lexy wrote:I'm confused by the saying "God transcends time" . To me it seems time is change ( thoughts, actions , and any other form of change ) So transcending time doesn't make any sense as you would need to change in some way to create the universe ,because To be timeless ( due to transcending time not making sense )would mean to be forever timeless if there is no form of change to cause you to change yourself. With this in mind wouldn't god creating the universe mean god exists within time? This would restrict god with the question of "where did it come from" due to it also being a timed being with a required beginning to initiate change. So what i'm trying to ask is, am i missing something? is it just that i'm not taking something into account that lead me to deduce this as impossible? I always hear this from many adults who have faith in god and i just ponder in my head how they could think this to be true. I'm not stating no god exists, nor that one does, i simply think this idea of transcending time should be either explained in detail or not spoken of at all .
So K has given you the modern evangelical answer to your question. Allow me to present the other view.
First, while A and B Theories are both conceptions of time, they are not the only ones. The classical view is actually precisely what you have suggested, namely, that time
is change. A-Theory (which K's answer necessarily presupposes) requires that we think of time as a real thing in and of itself. It is a Platonic conception that views time as a collection of "containers" of various lengths
in which things happen. B-theory, on the other hand, just argues that there is really no such thing as time at all, that everything is static, and that all change is a matter of perception. I think both views are wrong. I agree with you that time is change and nothing else. Were there is no change there is no time.
So the question is how a "timeless" being can do something "in time." Understanding "time" the way I've suggested, what we really mean is we need to know how a changeless being can produce a change in something else. First, let me just say that so stated, that isn't nearly as hard to imagine. Imagine a car accident in which a car smashes headlong into a brick wall (or if you prefer something less violent, a wave crashing into a cliff). The car/wave certainly changes
a lot at impact, doesn't it? It changes in response to the brick wall/cliff. And yet the brick wall/cliff experience no change at all (let's let slide for the sake of an imperfect illustration underlying physics here. Again, this is only an illustration). So we can say that the wall/cliff produced a change in the car/wave without itself being changed. (FYI, the classical illustration is actually a potters hand molding clay; the hand doesn't move--it holds its shape. The clay changes in response to the unchanging hand.)
Now if that makes any sense, let me go just a bit further. Descartes realy screwed us up here, because he gave us Hume, and the whole modern idea of God's temporality is based on the Cartesian/Humean notion of causality. See, for Hume, change happens when
e1 brings about
e2. So in our example above, the first event is the impact (of the car/wave against the wall/cliff), and the second event is the crumpling of the car/dispersion of the wave. Now on this view,
where is the causality? It turns out to be an unanswerable question, because there is nothing actually common between the events. What, after all, is between
e1 and
e2? This is why Hume argued that all causality is merely psychological, and that if it really exists, we can't know it. It is also why Kant, following Hume, rejected all causal arguments for God's existence, since psychological reality cannot be applied to the external reality (the way Descartes got around that was by appealing to God's existence; but, of course, that makes arguments for His existence based on causality circular). The second problem is,
when did the change happen? It turns out that we are forced on this view to assume either a Platonic view of time (as K does with his A-theory above) or else deny that time and change exist all the way around (which B-theory and Hume did).
I raise that because there are only two ways to conceive causality. The first is the way we just mentioned--the Cartesian/Humean notion in which events bring about other events within this Platonic container called "time"--or the classical position you implicitly assumed. The classical view is that
things change, that
things cause change (not events). On this view, change is not
e1->
e2, but rather
Sa1->
Sa2 (where S="substance," and a="accident"). That is, the car had the property
being well shaped before the collision. Because of the car's interaction with the way the wall actually is, the car lost the property
being well shaped (
Sa1) and acquired the property
being crumpled (
Sa2).
Now, on this view, I ask the same questions. First,
where is the causality? It is in the car/wave, not the wall. That is clear in that it is the car that changed, not the wall. So we see the classical axiom, "Change is always in the effect, never the cause." Second,
when did this change occur? The answer is that the change precisely
is the loss of one property and the gaining of the other. We do not need to presume a "container" called "time"
in which the change happend. The change itself is what time is.
As it happens, by the way, this classical view of time is precisely what we see in modern science, but that's another matter entirely.
So with all that said, the answer to your question should be easy enough to answer.
God is changeless (absolutely immutable). He simply is what He is. When He brought into existence the creation, there was no change in Him, because remember, change is always in the effect, not the cause. What changed? The creation. It "changed" insofar as it came into existence (I'm leaving aside here more technical discussions on the difference in generation vs. substantial change). God does not aquire a new property,
having now created the universe. The universe
has the property, "having been created by God." You cannot say that the universe aquired some new property at creation (
it exists where before it had the property
it does not exist) because prior to creation there was no creation to have any properties at all. So we say that creation is "really related to God"--it has the relationship to Him that the effect (that which is changed) has to a cause (that which causes the change). We say further, however, that "God is not really related to the universe." Put differently, God's relation to the universe is not real but one of reason, which is a distinction well understood by philosophers. The "changes" in God as result of His relation of reason to creation are called by philosophers "cambridge changes" are are widely recognized, even by evangelicals who hold the views K espouses, as not really being changes at all. For instance, I suspect that prior to reading this, you did not know that Aquinas taught everything I am saying here. Having gained this knowledge, would you say that Aquinas changed? After all, he gained the property
lexy is aware of my teaching, a property he did not have before! But it's obvious that Aquinas hasn't changed at all. On that level, your relation to him in one of reason, and the change is one of reason, not of reality. (As another aside, this is a good reason why we need to get away from the Platonic notion of "properties" all the way around and get back to proper language of accidents and substances).
So bottom line:
In creation,
it changed, not God. Since God did not change, He is not temporal. God transcends time.