Evidence for God from Science

They saw in the denial of freedom of the will a proclamation of a divine grace which was overwhelming and which could affect human life only in irruptive and mechanical fashion, overpowering defenseless and enslaved man. The Reformers' teaching on the will of man was interpreted as coactio, as necessitas, and over against this the so-called physical freedom of the will was stressed, a freedom not destroyed through the power of sin because it belonged to the essential structure of man's nature.

And this distinction also marks Calvin's judgment of the term. If freedom of the will means that man sins with his will and not through compulsion, then Calvin has no objection; but he considers that the term must be used with great caution, and would prefer that it not be used at all (Institutes, II, II, 8 ). For, he says, he has found that the usual connotation of the term is not merely that the will is not externally compelled but also includes the idea that man can freely determine his own path and the direction of his whole life in autonomy, as if the man who wills is not a fallen and falling man, whose life's direction is already decided because of the fall.

If we place divine power and human freedom in a relation of opposition — even if we refer to a mystery in connection therewith — we are actually operating with a secularized and autonomous concept of freedom. When such a concept, which implies some sort of competition in the relation between God and human freedom, is held consistently, one cannot but conclude that the divine greatness and power rob man of his due, and threaten man in his true humanity. But such a concept actually involves a serious misapprehension of freedom, a misapprehension that really presupposes the idea of the jealousy of a God who begrudges man his proper nature, viewing it as a threat to His own power.

Such a formal freedom has often been posited alongside true freedom, and as an illustration thereof reference is often made to the situation before the fall and especially to the “probationary command” given to man in paradise. Does not this “test command” clearly imply formal freedom? And how must we then view the relation between the positive nature of true freedom and this “uncertain” freedom, with which man faced a choice? For we can hardly describe true freedom in terms of standing at a crossroad; it means, rather, walking along one road, and being continually reminded thereof by way of the gospel of freedom. And how is this to be understood when we see next to it freedom as choice, as a power not to sin (posse non peccare) but also as the power to sin (posse peccare)? Do we not face here a dual concept of freedom, implying an unmistakable antinomy?

Men tried, within this antinomy, not so much to explain the origin of sin as to indicate the sphere within which it could arise, the sphere of human freedom of choice. This formal freedom was thus generally so defined that man was created free to choose for himself between good or evil, placed before a crossroad, in a situation which was still open. Against the background of the contrast between freedom and compulsion, a further idea was often added, that man was necessarily created with this freedom of choice because God did not wish compulsion and desired this kind of freedom.

In spite of the undeniable problems which in this manner are always revived, theologians have time and again asked the question whether when we examine man's originally good nature we do not encounter de facto an ability to sin, a posse peccare, and if so whether we should not honor this possibilitas with the name of freedom. Can we escape postulating a formal concept of freedom — an ability to choose at the crossroads — along with true freedom? As answer to such questions, it has often been said that God created the “possibility” of sin, that He created man so that he could fall and then let man choose, freely, whether he would follow God's way or his own way.

Man — the man of God — must seek inventions because they are not there, because he does not see them before him, neither in communion with God nor in his own good life. Thus sin is the senselessness of unjustified rebellion dashing with God's own work, clashing with the richness and goodness of the human nature created by Him. In that sense, sin is a riddle. This riddling character occurs again in every sin, as in Israel, where it led to the question of divine concern for His sinful people: “O my people, what have I done unto thee? and wherein have I wearied thee? testify against me” (Micah 6:3, and see 4, 5). That is more than simple unintelligibility or simple riddle.

The depth of man's guilt is here revealed, which Christ Himself with respect to the sin against Him described thus: “They hated me without a cause” (John 15:25. See Ps. 35:19 and 69:5, and John 15:22: “If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloke for their sin”). This is a different description of the “riddle” of sin than that given when men try to escape its force in the “tragedy” of evil or the “fatality” of freedom or in an ineluctable dualism.

The darkness of this “without cause,” this contra voluntatem Dei, can only be understood and confessed in the light of the love of God, which is not an answer to our love but to our enmity: “God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us even when we were dead in sins . . .” (Eph. 2:4-5).

These fatiguing cogitations on the origin of sin, on unde malum, can never find rest except at the point where there is vision — without reason — that penetrates sin in all its riddling character; and this vision is from within the freedom of the sons of God. This freedom in its fullness is an eschatological fruit of salvation. It is the fruit of the Holy Spirit in the power of the “once” of Hebrews, of the revealed mysterion (Rom. 16:25) and the deep content of the profession of the perseverance of the saints.

Still, is there anyone here who thinks that Adam's sin -- and yes, our sins today ARE manifestations of free will? I'd like to hear comments.

I affirm that the T in TULIP is valid. However, I must qualify by saying that while it is valid, it is not supported by as many Scriptures as some are wont to think. Originally this essay was to explore the doctrine as expressed in the epistalory literature, but since it seems that "T" is clearly affirmed (in the first verse to be examined below) I see no need, at present, to proceed further. One may as well ask whether the Bible teaches that "God so loved the world..."

Any good deeds we do (outside of Christ) is merely a "relative" good deed. A truly good deed is done for the glory of God; unbelievers are incapable of this.

• Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law (NIV)

1) An act done from agape. And that is only possible through the operation of the Holy Spirit in the believer's life, says this site.

2) Psalms 14:1-3; 53:1-3; Ecclesiastes 7:20; Romans 3:12.

• The fool says in his heart, "There is no God." They are corrupt, their deeds are vile; there is no one who does good. The LORD looks down from heaven on the sons of men to see if there are any who understand, any who seek God. All have turned aside, they have together become corrupt; there is no one who does good, not even one.
  
  There is not a righteous man on earth who does what is right and never sins.
  
  All have turned away, they have together become worthless; there is no one who does good, not even one."

3) You can think that you do something for the glory of God and yet be wrong. Conversely, when a believer does perfectly 'neutral' acts (eating, drinking), he can do them for the glory of God (I Corinthians 10:31).

4) The Law puts down rules. It is sometimes commanding, sometimes restrictive. However, it is not concerned with the motives of the human heart. It's relatively easy to keep the commandment 'Thou shalt not murder'. But what Jesus said -- who hates, has already committed murder; who lusts, has already committed adultery -- is more difficult...
The Athenian altar was for any unknown god, not for YHWH specifically.

5) I believe the saved believer glorifies God with everything he does in his life except sin.

roverdisc1 wrote:I simply think the point has been missed and garbled with a bunch of [poop]. simply stated....can I make my own decisions without Gods knowledge?

If you can answer that with a logical one sentence answer, I will lean to the other side of the fence.

Turgonian wrote:Okay Jac, I have a book about ethics at home and I have a quote that might help me somewhat. Give me a day.

roverdisc1 -- As God is omniscient, he knows everything, and he also knows what decisions you will make.

Fallen off the fence yet?

FFC -- Have you taken a look at the thread Puritan Lad's Response?

roverdisc1 wrote:If I have been on the fence this long it will take much more than a puff of air to blow me either way.

FFC Wrote "An omniscient + omnipotent God can direct and redirect the decisions that we make with our free will". I wonder if FFC is trying to make my point for me?

One thing is for sure, whatever side of the fence I will fall, will certainly depend on a concise lack of contradictions. If god can direct and redirect my decisions, then I have no free will.

Not necesarily. God's will will always be done, but the real contradiction is a loving God offering salvation to someone who can't accept it.

You seem to still be making my point for me. If god's will will always be done....I have no choice in the outcome.....hence, no free will. If what you say is true, why would god even offer the salvation if he knows the person won't accept it? By offering to that sort of person, questions his omniscience. Why offer if he knows it won't be accepted (kind of a waste of time).