Kurieuo wrote:Thanks Jac,
I guess is really depends on how one interprets "entity". I half regret using such an ambiguous term... but I was trying to drive at the plurality in one to see whether it serves as a plausible example for something other (gee, I wonder what?
).
The way I see it, the fact they are physically joined and cannot be divided (I presume), shows to me they are physically one entity. However, knowing better that this is more a malformation of two animals which if developed normally, would be two animals... I see that there are two animals in the one physical entity.
I don't want to spend too much time here just to debate examples, as I think your last question is the important one, but I just want to note that I still don't know that I'd even say they were one entity. If we accept the notion of the soul as the active principle of the body (and I'm pretty sure you do, given our previous discussions on substance dualism), then it is the soul that produces the body, not vice-versa. So if you have two souls, you necessarily have two-bodies. That there was a malfunction in development that caused one body to cease developing on its own and develop an essentially parasitic relationship on the other doesn't change the fact that we still have two bodies.
If you spiritualise "entity" though, then I would agree. There are two animal souls (entities) that are of turtle form trapped in a physical body. As such, there are two entities/two turtles. Or one could I suppose even say two entities and one animal if they did not know better that such was a malformation.
So let's say there existed a species of animal with two heads. That is, the two heads was not a malformation, but the actual creature itself. What would we have in this instance?
Ontologically, the only way I could see this happening is if the creatures soul was such that it had two intellects, two wills. But that is a difficult notion. What
is the intellect? What
is the will? Traditionally, the former has been regarded as the soul's faculty of thought, and the latter the soul's elective power. Notice in both cases that
the soul knows and
the soul wills. It knows through its intellect. It acts through its intellect.
Now, here may be a difference in the two of us, but being a good Aristotelian, I accept the simplicity of the soul. So it doesn't make much sense to me to speak of two intellects and two wills!
But let's forget the simplicity of the soul and let's just focus on one of the two powers: let's take willing, only because it is not a faculty and therefore involves few distinctions. What does it mean to say the soul wills? Again, traditionally, the idea (so far as I understand it) is that the soul is presented with a range of possible acts by the intellect. I can turn right or left or stay where I am. The soul, not being omniscient, perceives good in each choice (perhaps it perceives good wrongly! The point, though, is that it perceives good in each choice!). The will
always wills the good, but that willing is indeterminate precisely because the soul cannot guarantee in any given case absolutely the greatest good. So it elects. In other words, the soul moves (
motus) the body in accordance with a perceived good, and this movement is called election or will. But on this view, what would it even
mean for a soul to have two wills? Since it is the same soul that wills, how could the soul at one time will A and at the same time will ~A? That would seem to require the simultaneous acceptance of two contrary propositions as true. I have no problem with the notion of two distinct souls coming to opposite conclusions. But how could
the same soul both will A and ~A simultaneously, which would seem to be exactly what is the case in one soul had two wills?
So I don't think that it makes much sense to speak of one soul with multiple intellects/wills . . .
How that all relates to the Trinity is a rather long discussion. More importantly, since my view of the Trinity is squarely grounded on Divine Simplicity, I don't know that I could accept some illustrations for it that you perhaps could given what I understand to be your distaste for the doctrine. But maybe we can get into it focusing on common ground . . . I don't know. I'd be interested to see if you agree with the ontology of the soul in relation to the will discussed above first.