Evidence for God from Science

Hey all - I want to copy a thread here I made on another forum. It's very long, but I think worth the read. I'd love to get your throughts on it.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OK, here's my basic contention: we've had the wool pulled over our eyes by the academic world as it relates to what we know and what we think we know and how we know it. In short, we look at the world one way, and they look at the world in a fundamentally different way, a way that if they told us about, we'd write them off as crackpots. So, they just don't tell us. They just give us their conclusions and let us think that the worldviews are basically the same. What do I mean by all this?

Consider this very simple question: "What is that?" How would you answer that? Well, very simply, you would answer it by saying, "That is a so and so," and you would explain from there. This seems to be common sense. Indeed, it is. It is the way we all look at the world. We believe that we can look at things and know what they are. Look around you right now. You probably see things like a computer monitor, keyboard, lamp, desk, window, etc. You know what they are. But what would you say if I told you that modern science denies that? What would you say if I told you that modern science says that you don't know what anything is at all, and not for scientific reasons, either. They aren't saying that you don't know what a lamp is because at the molecular level it is so complicated. No, they are saying you simply don't know what a lamp is.

Huh?

Consider the following statement: "Things are things." That seems fair enough. It must be true by definition! And now suppose we said, "Things are what they are." Again, that seems fair, but it's really important. If you don't believe that things are what they are, then you can't ask the question, "What is that?" The answer to every question in that form must be, "That is such and such." First major point--please catch this: Things exist in the real world. Things have a reality that is true of them regardless of anything we know or believe about them.

But here is where we start getting more technical. Consider, again, the statement, "That is such and such." Are we speaking about what we know X is, or are we speaking about what X really is, apart from out knowledge of it? And it is here that philosophers make two MAJOR distinctions that we MUST make, which is the second thing I want you to see: Our knowledge of the world is different from the reality of the world. This is thought to be true whether or not our knowledge is correct. So, for instance, it may be raining outside, and I may know it is raining outside, but the fact that I know that it is raining is different from the fact that it is raining.

Thus, we make a distinction in philosophy: there is epistemology, which deals with what we know, and there is ontology, which deals with what things are. A fundamental question in philosophy, then, is this: how can I know how things really are? Or, what is the bridge between epistemology and ontology?

Most of us make that bridge using what-statements. Thus, when we say, "That is a lamp," we are saying something about both our knowledge and the actual nature of the thing in front of us. It really is a lamp, and we really do know it. But just here we come to my next major point: modern logic, including modern science, rejects that idea! Why? That's a bit tougher, but let's take a stab at it.

Suppose you are looking at a lamp, and thus you make the statement, "That is a lamp." We here have another distinction to make between what is sometimes called the sign and reference. The reference is the actual thing we are talking about, in this case, the lamp. The sign is not the lamp itself, but the thing by which we point to the lamp. In our sentence, it is the word "lamp." It is absolutely imperative that we distinguish between the lamp and the word "lamp." The first is the reference. The second is the sign.

This can get pretty deep. For example, get a pad of paper out and draw an equilateral triangle. Now, draw a line from each point to the middle of the line opposite of it. You should have three lines, then, that you can just label A, B, and C, and that should have effectively divided your triangle into six smaller triangles . . . looks like a triangular pizza. The three lines all intersect in the middle of the triangle. Now, consider lines A and B. They intersect in the middle, and we can call that intersection AB. Next, consider lines B and C. They also intersect in the middle, and we can call that intersection BC. If you drew your triangle right, you should see that AB=BC. If you have that, let's apply our ideas of sign and reference. AB and BC are both signs, and they both point to the same reference. Their reference is the particular point. So, two different signs have the same reference. Thus, AB=BC . . . Two signs; ONE reference.

Now, in modern logic, it could be argued that the reference is objective. It is actual reality. If you and I both look at a lamp, we are both looking at the same reference. Further, we could argue the sign is also just as objective, because we are both using the same sign, in this case, "lamp." But here's the trick, you don't have access to the reference. You don't even have access to the sign. Instead, your brain represents to itself what the sign refers to. Thus, you get an IDEA. Hopefully, that idea matches the sign and reference. But, and here's the point:

In modern logic, ideas are completely subjective.

That is, even if you and I have the same idea, your idea is your idea and my idea is my idea. I don't have access to your idea, and you don't have access to my idea. Even if I were to describe my idea to you perfectly so that an idea came into your head that was precisely the same as mine in every way, it would still be argued that you have your OWN idea. And that idea, being yours, is subjective. By extension, then, you don't ever have access to any reference.

The ONLY thing you have access to is your ideas!!!

Therefore, modern logic pulls this trick on us: it is improper to talk about the lamp, because that would be to talk about the reference. You can't talk about the reference, because you have no access to it. You only have access to your idea. Instead, you should talk about the "lamp." In the philosophy of language, we call this distinction the use versus the mention. The use is the actual thing; the mention is the word or concept that denotes the thing. We never have access to the use; we only have access to the mention.

So then, let's reconsider our first question, "What is that?" Suddenly, this question becomes very complicated. I cannot say, "That is a lamp." What do I mean? That, modern logic will tell us, is short hand for, "The idea produced in my mind by that sign is one that I am going to label 'lamp'." Thus, here is the key: modern logic doesn't tell us what anything IS; it only tells us what our LANGUAGE represents, and what it represents is IDEAS, which are things we think we KNOW. There is, therefore, an uncrossable barrier between ontology and epistemology.

But it goes further. In modern logic, we have what are called analytic truths. This is their version of a "what-statement" (i.e, x is such and such). In an analytic truth, things are true simply because they are. So let's ask our question, "What is a lamp?" Modern logic, despite the above, has an answer. It will say, "A lamp is a light-bearing device." But remember that we aren't talking about references. We are talking about ideas! So what we really mean is, "A 'lamp' is a 'light-bearing device'." And here's the fun part: the concept of "light-bearing device" is considered to be embedded within the concept of lamp! We aren't then talking about ontology after all. We are still talking epistemology, because we are the ones who decide what is included in the concept of "lamp." We define it. We add our concepts to it. It's a purely linguistic game we play with ourselves.

We. then, are not allowed to talk about lamps. We can only talk about "lamps." So David Hume argued that we have absolutely no access to anything outside of our own minds. Indeed, we simply receive sense-data. We receive patches of things we interpret as sound, smell, color, etc. Then, depending on how those data are combined, we give them different labels. One set of sense-data combinations (what we call "ideas") we label "lamp," and another "desk" and another "computer." But this, of course, tells us nothing of what lamps, desks, and computers really are. Indeed, we simply don't have access to that world.

What we see, then, is that modern logic not only doesn't know what anything is, by its very structure, it is incapable of even formulating a statement on what anything is. It not only doesn't know, it CAN'T know. All it can know is what it labels things. All it can know is what concepts are packed within other concepts, but please note:

These concepts packed within other concepts are purely linguistic. They have, and can have, no relationship to the outside world!

If that sounds odd, let me just quote you a famous passage from Steven Hawking:

• Any sound scientific theory, whether of time or of any other concept, should in my opinion be based on the most workable philosophy of science: the positivist approach put forward by Karl Popper and others. According to this way of thinking, a scientific theory is a mathematical model that describes and codifies the observations we make. . . . If one takes the positivist position, as I do, one cannot say what time actually is. All one can do is describe what has been found to be a very good mathematical model for time and say what predictions it makes.(The Universe in a Nutshell, Bantam, 2001; 34)

Later, he says:

• I must say that personally, I have been reluctant to believe in extra dimensions. But as I am a positivist, the question "Do extra dimensions exist?" has no meaning. All one can ask is whether mathematical models with extra dimensions provide a good description of the universe. (54)

And yet again, "From the viewpoint of positivist philosophy, however, one cannot determine what is real . . . so what is real and what is imaginary? Is the distinction just in our minds?" (59) In all of these quotes, the idea is the same. Hawking has no interest in what the world really IS. He has no interest in Time. Indeed, he can have no idea of what Time is. He can only know what "Time" is, where "Time" is the label for a concept of his own invention. And don't be fooled. "Time" doesn't include anything real, either, for every observation and concept that is included in "Time," for example, "dimensions", are also concepts and not themselves related to the real world!

OK, if you are still with me, let's point out why this is a problem, assuming it isn't obvious.

Remember our use/mention distinction, where the use describes the actual thing, and the mention points to our descriptive label. Time is the use; "Time" is the mention. First of all, it appears as if all of science rests firmly on the fallacy of confusing the use with the mention. That is, when they talk about Time, they are not talking about Time, but rather about "Time." But to get around this, they'll say that they aren't doing that at all. Instead, they really are talking about "Time," and they are fully aware of that. But they just don't bother pointing it out all of time time. They know, after all, that what the are talking about really has no bearing on the real world, because they have no access to the real world! Instead, it's only us simpletons who make the mistake of thinking they are talking about the use when THEY know they are talking about the mention. Rather, it is actually you and I who are committing this fallacy, for when we THINK we are talking about Time, we are actually talking about "Time." We, then, are the ones committing the fallacy of confusing the use with mention! How embarrassing!

Or is it?

The Scholastics made a very helpful distinction here that should be very obvious when it is explained, which is the difference in first and second intentionality. This is closely related to the use-mean distinction in that it has to do with language. Statements of the first intention deal with what things actually ARE. That is, they deal with the use or with ontology. Statements of the second intention deal with how we talk about what things are. That is, they deal with the mention or epistemology.

Now, let's consider an example from Henry B. Veatch's book, Two Logics. Consider the concepts of "red" and "green." Now, Red and Green, whatever they are, actually do exist. And we know that nothing can be both Red and Green at the same time. True, a thing can have both Red and Green on it; but if you combine the two colors together, you actually get a different color entirely, Yellow. So Red and Green are mutually exclusive (if you don't like this example, pick another, like Hot and Cold or Alive and Dead). So far, it should be obvious that there is a difference in Red and "Red", and Green and "Green." It should also be obvious that scientists are not interested in, nor can they know anything about, Red and Green. All they can talk about is "Red" and "Green." And they say that something cannot be both "Red" and "Green" at the same time.

Very well. But just here we have a problem. It is most certainly a linguistic, grammatical, and logical rule that something cannot be both "Red" and "Green" simultaneously. But let me ask a very simple question. Which of the following statements is TRUE:

(1) Something cannot be both Red and Green simultaneously because we have a grammatical rule stating that something cannot be both "Red" and "Green" simultaneously; or
(2) We have a grammatical rule stating that something cannot be both "Red" and "Green" simultaneously because things can't be both Red and Green at the same time in reality.

Clearly, (2) is true. That is, our concepts don't DETERMINE the nature of reality! Why, if that was the case, I'll simply declare a million dollars to be in my account. Sadly, it doesn't work that way. No, our grammar, supposedly, lines up with the real world. But it is just here that scientists make their greatest mistake. They certainly are not confusing use with mention; far worse, they are inverting intentionality. I mean, they can't say anything about the real world; their logic debars them from such. Therefore, they can only talk on the second level of intentions. But in doing so, they declare the way the world is based on their concepts. And that you obviously cannot do!

Of course, the scientist has a very easy way out. Just don't talk about reality. Just talk about words and concepts, and don't pretend for one second that any of those words and concepts have anything to do with reality at all. But the moment they do, they either commit the fallacy of confusing use with mention, or they commit the fallacy of inverted intentionality. There's just no way around this. Either they really mean to talk about Time when they are talking about "Time," or they really are talking about "Time" and think that determines the nature of time. The first is use/mention confusion; the second is inverted intentionality.

OK - so I'm getting to the end of this!

Hopefully, any right thinking person can see the stupidity of modern logic. The simple fact is that science DOES believe it can say things about the real world, but that means something must be wrong somewhere. Where did they come up with such a stupid notion?

The answer lies in what we call their metaphysics. They claim that epistemology cannot necessarily correspond to ontology. Remember that whole sense/reference/idea thing? But why would they posit that? And the answer is religious. If we have access to the way things really are--that is, if we can KNOW what a thing is that is--then suddenly everything becomes objective. But in order to do that, you have to posit what are called universals. And if you posit universals, then the ontological proof for God's existence actually comes back into play. Also, things like Right and Wrong immediately take on universals as well, rendering them objective. Suddenly, values like "better" or "worse" become universals, leading to some sort of a standard. And worst of all, you end up with bringing essences back into the discussion! In fact, the entire enterprise of analytic-logic was to get away from Aristotelean essences. That's a metaphysical view of the world that scientists just don't want to hold to.

The implications of this are staggering. It means that all kinds of things we have been trained to think of as "non-scientific" and therefore worthless as far as real knowledge is concerned may actually be just as valid as scientific thought, actually possibly more valid as these things seek to describe what things actually ARE. To consider but one example, read Romeo and Juliet. There's nothing scientific anywhere in the story, and yet anyone who has ever been in love immediately come to understand something deeper than the story itself. And anyone who has not been in love comes very close to understanding it as well. More so, though, we see the story and understand the heartache and pain--both real things, mind you--that pointless rivalries founded in shear pride can cause. We then actually learn something about ourselves, and may I suggest that what we have learned and, in this case, internalized, is far more valuable than a psychological profile of each of the characters? Both are knowledge, aren't they? But the non-scientific knowledge based on a reality--a reality that we can actually KNOW--of virtues and values is, in my judgment, of a superior quality to the knowledge of "love" that the psychologist's profile brings. In other words, modern logic may tell us what "love" is, but these stories tell us what love is. And the greatest expression of love--the greatest and most profound teaching on love ever--is found in the Gospels. The Cross of Christ presents a very real type of knowledge. It is in God's sacrifice that love is at once understood and grasped, even if it cannot be explained and quantified. Let the psychologists debate what "love" is; I know what love is. But then again, I'm not tied down to their metaphysical views.

So, does the belief in God have a direct bearing on what we can and cannot know? Hopefully, in this very, very long (too long) discussion, I've shown it has very, very direct bearings on the question.

My goal here, then, is to figure out how to reduce this material into something more manageable. What do you guys think? Yes or no? Did you actually read it all? Is my reasoning faulty anywhere, and what of the conclusions? Your thoughts?

I do not classify what you've dug into necessarily as "modern thought", but rather more post-modern thought.

Modernity is very much a positivist enterprise which embraces objectivity. Yet, to the positivist one can ask on what empirical grounds do they claim that all that is provable must be empirically so? How can they believe such a proposition if they only believe truth is only that which can be empirically demonstrated?

Post-modern thought I think rightly poses the challenge that you laid out to "modern thought" - that they accept their own claims as objective truths despite having no foundational reasons to do so.

To a "modern" thinker your argument would be better directed. Theists can very well point out that perhaps sense perception includes a spiritual dimension which many Christians (and other faiths mind you) claim to have experienced. Thus, we are justified in accepting certain spiritual claims. However, to those who say positivists have no logical basis to make the objective truth claims they do, they would just say we also have no basis to accept what we do.

We both would be wrong according to some post-moderns. Such an extreme skepticism which says we can not accept anything until it is proven suffers a nihilistic fate in that the reason and logic we would use to justify anything can not itself be even be proven as correct. We are therefore unable to accept anything as true, even that very truth. A kind of limbo of utter denial of everything including the denial itself can only unfold with such an extreme skepticism.

Obviously, from a practical standpoint, it is better that we embrace certain things as objectively true. We need to do this in order to live and survive and live sanely. However, from a logical angle, we can not embrace anything objectively without starting with certain givens - foundational truths which just seem obvious to us. Modernists limit the givens to physical sense perception, but this boundary appears to be quite arbitrary to me.

I wasn't using the phrase "modern thought/logic" in the sense of modernity vs. post-modernity, but rather in its common usage sense of "current." I could always use Veatch's terms, "Classical vs. Neo-Analytical Logic."

Second, while post-moderns have taken this idea and run with it, I'm dealing with a far more subtle issue. I'm dealing with Decarte, Kant, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, et al. I'm dealing with the way scientists look at the world today. What I have outlined about is the way we do science today. Of course, it wasn't the way that Newton did science, so it isn't the way science must be done. But it is certainly the science of Hawking and those in his camp. It's the science of logical positivism.

Take, for example, the way a circle is defined in modern science. Most of us would define it something along the lines of "a curved line on a flat service . . ." yada, yada. That's not at all how they would do it. Rather, they would do it functionally. They would say, "Any figure in which all points X are equidistant from Y; thus, XY=AY=BY=CY . . ." and they would continue on from there, far more effectively and impressively than I ever could.

All of this is to keep us from trying to define things by their actual realities. For instance, there was a scientist in the middle of the last century--I'll look him up, right now his name escapes me--who defined "planets" along the lines above, importing into the definition things like eliptical orbits (although not by that phrase, but rather, by the math). In doing so, he went on to defend Aristotle's definition of planets and their circular orbits. He argued that Aristotle was not wrong, but rather, we have simply found that his version of planets did not exist.

Thus, for him, we define "planet" (or any other word) analytically; as we continue our observations, we import more and more things into our definition. It doesn't matter what the thing actually is. We don't know, nor do we care. What we care about is that we have a working definition. Take a final example:

Electrons have been observed to have properties like particles, and thus, such properties are imported into their definition. Likewise, electrons have been observed to have properties like waves, and thus, such properties are also imported into their definition. The net result of this is that we have a thing that is totally unpicturable (a concept Hawking himself admits to repeatedly), and the more we discover and import into the definition, the more unpicturable that thing becomes. And why? Simply because we aren't defining things by what they are, but rather by how they behave in relation to other things.

This isn't an issue of post-modernity, although that issue exists as well and is closely related. I'm talking about the way we "do" science. Analytical philosophy is simply absurd.

The above said, I wanted to respond to some things you've brought up here:

Kurieuo wrote:Modernity is very much a positivist enterprise which embraces objectivity. Yet, to the positivist one can ask on what empirical grounds do they claim that all that is provable must be empirically so? How can they believe such a proposition if they only believe truth is only that which can be empirically demonstrated?

Of course, the funny thing here is that the supposed truth that "things can only be accepted as true if it is empirical" is itself a truth claim and not empirical. This is the standard objection to Ayer's verificationism; it's based on a truth that is self-refuting.

Post-modern thought I think rightly poses the challenge that you laid out to "modern thought" - that they accept their own claims as objective truths despite having no foundational reasons to do so.

And this is why I love to have this discussion with people today. They just don't realize that they don't have a self-consistent worldview.

To a "modern" thinker your argument would be better directed. Theists can very well point out that perhaps sense perception includes a spiritual dimension which many Christians (and other faiths mind you) claim to have experienced. Thus, we are justified in accepting certain spiritual claims. However, to those who say positivists have no logical basis to make the objective truth claims they do, they would just say we also have no basis to accept what we do.

Perhaps we can make that assertion. I don't know, personally. Even as a conservative, evangelical Christian, I'm skeptical of such "experiences." Be that as it may, I'd like to take it deeper. Going back to the reference/sense/idea distinction in the OP, I'd press people on inverted intentionality, and then point out that I don't have that problem. As something of a Thomist (and a moderate-realist), I don't have this problem. I believe that there are universals, and that these are consistent and objective. Of course, I have to have a metaphysical basis to believe that, and I do. It just so happens to require God.

We both would be wrong according to some post-moderns. Such an extreme skepticism which says we can not accept anything until it is proven suffers a nihilistic fate in that the reason and logic we would use to justify anything can not itself be even be proven as correct. We are therefore unable to accept anything as true, even that very truth. A kind of limbo of utter denial of everything including the denial itself can only unfold with such an extreme skepticism.

Well put. I like! This needs to be pressed more, though, because it extends beyond post-moderns to anyone who holds to a representionalist view of reality (the reference/sense/idea paradigm above).

Obviously, from a practical standpoint, it is better that we embrace certain things as objectively true. We need to do this in order to live and survive and live sanely. However, from a logical angle, we can not embrace anything objectively without starting with certain givens - foundational truths which just seem obvious to us. Modernists limit the givens to physical sense perception, but this boundary appears to be quite arbitrary to me.

Which is why, I think, post-moderns are so confusing. Logically, they are ultimate relativists, but pragmatically, they hold their senses to be objective. I agree with you that sense perception as a boundry is arbitrary. It's also wrong. I think foundational truths are much more . . . foundational . . . than that. Things like the law of non-contradiction are foundational. I would go further and say that certain categories of thought are foundational. For example, the very idea of "Red" vs. "Green" is foundational. What we fill those categories with may be subjective, but the categories themselves exist, and they cannot be conflated. We simply recognize them as they are, and later on, we name them. Thus, when I observe my computer, I have a broad array of foundational catagories working together to give me a "monitor," things like its shape, color, hardness, etc. I obviously fill those things with my sense perceptions, but the perceptions themselves aren't objective.

In this view, objective truth IS possible, and better yet, ideas themselves are objective because of these universal categories. Again, all this will ultimately require a belief in God, but that's another story.

Jac3510 wrote:I wasn't using the phrase "modern thought/logic" in the sense of modernity vs. post-modernity, but rather in its common usage sense of "current." I could always use Veatch's terms, "Classical vs. Neo-Analytical Logic."

Second, while post-moderns have taken this idea and run with it, I'm dealing with a far more subtle issue. I'm dealing with Decarte, Kant, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, et al. I'm dealing with the way scientists look at the world today. What I have outlined about is the way we do science today. Of course, it wasn't the way that Newton did science, so it isn't the way science must be done. But it is certainly the science of Hawking and those in his camp. It's the science of logical positivism.

Take, for example, the way a circle is defined in modern science. Most of us would define it something along the lines of "a curved line on a flat service . . ." yada, yada. That's not at all how they would do it. Rather, they would do it functionally. They would say, "Any figure in which all points X are equidistant from Y; thus, XY=AY=BY=CY . . ." and they would continue on from there, far more effectively and impressively than I ever could.

All of this is to keep us from trying to define things by their actual realities. For instance, there was a scientist in the middle of the last century--I'll look him up, right now his name escapes me--who defined "planets" along the lines above, importing into the definition things like eliptical orbits (although not by that phrase, but rather, by the math). In doing so, he went on to defend Aristotle's definition of planets and their circular orbits. He argued that Aristotle was not wrong, but rather, we have simply found that his version of planets did not exist.

Thus, for him, we define "planet" (or any other word) analytically; as we continue our observations, we import more and more things into our definition. It doesn't matter what the thing actually is. We don't know, nor do we care. What we care about is that we have a working definition. Take a final example:

Electrons have been observed to have properties like particles, and thus, such properties are imported into their definition. Likewise, electrons have been observed to have properties like waves, and thus, such properties are also imported into their definition. The net result of this is that we have a thing that is totally unpicturable (a concept Hawking himself admits to repeatedly), and the more we discover and import into the definition, the more unpicturable that thing becomes. And why? Simply because we aren't defining things by what they are, but rather by how they behave in relation to other things.

This isn't an issue of post-modernity, although that issue exists as well and is closely related. I'm talking about the way we "do" science. Analytical philosophy is simply absurd.

Hmm... I've never actually thought of "modern science" as pure subjective / relativistic movement. I had always seen it as embracing objectivity and putting faith in sense perception, but you are right I think on identifying something - a trend in modern science to define something by the observer. For example, Newton's physics versus that of Einstein's general relativity, etc.

Thing is knowing "what" something is can only be understood through our "perception" of it. Just because this is so, does not necessarily mean "modern science" rejects attempting define things by their actual realities. This is what it seeks to explain, although I have no doubt many may fall into the trap of pure subjectivity to believe how they see reality is in fact reality.

Thing is knowing "what" something is can only be understood through our "perception" of it. Just because this is so, does not necessarily mean "modern science" rejects attempting define things by their actual realities. This is what it seeks to explain, although I have no doubt many may fall into the trap of pure subjectivity to believe how they see reality is in fact reality.

This is the main problem I was addressing. I'm not at all saying that science doesn't "work." I'm saying its working from a faulty foundation that has had massive ramifications on everything from politics to morals. Take your first sentence in the quote. The reality is that the modern philosophy of science does not at all treat our sense perceptions as objective, but rather as subjective, and thus, we get logical positivism.

Now, the reason this is done is what is fascinating to me. Take the idea of sensing your keyboard. The scientist actually is just measuring sense perceptions, and he labels those perceptions with a given name, "Keyboard." Of course, the label could be anything at all, and he is quite sophisticated about what he imports into his definition. It is, after all, exactly what is imported that allows him to examine its relationship to other things and therefore "do science" (and this, whether we are talking about "keyboards," "electrons," or "stars"). But ask someone--anyone--to talk about the objective reality that is the actual keyboard rather than our concept of "keyboard." To go back to the OP, ask them to talk about the reference rather than the sign or idea. Virtually everyone will tell you that we cannot have knowledge of any extra-mental reality, because all we have access to is our own minds and our interpretation of reality, which is, of course, through the senses.

Terrible thing! The necessary result is that you can't know what anything is. So, take a debate I'm having on another board where the California decision regarding gay marriage has come up. I'm pointing out that the biggest problem here is that marriage (note, NOT "marriage"), as a thing itself (that is, ontologically), is between a man and a woman. We can define it all we want as "a committed relationship between two people," but that's just not reality. It would be the same thing as calling monopoly a "sport." Well, we could certainly modify the definition of "sport" to include monopoly's characteristics, but ontologically, monopoly is still not a sport.

The response to this argument? They want to know who I am to say what marriage (not "marriage") actually is. It's impossible to know such things, because we don't have access to anythings ontology. We only have access to our epistemology.

This is exactly the problem that modern science--better, analytical philosophy--has created. A classical philosopher doesn't have these problems, because he believes in a real correspondence between ontology and epistemology, or, put differently, in a correspondence between the knower and the thing known. And, for the Christian, that assertion is rooted in the connection between God's knowing and our being known. It is part of what it means to be "like" God. But, take that away and work from a Darwinian framework, and the bridge between ontology and epistemology goes out the window. Science no longer talks about the real world at all, but only about its own definitions--nothing more. It has no idea what anything is. Nor does it care.