Evidence for God from Science

The thread on the emotions of God basically came down to whether or not people chose to accept classical theism (especially as defined by Aquinas). So I want to get into that here, and the best way to do that is to ask the question:

Do you accept the doctrine of God's simplicity?

It can be defined as the doctrine that teaches that God lacks any composition, but is rather completely and wholly a single, self-existent substance with whom there is no potentiality, but rather is pure act. This can be detailed under eight assertions:

1. God has no body;
2. God is pure form (He has no matter);
3. God's essence is identical to His nature;
4. God's existence is not external to His essence;
5. God is in no genus and thus no species of genus;
6. God has no accidents (that is, no non-necessary features);
7. God has no composition of parts;
8. God does not enter into the composition of anything external to Himself.

This is the central doctrine that must be discussed, for from this come a myriad of others (impassibility being one of the most important). Obviously, I hold to Divine Simplicity. Many modern Christian philosophers do (i.e., Norman Geisler), and many do not (i.e., William Lane Craig). I'll provide my own defense as we progress through this discussion.

Your thoughts, then?

Jac,

Could you provide the other possibilities? For instance, what does Craig believe.

Let me quote Craig on this, Zoe:

Craig wrote:God is said to be an absolutely undifferentiated unity. This medieval doctrine is not popular among theologians today, and even when Christians do give lip service to it, they usually do not appreciate how truly radical the doctrine is. It implies not merely that God does not have parts, but that He does not possess even distinct attributes. In some mysterious way His omhipotence is His goodness, for example. He stands in no relations whatsoever. Thus, He does not literally love, know, or cause His creatures. He is not really composd of three distinct persons, a claim notoriously difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the Trinity. His nature or essence is not even distinct from His existence, an assertion which led to the difficult doctrine that God's essence just is existencel He is, Thomas Aquinas tells us, the pure act of existing. . . . Thus, God's timeless can be deduced from either His simplicity or His immutability. Is there a good reason for thinking that God is timeless? That all depends on whether we have any good reason to think that God is simple or immutable. . . . Philosophically, there seem to be no good reasons to embrace these radical doctrines, and weighty objections have been lodged against them. (Time and Eternity. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. 30-31)

I'm sure, as you read this, you can see that while Craig rejects simplicity and immutability as too radical for his tastes, he doesn't give any alternatives. The reason is that his alternative is to simply assert that God is, in fact, composite (that is, composed of parts) and mutable (that is, He can change).

Now, I have many problems with Craig's assessment of the doctrine, not the least of which is that supposed necessary consequences of the doctrine are examined and expressly rejected by Aquinas (i.e., that there are not a plurality of persons in the Godhead). Be that as it may, we can discuss that later. For now, the alternative is to believe that God is a composite being--that is, He is composed of parts--and that He is capable of experiencing intrinsic changes. Craig reduces immutability to referring only to God's morality and simply rejects the idea of simplicity.

One may, of course, depart further, and side with open theists and process theologians, arguing that God is a composite being and also totally mutable to the extent that one rejects God's sovereignty, but I doubt anyone wants to go that far.

Does that help at all?

Welll, it sort of helps

Will have to digest this...definitely not my area of expertise.

Not sure of the implications of Craig's versus your simplistic theology.

Trinity is a hard enough concept to imagine, trying to establish any sort of methodology for God's "physiology" seems almost impossible!!

People will disagree about what the implications are. Thomists, like myself, would suggest that the implications are a profound apologetic and ability to explain how the concept of God is coherent. I believe that people who reject this doctrine really have an incoherent position. On the other hand, critics, like Craig, believe that the doctrine is itself incoherent and that it ends up denying the Trinity, God's ability to respond to us (or to have a relationship with us), etc.

Let me offer the beginnings of a defense of the position.

First, let's re-examine the definition of the doctrine: "the doctrine that teaches that God lacks any composition, but is rather completely and wholly a single, self-existent substance with whom there is no potentiality, but rather is pure act." The key here is that God lacks any composition. Now, this is a rather technical word that can be used in two ways (both of which are denied of God). A composition is:

1. A unity of individual parts;
2. A unity of potentiality and actuality.

(2) is far more sophisticated than we need to get into here. Let's just focus on (1) because it is easy to grasp. In a crude sense, water is simple. It is not a composite (again, I mean this in a crude sense, because we all know that water is actually a composite of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom). For proof of this, pour yourself two glasses of water and label them "A" and "B". Now, pour them into a single glass. Is the new glass of water composed of two parts, namely, A and B? Of course not. It's all the same thing: water. On the other hand, you can look at things like human beings and say we are clearly composed of parts: hearts, lungs, brains, etc.

Is God, then, made up of parts? I would say "no." The reason is that God is a self-existent thing. He wasn't created. He exists by virtue of His own nature. In fact, our doctrine teaches that God is existence actualized. Clearly, existence must exist (interestingly enough, I think this is actually a good way to build a logically valid ontological argument for God's existence, but that's another story). It is the nature of existence to exist. But how could a composite (what I called "complex" many times in the other thread) being be existence in itself? How could such a thing be necessary?

Let me clarify. Things can be either necessarily or contingent. Contingent things are things that rely on something else for their existence. They may or they may not exist. If something is, in principle, capable of not existing, then it is contingent. Necessary things, however, rely on themselves for their own existence. They must exist because it is their nature to exist. Thus, necessary things cannot be contingent, and contingent things cannot be necessary.

But it seems that all composite things are contingent things, for if you take them apart, they no longer exist. Perhaps the parts are necessary, but the unified whole is contigent on the unity of its parts. And since contingent things can't be necessary, it seems that no composite can be necessary. But if God is a composite, then His existence, too, requires the unification of His parts. Thus, His existence is dependent on something more basic than Himself. But if that is the case, then God is not necessary; He is contingent. He does not have existence within Himself.

Clearly, that is absurd, so it must be true that God is necessary, and thus, not a composite. He is composed of a single substance, without multiple parts. Frankly, I do not see how anyone, even Craig, gets around this rather basic argument . . .

Jac3510 wrote:Clearly, that is absurd, so it must be true that God is necessary, and thus, not a composite. He is composed of a single substance, without multiple parts. Frankly, I do not see how anyone, even Craig, gets around this rather basic argument . . .

Perhaps I can. Irreducible Complexity. I know it's a rather simplistic answer but if we are to apply it to biological entities, why not to the first cause? It negates, by definition, your premise that complexity can be reduced.

I would have three objections to viewing God as an IC Composite:

1. IC deals with function, not essence. In the case of a mousetrap, if you take away one part, it ceases to be a mousetrap at all. If you take the pistons out of the engine, it really isn't an engine anymore. We may say that the mousetrap or engine are broken, but that's only from the perspective of intention. The thing was intended to be a mousetrap or intended to be an engine; we repair it so as to restore it to that function, but in its broken state, it isn't that at all.

So making God an IC Composite would mean that "God" is actually a function, analogous to a mousetrap or engine. But I don't think anyone is comfortable with the idea of God being a function. He is an essence. He is the I AM, not the I DERIVE FROM.

2. If His existence arises out of a certain organization of pre-existing things, then you have to deal with the nature of the pre-existing things. What are they? Whatever they are, they are definitely more fundamental than God, just as the hammer is more fundamental than the mousetrap. If Love, then, is part of God's IC Composite, then God did not create it. It is more fundamental than Himself. The same would go with morality, with power, with intelligence, will, etc. But is the God of Scripture only a Being who shares those fundamental forces with us, albeit more perfectly? That seems to turn God into something of a superman.

3. IC still implies that God is contingent, even if irreducibly so. Even if we get past the first two objections, I still don't see how an assembly can be necessary, for only things can be necessary/contingent. The way things are assembled are not. But if God is not necessary, then it is possible for Him not to exist. But that seems rather absurd . . . for if it is possible for God not to exist, then existence exists outside of God, meaning He is, in some sense, not the Creator of ALL things.

Is God's existence purely rationally definable? If so, then is man's perspective and finite capacity and capability able to adequately define him?

What were the earliest Church Father's perspectives on this? Is this approach to God the one that Jesus took in revealing God the Father to us? If not, why are Greek philosophical constructs which primarily enter into the mix centuries after Christ's incarnation perceived to be preferable as a hermeneutical approach to these questions when Jesus himself, as recorded in the Gospels, chose to speak of God and his characteristics in terms of parables and to encourage others to equate God to what they saw in Christ Himself?

If God chose to reveal Himself ultimately in the person of Jesus Christ, why would the merger of Greek sophistry from the pagan traditions that was accelerated with the elevation of the Church and its absorption of many of the pagan traditions and priesthood of the Greco-Roman Temples be preferable over the Hebraic mindframe that Jesus, Paul and John (the primary sources of the NT) had when they wrote under inspiration (assuming the plenary model.)?

Don't minsunderstand. I'm not stating an opposite extreme of rejecting reason, but reason itself (as expressed finitely by humans) is incapable of fully defining and understanding God. Further, reducing God to attributes and perfect shadows smacks more of Platonic philosophy and leads to an impersonal form of religion where God is seen as distant, unapproachable and unwilling to transcend. It smacks to some extent as gnostic and the elevation of God to principles rather than loving and knowable as Jesus embodied God and reached out to Humanity to restore us from our fallen state and nature.

One of my concerns with the Thomastic approach is that it presumes elements that were not in the understanding of those who wrote under inspiration, and then in turn claims infallible, inerrency without defining and recognizing those assumptions that find their origins not in the scriptures but with their assumed hermeneutic approach.

I haven't got it figured out (nor do I think can or ever will) but these are the surface elements that concern me the more I consider and examine what appears to me to have replaced the relational origins of Christ's revelation with a religious system similar to those that Christ came to end.

Canuckster wrote:Is God's existence purely rationally definable?

Of course it is. It's a matter of general revelation. Existence is a binary state: it either is or it is not. The question in this thread isn't the issue of that; it's an issue of the nature of God's existence. That, too, is rationally definable. Purely? Of course not. We could never come to the Trinity without special revelation, but once special revelation is given, it still must not contradict itself. To that extent, all revelation, both general and special, must be "rationally definable." To argue otherwise is to argue that God is asking us to believe self-contradictions. As an OECer, I'd expect you to see the absurdity of that position immediately. After all, isn't that the entire basis on which you reject the "appearance of age" argument? It would, as Rich says, turn God into a deceiver.

If so, then is man's perspective and finite capacity and capability able to adequately define him?

Until shown otherwise, we must assume so. You can't start out with skepticism about your own perspective. If your perspective proves inadequate, that must be at the end of investigation, not at the beginning.

What were the earliest Church Father's perspectives on this?

They held the positions I'm espousing in this thread.

Is this approach to God the one that Jesus took in revealing God the Father to us?

In some ways, yes, and in other ways, no. Ultimately, Jesus was the ultimate form of special revelation. But what we are dealing with in this thread is general revelation. Now, because we have been given special revelation, we will be able to go further than unaided natural theology, but we must at least start there. I don't assume that you are going to argue that the only way to know God is through special revelation. Paul didn't seem to think so.

If not, why are Greek philosophical constructs which primarily enter into the mix centuries after Christ's incarnation perceived to be preferable as a hermeneutical approach to these questions when Jesus himself, as recorded in the Gospels, chose to speak of God and his characteristics in terms of parables and to encourage others to equate God to what they saw in Christ Himself?

First, what does the origin of a particular way of thinking have to do with whether it is accurate or not? That would be called a genetic fallacy. Just because a bad person comes up with an idea doesn't make the idea bad. If your second grade teacher was a rapist, that doesn't change the fact that he was right when he taught you your times tables.

Second, there is nothing hermeneutical about our discussion. Philosophical? Yes. But we aren't dealing with the words of texts. To the extent that we need to go to special revelation to find out things about God, we will, and hermeneutics will apply to our investigation of Scripture, but ultimately, the issue of God's nature is not hermeneutical at all.

Third, we can expand the meaning of "hermeneutics" to include the way in which we understand any communication, which would include general revelation. But under that position, we still must have the conversation we are having, for hermeneutics comes from general revelation. You don't learn your hermeneutical method from Scripture. Rather, you apply the hermeneutical method that you use every day to Scripture to see what God would have you to see. Likewise, we apply that same method (basic rationality) to general revelation, and we see the things about God that we are talking about in this thread. It is precisely BECAUSE of this that Paul could say that all men know the basic truths about God. To say that we cannot is to negate Paul's argument in Romans.

If God chose to reveal Himself ultimately in the person of Jesus Christ, why would the merger of Greek sophistry from the pagan traditions that was accelerated with the elevation of the Church and its absorption of many of the pagan traditions and priesthood of the Greco-Roman Temples be preferable over the Hebraic mindframe that Jesus, Paul and John (the primary sources of the NT) had when they wrote under inspiration (assuming the plenary model.)?

Again, we have to distinguish between general and special revelation. The former can say a lot about God's attributes, existence, nature, etc. The latter can certainly speak to that, and where it does, we must give it preference. But it is primarily focused on God's plan. Christ is both the manifestation and the great revelation of God's intentions for humanity, and it is because of that that we can know Him experientially. But the conversation we are having here has nothing to do with either of those--God's plan for man (or the universe) or our ability to experientially know Him.

Don't minsunderstand. I'm not stating an opposite extreme of rejecting reason, but reason itself (as expressed finitely by humans) is incapable of fully defining and understanding God. Further, reducing God to attributes and perfect shadows smacks more of Platonic philosophy and leads to an impersonal form of religion where God is seen as distant, unapproachable and unwilling to transcend. It smacks to some extent as gnostic and the elevation of God to principles rather than loving and knowable as Jesus embodied God and reached out to Humanity to restore us from our fallen state and nature.

First, I don't believe you are rejecting reason. You can't, because such an assertion is self-defeating. You can't use reason to reject itself. Second, I've not said anywhere that I'm trying to fully define or understand God. But the fact that you include that word shows me that you recognize that reason can to some extent understand Him, a fact that is supported by Paul's reference to natural theology. What we are trying to do is discover what reason--natural theology--actually does say about God, and I argue that reason teaches Divine Simplicity. Third, I'm not sure where you got the idea that anyone wants t reduce "god to attributes and perfect shadows." Perhaps a quote would be in order here. Fourth, the ideas we are discussing here are neither Platonic or Aristotelean (or, for that matter, Thomistic). You can find these points in all these systems, and then others. Augustine was a Platonist. I'm not, and neither was Aquinas. If advocates of Divine Simplicity can reject Platonism, then it is not true that our theology "smacks" of it; still less does it lead "to an impersonal form of religion where God is seen as distant, unapproachable and unwilling to transcend." I get the impression that at this point of your paragraph, you were just "throwing mud"--albeit respectfully--more than analyzing the positions and commenting on them respectively. I, for one, hardly view God as any of the things that you say this system necessarily leads to. Still less did the Church Fathers, and they were the ones who had a hand in developing it!

One of my concerns with the Thomastic approach is that it presumes elements that were not in the understanding of those who wrote under inspiration, and then in turn claims infallible, inerrency without defining and recognizing those assumptions that find their origins not in the scriptures but with their assumed hermeneutic approach.

How does it claim infallibility or inerrency? It's only so to the extent that it properly applies reason to sound premises; in this respect, it is no difference from any other science, be it math or physics. Let me ask you: what do you understand "the Thomistic approach" to be?

I haven't got it figured out (nor do I think can or ever will) but these are the surface elements that concern me the more I consider and examine what appears to me to have replaced the relational origins of Christ's revelation with a religious system similar to those that Christ came to end.

I'm not sure where you see any such similarities. Like I said, when you understand that what we are dealing with is general revelation--that is the only thing with which natural theology can be concerned--then there is no way that our system at all overthrows special revelation. They are distinct spheres. So unless you are going to call Paul a liar (which I know don't), there is no reason that we cannot look to natural theology and learn things about God. If it teaches that God is not a composite being, then so it teaches. If it teaches that God exists as a omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient being, then so it teaches. Asserting that it does teach these things in no way undermines Scripture or the self-revelation of God through Jesus Christ.

What were the earliest Church Father's perspectives on this?

They held the positions I'm espousing in this thread.

Really. That's a remarkable claim. All of them?

All of them who commented on the subject, yes. I'm not aware of any to the contrary. Like everything else, the doctrine developed in response to heretics--particularly the gnostics. They took the already established view that God was impassible and used it to argue that Jesus did not have a body. The Fathers wrote in reply to that, attempting to prove that Jesus did have a body while not sacrificing impassibility. Augustine, Anselm, Cyril, Justin, Ambrose, Origen . . . I don't know of any who denied this. Everything I'm saying is simply a restatement (in Thomistic terms) of the theology that was used to develop the Trinity. In fact, in the thread on emotions, I provided quotes from several, including Irenaeus, that expressly teach the position I'm espousing here.

Now, there were differences in thought as to which ones were Platonic and which ones were Aristotelean, but the general ideas of simplicity and impassibility were universally held, so much so that modern theologians who deny these ideas typically accuse the fathers of falling into Greek paganism! At worst, you can accuse me of falling into the same errors as they; you can't, however, say that I'm departing from anything that was taught in the earliest days.

Not that history is the end-all/be-all, of course. They could have been wrong. Truth isn't decided by vote, but just answering your question as to who taught what: yes, the Church Fathers held to God's simplicity (what's being discussed in this thread) and impassibility (what's being discussed on the emotions thread).

Canuckster wrote:Is God's existence purely rationally definable?

Jac3510 wrote:Of course it is. It's a matter of general revelation. Existence is a binary state: it either is or it is not. The question in this thread isn't the issue of that; it's an issue of the nature of God's existence. That, too, is rationally definable. Purely? Of course not. We could never come to the Trinity without special revelation, but once special revelation is given, it still must not contradict itself. To that extent, all revelation, both general and special, must be "rationally definable." To argue otherwise is to argue that God is asking us to believe self-contradictions. As an OECer, I'd expect you to see the absurdity of that position immediately. After all, isn't that the entire basis on which you reject the "appearance of age" argument? It would, as Rich says, turn God into a deceiver.

You've answered both ways. The statement I made was whether it was purely rationally definable and you answered "Of course it is" and then go on to agree that it is not "purely" raionally definable. I do reject the appearance of age argument on the basis that the argument assumes God is a deceiver. However, it's entirely possible (although I don't believe it probable) that Man has mistaken the appearance of age as a result of our limited observations and perspective. If that were the case, it would have nothing to do with God's intention to deceive or not. It would simply be that some men have mistakenly interpretted the available evidence and come to an erroneous conclusion. When you claim that special revelation must not contradict itself, you appear to me to assume man's capacity to understand is complete and that special revelation eliminates any mystery. What you may be reducing by your approach to "rationally definiable" may in fact be elevating the approach over the source and assuming more than that which has been specially revealed is in fact intended to declare.

Canuckster1127 wrote:If so, then is man's perspective and finite capacity and capability able to adequately define him?

Jac3510 wrote:Until shown otherwise, we must assume so. You can't start out with skepticism about your own perspective. If your perspective proves inadequate, that must be at the end of investigation, not at the beginning.

I don't agree with this. It may be adequate from our perspective and in that capacity perhaps I'm splitting hairs. But it's not necessary to assume that our capacity and capabilities are adequate and by that to assume that God is not greater than our ability to comprehend or to discover. That's the basis of the need for special revelation in the first place. Certain elements are knowable and discernable through natural observation. Even special revelation, by definition exceeds that, and further special revelation is sufficient I believe to what we need to know but it is not all there is to know. The sending of Christ as the living word demonstrates that as well in my opinion. Assuming an absolute dualistic, system may be an easier approach in this regard, but it is, in fact, not necessary to eliminate skepticism about one's own perspective. In fact, I think it's healthy to hold even one's own perspective in question. In fact, I think the idea that we can't start our with skepticism about our own perspective has more in common with what has developed into humanism and materialism. If we accept that we are created and that there is a God who supercedes the sum of our own existence and knowledge then we begin from a position of professed inability to understand everything and a dependence upon that creator to reveal to us that which we cannot by our own devices perceive and then understand. That doesn't fit into a dualistic all or nothing viewpoint of course. Perhaps the viewpoint espoused is what is determining some of the conclusions.

Canucckster wrote:[What were the earliest Church Father's perspectives on this?

Jac3510 wrote:They held the positions I'm espousing in this thread.

This really surprised me and it''s why I answered so quickly earlier on. You're making a universal absolute statement here that requires only one exception to disprove. I'm not complete in my reading of all the early Church Fathers but I've read enough to know that projecting Thomastic assumptions anachronistically backward upon them is quite a remarkable claim. Before I take the effort to show otherwise, is this really what you're wanting to say, or am I misunderstanding you?

Canuckster1127 wrote:Is this approach to God the one that Jesus took in revealing God the Father to us?

Jac3510 wrote:In some ways, yes, and in other ways, no. Ultimately, Jesus was the ultimate form of special revelation. But what we are dealing with in this thread is general revelation. Now, because we have been given special revelation, we will be able to go further than unaided natural theology, but we must at least start there. I don't assume that you are going to argue that the only way to know God is through special revelation. Paul didn't seem to think so.

We're dealing with more than just General Revelation. We're also dealing with the assumptions made by the one's interpretting the evidence and the conclusions mafe. For the record, I agree with you that God can be known in part through General Revelation and that Paul clearly understood that.

Canuckster1127 wrote:If not, why are Greek philosophical constructs which primarily enter into the mix centuries after Christ's incarnation perceived to be preferable as a hermeneutical approach to these questions when Jesus himself, as recorded in the Gospels, chose to speak of God and his characteristics in terms of parables and to encourage others to equate God to what they saw in Christ Himself?

Jac3510 wrote:First, what does the origin of a particular way of thinking have to do with whether it is accurate or not? That would be called a genetic fallacy. Just because a bad person comes up with an idea doesn't make the idea bad. If your second grade teacher was a rapist, that doesn't change the fact that he was right when he taught you your times tables.

I'm not going to let you off the hook that easily. When you bring a system of thinking and organizing to written revelation that carries with it assumptions both logically and culturally outside of that which was assumed and intended by the original authors and intended audience then you do more than change the message. Your analogy is both fallacious as the message of the gospel is not mathmatics (which interestingly assumes the dualist assumptions of your ealier comments) and further the imposition of a foreign philosophy and approach to frame and organize things within an original piece of literature may result in eisogesis into the text rather than exegesis out from it. I suspect we agree with that in general, but perhaps there's some different applications taking place.

Jac3510 wrote:Second, there is nothing hermeneutical about our discussion. Philosophical? Yes. But we aren't dealing with the words of texts. To the extent that we need to go to special revelation to find out things about God, we will, and hermeneutics will apply to our investigation of Scripture, but ultimately, the issue of God's nature is not hermeneutical at all.

You don't think so? You don't think Thomastic thinking and tradition hasn't made assumptions both as the nature of special revelation and then examined the text and applied the assumptions implicit to the organization and reconciliation of scriptural passages, concepts and in turn built theology upon it?

Jac3510 wrote:Third, we can expand the meaning of "hermeneutics" to include the way in which we understand any communication, which would include general revelation. But under that position, we still must have the conversation we are having, for hermeneutics comes from general revelation. You don't learn your hermeneutical method from Scripture. Rather, you apply the hermeneutical method that you use every day to Scripture to see what God would have you to see. Likewise, we apply that same method (basic rationality) to general revelation, and we see the things about God that we are talking about in this thread. It is precisely BECAUSE of this that Paul could say that all men know the basic truths about God. To say that we cannot is to negate Paul's argument in Romans.

You again appear to be framing the question dualistically to assume that Paul meant what your Thomastic tradition assumes and if someone doesn't agree with that implicit assumption then they must be disagreeing with Paul and not with your Thomastic tradition. It's an interesting assumption, but I don't buy it. Neither do I assume there isn't probably common ground, but I don't accept the all or nothing construct you're assuming.

Canuckster1127 wrote:If God chose to reveal Himself ultimately in the person of Jesus Christ, why would the merger of Greek sophistry from the pagan traditions that was accelerated with the elevation of the Church and its absorption of many of the pagan traditions and priesthood of the Greco-Roman Temples be preferable over the Hebraic mindframe that Jesus, Paul and John (the primary sources of the NT) had when they wrote under inspiration (assuming the plenary model.)?

Jac3510 wrote:Again, we have to distinguish between general and special revelation. The former can say a lot about God's attributes, existence, nature, etc. The latter can certainly speak to that, and where it does, we must give it preference. But it is primarily focused on God's plan. Christ is both the manifestation and the great revelation of God's intentions for humanity, and it is because of that that we can know Him experientially. But the conversation we are having here has nothing to do with either of those--God's plan for man (or the universe) or our ability to experientially know Him.

You don't believe that the incorporation of the Greco-Roman pagan traditions at the time of Constantine impacted the theological understandings and took them in a path different than what Christianity was before that?

I've addressed most of what you've said, although dropped the last few elements which I can address more as we go if you wish.

Canuckster1127 wrote:You don't believe that the incorporation of the Greco-Roman pagan traditions at the time of Constantine impacted the theological understandings and took them in a path different than what Christianity was before that?

I realize this is a bit of a detour so I'll be brief but I found Ronald Nash's 'The Gospel and the Greeks: Did the New Testament Borrow from Pagan Thought?' a good read. Ok.. back on topic. TY.

ageofknowledge wrote:

Canuckster1127 wrote:You don't believe that the incorporation of the Greco-Roman pagan traditions at the time of Constantine impacted the theological understandings and took them in a path different than what Christianity was before that?

I realize this is a bit of a detour so I'll be brief but I found Ronald Nash's 'The Gospel and the Greeks: Did the New Testament Borrow from Pagan Thought?' a good read. Ok.. back on topic. TY.

THanks for the reference. I'm not pointing to the NT itself however, but the influence of Pagan tradition in Church history incorporate at the time of Constantine and the elevation of Christianity to a state church at which time the greco-roman temple traditions and priests were indeed incorporated into both practice and thought which would be a reflection back upon the NT, not something written in at the time.

Sounds like an interesting book however and I may need to take a look at it when (laughing) I make some time to do it ......