Evidence for God from Science

I've referenced several times recently that there are strong arguments against Platonism generally. I want to put two of them here for ease of reference, because I'm sure it is something that will come up repeatedly in the future. But first, let me offer a very quick definition of Platonism as the view that properties and abstract objects really exist in and of themselves. So, for instance, consider the sentence, "The apple is red." Platonism sees the property "redness" attributed to the apple; so they say, 'the apple exemplifies redness.' Redness, for a Platonist, is a real thing that exists in and of itself; the apple is red precisely because redness really exists. Moreover, this is true also for propositions generally. "Two plus two is four" is a true proposition in every possible world. Even further, propositions like "All unmarried men are bachelors" are necessarily true, because properties like 'Unmarried Men' and 'Bachelors' really exist, and this even if in the world under consideration men never existed! The point is that, on Platonism, all of these things exist as abstract objects.

A great many modern Christian philosophers are Platonists in one form or fashion. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland are only two examples I could provide of what would be a very long list. Because of that, a lot of people who read them have adopted Platonic assumptions without even knowing it. For more on Platonism, I'd recommend this article; if you want to see how Platonism works in mathematics, this one is good. Finally, if you have some money to spend and want a good defense of Platonism from a very good Christian scholar, I'd strongly recommend J. P. Moreland's Universal's. If you want to see a history of how this argument has played out (from someone who is not a Platonist), I would recommend (yet again) Etienne Gilson's The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

Okay, enough with the introductory stuff . . . I'm going to follow this up now with a post that argues that if Platonism is true, then God does not exist a se, and therefore is neither sovereign nor the Creator of the universe, and therefore, that Platonism is incompatible with biblical Christianity.

The first argument is relatively simple. It goes as follows:

1. If Platonism is true, then God's properties are not identical with one another (that is, attributes such as being omnipotent are really different from attributes like being omniscient)
2. If God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition of His various properties
3. If God is a composition of His various properties, then God is dependent on the existence of those properties for His own existence
4. If God is dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does not exist a se, is not sovereign, and requires a cause of some sort to explain why this set of properties are so composed as to constitute God.
5. But the Bible asserts that God is exists a se, that He is sovereign, and that He is dependent on nothing other than Himself (and therefore requires no explanation as to why He exists as He does)
6. Therefore, by reductio, Platonism is not true.

To defend the argument

(1) Should not require much explanation. Given what was said in the first post, it should be clear that Platonism sees properties such as being omnipotent as abstract objects. But each object is distinct from one another and therefore non-identical.
(2) simply states an obvious fact. We must affirm that God has various attributes such as omnipotence and omniscience. Since Platonism requires each of these attributes to be really existent abstract properties, then each of those properties exist in God separately. That is just to say that God is composed of that set of properties.
(3) is really the crux of the argument, but it shouldn't be too hard to see that it is true. Suppose, for instance, omniscience did not exist as a property. If it did not exist, then it could not be a property of God's, and therefore, we could not say that God is omniscient (since we would be attributing to God a non-existent property). Thus, everything we attribute to God, it turns out that God is dependent on their existence to be the way He is.
(4) is really the dividing line. Christian Platonists all agree with 1-3. They traditionally will challenge (4) by arguing that I have misdefined the terms. I argue that to exist a se is to exist in and of yourself, dependent on nothing else. But Platonism clearly violates aseity by making God dependent on His properties. The response is to redefine aseity such that aseity now refers to dependence on nothing outside of one's self. They then argue that all abstract objects exist as essential properties of God--they make them (following Augustine) "divine ideas." The next argument will take up this objection, but for now, I simply want to note that such a weakened view of aseity seems a high price to pay for holding on to Platonism, since it means that there is quite a bit that God did not create. Likewise, Platonists much challenge the definition of sovereignty, for if God is dependent on His properties, then He has no control over them. He is not free to create or destroy them. That is, He is not sovereign over them. Thus, they say that sovereignty refers to God's absolute authority over all He created, but since He did not create abstract objects, they don't count against His sovereignty. Again, I will point out that this seems like a very high price to pay for embracing Platonism. Finally, I've seen no argument accounting for God's composition. It is usually just asserted that God exists like He does necessarily, and that as a brute fact. I fail to see how that is at all persuasive, and it opens up the Christian who holds it to a powerful argument against theism generally (in brief: if we can just assert that God is metaphysically necessary as He is with no explanation for it, atheists can assert that matter is just metaphysically necessary and likewise are not required to give an explanation; to argue that matter is clearly not necessary doesn't work, because for all we know, there may be something about matter that is necessary--so the old question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' ends up with, 'Just like your god, because there just is!') Again, I find this a terribly high price to pay for maintaining Platonism.
(5) just states the obvious. The Bible declares that God is the creator of everything, both invisible and invisible, and that He therefore depends on absolutely nothing other than Himself. As such, we cannot search for a Cause for God, for then God would not have created that Cause. Any view then (i.e., Platonism) that requires a causal explanation of God or asserts that there are things that He did not create is, on my view, inconsistent with Scripture.
(6) then simply concludes that Platonism cannot be true.

The assumption here is, of course, that God really does exist a se, that He is sovereign, and that He is the First Cause. This argument would not work against a non-theistic Platonist. Nor would it work against those theists like Plantinga who have rejected those aspects of God's nature. My point is simply that it seems obvious enough to me that the Bible teaches those things about God, and therefore, Platonism runs contrary to Scripture.

Put in simplest terms:

1. Either Platonism is true or God exists as described by Scripture
2. God exists as described by Scripture
3. Therefore, Platonism is not true

I'll post the second argument in the next reply.

The second argument comes directly from Browers and Bergmann. I have linked to this before, but hereit is again for reference. As I'm going to simplify it, I'd recommend reading the full paper as time allows.

The argument here simply concludes the same way as the last one. If Platonism is true, then biblical Christianity is not. It runs as follows:

1. In order for God to create any X, He must have the property able to create X
2. Either God created the property able to create X or He did not
3. If God did not create the property able to create X, then that property exists uncreated, independently of God
4. If God did create the property able to create X, God must have the property able to create properties
5. Either God created the property able to create properties He did not
6. If God did not create the property able to create properties, then the property exists uncreated, independently of God
7. If God did create the property able to create properties, then He must have the property able to create the property able to create properties ad infinitum, which is absurd
8. Therefore, God did not create the property able to create properties
9. Therefore, the property able to create properties exists uncreated, independently of God
10. Therefore, there exists a reality apart from God that God did not create
11. But there is nothing that exists apart from God that He did not create
12. Therefore, it is not true that in order for God to create any X, He must have the property able to create X (which is to say, Platonism is false)

Now, again, Browers and Bergmann put a lot more detail in their own argument and show some more severe problems with Platonism, but this one is one of the easier to explain problems. On a Platonic view of properties, "able to create" would be a property people have--and bear in mind, that property would be a really existent property. But even without going through the formal process above, it should be obvious that such a property requires explanation. Was it created, or has it always existed? If created, then what about the property "able to create the property able to create"? Eventually, you must end up with a property that simply exists, uncreated--"able to create."

Thus, even God cannot create the property "able to create" without positing an infinite regress in God. But that means that the "properties as divine ideas" argument doesn't work, because God is not the originator of those "ideas." Rather, those ideas are essential to Him--take the "idea"/property of "able to create" away, and you no longer have God! So these "divine ideas" really turn out to be necessary constituents of God.

Again, this creates serious problems with either God as traditionally understood or with Platonism generally. If we are to assert with Scripture that God needs nothing, then we cannot assert that He needs the so-called property "able to create" (or any other property for that matter; how about the property, "does not need anything"--did God create that property?). Thus, either those properties exist in and of themselves, as per Platonism, or they do not. And if those properties do not exist at all, then Platonism is false. Thus, we have the same conclusion as before. Either biblical Christianity is true (assuming biblical Christianity teaches that God is absolutely sovereign and that God exists a se, dependent on absolutely nothing other than Himself) or Platonism is true. They cannot be reconciled as they stand in necessary contradiction to one another.

Your thoughts?

Important to understand, because most errors start in the foundation.

One thing Feser reveals in his Aquinas book is how many philosophers reject Thomist philosophy based on fautly or no understanding of foundational principles.

Is it possible for God Himself be considered a property? If God were, somehow, the uncreated property "able to create", then He wouldn't have had to create "able to create" or "able to create able to create"; and it also wouldn't be necessary to attribute any properties outside of Him to Him, as He is the property that all properties came from.

DivineRageFromSpace wrote:Is it possible for God Himself be considered a property? If God were, somehow, the uncreated property "able to create", then He wouldn't have had to create "able to create" or "able to create able to create"; and it also wouldn't be necessary to attribute any properties outside of Him to Him, as He is the property that all properties came from.

There is one scholar I know of who tried to defend that view (Mann). It was widely panned, though, by both sides of the debate for a few reasons. For one thing, it seems evident that whatever else God is, He is a person, and it's hard to think that a property is a person (or a person is a property). Second (and related), properties seem to be things that persons have. Indeed, personhood itself seems to be a property things have, and it seems to be that by that property, they are thereby persons (I'm assuming a Platonic view of personhood and properties here for the sake of having this discussion). Another serious problem seems to be that if God is a property, then He is a self-exemplifying property. I, and some others, wonder if that is even a coherent notion. This leads to a rather famous problem called Russell's Paradox. That gets much deeper than we need to go. Suffice it to say that you end up with some linguistic ideas that may be problematic.

So is it a POSSIBLE solution? Sure. Is it a widely accepted one? No, not at all. But take that for what it is worth. Truth, after all, isn't decided by vote.

Jac3510 wrote:. . . This leads to a rather famous problem called Russell's Paradox.

I did some extensive Googling on Russell's Paradox and was interested enough to invest several hours reading up on it. Glad you brought it up. C:

I've thought that, at the very least, Platonism causes some problems for some arguments for the existence of God and raises some troubling theological questions. I would hesitate to say that they are irreconcilable with the God of Scripture, but it certainly wouldn't be my first choice.

But probably the main reason I reject platonism is the so-called "Ockham's Razor", I just don't think that its necessary to appeal to some brute Platonic realm.

narnia4 wrote:I've thought that, at the very least, Platonism causes some problems for some arguments for the existence of God and raises some troubling theological questions. I would hesitate to say that they are irreconcilable with the God of Scripture, but it certainly wouldn't be my first choice.

But probably the main reason I reject platonism is the so-called "Ockham's Razor", I just don't think that its necessary to appeal to some brute Platonic realm.

The problem I have with using the razor to cut out the third realm is that, if you don't go on and do the hard work of nuancing a moderate-realism position, then you effectively just get nominalism. But if nominalism is true, then there are no such things as natures. And if there are no such thing as natures, central Christian doctrines such as "God became man" are reduced to gibberish, since there is no "human nature" for God to take on. Yet if God isn't man, then the mediation between God and man in Christ is lost, and the entire theology of salvation is torn up at the roots.

So as dangerous as Platonism is, I think we need to be just as careful not to become nominalists. That means that our arguments against the former have to be couched in such a way that they don't leave us with the latter. All that is to say, again, we need more than just Ockham to get us away from Plato (if we think Christianity is true, anyway).

Oh you still definitely have to do the dirty work, and of course there are reasons to go as far as moderate-realism and to believe in natures. But you could argue that Platonism goes further than necessary. So maybe not a "shaving off" per se, but stopping before you go beyond where the evidence leads.

I should further add, even if there were no direct reasons to support even moderate-realism, you could be justified in going that far if you can show that Christianity is true. Something like "If Christianity is true, there are such things as natures. Christianity is true. Therefore, there are natures". Not that I think that's necessary.

I have a couple of what I think is simple questions. Perhaps this clarifies my objection. I'm going to do this like a sniper and target specific premises. I would like to see a REAL response, not a "read this essay".

Jac3510 wrote:The first argument is relatively simple. It goes as follows:

1. If Platonism is true, then God's properties are not identical with one another (that is, attributes such as being omnipotent are really different from attributes like being omniscient)

There is 2 particular questions/objections I raise here.

1. On a BIBICAL BASIS, can you show me where in the bible it shows that God's properties are explicitly stated as identical to each other? If not explicit, can you show me where it is implicit? Notice that I'm talking about his properties and not his personhood. Keep that in mind.

2. On a logical basis, can you prove to me why said properties are identical?

On your view, can you define the law of non contradiction so we can clarify this?
For example, All Bachelors are unmarried. Is your understanding of Bachelor identical to your understanding of unmarried? Or is this a contradiction?
If I make the following statements
Jac is a Bachelor
Jac is married
Is your understanding of Bachelor identical to your understanding of married? Or is this a contradiction?

Lastly, perhaps we have different understandings. Is identity (who someone is) different from identical (the same idea)?

Jac3510 wrote:To defend the argument

(1) Should not require much explanation. Given what was said in the first post, it should be clear that Platonism sees properties such as being omnipotent as abstract objects. But each object is distinct from one another and therefore non-identical.

As I already stated. I disagree, you need a lot of explanation. You don't need to be a Platonist in order to believe that 1 idea is not identical to another idea. Like myself, I'm not a Platonist.
I would really like to see a biblical basis and a logical explanation on how different ideas is identical.

Jac3510 wrote:7. If God did create the property able to create properties, then He must have the property able to create the property able to create properties ad infinitum, which is absurd

Can you clarify this?

Lastly, would you accept the premise that existing in understanding is also part of reality? Do you see the possibility here? If you accept this premise, do you see that existing in understanding alone doesn't require creation in everything that is understood? Namely, would you believe that this knowledge is intuitive? I would hardly say that existing in understanding alone violates the that God is a se. Feel free to tell me why you don't think so.

1. The basis for (1) is just definitional. IF Platonism is true, then all of God's properties are really distinct from one another. You don't have to be a Platonist to accept that. Nor does accepting that make you a Platonist by definition (it would just mean that you agree with this one aspect of Platonism). You cannot, however, be a Platonist and disagree with (1).

2. As for the logical and biblical basis that God's properties are identical with one another, that's what the rest of the argument does. So the answer is:

• 2. If God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition of His various properties
  3. If God is a composition of His various properties, then God is dependent on the existence of those properties for His own existence
  4. If God is dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does not exist a se, is not sovereign, and requires a cause of some sort to explain why this set of properties are so composed as to constitute God.
  5. But the Bible asserts that God is exists a se, that He is sovereign, and that He is dependent on nothing other than Himself (and therefore requires no explanation as to why He exists as He does)
  6. Therefore, by reductio, Platonism is not true

In short, either God is composed of parts and therefore dependent on those parts for His existence, or He is not composed of parts and therefore not dependent on anything other than Himself for His existence. To reduce, either God's properties are identical to one another, and therefore He exists a se; or God's properties are distinct from one another, and therefore God is dependent on something other than Himself for His existence.

One can make biblical or philosophical arguments to decide which of those is the case. Biblically, I contend that Gen. 1:1, John 1:3, etc. teach that God created all things. That is, there is nothing God did not create, and therefore, that which is not God was created by Him. But if God is composed of parts, then those parts are not identical with God (anymore than I am my heart or my heart is me). But if God's parts are not God, then either God created His parts or He did not; but if God did not create His parts, then there are things that God did not create, which seems to violate the verses such as those I mentioned. But if God did create His parts, then God has effectively created Himself.

That last option directly comments on the last question you asked, so . . .

3. If God created His parts, then we must suppose that one of God's properties is "having the ability to create." Now, on the argument you and the Platonists make, "having the ability to create" is not identical with God's other properties (e.g., "being all-loving," "being all-knowing," etc.). But if God has the property of being able to create properties, then where did He get the property, "being able to create properties"? He must have the property, "being able to create the property, 'being able to create properties'." But where did He get that property? Again, if God created His own properties, He must have created that one as well, which presupposes a property to create that property, and that on to infinity. But that is absurd.

So either God must be identical with the property "being able to create properties," or else that property "just exists" and God did not create it and, in fact, is dependent on it for His existence. Again, then, God is not sovereign and does not exist a se, and the verses I mentioned above are apparently not true, for there are things that God did not create (namely, the property 'the ability to create properties').

So, again, the conclusion is simple:

Either God's properties are distinct from one another and therefore God is dependent on them, or God's properties are identical to one another and thus Himself and therefore He is not dependent on them. The former makes God a contingent being and the Creator over only some of reality; the latter makes God a se and Creator of all reality.

Dom, I take it you understand symbolic logic. I just post this here for your benefit, since you asked for a logical argument for the notion that God's attributes are identical to one another. Beyond what I have already provided (which I adapted from Plantinga), the following is a simplification of Leftow's article, "Is God an Abstract Object" (see pp. 582-83). If you do decide you want to read an essay and don't have access to it, let me know and I can email you a copy (I have the .pdf). Anyway, he argues as follows:

• 1. Necessarily, for any x, if x is God, x creates and maintains in existence whatever is not identical with x.
  2. There is a set S of attributes which is such that necessarily, for any x, if x is God, then for any attribute φ, if φ∈S, then φx
  3. (∃φ)(φ∈S)
  
  Therefore, propositions such as the following are false:
  4. There is an attribute which is a member of the set S and which is distinct from God. (In symbols: (∃φ)((φ∈S)&(φ≠God)))
  
  Thus:
  5. ~(∃φ)((φ∈S)&(φ≠God))
  6. (φ)~((φ∈S)&(φ≠God))
  7. (φ)~((φ∈S)⊃(φ≠God))
  8. (φ)((φ∈S)⊃(φ=God))

As I said, that's just something of an aside. The basic problem this gets at is similar to what I'm getting at above. It demonstrates that if God's attributes are distinct from one another, then you eventually have to argue that God creates a part of His own nature, which seems absurd. The technicalities are there to work through. Again, for the purposes of this board, I'll limit my comments and defenses to what I've proposed above. If you want a thorough defense of this particular aspect, let's do that via PM, or I can email you the .pdf of the paper.

edit: for those who don't do symbolic logic but want to torment themselves by working through this: first, note that φ (pronounced "fee") is not a logical symbol. It's a variable, as are "x," "S," and "God"; second, here's a Wikipedia page you should find helpful with the rest: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols

1. Ok I can accept that. That's far more fair.

2. I disagree.

Premise 2 claims that God is a composition. This is a presupposition. We only have reason to believe that God is a perfect mental substance.
Premise 3 says that God must dependent on his properties. This is only an assertion. I would defend against this by saying that God's perfect attributes are understood, they are not identical and not separate. They are NECESSARILY CONNECTED to be understood. These attributes are NOT OBJECTS, but they are real and distinct.
Premise 4 says that God is not a se and not sovereign. I don't see how this follows at all. Sovereign carries a very heavy meaning in the bible and I don't think people completely understand it. Explain what you think it is.

Lastly, can you define what a "thing" is? Provide justification for believing that God's perfect attributes are "things".

So, that you get the gist of where I am going with that.
Is a square circle a "thing"?
Is a triangle that has 8 sides a "thing"?
Is a rock that is so heavy that God cannot lift it a "thing"?
Is a dream a "thing"?

Notice that some "things" can be understood while others cannot?
how would you stack this up with the understanding of God?

I think the real hurdles here is understanding what is and isn't a "thing". I don't view God as a thing. I view him as person that architect of the mind and all reality in the res cogitans & res extensa. We are not in any position to deny what is necessary, and we are not free to assert our understandings from one idea to another is identical. In fact, I would say its complete counter to that.

That's all I got right now. Gotta get back to work.

domokunrox wrote:Premise 2 claims that God is a composition. This is a presupposition. We only have reason to believe that God is a perfect mental substance.

No it doesn't. Read it again:

• 2. If God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition of His various properties

Look, Dom. IF God's properties are not identical with one another, then God is a composition. That's definitional (on Platonism). Obviously, if God's properties ARE identical to one another, then God is not a composition (at least, not a composition of properties). But if they are NOT identical to one another, then He IS a composition of properties. He is composed of the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.

The only alternative to this is nominalism--that properties aren't real at all. If that's the case, then God isn't a composition of properties at all since there are no such thing as properties. Now, are you a nominalist? If not, then you believe that properties are real. And if properties are real, then they really exist in God. And if they really exist in God and are distinct from one another, then there are multiple really existent properties in God--which is to say, God is a composition of properties.

Premise 3 says that God must dependent on his properties. This is only an assertion. I would defend against this by saying that God's perfect attributes are understood, they are not identical and not separate. They are NECESSARILY CONNECTED to be understood. These attributes are NOT OBJECTS, but they are real and distinct.

So the property "being omniscient" is a real property in God; it is not the same as the property "being omnipotent," which is a real property in God. So you have TWO DISTINCT PROPERTIES IN GOD. If you take away the property "being omnipotent" such that it doesn't exist, then God changes. If that property doesn't exist, then God does not exemplify that property. Therefore, God is dependent on that property to exist the way He does.

That's not just an assertion. That's a necessary corollary. My eyes are blue--I exemplify the property "having blue eyes." If that property did not exist--if no one had that property--then I would be different from the way I am now. That is, the way I am now is dependent on that property. I am composed of that property and myriads of others. A Platonist is a realist, so he sees properties as really existing things. You can say Platonists are wrong in that, of course. You can then feel free to try to develop your own understanding of universals. If you aren't a Platonist and reject realism of all kinds, you are left with nominalism. So, again, are you a nominalist? I know you like Descrates. He was a nominalist. Are you following him there?

Premise 4 says that God is not a se and not sovereign. I don't see how this follows at all. Sovereign carries a very heavy meaning in the bible and I don't think people completely understand it. Explain what you think it is.

It follows easily. Here it is again:

• If God is dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does not exist a se, is not sovereign, and requires a cause of some sort to explain why this set of properties are so composed as to constitute God.

Again, notice the conditional--IF God is dependent on anything other than Himself. Is He? Well, if He is dependent on His properties, then the answer is "yes." If He is not dependent on anything other than Himself, then He does exist a se and is sovereign, and thus the premise doesn't apply. You need to watch the "ifs" and trace the flow of the argument better.

As far as sovereignty goes, it has a wide range of applications. If any one of them is violated then God is not sovereign. The particular aspect of sovereignty being violated here is His dependence on something else. I cannot claim to be sovereign over what I am dependent on.

None of this is at all controversial in the literature. Craig, Plantinga, and Moreland would agree with everything I've said so far (I get most of this from them!). Plantinga has simply suggested that we ought to reject the notion that God exists a se and that we redefine sovereignty and limit it to God's control over what He did create. Craig is in the middle of writing an entire book on the subject, so I don't know his solution yet. I'll read it when it comes out. For now, he's openly acknowledge in Philosophical Foundations that Platonism appears incompatible with God's aseity.

Lastly, can you define what a "thing" is? Provide justification for believing that God's perfect attributes are "things".

So, that you get the gist of where I am going with that.
Is a square circle a "thing"?
Is a triangle that has 8 sides a "thing"?
Is a rock that is so heavy that God cannot lift it a "thing"?
Is a dream a "thing"?

Notice that some "things" can be understood while others cannot?
how would you stack this up with the understanding of God?

I think the real hurdles here is understanding what is and isn't a "thing". I don't view God as a thing. I view him as person that architect of the mind and all reality in the res cogitans & res extensa. We are not in any position to deny what is necessary, and we are not free to assert our understandings from one idea to another is identical. In fact, I would say its complete counter to that.

A thing is a defined existent.
The first four "things" you mentioned are not "things" at all. They are non-things. What is a "thing" is the concept of a square circle. That CONCEPT is a thing. It just turns out that that concept refers to nothing in reality. A dream is a thing.

God is not a thing. He is not defined, nor is He an existent. God is Being, the technical jargon being "subsistent existence." Properties, however, are things (on realism, whether Platonic or Aristotelian), unless, of course, you are a nominalist (e.g., Ockham, Descartes).

That's why I titled this thread "Against Platonism." If you are a nominalist, then this thread has nothing to do with you. You can't read an argument against Platonism as a nominalist and then complain that the argument is using words in a way you, as a nominalist, wouldn't use it. But if you are not a nominalist, then you have to agree that properties are things (that is what non-nominalism IS). And if properties are THINGS, and God has properties, then you have THINGS in God. Moreover, if those THINGS are not identical with one another, then you have many THINGS in God, and God is dependent on those THINGS, since those THINGS make up His nature (e.g., would God be God if He didn't have the property of omniscience?).

So the real issue here is whether or not you are a nominalist. Are you?