Evidence for God from Science

Continued discussion from this thread

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Beanybag wrote:Well, there's two objections I have here. One is that two different definitions of 'knowing' seem to be being used. When I know an object, I clearly do not know everything about that object. . . . Two, our minds are at least partly physical. Knowledge/information is at least partly physical. Concepts, then, would be at least partly physical. When we think of a picture on a computer, we don't say that the picture on the computer is the object itself, we only say it's a representation. But, the picture is also still physical (somewhat) in the information that makes up this representation, because it is stored in a physical way on the computer. Now, intuitively, the picture is not the object, but it is at least somewhat accurately representing the object. Thus, while knowing Y might be impossible, we can at least know things ABOUT Y, and that is sufficient. We can also learn to approach Y through corroboration and deduction.

Receiving an object's form does not entail "know[ing] everything about that object." It just means that what you do know you know of the object itself. Second, information is not partly physical. It is completely immaterial. What information informs is physical, so when you consider information along with the medium in which it is encoded, you have a partially mental and partially physical thing. But information qua information is strictly mental. Finally, I would object to saying that you know anything about Y, but I'll address that below.

I suppose the question is, then, why does our idea X of object Y in any way accurately represent Y, and how can we even know?

I just want to highlight that this is the question, and I would suggest that unless you have X and Y both in your mind to compare them, then you cannot in principle know. All you can do is build a more detailed representation in your mind. That representation can become more and more coherent with other representations that you are in turn making more detailed. But in the end, if the thing itself is not in your mind, you cannot compare the representation with the thing itself, and therefore, you can never know that your knowledge of the representation transfers to your knowledge of the object itself. This, by the way, is also true of words and creates quite a problem in linguistics--thank you Wittgenstein. But we can address that another time. Suffice it to say that hylomorphism gets around all the problems we are talking about because we are dealing with common essences that have an immaterial aspect that is really present in the mind.

One, I find it hard to know what an object is without knowing the fundamental pieces of an object. So, objects are made up of atoms and energy, and correspond to certain laws of nature. Atoms are made up of subatomic point-particles that exhibit a dual-nature. But, what are those objects made up of? Will this question continue on ad infinitum? I can't say I know the answer, and epistemic grounding seems difficult indeed. Munchhausen's trillemma seems difficult to answer, but I tend to agree with a more coherentist approach - we assume certain concepts and break them down into simpler common unknown denominators and work from there to explain things.

You aren't allowed to talk about atoms and subatomic particles. How do you know anything about them? You are still dealing with mere representations. The fundamental pieces of objects are still a part of the material world, and since the material cannot be taken into the immaterial, you still only know an immaterial representation of those material fundamentals. All you have done is push the problem back one step.

So, I suppose the problem I'm trying to represent is - what is a hylomorph? You're saying that every fork has a 'fork' essence? I think a fork is an emergent pattern that only has meaning to an intelligent being, and this concept is an abstraction invented by us - without a being to recognize such an object and classify the pattern, it remains a combination of simpler concepts. So, a fork is a complex shape made up of various different atoms and molecules - the essence behind the fork thus breaks down into the essences of these objects. So, each atom is made up of different sub atomic particles which have plank length, and perhaps it's these that have true essences since there can be nothing smaller can there? But then, what are these subatomic particles made up of if we have string theory? So, if these essences correspond to objects, it seems they must correspond to the most simple object to me, because I see nothing 'inherent' in a fork that gives it a fork like quality unless we define such a quality in our minds first. So, the object of a 'fork' is just a projection of an idea onto an object that isn't inherently thus, making the idea subjective. So, if an essence must correspond to the most fundamental particle, what is it about essences that we know and can we ever really know them since the question of composition seems to be of infinite regression

Now, for this last paragraph, it's very possible I got the wrong idea here on essences. These are just my immediate inclinations whilst not having fully informed myself, so I apologize.

No apologies necessary. Anything that is a thing has an essence, for essence is that whereby a thing is what it is. In the case of a fork, we have an odd situation (as we do with all artifacts). Is a fork really a fork? Or is it, like you said, something else that has been so shaped that, having be so shaped, it has a particular set of properties (i.e., able to stab and hold food)? If so, we would not say that the fork itself is or has an essence so much as we would say the metal or plastic out of which it is made has an essence. So let's be a bit more specific and think about a plastic fork. Plastic has an essence--its plasticness, so to speak--and that plastic can be shaped in various ways. Plastic, as I'm sure you know, is an amazing material. It can do SO MUCH when properly shaped! When shaped one way, it can stab food; when another, it can stab a vein and carry liquid into a blood stream. So plastic is such that it has some dormant potentialities--things that plastic can do or be in virtue of being plastic. When those potentialities are actualized, those properties emerge.

So a hylomorph is an essence (which here is synonymous with a form) embodying matter. Again, plastic has an essence. But that essence is only a part of the real world when that essence is combined with matter. Matter arranged according to the essence of plastic becomes what we call plastic. And then we shape it into things like forks. When I see a fork, my mind judges that something exists and it apprehends something about what it has so judged; it apprehends that the purpose of this object to is to eat, and my mind then says, "Oh! That's a fork!" If I lived in a culture, however, that never used forks, then when I saw the fork I would have no idea what it is. Instead, my mind would say, "That's an oddly shaped piece of plastic. Oh, I know, perhaps it is used to brush hair!" I have known the essence of a thing, but I have failed to grasp what it was intended for (intended by whom, by the way?).

I think what bothers me is the dichotomy between X and Y and whether or not it's true. I know X is at least somewhat physical while Y seems entirely physical. There may be an essence Y that corresponds to the physical Y that wholly describes it, but is that really Y itself? I think back to Plato's allegory of the cave and the shadows being projected on the wall - clearly the shadows correspond to the real reality (the real reality being what creates the shadows) even if the shadows are not the things themselves. Thus, we can learn about the real reality even if our ideas don't seem to be the real reality itself.

We need to distinguish here between Plato's ideas of forms and Aristotle's. For Plato, the Forms are real, and all of reality just a shadow of that reality. Aristotle rightly I think rejected that view. Forms are real only insofar as they have existence, and whether or not forms can exist independently of matter depends on the nature of that form. So human souls can exist independently of matter because of what they are (souls); plastic cannot exist independently of matter, because matter, by definition, is a material thing.

So when you ask if the essence of a thing is the thing itself, the answer is NO. The essence of a thing is WHAT A THING IS. The FACT that it is and the WAY that it is depend on other notions (existence and matter, respectively). But knowledge does not require us to have a thing's matter in our mind; it only requires us to have its essence--it's whatness. Let me say it more plainly. Essences are not things (normally). Things have essences. When we know a thing's essence, we know a thing, because a thing's essence is what it is--so to know a thing's essence is to know what it is.

I argue, then, that if things don't have essences in themselves that can exist in our mind, then our representations of things are not actually representations of things at all (which goes back to your third point in the first paragraph quoted). They are, at best, pictures our minds build out of the sense data they receive in attempt to make sense of it all. On that view, the chasm between ideas and the things they supposedly represent is absolute and cannot be bridged. If you think it can be, it's up to you to show how the mind can look to see if the picture it has build based on the sense data it has received accurately reflects some external reality to which it has no access.

Perhaps reality is similar to so: an object emits information about itself that is not wholly descriptive, but is partially descriptive. Each time an object emits information about itself, it also changes itself, thus, information about an object is always historical - but can still be used to make valid and accurate inferences. An object emits information along different channels of which our senses are able to pick up on some. While we may never fully understand an object (indeed, quantum mechanics leads us to believe that is impossible), we can at least approach accurate broader knowledge of an object that is emergent from higher order patterns. I think the dichotomy between mental and physical is possibly too stressed.

Why an object's information is nonrandom and in any way related to the object itself? Why does information about an object correspond accurately to these objects? Because the information itself is an object of sorts and has properties of sorts. Where do we get information about information? Well, it seems we necessary are able to get the information by having, in part, physical minds that can interpret and interact with it. Perhaps this makes certain aspects of knowledge impossible and makes material knowledge (through the senses) the only possible knowledge. That leaves an explanation for qualia and intent lacking, as they have no physical explanation, then (and the consciousness at some level). I don't have a good explanation for that, but I think this ontology handles part of the objections you raised quite soundly, but not completely.

These are only my immediate inclinations, however.

Randomness or nonrandomness of information doesn't help you here. You need to be more precise about what you mean when you say "an object emits information about itself." What is information here? I can understand it as the essence of the material make up. You, denying essences, don't have that option. So you are left with nothing but sense data. You look into the sky and see light. Your mind analyzes that sense data and separates it into a picture. You look at that picture and call that picture a "star." But what makes you think you know anything about anything in the extra-mental reality? All you know is sense data. You can't even say you know any information, because you don't have any evidence that the data streams are related to any thing at all. And even if it were, there would be no way for you to know whether or not your picture was accurate, since you have in principle no access to the thing you are building a picture of.

Again, this basic point is extremely important: if both the object itself and the picture you have build of the object are not both in some way in your mind, then you cannot compare them and know whether or not the picture is accurate. If all that is in your mind is the picture that you constructed, then all you know is that picture. Since that picture is not identical to reality, then you don't know anything about reality. All you know is your own mental world. That's a problem that is known as the Cartesian Theater.

I think, my point is that: an accurate representation of an object is possible without the object being existent. We can have a picture of a horse on a computer but, upon searching the computer's memory, we will find no horse in the computer quite obviously. Even a nonphysical, immaterial essence of the horse doesn't seem necessary to construct the picture, an accurate picture, of a horse. Especially for human concepts like 'horses', 'forks, and other higher level emergent patterns that we classify as objects, I highly doubt those to have 'objective and true' essences. Rather, I think they are abstractions based on smaller ideas that break down into a most common denominator that might be objectively true. Even still, I can't be sure.

No, you don't have a picture of a horse on a computer. This is important. You have 1s and 0s in a certain order. In and of itself, that is nothing. It is only a picture of a horse when it enters the human mind. I mean, think about that. Suppose tomorrow that every living thing in the world ceased to exist with not potentiality of ever coming back. Would those 1s and 0s still be a picture of a horse? Would a painting of a horse still be a picture of a horse? No, it would not. It would just be 1s and 0s or splotches of paint. It becomes a picture once interpreted by the intellect, and the intellect sees it and draws from its own memory its knowledge of essences and says, "Oh! Horse!"

Now there are those (Platonists) who would argue that the picture would still be a picture of a horse, but that is because they believe abstract objects really exist whether or not they are informing any matter. But that's a step further than even I'm going, and it's not open to you. You are espousing nominalism; Platonists espouse realism; I espouse moderate-realism. Let's illustrate that problem:

Take the word "horse." Let's say that there is an essence called "horseness" as I say there is, and that essence really exists in horses--in fact, it is what makes them horses. Now, the word "horse" refers to horses primarily because the word corresponds to that reality. That is, the essence horseness REALLY exists; thus, we have realism. But there's a problem here. Suppose you are looking at two horses: Ed and Silver. You say "Ed is a horse" and you say "Silver is a horse." But how can that be? If the essence of horseness exists entirely in Ed, then Ed is certainly a horse, but then what is Silver? Since horseness exists entirely in Ed, there is nothing left to exist in Silver. But if horseness exists partly in Ed and partly in Silver, then Ed and Silver are only partly horses (since essences are what make a thing what it is!). So, clearly, "horse" cannot refer to an essence horseness in Ed or Silver. That is to say, realism is false.

But now we have a new problem. You still say "Ed is a horse." since "horse" does not refer to Ed's horseness, to what does it refer? Horseness is not a real thing. There is no such thing as essences. Well that which is not something is nothing, and so the word "horse" refers to . . . NOTHING. All it is, is a mental construct--a representation that actually re-presents nothing, for there is nothing to present to the mind. What is being presented is a picture that the mind authored. The word "horse" refers to nothing in reality. It only refers to your own internal concepts--your own pictures. And thus with ALL words. So on nominalism (this view), there is no such thing as knowledge about the external world, since ALL words refer to our own concepts. We can't even TALK about the extra-mental world, for even the phrase "extra-mental world" refers to no essence.

But that is obviously false, for you and I both agree that knowledge of the extra-mental world is possible. So we are left with moderate realism, the view I have been defending here. Essences exist in things (not in themselves). When I see a thing, my mind apprehends its essence, which is what I know. Words refer to the essence and therefore have external, objective meaning, but essences can likewise exist in multiple things because essences do not exist in and of themselves apart from those things.

Again, I'm not sure I admit to its existence because I would want a 'form' to correspond to the least common denominator of an object, and I'm not sure that LCD exists. It would seem to not be justifiable based on Munchhausen's trilemma, currently, and requires more knowledge for us to do so. Further, I think thoughts are, in part, physical.

So, I don't think 1) follows as concretely as you think. I'm still content to allow 2) be assumed true without justification until such time we can provide it. It might not be providable from our mind since our minds seem bound by some laws (including deterministic laws), and since our thoughts are somewhat physical and related to information theory, we are not capable of deciding an computationally undecidable problem (bringing my computer science degree into this, lol) since our thoughts and knowledge about the universe seem bound by physical, deterministic constraints and incapable of nondeterministic computing.

Again, apologies if my thoughts are somewhat ignorant, I still haven't had time to read your recommended book, but I promise it's on the to-do list.

Again, thoughts are not physical. Nor are concepts. Nor is information. In the human mind, thoughts are related to our bodies and we have them by producing certain physical effects. That's what the soul does--as an essence, one of its properties is to do things like think, and it uses physical means to do so. But the thought itself is not physical.

NOW

This has been very long, but it seems to me the basic disagreement between the two of us is your contention that thoughts and concepts are in some sense physical. You think you can bridge the gap here by having a partly physical, partly immaterial thing. I don't think that works for the reasons I've laid out above. But finally, I would point out that even if you are right (and again I would deny that), all you have done is move the form/matter distinction back a step. What is the immaterial part of thoughts and what is their material counterparts? Whatever you call it, you are just talking about forms and matter under a different name. So you can respond to the above if you like . . . I mostly responded to all of the above to explain some of the concepts to you. But it seems to me our discussion needs to focus on the nature of thought and concept.

Your move.

This has been very long, but it seems to me the basic disagreement between the two of us is your contention that thoughts and concepts are in some sense physical. You think you can bridge the gap here by having a partly physical, partly immaterial thing. I don't think that works for the reasons I've laid out above. But finally, I would point out that even if you are right (and again I would deny that), all you have done is move the form/matter distinction back a step. What is the immaterial part of thoughts and what is their material counterparts? Whatever you call it, you are just talking about forms and matter under a different name. So you can respond to the above if you like . . . I mostly responded to all of the above to explain some of the concepts to you. But it seems to me our discussion needs to focus on the nature of thought and concept.

Your move.

Well, I'll put it like this. I would be inclined to say that all our knowledge and thoughts are physical if it weren't for qualia and intent. Various qualia associated with an object seem to corroborate accurately with the physical details they are often paired with, which presents the obvious knowledge problem for physicalism, but that was my initial intuition into things. As for some back ground, I have my undergrad degree in computer science, and I most heavily researched mathematics before turning to philosophy. I initially got into it because I was interested in artificial intelligence and I wanted to know if and how we go about creating a sentient being. I had to then understand sentience, though, which is not a task I have come close to doing. But, assuming artificial intelligence can ever be sentient is to assume that humans are, at least somewhat, a computer. We resemble a computer in a lot of ways but some people say we are most definitely not a computer and bring up issues of free will, qualia, and intent - how could a computer ever come to have such qualities? I can't say I know the answer.

I think the problem is that I feel thoughts are entirely physical minus qualia and intent (and I think intent are actually a subset of qualia). So I would be lead to dismiss qualia as a simple strange non-physical by product to be explained later, except that qualia themselves can convey physical information, and thus constitute knowledge! I am still not sure what and how qualia will be resolved and what they ultimately are. Forms are definitely a possibility, but I'll try and lay out better objections of them.

Jac3510 wrote:

Beanybag wrote:Well, there's two objections I have here. One is that two different definitions of 'knowing' seem to be being used. When I know an object, I clearly do not know everything about that object. . . . Two, our minds are at least partly physical. Knowledge/information is at least partly physical. Concepts, then, would be at least partly physical. When we think of a picture on a computer, we don't say that the picture on the computer is the object itself, we only say it's a representation. But, the picture is also still physical (somewhat) in the information that makes up this representation, because it is stored in a physical way on the computer. Now, intuitively, the picture is not the object, but it is at least somewhat accurately representing the object. Thus, while knowing Y might be impossible, we can at least know things ABOUT Y, and that is sufficient. We can also learn to approach Y through corroboration and deduction.

Receiving an object's form does not entail "know[ing] everything about that object." It just means that what you do know you know of the object itself. Second, information is not partly physical. It is completely immaterial. What information informs is physical, so when you consider information along with the medium in which it is encoded, you have a partially mental and partially physical thing. But information qua information is strictly mental. Finally, I would object to saying that you know anything about Y, but I'll address that below.

One of the interesting things, though, is that information is always relayed to the mind through physical means. And much information can be almost entirely physical. Information stored in a computer, for instance, is physical and on a disc. But, I suppose what you argue, for that information to have meaning, some sort of form-like process is necessary to know it?

One, I find it hard to know what an object is without knowing the fundamental pieces of an object. So, objects are made up of atoms and energy, and correspond to certain laws of nature. Atoms are made up of subatomic point-particles that exhibit a dual-nature. But, what are those objects made up of? Will this question continue on ad infinitum? I can't say I know the answer, and epistemic grounding seems difficult indeed. Munchhausen's trillemma seems difficult to answer, but I tend to agree with a more coherentist approach - we assume certain concepts and break them down into simpler common unknown denominators and work from there to explain things.

You aren't allowed to talk about atoms and subatomic particles. How do you know anything about them? You are still dealing with mere representations. The fundamental pieces of objects are still a part of the material world, and since the material cannot be taken into the immaterial, you still only know an immaterial representation of those material fundamentals. All you have done is push the problem back one step.

Why not? What makes plastic plastic is evidently caused by the traits that make up its chemical composition. Thus, the 'essence' of plastic reveals itself to be in fact the essence of the chemical components of plastic. And those of their components. And so on. I don't think it's necessary to have an essence for each upper level abstraction that humans make, either. Just because someone might say that 'plastic is malleable' doesn't really have to mean that plastic's malleability is an essence of plastic - that idea can be derived from lower level 'essences'. Further, that plastic is malleable really only has meaning to an intelligent being, and it seems only an intelligent being could make such a judgment. Malleable? With respect to what? Certainly not to any liquids or plasmas. Even many solids are more malleable than plastic.

Concepts are so fuzzy, subjective, and abstract, it seems strange to say that each concept corresponds to an essence. That posits a seemingly infinite amount of essences. Makes much more sense to posit an essence for each LCD component, that would limit the amount of essences greatly. The combination of these essences would then lead to 'new' essences, in a sense.

I argue, then, that if things don't have essences in themselves that can exist in our mind, then our representations of things are not actually representations of things at all (which goes back to your third point in the first paragraph quoted). They are, at best, pictures our minds build out of the sense data they receive in attempt to make sense of it all. On that view, the chasm between ideas and the things they supposedly represent is absolute and cannot be bridged. If you think it can be, it's up to you to show how the mind can look to see if the picture it has build based on the sense data it has received accurately reflects some external reality to which it has no access.

However, what if the representations in our minds, let's call them models, can make accurate representations about the things we observe? I'm alluding to a model-dependent reality. It would mean that we don't REALLY get to have knowledge about the extramental world, but at the same time, we do. Reality will appear to correspond to our given models - thus science becomes an avenue through which we can gain a form of extra mental knowledge. Not sure if this one holds.

Randomness or nonrandomness of information doesn't help you here. You need to be more precise about what you mean when you say "an object emits information about itself." What is information here? I can understand it as the essence of the material make up. You, denying essences, don't have that option. So you are left with nothing but sense data. You look into the sky and see light. Your mind analyzes that sense data and separates it into a picture. You look at that picture and call that picture a "star." But what makes you think you know anything about anything in the extra-mental reality? All you know is sense data. You can't even say you know any information, because you don't have any evidence that the data streams are related to any thing at all. And even if it were, there would be no way for you to know whether or not your picture was accurate, since you have in principle no access to the thing you are building a picture of.

When we look at a star, the light from that star enters our eyes and 'pushes buttons' or light censors in our eyes. There is a physical interaction going on when we sense things. This light then turns into electrical information which is handed off to our brain, which is still physical. Our brain, through processes similar to a neural computer network, processes that information, pattern matches, searches our memory for similar patterns, etc. And this is all done subconsciously before we even realize what we're looking at. Most of our sense of vision is actually a lot of high level computation of our brain subconsciously churning this data and processing it. Our 'mental' information is stored in a physical way. Take this example of a google neural network that learned to identify cats. The information, the 'essence', that makes up the cat, in this case, is entirely physical! We can look at the patterns on the neural network and it will describe what this network has learned to be a as a cat. Now, clearly there is more information missing about what a cat is, qualia associated with a cat, etc. I don't have an explanation for qualia, but when we are able to recognize that cat, it seems that information and processing of the information is entirely physical. I can't account for the nonphysical part, which is why I put 'in part' physical. The other thing is, I'm not entirely convinced what information is actually held in qualia - certainly nothing physical, though. So, if essences are required at all, it should only be for the non-physical information about an object (which is not the idea of the object, or any information about the object). Now, while qualia correspond accurately to the physical information they are associated with, it's also a mystery to me as to why they do so. Any given quale could be arbitrary and non-uniform, but they aren't.

Now, I do make a distinction between knowledge and information. Knowledge is any true belief we have, so a belief that accurately corresponds to reality. Information is a subset of knowledge, a term I borrow from information theory - it is, as far as I know, always physical and operates within deterministic processes in the Universe.

I should also point out that our mind existing as a computer has assumed determinism up to a point. The reason is is that I don't know what part of our mind is non-physical and I don't know how that part operates - hopefully neuroscience helps us elucidate this area somehow, but until then, I only have speculation. I don't think free will is precluded in this scenario, the non-physical mind should still be capable of free will somehow. I don't think a soul is precluded either, I only don't know where and how much it comes in and how it interacts with the brain.

So on nominalism (this view), there is no such thing as knowledge about the external world, since ALL words refer to our own concepts. We can't even TALK about the extra-mental world, for even the phrase "extra-mental world" refers to no essence.

All words may refer to our own concepts (which I actually agree with - many a problem is caused by differing conceptual definitions), but our concepts refer to an external world. We can demonstrate this through corroboration and accurate predictions, I think. It actually feels slightly correct that I will only ever have a 'picture' of an object in my head, never the full knowledge of that object. Why then must that picture corroborate with reality and how can we know? Through scientific prediction.

Again, I'm not sure I admit to its existence because I would want a 'form' to correspond to the least common denominator of an object, and I'm not sure that LCD exists. It would seem to not be justifiable based on Munchhausen's trilemma, currently, and requires more knowledge for us to do so. Further, I think thoughts are, in part, physical.

So, I don't think 1) follows as concretely as you think. I'm still content to allow 2) be assumed true without justification until such time we can provide it. It might not be providable from our mind since our minds seem bound by some laws (including deterministic laws), and since our thoughts are somewhat physical and related to information theory, we are not capable of deciding an computationally undecidable problem (bringing my computer science degree into this, lol) since our thoughts and knowledge about the universe seem bound by physical, deterministic constraints and incapable of nondeterministic computing.

BB, are you familiar with Searle's Chinese Room?

Jac3510 wrote:BB, are you familiar with Searle's Chinese Room?

Yes, but I didn't find it particularly persuasive because the premise felt like an argument ex nihilo. It was more of just an idea to me. It would be interesting, actually, if a hive mind emerged as the product of other minds/processes. I do acknowledge, as I think I showed, there is a possibility that a computer alone cannot be conscious.

Beanybag wrote:Yes, but I didn't find it particularly persuasive because the premise felt like an argument ex nihilo. It was more of just an idea to me. It would be interesting, actually, if a hive mind emerged as the product of other minds/processes. I do acknowledge, as I think I showed, there is a possibility that a computer alone cannot be conscious.

That's why I asked - your admitting that a computer alone cannot be conscious. You referred rightly I think to intentionality and the qualitative aspect of our experience as meaning there is something more than just computation going on. The other reason I ask, though, is because whether or not you find his argument persuasive, you do have to recognize, I think, that the imitation of intelligence/consciousness is not identical with intelligence/consciousness.

All of that has a very direct bearing on our discussion. Essentialism/hylomorphism can easily account for the mind. I don't think people who argue that the mind is an emergent property are necessarily that far off, but that's only because I think strictly physical things in reality itself have essences. Since essences are immaterial, they can be so arranged that consciousness emerges upon a certain configuration. But how do you account for an immaterial reality without appealing to essences?

Anyway, on to some specifics in your post:

One of the interesting things, though, is that information is always relayed to the mind through physical means. And much information can be almost entirely physical. Information stored in a computer, for instance, is physical and on a disc. But, I suppose what you argue, for that information to have meaning, some sort of form-like process is necessary to know it?

I would distinguish, as you implicitly recognize here, between information itself and the medium through which it is conveyed. I agree that it is always conveyed to us through a physical means. But that's because we're physical. How else in principle would we receive information?

But the fact that information is conveyed via a medium proves that information is not identical to the medium. The medium itself is physical--the encoding of that medium is immaterial (which easily comports with how our immaterial minds can know it). In light of that, you are right that I would argue that some form-like process is necessary to know information. I would further argue that if there are no form-like processes, then there is no such thing as information. There would only be physical things in this or that configuration, where "this or that" refers to nothing! Those configurations would not be anything (unless you presuppose, as I do, that they are configured according to something real in them that makes them what they are, but now we are right back to talking about forms again).

Why not?

Because the "chemical components of plastic" are themselves physical and are not directly present in your mind (unless you appeal to their essence). You can only say that you know something about any physical thing--atoms, chemical compounds, plastics, etc.--if you have more than a representation of that thing in your mind, that is, unless you have the thing itself in your mind. But since physical things can't be in the thought, then if the thing itself is in the thought, then the thing itself must be in your mind via its immaterial form.

I mean, think about thought itself. You already said you acknowledge the reality of intentionality. Thoughts are about things. When you think about a chemical compound, the physical compound itself is not what your thought is directed towards. It is, as you agreed later, directed towards your concept of the compound. But that concept is not identical with the compound either. That concept is a concept of the compound. But if the compound itself is not in the mind, then the concept is really only a concept of a concept, and that of a concept, etc., ad infinitum. But that is absurd. So if you want to talk about the extra-mental world, then you have to have the form itself in your mind, and that form itself is what the concept is about (which is what Aristotelian/Thomists call the "formal word"). Anything less and you don't have the thing itself in your mind, in which case you just have concepts of concepts of concepts, etc.

So what, for you, is a concept a concept of?

Not sure if this one holds.

Sure it does as far as it goes. Science makes models of what it observes. But that's not the question. You have to explain how it is that science observes reality and just our representations of reality. You ask if our representations are accurate. Fine. But what are they representations OF? Physical reality? But what does that even mean? The term "extra mental reality" itself is just a concept . . . a concept of what? If the extra mental reality can't get in your mind immaterially, then "extra mental reality" is itself just a mental concept. So science is only making models of our ideas.

Now, I do make a distinction between knowledge and information. Knowledge is any true belief we have, so a belief that accurately corresponds to reality. Information is a subset of knowledge, a term I borrow from information theory - it is, as far as I know, always physical and operates within deterministic processes in the Universe.

I think Gettier showed that definition of knowledge is faulty--and I assume you just accidentally left out the "justified" in the "justified true belief" concept of knowledge. And before Gettier did, Socrates did.

Anyway, I go back to the distinction I made earlier. Information is not physical. The medium that carries the information is physical. I mean, what makes this string of text informational and the string "askofhasdgnawsogahwogin" not? Physically, both are the same. Something is "shaping" the material medium, but the thing that shapes the matter cannot itself be material (for then what shaped that matter, etc.?). Knowledge is best understood as the processing of the informational form of matter by the mind.

All words may refer to our own concepts (which I actually agree with - many a problem is caused by differing conceptual definitions), but our concepts refer to an external world. We can demonstrate this through corroboration and accurate predictions, I think. It actually feels slightly correct that I will only ever have a 'picture' of an object in my head, never the full knowledge of that object. Why then must that picture corroborate with reality and how can we know? Through scientific prediction.

But you aren't explaining how our mind can make such predictions. You say that "concepts refer to an external world," but you don't even say what that means. What about the word "external world"? I know that you want to make concepts refer to the material world, but you have to explain how that is possible in principle. Your mind constructs a concept based on sense data it gets from the eyes, ears, nose, etc. If the thing itself that caused those sensations is not in the mind, then talking about concepts referring to the external world is just meaningless. AGAIN, what are concepts concepts of?

Interesting. So it seems that either thoughts must be entirely physical or some sort of immaterial forms exist. I can't say I know which is true, however.

Beanybag wrote:Interesting. So it seems that either thoughts must be entirely physical or some sort of immaterial forms exist. I can't say I know which is true, however.

Just wanted to confirm that I think this is true, and that this is the dichotomy I having been arguing for. The problem, I think, with the former is that it means that knowledge (like consciousness) is just an illusion. We end up having to view humans as just complicated computers. It also seems to entail absolute determinism.

None of that makes the former view incorrect, of course, but it certainly doesn't jive with our basic intuitions. Since I think that knowledge and consciousness are real, since I think that thoughts have intentionality and a qualitative aspect, I think it's far more justified to adopt the second view. And since there is nothing illogical about immaterial forms, but in fact they make very good sense out of modern science, I thin not only am I warranted in accepting their existence, I think a denial of their existence requires a meeting a rather heavy burden of proof in its own right.