were trying to prove (2) is true. But I don't. I assume it. And I think I assume it necessarily. It is impossible to prove that knowledge is possible (or impossible, by the way), because everything you prove is itself an object of knowledge! To try to prove (2) would put you in the same category as trying to prove the law of non-contradiction. In order to prove it, you must assume it. Or put differently, proving it requires employing it.

So there is no circular argument, because I'm not so naive as to argue that it must be proven. It's just a bare fact that knowledge exists. Any philosophical position, therefore, that denies the possibility of all knowledge or requires us to prove its possibility is itself self-refuting.

also, I have not accepted that logical positivism is true. I've only assumed that knowledge is possible. The argument that logical positivism made towards breaking down the knowledge wall was still an admirable one, even if it ultimately failed. It's one tenant that we've stuck with and want to explain. It used to be popular to assume, like other philosophers, that extra-mental knowledge was impossible - but with the progress of science, we wish to reject this idea. It seems clear that we can gain knowledge of the extra-mental world, even if we don't understand how. I think it's a fine point to assume it's possible while still trying to find out how.

You are correct in assuming that knowledge is possible. Your problem is to explain how knowledge is possible. Logical positivism cannot do it, because it entails a self-refutation. Further, you are correct that science strongly suggests that we know something about the extra mental world (indeed, I would argue that our basic senses do the same--I don't need something like a moon-landing to accept the obvious fact that I know something about the extra mental world). Again, the philosopher's job is to explain how that is true. Hylomorphism does the job admirably, and I contend that it is in principle the only possible solution, which is one of the (several) reasons I adhere to it. It also explains the entire enterprise of modern science rather well . . .

Jac3510 wrote:

Beanybag wrote:You assert that without hylomorphism, knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is possible, therefore hylomorphism is true. But, you can't know knowledge is impossible without assuming that hylomorphism is true, and thus, knowledge is possible. Because, the statement "knowledge is impossible" is self-refuting. So, you have asserted hylomorphism via argument ex nihilo. Knowledge may not be known to be possible without hylomorphism, and under the assumption that hylomorphism is true, it might seem that only hylomorphism is true, but we can't know that for sure.

Are you even sure that the question "Do you know knowledge is possible?" is even meaningful? Better, is knowledge an object of knowledge? It can't be, because such would be viciously circular. That's where you (along with much epistemological debates I've read) seem to be making your mistake. So let's look at the syllogism you suggested:

1. Knowledge cannot be possible unless hylomorphism is true
2. Knowledge is possible
3. Therefore, hylomorphism is true

I've argued for (1). You argue that proving (2) requires assuming knowledge is possible, the very thing under consideration. And you would be right, if I were trying to prove (2) is true. But I don't. I assume it. And I think I assume it necessarily. It is impossible to prove that knowledge is possible (or impossible, by the way), because everything you prove is itself an object of knowledge! To try to prove (2) would put you in the same category as trying to prove the law of non-contradiction. In order to prove it, you must assume it. Or put differently, proving it requires employing it.

No, I'm not arguing the problem is with 2. I'm saying it's with 1. 2 is presupposed, and rightly so. You cannot know 1 is true without making an argument ex nihilo. Unless you can create a proof to show that knowledge is ONLY possible with hylomorphism without assuming hylomorphism is true, you're begging the question.

also, I have not accepted that logical positivism is true. I've only assumed that knowledge is possible. The argument that logical positivism made towards breaking down the knowledge wall was still an admirable one, even if it ultimately failed. It's one tenant that we've stuck with and want to explain. It used to be popular to assume, like other philosophers, that extra-mental knowledge was impossible - but with the progress of science, we wish to reject this idea. It seems clear that we can gain knowledge of the extra-mental world, even if we don't understand how. I think it's a fine point to assume it's possible while still trying to find out how.

You are correct in assuming that knowledge is possible. Your problem is to explain how knowledge is possible. Logical positivism cannot do it, because it entails a self-refutation. Further, you are correct that science strongly suggests that we know something about the extra mental world (indeed, I would argue that our basic senses do the same--I don't need something like a moon-landing to accept the obvious fact that I know something about the extra mental world). Again, the philosopher's job is to explain how that is true. Hylomorphism does the job admirably, and I contend that it is in principle the only possible solution, which is one of the (several) reasons I adhere to it. It also explains the entire enterprise of modern science rather well . . .

You contend that it is the only principle, but can you know that for sure? I say no. That seems a very difficult thing to prove. It might be the most persuasive one to you, and the only idea you've thus heard that works, but it doesn't exclude everything else deductively.

Beanybag wrote:No, I'm not arguing the problem is with 2. I'm saying it's with 1. 2 is presupposed, and rightly so. You cannot know 1 is true without making an argument ex nihilo. Unless you can create a proof to show that knowledge is ONLY possible with hylomorphism without assuming hylomorphism is true, you're begging the question.

...

You contend that it is the only principle, but can you know that for sure? I say no. That seems a very difficult thing to prove. It might be the most persuasive one to you, and the only idea you've thus heard that works, but it doesn't exclude everything else deductively.

Then you are all the more mistaken, my friend.

(1) can be restated, "If knowledge is possible, hylomorphism must be true." We aren't begging the question when we assume the reality of knowledge in examining hylomorphism. For if in examining the latter we disprove it, then we do not prove that knowledge does not exist. We merely prove that the proposition itself is false. So there is no conclusion assumed in the premise.

As to how the argument is made, again, it's rather easy. The question is what we know. It's all boringly analytical. If I know X, then I know X and whatever is analytically implied by X. So if Y is analytically implied by X, then knowing X means I know (or can know, upon analysis) Y. But if Y is not so implied, then knowing X does not mean I know Y. In order to know Y, I would either need to know Y or some other Z that analytically implies Y.

So let's take the idea that all we really know are our ideas--our self-representations of the external world (whatever that is). X = ideas, and Y = the external reality to which X corresponds. We know X. Do we therefore know Y? No. Obviously not, since Y is not analytically implied by X. That's just definitional. There's no metaphysics or ontology that needs to be done here really. The statement, "X accurately represents Y" is a synthetic, not an analytical, statement.

Now that's not a problem insofar as it goes. Perhaps I know X and I know Y. Then knowledge of the external world is possible. And better, we can compare X and Y and see whether or not they really correspond, thus confirming our knowledge. But if I can only know ideas, then I can never know Y. And if I can never know Y, then I can have no knowledge of the extra mental world, which is clearly absurd.

So, again, we either know things in themselves only, or we know both things in themselves and our internal representation of those things, or we know our internal representation of those things only. Thus, as soon as you say that all we know are internal representations, you admit the third option and therefore necessarily deny all knowledge of the extra-mental world.

So the only way to have knowledge of the extra mental world is to admit some possibility of things themselves apart from our internal representations of them. That means the thing itself must be in the mind and not merely a representation of that thing. But the moment you say that the thing itself is in your mind, you are necessarily admitting some form of hylomorphism. Perhaps it isn't a full blown Aristotelian hylomorphism you are admitting, but you are admitting to SOME kind, since material things cannot get inside a thought. Thoughts are immaterial, and therefore what they know is immaterial. Therefore if thought knows the thing itself, the thought knows the thing itself qua its immaterial self. Aristotle called that immaterial aspect of a thing its form. You can call it whatever you want. Admitting to its existence, you necessarily admit, again, to some form of hylomorphism.

So (1) is rather easy to prove and there is no question begging or self-refutation involved, unlike logical positivism. If you can know things, and not just your ideas about things (which raises an entire other issues about the self-refutation of denying teleology, a concept that ALSO entails hylomorphism), then that thing--being knowable--must have an immaterial aspect by which it can be known. But things are also material. Thus things have a material and immaterial aspect. Thus, if you can know things, some form of hylomorphism is necessarily true.

I was hoping to avoid this discussion until after I had read the book on this subject, but here I am. So pardon any ignorance on my part, I can't help myself.

Jac3510 wrote:As to how the argument is made, again, it's rather easy. The question is what we know. It's all boringly analytical. If I know X, then I know X and whatever is analytically implied by X. So if Y is analytically implied by X, then knowing X means I know (or can know, upon analysis) Y. But if Y is not so implied, then knowing X does not mean I know Y. In order to know Y, I would either need to know Y or some other Z that analytically implies Y.

So let's take the idea that all we really know are our ideas--our self-representations of the external world (whatever that is). X = ideas, and Y = the external reality to which X corresponds. We know X. Do we therefore know Y? No. Obviously not, since Y is not analytically implied by X. That's just definitional. There's no metaphysics or ontology that needs to be done here really. The statement, "X accurately represents Y" is a synthetic, not an analytical, statement.

Well, there's two objections I have here. One is that two different definitions of 'knowing' seem to be being used. When I know an object, I clearly do not know everything about that object. Information theory would have strong objections there. Knowing an idea, also becomes a strange thing to say when I consider the second objection.. Two, our minds are at least partly physical. Knowledge/information is at least partly physical. Concepts, then, would be at least partly physical. When we think of a picture on a computer, we don't say that the picture on the computer is the object itself, we only say it's a representation. But, the picture is also still physical (somewhat) in the information that makes up this representation, because it is stored in a physical way on the computer. Now, intuitively, the picture is not the object, but it is at least somewhat accurately representing the object. Thus, while knowing Y might be impossible, we can at least know things ABOUT Y, and that is sufficient. We can also learn to approach Y through corroboration and deduction.

Now, this is where I get confused, so bear with me.

I suppose the question is, then, why does our idea X of object Y in any way accurately represent Y, and how can we even know? I have a few inclinations. One, I find it hard to know what an object is without knowing the fundamental pieces of an object. So, objects are made up of atoms and energy, and correspond to certain laws of nature. Atoms are made up of subatomic point-particles that exhibit a dual-nature. But, what are those objects made up of? Will this question continue on ad infinitum? I can't say I know the answer, and epistemic grounding seems difficult indeed. Munchhausen's trillemma seems difficult to answer, but I tend to agree with a more coherentist approach - we assume certain concepts and break them down into simpler common unknown denominators and work from there to explain things.

So, I suppose the problem I'm trying to represent is - what is a hylomorph? You're saying that every fork has a 'fork' essence? I think a fork is an emergent pattern that only has meaning to an intelligent being, and this concept is an abstraction invented by us - without a being to recognize such an object and classify the pattern, it remains a combination of simpler concepts. So, a fork is a complex shape made up of various different atoms and molecules - the essence behind the fork thus breaks down into the essences of these objects. So, each atom is made up of different sub atomic particles which have plank length, and perhaps it's these that have true essences since there can be nothing smaller can there? But then, what are these subatomic particles made up of if we have string theory? So, if these essences correspond to objects, it seems they must correspond to the most simple object to me, because I see nothing 'inherent' in a fork that gives it a fork like quality unless we define such a quality in our minds first. So, the object of a 'fork' is just a projection of an idea onto an object that isn't inherently thus, making the idea subjective. So, if an essence must correspond to the most fundamental particle, what is it about essences that we know and can we ever really know them since the question of composition seems to be of infinite regression?

Now, for this last paragraph, it's very possible I got the wrong idea here on essences. These are just my immediate inclinations whilst not having fully informed myself, so I apologize.

Now that's not a problem insofar as it goes. Perhaps I know X and I know Y. Then knowledge of the external world is possible. And better, we can compare X and Y and see whether or not they really correspond, thus confirming our knowledge. But if I can only know ideas, then I can never know Y. And if I can never know Y, then I can have no knowledge of the extra mental world, which is clearly absurd.

I think what bothers me is the dichotomy between X and Y and whether or not it's true. I know X is at least somewhat physical while Y seems entirely physical. There may be an essence Y that corresponds to the physical Y that wholly describes it, but is that really Y itself? I think back to Plato's allegory of the cave and the shadows being projected on the wall - clearly the shadows correspond to the real reality (the real reality being what creates the shadows) even if the shadows are not the things themselves. Thus, we can learn about the real reality even if our ideas don't seem to be the real reality itself.

Perhaps reality is similar to so: an object emits information about itself that is not wholly descriptive, but is partially descriptive. Each time an object emits information about itself, it also changes itself, thus, information about an object is always historical - but can still be used to make valid and accurate inferences. An object emits information along different channels of which our senses are able to pick up on some. While we may never fully understand an object (indeed, quantum mechanics leads us to believe that is impossible), we can at least approach accurate broader knowledge of an object that is emergent from higher order patterns. I think the dichotomy between mental and physical is possibly too stressed.

Why an object's information is nonrandom and in any way related to the object itself? Why does information about an object correspond accurately to these objects? Because the information itself is an object of sorts and has properties of sorts. Where do we get information about information? Well, it seems we necessary are able to get the information by having, in part, physical minds that can interpret and interact with it. Perhaps this makes certain aspects of knowledge impossible and makes material knowledge (through the senses) the only possible knowledge. That leaves an explanation for qualia and intent lacking, as they have no physical explanation, then (and the consciousness at some level). I don't have a good explanation for that, but I think this ontology handles part of the objections you raised quite soundly, but not completely.

These are only my immediate inclinations, however.

So, again, we either know things in themselves only, or we know both things in themselves and our internal representation of those things, or we know our internal representation of those things only. Thus, as soon as you say that all we know are internal representations, you admit the third option and therefore necessarily deny all knowledge of the extra-mental world.

So the only way to have knowledge of the extra mental world is to admit some possibility of things themselves apart from our internal representations of them. That means the thing itself must be in the mind and not merely a representation of that thing. But the moment you say that the thing itself is in your mind, you are necessarily admitting some form of hylomorphism.

Again, my inclination is that extra-mental and internal are difficult to define and the dichotomy seems to break down there. I accept the objection as being important and as one that must be addressed, I am just not sure it's necessarily true.

I think, my point is that: an accurate representation of an object is possible without the object being existent. We can have a picture of a horse on a computer but, upon searching the computer's memory, we will find no horse in the computer quite obviously. Even a nonphysical, immaterial essence of the horse doesn't seem necessary to construct the picture, an accurate picture, of a horse. Especially for human concepts like 'horses', 'forks, and other higher level emergent patterns that we classify as objects, I highly doubt those to have 'objective and true' essences. Rather, I think they are abstractions based on smaller ideas that break down into a most common denominator that might be objectively true. Even still, I can't be sure.

Perhaps it isn't a full blown Aristotelian hylomorphism you are admitting, but you are admitting to SOME kind, since material things cannot get inside a thought. Thoughts are immaterial, and therefore what they know is immaterial. Therefore if thought knows the thing itself, the thought knows the thing itself qua its immaterial self. Aristotle called that immaterial aspect of a thing its form. You can call it whatever you want. Admitting to its existence, you necessarily admit, again, to some form of hylomorphism.

Again, I'm not sure I admit to its existence because I would want a 'form' to correspond to the least common denominator of an object, and I'm not sure that LCD exists. It would seem to not be justifiable based on Munchhausen's trilemma, currently, and requires more knowledge for us to do so. Further, I think thoughts are, in part, physical.

So, I don't think 1) follows as concretely as you think. I'm still content to allow 2) be assumed true without justification until such time we can provide it. It might not be providable from our mind since our minds seem bound by some laws (including deterministic laws), and since our thoughts are somewhat physical and related to information theory, we are not capable of deciding an computationally undecidable problem (bringing my computer science degree into this, lol) since our thoughts and knowledge about the universe seem bound by physical, deterministic constraints and incapable of nondeterministic computing.

Again, apologies if my thoughts are somewhat ignorant, I still haven't had time to read your recommended book, but I promise it's on the to-do list.

I made a new thread to reply in, BB, so as not to further derail this one.

http://discussions.godandscience.org/vi ... 19&t=37745