AttentionKMartShoppers wrote:We went over relative ethics in class, and it was pretty obvious that even Christians are relative in their ethics sometimes-which is wrong, because ethics is based on God's nature, and it never changes from situation to situation.
This is a misrepresentation of true moral relativism. Relativism doesn't only mean moral actions change under certain circumstances or conditions. It also takes into account differences of moral
values being relative to persons or groups.
A better example of showing varying moral choices under certain circumstances would perhaps be is it wrong for someone to steal for no reason? Yes. Is it wrong for someone who would otherwise die of starvation to steal food? What we have in the latter example is a more complex scenario which creates a moral dilemma. Just because people may concede it is better for a person to steal than die, does not mean stealing is now alright. Is it good to steal? No. Is it good for someone to unnecessarily die? No. This is a moral dilemma. Yet, I'd say within such a scenario, it is better for someone to steal rather than die which is more serious. Anyone who can't see this, likely places the moral value of trustworthiness over and above fairness or human worth. Yet, the moral values underpinning this issue are still realised by all.
Now for something to be truely relative, moral "values" (not just moral "laws") have to be subjective to persons or groups. If it is truely alright for one person to be dishonest, but not for another person under the same circumstance, then we have moral relativism. Some people often try to point to differences in morality by pointing to people who commit moral wrongs. "See," the relativist will say, "you consider killing wrong, but that person doesn't because he has killed." Yet, this does not prove moral relativism, for people can commit actions they know to be wrong. For example, Richard Wurmbrand, who was tortured for his faith recalls his the words of his torturers from within a communist prison:
- The communist torturers often said, 'There is no God, no Hereafter, no punishment for evil. We can do what we wish.' I have heard one torturer even say, 'I thank God, in whom I don't believe, that I have lived to this hour when I can express all the evil in my heart.' He expressed it in unbelievable brutality and torture inflicted on prisoners.
What is significant about this scenario, is that the torturers' consciences revealed that they knew what they were doing was morally wrong. Therefore, just because some people might act out on what is wrong, does not mean such a wrong action is morally right for them.
Other scenarios often raised by moral relativists are varying cultural practices and diverging opinions on moral issues within society, or across societies. Doesn't this show moral relativism is true? Well, allow me provide some examples of differences in other cultures/societies who have different customs and seem to differ regarding basic moral values.
<ul><li>Strangling ones parents when they old was practiced by tribes in the 17th century at Hudon Bay. It seemed completely "moral" to them as Tom Beauchamp describes: "Members of these tribes practiced a custom of killing their parents when they had become old and incapable of supporting themselves by their labor. Elderly parents were strangled by their children, who, natives believed, had an obligation to perform this ritual act.... Should a tribe member suffer the misfortune of having no children to perform this duty, the custom was to request the service from friends.... A refusal was viewed as a humiliation for the person making the request; dying for the sake of the group was a point of honor in these tribes."</li>
<li>In India before the British were there, Hindu widows practiced suttee. In this practice they threw themselves alive on the funeral pyre of their dead husbands.</li>
<li>Then there are differences of opinions on abortion, euthanasia. Is such practices really wrong?</li></ul>It seems to appear that the moral values here are very different, however a closer look reveals another picture. As Gregory Koukl points out:
"Apparent moral differences often represent differences only in perception of the facts of a circumstance and not a conflict in the values themselves.
Facts are descriptive, answering the question, What is the case? A fetus is or isn't human. Euthanasia is or isn't an example of murder. Values, on the other hand, are prescriptive, answering the question, "What ought to be the case? One ought not murder. Life ought to be more important than choice.
Unjusified killing of human beings (murder) has been wrong in every culture at every time in history; what has changed is the concept of justification. Hitler justified killing Jews because he considered them subhuman. In the Hudson Bay tribes, children strangled their own parents as an act of kindness instead of letting them live to what they saw as an unproductive old age. "Dying for the sake of the group was a point of honor in these tribes." The underlying moral rule that it is noble to die for the welfare of many is one all cultures share. Indeed, that's what soldiers do." (Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-air).
So the apparent moral differences are not because of conflicting moral values, but because of facts pertaining to the common values everyone shares. C.S. Lewis writes in "Mere Christianity" that, "
If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks, and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own."
Thus, one has their work cut out for them if they wish to prove relativism correct. The way we live life thinking some things really are wrong such as unfairness, hatred, irresponsibility, dishonesty, while other things such as love, respect, fairness and trustworthiness are right, seems to point to a consistency that would be found in objective moral values. Despite whether or not someone (or everyone) thinks torturing and raping an innocent little girl is morally good, such an act is still morally wrong. If there is even one thing you believe is wrong for everyone, then you embrace objective moral values (moral values that exist regardless of anyone). The next question that needs answering is, "what is the nature of the existence of moral values if they exist apart from us?"
Kurieuo.