Byblos wrote:Wha?
I honestly have no clue how you could possibly come to that conclusion but I'd like you to back that up if you would (in a different thread of course).
We can do it here. Its not off topic or derailing this thread.
Just want say that we're talking strictly about Mathematics here. Not any thing else like redness, browness, etc. Not doing this on purpose, if you want to talk about these other universals we can do that later.
There are only few views on Mathematics in regards to what it is in reality
Platonism (which I am sure we all mostly agree is wrong)
Which says that Math is non-spatial, non-temporal, non-physical, and non-mental (whatever they mean by that).
Immanent realism (Also known as moderate realism)
Which agrees with Platonism except for the non-physical part. They believe mathematics really does exist physically (Jac says he holds this position, and he advocates divine simplicity)
I have to come under the impression that this view believes that universals are instantiated. Universals exist within each "thing" on which each universal is predicated. I'm fairly sure that Aquinas has this view or very similar to this view, and it made its way to the Divine simplicity doctrine.
It should look pretty obvious that this view is pretty much saying that Mathematics is physics. Not metaphysics. If someone wants to argue against this point. I welcome it.
Conceptualism
Which says that numbers do exist, but they do not exist "independently of us" (whatever that means)
Nominalism (which is also sometimes called "anti realism")
Which essentially says that mathematics does not exist at all.
Now, there are many types of nominalism and some people could argue that immanent realism is a type of nominalism (I concur. Its fictionalism, just more simplified or contrived). How? Simple, this "physicalism" is just mistaken for what it really is....
Pure Ontology. Also, we have plenty of reasons to believe that our senses are dubitable in regards to Mathematics. This, combined with some pretty obvious syllogistic errors pretty much leads us to the fact that Mathematics does not exist physically, but instead we have switched to fictional reasonings (which by the way isn't wrong in that "sense"). In fact, I feel that when we do switch over to fictional talk, we need to recognize that it is fictional talk. If its insisted that we're not talking about fictions, then theres a monism/pluralism problem with universals (I won't get into this, its really messy). Overall, what I'm trying to say is that scholastic theories aren't simple enough and run into bad problems when compared to modern thought (minus Kant, of course).
Now, I don't consider myself a Nominalst because I don't concede any point to Platonism. I consider myself a Foundationalist, with rational realism (not anti-realism).
How would something that is non-spatial, non-temporal, non-physical, and non-mental
inform us of their presence? Sounds impossible because it actually is.
Now, you might be thinking that I take Descartes' modern Conceptualist view since we agree on Foundationism, but I think we differ a tad bit differently, but thats another subject
I guess what I would like to know is if theres anyone who holds a divine simplicity position and says they are a Nominalst (any kind Nominalst)? We can have a Math dialogue that would probably clarify my thoughts.
If not, who holds the position of divine simplicity/immanent realism? We can have a Math dialogue that would....well....something hopefully (I tried to have this dialogue with Jac, but he didn't seem very interested and it sounded like he was conceding Fictionalism).
I want to point this out again, so that nobody mistakes me here. Here is my quote
domokunrox wrote:the alleged truths and existence of mathematics only is true and exists in understanding SOLELY AND ONLY BECAUSE OF God's existence.